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Abstract 
For many years Britain was the most important maritime nation on Earth. Of its many 
significant ports Liverpool, with its world-wide connections, was among the most important. 
One significant element in Liverpool's maritime success were those persons who invested 
in tonnage at the port - the Liverpool shipowners. 
Although such did not guarantee success in any endeavour, it seems that most of the 
more prosperous Liverpool shipowners had something of a "leg up," or a comparative 
advantage, that fostered their commercial success. Most Liverpool shipowners came from 
the local area, where they also registered their tonnage, and were likely to buy their vessels 
in the local (or at least a regional) market. Barring this, tonnage purchases were often made 
based on commercial linkages, like the timber trade between Liverpool and British North 
America. In terms of the investors themselves, most would have had some form of seaward 
connections through careers such as mariners, or merchants. William Wheelwright, for 
example, grew up in a thriving port, the son of merchant shipowners. From an early age 
Wheelwright went to sea, eventually founding South America's first Pacific steamship 
service - a venture intimately connected with Liverpool which had long-standing links to 
South America. 
Of perhaps coequal importance to comparative advantage in shipowning was the 
ability to adapt to changing conditions. This was especially important in the nineteenth 
century, which witnessed the most profound commercial, social and technological shifts 
then seen. Certain firms like Wheelwright's Pacific Steam Navigation Company (PSNC) 
ll 
were on the very cusp of change and could be considered innovators from the start. Other 
shipowners, like Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank, timed adaptations much more conservatively, 
but were nonetheless equally adept at sensing and responding to a need for change, based 
on the requirements of their chosen trades. 
Neither the possession of comparative advantage, nor an ability to adapt with the 
times (even when such were allied to formidable business intellects), could guarantee a 
shipowners' success. However, the track record of Liverpool-based firms such as 
Brocklebanks and PSNC will demonstrate that they were at the very least powerful building 
blocks for the prosecution of seaward enterprise. 
iii 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis will profile the careers ofLiverpool-based shipowners between 1820 and 1914. 
It is hoped that this study will add to our understanding of the business of shipowning as it 
was practised at Liverpool over the period 1820-1914 and in this way contribute to the larger 
field of maritime business history. 1 The intention is, first, to present a statistical overview 
of the "typical" types of owners, along with the primary type of capital in which they 
invested and second, to take a case study approach by examining the histories and business 
strategies of two specific companies. A major aim of the first element is to uncover the 
capital composition of the Liverpool-registered fleet, at least in terms of newly-registered 
vessels, over this period. Among the themes explored are the adoption of new technologies, 
such as steam propulsion, and the tendency to invest in larger vessels over time. Following 
this examination we will then look at who invested in this tonnage and how the investor 
profile shifted over time (especially concerning the professionalization of shipowning and 
the rise of investment by companies). 
The story of each investor, and the choices that he or she made, were, at least in part, 
unique. Still, many of these individuals and firms did follow, if not always consciously, 
those strategies which they believed would make their enterprise successful. One element 
A number of the best scholarly works on Liverpool's maritime business history, including Francis Hyde on 
Cunard, Peter N. Davies on Elder Dempster, plus Graeme Milne's examination of the mid-nineteenth century 
business ofshipowning at Liverpool, are profiled in Chapter Two (along with a number of monographs on the 
port of Liverpool itself). 
2 
of these strategies was, according to Graeme Milne and Gordon Boyce, based on information 
and reputation. 2 That is, the Liverpool shipowner (even before s/he typically was identified 
by this title) did not operate in a vacuum- such people and companies moved within wider 
circles. From these contacts they gathered important information, made useful acquaintances 
and garnered reputations that sustained their businesses, while simultaneously creating an 
interdependence among the port's commercial elites. In this type of context both the 
information available to an entrepreneur and his reputation were of crucial importance. 
Although Milne and Boyce are essentially correct in this assessment, I would argue that 
there is a further, albeit related, element here- the ability of shipowners to find and maintain 
their own niche (or comparative advantage) in the industry while at the same time being 
flexible enough to adapt during times of change? On the surface these two skills might 
appear mutually exclusive, and indeed it was a very fine line for shipowners to decide when 
it was best to stick with what they knew or when the time had come to adjust a business 
strategy in the face of changed conditions. As Milne notes, companies venturing outside an 
2 
See Gordon H. Boyce, Information, Mediation and Institutional Development (Manchester, 1995); Graeme J. 
Milne, Trade and Traders in Mid-Victorian Liverpool: Mercantile Business and the Making of a World Port 
(Liverpool, 2000); and Milne, "Information, Reputation and Collaboration in Mercantile Business: Evidence 
from Mid-Victorian Liverpool," International Journal of Maritime History, XIV (June 2002), 1-20. 
3 
I use comparative advantage to indicate those factors that gave investors an "edge" in the business of shipping. 
Among other things, their comparative advantages were often derived from a focus on the industry in general 
or from a concentration upon certain trades. As we will see, many Liverpool investors also came from a maritime 
background. For example, the founder ofPacific Steam Navigation Company, William Wheelwright, hailed from 
a seafaring family in a community that had maritime links to South America, and it was there that Wheelwright 
proposed to establish his shipping line. Likewise, the founder of the Houston Line, R.P. Houston, came from 
a marine engineering background, while the founders ofSandbach, Tinne & Co. based their business on previous 
experience in the West Indies. 
3 
"established specialty" risked being considered untrustworthy by local information brokers, 
like bank managers. No less than in contemporary business, it was a serious matter to have 
your creditworthiness downgraded. Moreover, "moving out of an established niche was 
likely to incur heavier costs than any slowdown or decline in existing business. "4 
Boyce and Milne's research suggests that such information networks were quite 
important to shipowners at Liverpool and other ports. There is also evidence that, for certain 
investors at least, making the best use of their comparative advantages and adapting to 
changing conditions were important elements of their success. Chapters Seven through Ten 
take a case study approach, profiling two Liverpool-based shipowning concerns, 
Brockle banks and Pacific Steam Navigation Company (PSNC). 5 Both were long-established 
4 
Milne, "Information, Reputation and Collaboration," 4; and Milne, Trade and Traders, 113. 
5 
In using these two companies as examples I am adopting a "micro history" approach, which raises the hoary 
issue of typicality. It can be argued, for example, that no two firms can be considered to be representative of the 
entirety ofLiverpool' s investors; indeed, even a dozen would not reflect the diversity of investors. While I accept 
that such concerns are valid, they overlook the valuable insights to be gained through in-depth analyses of 
particular segments of the industry. Although they cannot tell us exactly how every company or investor 
behaved, a study ofBrocklebanks and PSNC can provide us with a useful window into shipowning as it was 
practised at Liverpool. Furthermore, these firms display some broad commonalities in their business strategies, 
despite the fact that their structures (a family firm versus an incorporated company) and chosen trades were quite 
different. A good example of the insights to be gained using this approach is Simon P. Ville, English Shipowning 
during the Industrial Revolution. Michael Henley and Son, London Shipowners, 1770-1830 (Manchester, 1987). 
Ville reminds us that although Henley and Son can only give us concrete information on a single firm, this 
nonetheless provides some important insights into shipowning in the Napoleonic era. Moreover, what makes 
Henley and Son so useful is the fact that a significant portion of their records survived while those of many other 
firms did not. Graeme Milne, Trade and Traders, 7, notes that through accident or neglect much valuable 
material relating to Liverpool shipowning has not survived. Yet in the case of Brocklebanks and PSNC the 
historian is fortunate in that a good selection of their records are held at the National Museum Liverpool, 
although even in these cases much appears to have been lost or scattered. While neither company can provide 
an absolute template for Liverpool shipowners, they formed an important part ofLiverpool 's investor community 
over a considerable length of time. 
4 
enterprises in the port, plying blue-ocean trade routes for many decades. Apart from this, 
however, the companies appear to have had little in common. Nonetheless, both found 
particular comparative advantages on the world's shipping lanes, and both were flexible 
enough to innovate when necessary. These factors helped Brocklebanks and PSNC establish 
themselves as shipowners and allowed each to compete well into the twentieth century. 
Their backgrounds and chosen trades differed, which helped to ensure that the pattern and 
timing by which they adopted new innovations were very different. Still, both did make the 
necessary transitions at the rate most suited to their particular circumstances. The example 
of these two companies does not prove conclusively that such was the case for all investors, 
even at Liverpool. On the other hand, the evidence provided by these two firms suggests the 
importance of comparative advantage and adaptability in understanding the development of 
the shipping industry. 6 
6 
In discussing Liverpool vessel investors in general, Chapters Five and Six will also briefly introduce a number 
of other investors, including Duncan Gibb, Charles Cotesworth & Co. and Sandbach, Tinne & Co. Their stories 
will help flesh out the statistical profile of more "average investors" and provide evidence for the importance of 
comparative advantage and adaptability. Although the emphasis here will be more squarely on firms which by 
their longevity can be considered success stories, it must be emphasized that no business strategy is a guarantor 
of success at all times. Milne's work identifies a number of spectacular failures among Liverpool's shipowning 
community. Perhaps the most notable of these concerned Edward Oliver. With around 100 vessels in 1854, 
Oliver was Liverpool's largest owner of wooden tonnage. Unfortunately, he built up this fleet by contracting 
a huge debt, mainly from fellow shipowners in the timber trade. Owing eighty-four persons and companies about 
£680,000 in total, Oliver's business collapsed. Ironically, he was no outsider and was supported by Liverpool's 
leading traders right up until his firm's demise. Milne, Trade and Traders, 156-157. Robin Craig also reminds 
us not to overlook the shipping industry's failures. Craig is quite correct in stressing the fact that shipowning 
success stories were "deviants" to some degree. Certainly, business failures generally outweigh successes in 
statistical terms. In presenting such examples I do not try to make the case, which Craig warns of, that the 
successful company was some kind of norm. Nonetheless, Liverpool was largely a successful port in the period 
1820-1914. Companies that failed may have played a positive role for a time, but stability must have been built 
primarily on those players, like Brocklebanks, PSNC, Harrisons and Sandbach, Tinne, who were contributors 
for extended periods of time. See Robin Craig, British Tramp Shipping, 1750-1914 (St. John's, NL, 2003 ), 15-
16. 
5 
Before examining the investors in general, or Brocklebanks and PSNC in particular, 
we will take an in-depth look at the capital in which these people invested - the ships 
themselves. This capital was a crucial element of shipowning because vessels were the 
primary capital investment for shipowners, and the possession ofthem defined membership 
in the profession. In many cases the type of vessel employed was based on the trade(s). It 
hardly made sense for a coasting firm to invest in large, ship-rigged vessels, for example, 
since few coasting trades required large volumes of tonnage, and speed was by no means a 
major prerequisite for success. Indeed, some vessels were built to a firm's particular 
specifications, as were PSNC's South American coastal passenger liners, which were used 
in trades that demanded specific characteristics. 7 An owner's fleet might be defined by the 
use to which it was put, but it could also be a major vehicle through which an investor 
displayed adaptability in reaction to changing conditions. Brocklebanks' own switch to 
metal construction for their vessels is an example. As the efficacy of iron was established, 
Brocklebanks made the switch, although this likely had spin-offs in its decision to close, 
rather than modernize, its Whitehaven shipyard. 8 By the mid-nineteenth century the firm had 
been operating tonnage for about eighty years. In effect, one niche (shipowning), had 
superseded another (shipbuilding), and the company adapted accordingly. The nineteenth 
7 
According to the historian Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets 8: Pacific Steam Navigation Company (Burwash, 
East Sussex, 1984), 7, William Wheelwright, "to cater for local passenger needs ... created that new breed of 
vessel: the coastal passenger liner. These beautiful and versatile ships served a mileage equivalent to a 
transatlantic crossing with clock-like punctuality." 
8 
Naturally, other factors would have come into play, including the actual cost of modernization itself 
6 
century was marked by the greatest changes in technology and economy that the world had 
yet seen. It was thus of crucial importance for owners like Brockle banks to strike the proper 
balance between their strengths with the flexibility to adapt as the need arose. The first 
portion of this equation- finding one's comparative advantage and sticking with it- has 
something of a negative connotation in the sense of being "hidebound." 
The scholarly consensus is that Liverpool was slow to adopt new shipping 
technologies. While this is true statistically, at least for the port's registered tonnage as a 
whole, this generalization obscures the strategies employed by shipowners engaged in 
various trades. Flexibility was a two-way street~ knowing when to apply the adage "if it isn't 
broke, don't fix it," was as important a skill as making timely adaptations. Sometimes it was 
in an owner's interest not to employ new methods. Depending upon the circumstances and 
nature of specific trades, the decision of whether or not to utilize new techniques was often 
eminently practical. Companies largely stuck with the methods that served them best, but 
they were constantly called upon to re-evaluate strategy and to modify, if necessary, their 
best course of action. Through such practical management Brocklebanks and PSNC 
contributed materially to Liverpool's seaward economy for generations- well beyond 1914 
in fact. By certain narrow standards, Liverpool's investors could generally be deemed 
conservative, or even reactionary, but those profiled here, if judged by their longevity and 
diversity, certainly cannot be considered failures. 9 
9 
A cursory examination ofBrocklebanks might lead to the judgement that they fit the conservative stereotype. 
This evaluation was not altogether undeserved. Nevertheless, Brocklebanks were survivors and did have had 
7 
While I have striven to be straightforward in these opening paragraphs, some 
additional clarification is still needed. For example, the term "shipowner" is multifaceted 
and can encompass a number of meanings. In its simplest definition it means anyone who 
chooses to invest in vessels for commercial gain. This analysis can itself be dissected, for 
there were many types of shipowners. As we will see, the earliest modem shipowners, in 
Britain and elsewhere, did not even consider shipowning as their main source of income. 
Although most of these owners tended to be merchants who used their tonnage to convey 
their own goods, many were simply investors from many walks oflife- although often with 
seaward connections - who choose to put a portion of their disposable income into vessel 
shares. Like the merchants, the typical investors of the first few decades of the nineteenth 
century, an era that in fact extended well past mid-century, often defined themselves by 
reference to occupations other than shipping. For example, it is much easier to find investors 
before 1850 listing themselves by the ubiquitous term "gentleman"than it is to locate a 
"shipowner." 
By about mid-century this situation began to alter in Britain. For reasons that have 
been explored by Sarah Palmer, among others, it was at about this time that the business of 
shipowning began a move toward professionalization, with many owners increasingly 
deriving their livelihoods specifically from owning vessels rather than simply earning extra 
a knack for capital and structural changes at opportune moments. PSNC was something of an anomaly among 
Liverpool shipowners as it was rarely conservative, even at its inception in 1840. 
8 
income from the possession of shares. 10 The ranks of the non-professional owners began to 
thin as those of the owner expanded; this was true not only of Liverpool but also of British 
ports in general over time. As a corollary of this development, the merchanting function was 
increasingly separated from ownership, as the latter became a profession in and of itself 
Shopkeepers no longer owned their own tonnage to carry their goods, but simply arranged, 
often through agents or brokers, to have their products carried aboard the vessels of full-time 
owners. 11 This development did not necessarily occur at the same pace, or at all, elsewhere. 
In Atlantic Canada, for example, only in the port of Yarmouth did the professional 
shipowner emerge as a major force during the nineteenth century. For the most part the 
merchant/shipowner, so important at Liverpool prior to 1850, remained the main category 
of vessel owner in Atlantic Canada (especially Newfoundland) throughout the nineteenth 
century. 12 
10 
See Sarah Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping, 1820-50," Maritime History, ll (1972), 46-68. 
11 
For an examination of agents, see Michael B. Miller, "Ship Agents in the Twentieth Century," in Gordon Boyce 
and Richard Gorski ( eds. ), Resources and Infrastructures in the Maritime Economy, 1500-2000 (St. John's, NL, 
2002), 5-22; and Peter N. Davies, Henry Tyrer: A Liverpool Shipping Agent and His Enterprise, 1879-1979 
(London, 1979). A shipping agent's duties could be numerous and wide-ranging. Miller's study, for example, 
profiles Rotterdam-based Intemationale Crediet-en Handels-Vereeniging (Internatio). Founded in 1863, it 
secured Rotterdamsche Lloyd's (RL) East Indies' account in 1878. Some of its duties as RL's agents included 
clearing and despatchingRL vessels, handling intelligence for routing, traffic and shipping, acting as a negotiator 
on RL's behalf, and running their Mecca pilgrim business. In addition, Internatio trained a new generation of 
managers and sought out cargo and passengers while maintaining links to shippers in its client's interests. Miller, 
"Ship Agents," 5. 
12 
Atlantic Canada will provide a major source of comparison with Liverpool in Chapters Three through Six. 
Although the region represents colonial mther than British ports, these are the only group of ports (in any locale) 
in which the characteristics of shipowners, and the nature of their fleets, has been studied in detail over an 
extended time period. From 1976 to 1982 the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project (ACSP), based at Memorial 
9 
It is important in the present context to be cognizant of the fact that shipowning, like 
most enterprises, was hardly homogeneous: firms reflected vast differences in size, scale and 
capitalization. Liverpool, more than most British ports of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, was reliant on large-scale liner trades. It was these trades which 
employed the famous, or infamous, vessels like the Great Western, Britannia, Mauritania 
and Titanic that have garnered so much popular attention. Starting from more humble 
beginnings in sail, these lines evolved into steam services - sometimes reliant on mail 
subsidies - that promised fast, regular service that linked ports such as Halifax, New York 
and Boston on a regular schedule with their old-world counterparts, including Liverpool. 
This was how Liverpool, in fact, became the eastern Atlantic hub for North Atlantic traffic, 
a role in which is was later joined by continental ports such as Hamburg. 13 By the early 
University of Newfoundland, analysed both vessel registries and Crew Lists for major ports in Canada's 
Maritime Provinces, Newfoundland and Quebec. By computerizing the two data sets ACSP members were able 
to efficiently analyse information on vessels, owners, crews and voyages over their chosen study period from 
1820 to 1914. Their research remains the most extensive computerization and analysis of port and vessel records 
attempted to date, making the Atlantic Canadian ports ideal candidates for comparative study ("Maritime 
Provinces" refers to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward island. "Atlantic Canada/Provinces" refers 
to these three Provinces, plus Newfoundland). For a more detailed description of the project and its data sets 
see Rosemary E. Ommer, Lewis R. Fischer and Eric W. Sager, "The Data Base of the Atlantic Canada Shipping 
Project," in Lewis R. Fischer and Eric W. Sager (eds.), Merchant Shipping and Economic Development in 
Atlantic Canada (St. John's, NL, 1982), 1-6; Lewis R. Fischer and Eric Sager, "An Approach to the 
Quantitative Analysis ofBritish Shipping Records," Business History, XXII, No.2 (July 1980), 135-151; and 
Peter N. Davies, "Commentary: On the Methodology and Results of the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project," in 
Fischer and Sager (eds.), Merchant Shipping and Economic Development, 55-59. 
13 
Toward the end of our study period Hamburg increasingly emerged as a competitor to Liverpool in trades like 
immigrant traffic. Already a long-established port, Hamburg's development was aided by Germany's nineteenth-
century industrialization; the port was enlarged and infrastructure improved. Despite a fire in 1842, Hamburg 
was eventually transformed into a modem port with artificial quays and discharge facilities, while the river Elbe 
was developed to better cope with the increasing size of steamships. C. Prange contends that the provision of 
good rail links, plus extensive wharfage with storage sheds and steam cranes, greatly contributed to Hamburg's 
later reputation for efficiency. By the late-nineteenth century a growing traffic in export goods from regions like 
10 
twentieth century most of the lines were increasingly reliant on the large numbers of low-
fare steerage passengers who emigrated to America in enormous numbers in the years prior 
to World War 1. 14 These lines might sometimes be little more than blanket organizations in 
which a collection of vessels owned outright, or only in part, and supplemented where 
necessary with chartered tonnage, provided a convenient "brand name" for a range of 
services and trades so that the public and shippers might associate them with one trusted 
symbol. 
Many of these lines evolved in their day into very large organizations, and this sets 
them apart from their smaller brethren. The Thomas lsmays and Samuel Cunards have made 
good subjects for writers over the past century or more, but their tale is not the whole story 
the Ruhr was centred on Hamburg, with steamers playing an increasing role in the port's trade. Hamburg became 
a member of the German Customs Union in 1888, and by the tum of the twentieth century was the German 
empire's premiere seaport. In the same era Hamburg's shipyards were aided by naval contracts promoted by 
Woermann Line founder, Adolph Woermann (1847-1910). A critic of the navalism espoused by Woermann, and 
by Kaiser Wilhelm, was shipowner Albert Ballin (1857-1918), Director General of the Hamburg-Arnerika 
(HAP AG) Line (initials from the full German name for the line, Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-
Gesellschaft). In 1881 alone, 123,000 immigrants departed for America through Hamburg, and HAPAG was 
at the forefront of this traffic. As Director General, Ballin also encouraged high-end passenger traffic. In 1902 
Hamburg-Arnerika carried a total of34,068 passengers. This was compared to 29,833 passengers for Liverpool's 
White Star, the leading British passenger line. Prange, "The Development of the Port ofHamburg in the 19th and 
20th Centuries," in L.M. Akveld and J.R. Brujin ( eds. ), Shipping Companies and Authorities in the 19'h and 201h 
Centuries: Their Common Interest in the Development of Port Facilities (Rotterdam, 1989), 9-15; and Melvin 
Maddocks eta/., The Great Liners (Alexandria, Virginia, 1982), 52-55 and 95. On Hamburg see Edwin Jones 
Clapp, The Port of Hamburg (New Haven, CT, 1911). On Albert Ballin and Hamburg-Amerika see Frank 
Broeze, "Albert Ballin, the Hamburg-Bremen Rivalry and the Dynamics of the Conference System", 
International Journal of Maritime History, Vol. ill, No. 1 (June 1991), 1-32; Lamar Cecil, Albert Ballin: 
Business and Politics in Imperial Germany, 1888-1918 (Princeton, N.J., 1967); and Hans Jiirgen Witthoft, 
HAP AG: Hamburg-Amerika Line (Herford, 1973). 
14 
This rule should not be applied too rigidly. The most successful of the Liverpool lines over the long term -
Cunard- managed to outperform its rivals in part by avoiding a large reliance on the immigrant trade, which was 
always beset by cyclical fluctuations. See Francis Hyde, Cunard and the North Atlantic, 1840-197 3: A History 
of Shipping and Financial Management (London, 1975). 
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of any port, including that most congenial to their ilk- Liverpool. 15 The internal records of 
such large firms are often, although by no means always, voluminous. For the first serious 
scholars of the subject of shipping, they provided a natural focal point for research. Indeed, 
it is by no means uncommon for the non-specialist to feel that Liverpool, in particular, has 
"been done" insofar as the business of shipping is concerned. The "Liverpool school," of 
whom we will hear more in Chapter Two, is generally credited with bringing the most 
important facets of Liverpool's business shipping history to light. 16 
Liverpool's shipowning community was comprised of a myriad of firms, partnerships 
and individual owners. The vast majority of these were either smaller, or lesser-known, than 
the largest liner firms. Still, this should not discount their combined impact on the rhythm 
of business in the port and the contemporary role they played in shaping its character as a 
shipping entrepot. Although they may not have the volume of surviving records as the more 
familiar large liner companies, their stories may be no less interesting or important. To date 
15 
There are a plethora of works on specific liner firms. See, for example, James E. Cowden and John O.C. Duffy, 
The Elder Dempster Fleet History, I852-I982 (Norwich, 1986); Malcolm Falkus, The Blue Funnel Legend. A 
History of the Ocean Steam Ship Company, I865-I973 (London, 1976); David Howarth and Stephen Howarth, 
The Story of P & 0, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (London, 1986); Wilton J. 
Oldham, The Ismay Line. The White Star Line and the Ismay Family Story (London, 1961 ); and James Taylor, 
Ellerman's. A Wealth of Shipping (London, 1976). These case studies are of British firms, but the liner firms 
of many maritime nations have attracted the interest of researchers. One example is William D. Wray,Mitsubishi 
and the NY.K., 1870-1914 (Cambridge, MA, 1984). On the modern business of liner shipping, see Susanne 
Holste, Liner Shipping in a Quality-Oriented World Economy (Bremen, 1993); and J.O. Jansson and D. 
Shneerson, Liner Shipping Economics (London, 1987). 
16 
A good overview of the work of the Liverpool School can be found in Lewis Fischer, "Introduction," in Fischer 
(ed.), From Wheel House to Counting House: Essays in Maritime Business History in Honour of Professor 
Peter Neville Davies (St. John's, NL, 1992), ix-xiv. 
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not much scholarly work has been conducted on these enterprises, although that is changing 
through the efforts of historians such as Graeme Milne. 17 
Firms like Brocklebanks and PSNC were quite important in their day and by no 
means insignificant, either in terms of routes, tonnage owned, or longevity. Nonetheless, 
many such companies, familiar until well into the twentieth century, are now almost 
forgotten. Brocklebanks, while the subject of numerous articles - and a few books - from 
the nineteenth century on, have hardly been discussed in the twenty years since their livery 
was last seen on the world's oceans. The firm has, in fact, had two book-length histories. 
The first, by John Frederick Gibson, is now over half a century old. It is quite detailed but 
essentially presents a narrative account of the company rather than analysing it as an 
economic entity. In discussing the Brocklebank family's sale of their business in 1911, for 
example, Gibson gives a good general overview. In discussing the reasons for this, however, 
he goes no farther than saying that " ... neither Harold nor Sir Aubrey Brocklebank were 
convinced that a family business could stand up against the large companies. Shipowning 
was becoming complicated and specialized. By the end of 1910, they both considered 
selling." In fact, much of Gibson's work, while extensive, consists of detailed descriptions 
of voyages made by Brocklebank vessels, interspersed with more general information on the 
17 
See Milne, "Information, Reputation and Collaboration;" and Milne, Trade and Traders. Graeme Milne, among 
the "new" Liverpool historians, wants to shift to a new paradigm for the study of Liverpool and the business of 
shipping that diverts attention away from the liner firms. Milne reminds us that the chance processes through 
which certain records survive, while others are lost, can produce anomalies in the material available for modern 
researchers. An example Milne presents is that ofDaniel Williams, a minor merchant operating in Latin America, 
from whom numerous letters exist. By contrast, few internal records pertaining to Liverpool's important Inman 
Steamship Line have survived to the present day. Milne, Trade and Traders, 7. 
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company; this latter, however, is often useful in understanding the firm, even if it is not 
always detailed. 18 The second book-length history ofBrocklebanks was by D. Hollett. Like 
Gibson's earlier work it took the form essentially of a narrative overview, although including 
a great deal of statistical information on the company. Hollett's work appeared about twenty 
years ago, just as the last two ships bearing the Brocklebank livery went out of service. In 
the two decades since Hollet' s account this company- once an important cog in Liverpool's 
trade network- has sadly been consigned to the dustbin ofhistory. 19 This study will attempt 
to build on work such as Graeme Milne's by providing an account of such overlooked 
participants in Liverpool's shipowning community and by covering a more extended time 
frame than has generally been employed. The goal here is to profile these players in a 
general context and also in light of my argument on comparative advantages and strategic 
flexibility. 
18 
See John Frederick Gibson, Brocklebanks: 1770-1950 (2 vols., Liverpool, 1953), II, 11. 
19 
D. Hollett, From Cumberland to Cape Horn: The Complete History of the Sailing Fleet ofThomas & Jonathan 
Brocklebank of Whitehaven and Liverpool- "The World's Oldest Shipping Company" (Norwich, 1984). For 
an overview of the company's fleet, see Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets: Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank (Uckfield, 
East Sussex, 1994). The lack of serious scholarly study has also plagued PSNC. The only book-length history 
of the firm is well over sixty years old. It is basically narrative in style and frequently makes use of lengthy 
quotations, often less than adequately referenced. Perhaps PSNC's disadvantage in this regard was that it 
operated largely in trades that attracted much less popular attention in Europe and North America than did the 
North Atlantic run. It may also have something to do with the nature of many of its routes which, although quite 
lengthy, were essentially coastal. Although very important in their own way, these trades are often forgotten 
amid the high adventure of Titanic's sinking or the race for the Blue Riband. Although coasting literature 
continues to appear, its volume is fairly thin compared to that on deep-sea trades. This point has been made on 
a number of occasions by one of Britain's preeminent coastal trade historians. See especially John Armstrong 
( ed. ), Coastal and Short Sea Shipping (Aldershot, 1996); and John Armstrong and Andreas Kunz ( eds. ), Coastal 
Shipping and the European Economy, 1750-1980 (Mainz, 2002). 
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Apart from discussing certain of these "neglected" investors, an important shift in 
our frame of reference will be to focus more on trades outside the traditional North Atlantic 
sectors ofLiverpool's seaward economy, particularly regarding immigrants and cotton.20 It 
is perfectly true, as shown in Table 1.1, below, that the North Atlantic portion of the port's 
trade predominated, at least in terms of tonnage entering and clearing the port.21 Like the 
largest liner firms, this portion ofLiverpool's trade has received the bulk of attention from 
scholars. This is understandable in that the Atlantic sector employed the largest share of 
tonnage. On the other hand, trades like those to Asia and India, as well as those to South and 
Central America, were by no means insignificant; the history of Brocklebanks certainly 
illustrates the former and PSNC the latter. As Table 1.1 demonstrates, African (excluding 
North Africa) and Antipodean trades, while practically non~existent in Liverpool prior to the 
1880s, grew increasingly important in the late Victorian period and expanded greatly after 
the turn of the century.22 Likewise, trade to Europe and North Africa, although its growth 
20 
One of the more well-known of Liverpool's North Atlantic trades, that in Canadian timber, does receive some 
treatment in the context of vessels and merchant investors. As will be explained it is hard to understand the 
transfer of Canadian tonnage to Liverpool without some background in this area. This does not, however, 
involve a major discussion of the trade in general. 
21 
Tonnage figures do not give a complete indication of the value of any particular cargoes or fares paid by 
passengers. For example, it would likely have taken many paying steerage-class immigrant fares to equal the 
value in sterling of a single cargo of high-grade China tea or top quality opium. For descriptions of such trades, 
see Freda Harcourt, "Black Gold: P & 0 and the Opium Trade, 1847-1914," International Journal ofMaritime 
History, VI (June 1994), 1-83; and Harcourt, "British Oceanic Mail Contracts in the Age of Steam, 183 8-1914," 
Journal ofTransport History, IX (March 1988), 1-18. 
22 
Table 1.1 's figures for tonnage entering and clearing Liverpool from/to Africa in 1871 (or lack thereof), while 
reflecting contemporary government statistics, do not accurately represent the state of trade between Liverpool 
and Africa that year. As early as 1852, for example, the African Steam Ship Company was incorporated by Royal 
15 
was by no means spectacular or always positive, generally expanded during the years 
sampled in Table 1.1. Although such sectors never came to dominate Liverpool's 
contemporary trade, their contribution to its prosperity and their role in making Liverpool 
a genuine "world port" should not be overlooked. For this reason, I will focus not only on 
those more-or-less forgotten owners who contributed to Liverpool's trade but also on certain 
of the under-appreciated sectors in which Liverpool craft played a part.23 
Although the basis for these profiles will be partially statistical, numbers do not tell 
the entire story. With increasingly efficient database technology it is fairly easy, if time 
consuming, for the researcher to computerize and process many years' worth of port data. 
I use these data to build a statistical profile of the "average" Liverpool shipowner over the 
period 1820-1889. This being said, statistics alone cannot provide an accurate, or especially 
interesting, picture of who these people were in individual and company terms. To round out 
Charter to trade with West Africa, Liverpool becoming its primary British terminus four years later. Peter Davies 
contends that from 1863 to 1868 trade with the region was buoyant enough that African Steam's fleet was 
insufficient to handle all the cargo on offer. The British and African Steam Navigation Company, with Alexander 
Elder and John Dempster as its Liverpool agents, began trading to West Africa in 1869. Vessels of both 
companies -later merging to form Elder Dempster- were certainly calling at Liverpool from West Africa in 
1871. Davies, The Trade Makers: Elder Dempster in West Africa, 1852-1972. (1973; rev. ed., St. John's, NL, 
2000), 7-36. On Liverpool's early links with West Africa via the palm-oil trade, see Frederick Pedler, with a 
chapter by Alan Bums, The Lion and the Unicorn in Africa. A History of the Origins of the United Africa 
Company 1787-1931 (London, 1974), 67-69. 
23 
For example, PSNC, while starting out on the west coast of South America, moved into Antipodean routes in 
the late 1870s. Even among the North American trades there are some that have received little attention from 
historians in relation to Liverpool. Brocklebanks' trade to Newfoundland is one (see Chapter Seven). The 
importance of such companies and trades should not be underestimated. There are a myriad of firms like PSNC, 
and trades like Brockle banks' to Newfoundland, that have received little attention in recent years. Yet a perusal 
of the registries, plus government and business records makes it very clear that in aggregate such companies and 
trades were of great significance to the port of Liverpool and British trade generally. 
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the numerical data, elaborated on below, I will employ such items as company records, 
personal correspondence and narrative accounts, both primary and secondary. 
Table 1.1 
T 000a2e E nterm2 an dCI earm2 L. I If 1verpoo to rom V . D a no us estmatwns 
Region 1871 1881 1891 1901 
Europe/ North Africa 1,906,453 1,890,531 2,331,225 2,372,699 
Africa 0 547 4,489 389,803 
Asia 814,590 876,535 767,117 554,355 
Antipodes 0 92,277 86,257 236,951 
North America 4,023,112 5,334,351 5,978,633 7,427,801 
South America 357,433 1,188,092 1,540,095 1,429,810 
Central America 526,258 339,278 380,092 405,917 
Total 
Notes: 
Source: 
8,062,959 9,721,611 11,087,908 12,817,336 
This table, unlike most others in this work, deals with shipping passing 
through the port of Liverpool rather than the shipping actually registered 
there. North America includes not only British North America, the US and 
Newfoundland but also the northern whale fisheries. Central America 
includes the West Indies. Tonnage figures above are net. 
Great Britain. Annual Statements of Navigation and Shipping, 1872, LVI, 
299; 1882, LXVIII, 291; 1892, LXXVII, 427; 1902, C, 473. 
The time frame has been selected for a number of reasons. The period of almost a 
century spans the years from just following the Napoleonic wars to the outbreak of World 
War I. During this epoch British commerce was protected both by the Royal Navy and a 
relative serenity in international relations, at least among the great powers of Europe. One 
of the backbones ofthis study, in terms of primary documents, is the Board of Trade 107 and 
17 
108 series, which I will discuss later. The starting date of the study coincides with the period 
from which large numbers of the shipping registries survive for Liverpool.24 The end date 
is more obvious, marking the start of the Great War and the subsequent trade disruptions 
from which British maritime hegemony would never fully recover. In such a context the 
United Kingdom's second-largest port- its leader in trades like Atlantic Canadian timber 
and on long-distance routes - and the business community behind it was of immeasurable 
importance to seaborne commerce not only on a national but also on a global scale. The era 
of pax Britannica was, in some respects, a genuine "golden age" not only for Great Britain 
generally, but for Liverpool in particular. Therefore, the period 1820-1914 is especially 
germane in understanding Liverpool's heyday as a world port and centre of international 
commerce. 25 
We should also at this point distinguish what is being referred to in the present 
context when talking about the tonnage in which this community invested and what the 
community itself was. There are a number of ways to describe Liverpool shipping, not all 
of which conform exactly to a notion of Liverpool shipowning. For example, we might 
choose to study the shipping which actually used the port. This would include not only 
vessels actually registered in and considered part of the port's fleet but any vessels -
24 
"Modem" ship registries for the British Empire date from 1787. But a fire in the Customs House destroyed most 
of the Liverpool records from the years before 1812. This is the reason that the date 1820 has been chosen. 
25 
On the British economy and the pax Britannica, see Albert H. Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica; 
studies in British Foreign Trade in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1958). 
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national, colonial, or foreign- which entered or cleared.26 This is of course much different 
than the vessels registered in the port of Liverpool itself. These craft might indeed call 
regularly at their home port, but many would spend much of their careers on the world's 
blue-water trade routes, returning only occasionally, or sometimes not at all, to Liverpool. 
The PSNC's vessels are illustrative of this. A contemporary commentator on the firm noted 
that: 
The most obviously striking point of difference which the Pacific Steam 
Navigation Company's Fleet presents to view, as compared with [a number 
of other Liverpool firms], is the somewhat remarkable one of being entirely 
occupied by the traffic growing up on the shores of a distant ocean ... with this 
additional peculiarity that, having been built in this country, and despatched 
to their trading station on the Pacific Ocean, are never expected again to visit 
our shores. 27 
This form of deployment reminds us of the vast difference between tonnage that 
simply passes through a port like Liverpool and that which is registered and/or owned there. 
Graeme Milne makes this distinction in relation to the transfer from sail to steam in 
Liverpool. As he reminds us, a mid-nineteenth century visitor to Merseyside would have had 
26 
The importance of this distinction cannot be overemphasized. In a recent study of coastal trades in pre-industrial 
Bristol, David Hussey found that the port was a major regional (and supra-regional) entrepot for a variety of 
coastwise trades in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. For this reason, it can justly be described 
as a major coasting port in the era. At the same time, the coastal tonnage actually registered in Bristol was quite 
limited, and it was thus not an important coastwise centre in registry terms. See David Hussey, Coastal and 
River Trade in Pre-Industrial England: Bristol and its Region 1680-17 30 (Exeter, 2000). 
27 
John Will ox, The Steam Fleet of Liverpool: A Series of Historic, Statistical, and Descriptive Sketches, Tracing 
their Origin, and Showing the Progress and Present Condition of the Leading Branches (Liverpool, 1865), 62. 
This phenomenon may not have been as remarkable as Willox believed, however. It has been asserted that up 
to one-quarter of all British shipping in the second half of the nineteenth century seldom entered British ports. 
P.J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914, (London, 1993), 179. 
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a far different picture of the port's shipping than a bureaucrat examining its registry figures. 
The former would have seen much more steam tonnage at the docks and quays than could 
have been accounted for by port registries. In other words, "Liverpool's users were more 
committed to steam than its own resident shipowners were."28 To reiterate this important 
point, there was indeed a difference between tonnage registered at and tonnage using the 
port, a distinction that must always be borne in mind. It is the tonnage of Liverpool-
registered craft that forms the basis of this study. Also, the tonnage most often referred to, 
especially in Chapters Three to Six, will normally take as its benchmark the volume of 
shipping that was newly-registered in the port each year. 
Finally, it should be noted who in this context counted as a Liverpool shipowner. The 
term will refer specifically to persons who invested in tonnage registered at the port of 
Liverpool, which was established by the Merchant Shipping Act of 1787 as a port of registry. 
The distinction here is not where the investors were domiciled - the individuals on the 
Liverpool register came from all over the United Kingdom, the colonies and sometimes even 
from foreign lands- but that they appeared as owners of tonnage in the local registry books. 
Conversely, Liverpudlians who chose to invest outside the port will not figure in the picture 
except insofar as they may also have chosen to buy shares in vessels in the port's own fleet. 
28 
Milne, Trade and Traders, 31. In fact, Milne feels there is a case to be made that the registry data is more 
important from the perspective of historians than it actually was to contemporaries. Nonetheless, these data are 
still quite important, especially as the companies profiled in this study did normally register their tonnage in 
Liverpool, and this is especially relevant as this thesis (with the possible exception of the Chapter Two literature 
review) takes as its focus Liverpool owners more so than the actual port itself 
20 
This study will therefore examine both the average Liverpool investor and a portion of the 
port's lesser-known shipowners: that is, those outside the pale of the more familiar large 
liner companies (like Cunard) who chose, whatever their residency, to invest portions of 
their income in Liverpool-registered shipping. It will likewise examine this newly-registered 
tonnage in terms of its physical characteristics, such as size, rig, and the like. 
A primary goal here is to view the activities and strategies of these businessmen over 
an extended period of time, particularly in regard to the idea of them finding a particular 
niche and then being able to adapt to changing market conditions. This is important because 
the period included in this study was marked by enormous shifts in trade, business and 
technology. These were also the years in which engine-powered water craft were first used 
extensively and the era in which we can speak for the first time of an international economy 
(in the sense of an integrated "world" system proposed by Immanuel Wallerstein).29 It was 
29 
It should be noted here that the ideas of "international" and "world" economies are not necessarily 
interchangeable. According to Wallerstein, the first of these concepts is limited. Essentially it involves a number 
of individual national economies which sometimes trade with one another. On the other hand, a world economy 
has existed since the sixteenth century - at least in certain regions - and is defined by its relationship to 
capitalism. Such an economy has no one ultimate authority; it is instead an inter-state system which legitimizes 
sovereign states, but at the same time constrains their actions. Such an economy, in Wallerstein's view, is 
dominated by entrepreneurs who operate via the principle of endless accumulation. The capitalist world economy 
functions by the appropriation of producers' surpluses by others. The appropriators then control the capital, and 
their "rights" in this regard are guaranteed. This is an unequal relationship in which those having the upper hand 
are referred to as "core" states, while those they control are considered "peripheral." Although no one state can 
control all aspects of the world economy, there do sometimes arise hegemonic states exerting the lion's share 
of influence over world markets, who attempt to build up the advantages of their own producers and seek 
legitimacy for this through the imposition of cultural values. Significantly, Wallerstein feels that the the 
hegemonic power from 1815-1873 was the United Kingdom. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the 
World Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations (Cambridge, 1984), 13-17. For another take 
on the world economy see A G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth of the International Economy 1820-
2000: An Introductory Text (London, 1999). The mechanisms of world economy are not necessarily a set of 
agreed upon principles. Cain and Hopkins also make use of the idea of core (in their terminology, metropole) 
and peripheral (hinterland) states. To Cain and Hopkins the crucial player in the growth of world trade after 1850 
21 
also characterized by an unprecedented revolution in communications. Since it was the goal 
of all capitalist enterprises to earn profits (or to maximize some other utility function) and 
thus to perpetuate themselves, the activities of lesser-known companies in Liverpool's 
seaward business community will be instructive in defining this era of transition and in 
helping to understand the way such enterprises coped. 
As I have noted, the work will be based in part on data extracted from the BT 1 07 
and 108 series. A frustration for historians studying earlier eras, especially those of more 
ancient vintage, is the lack of records and the need to draw conclusions based upon sources 
that are often quite tenuous. By the nineteenth century this was no longer the case for many 
subjects, as many governments by then had come to appreciate the utility of having detailed 
records?0 While not all facets of Victorian life were detailed equally well, it is certainly the 
case that the maritime historian ofBritain is especially fortunate. British governments, aware 
was clearly Great Britain, and this was based not on industrial but on service capitalism. The bourgeoisie were 
the main creators of wealth after the late eighteenth century, but depended on the prestige of the landed and 
military classes to effect real change. Over time so-called "gentlemanly" capitalism developed, based largely on 
service industries, in which it was acceptable for elites to directly participate. From this time on a well developed 
network of international services developed along with world trade, with London as the hub. International trade 
grew enormously in the period 1850-1900, largely under the industrial - and more importantly - in Cain and 
Hopkins' opinion, the financial aegis ofBritain. As late as the Great War Britain, although superceded in certain 
industrial and technological products, remained a prime mover of the world economy through London's control 
of international finance. See Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism. In the present context I use both the terms 
international and world economy interchangeably. Here I simply mean the enormous expansion in commerce, 
largely centred on Europe, but taking in the entire globe, from about 1850 on. Whatever its ideological 
underpinnings, it certainly related to the industrial revolution and the later growth of imperialism, at least 
indirectly. 
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With the rise of world empires and increasing populations in the period, this is hardly surprising. In the 
nineteenth century the world witnessed the rise of bureaucracy and middle management as governments, 
increasingly burdened by new responsibilities, needed more and more personnel to handle the routine tasks of 
governing. 
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ofthe importance of international trade to their global empire and ofthe need to protect their 
far-flung interests, were keenly concerned to track the fortunes of the merchant fleet. The 
smooth running of the merchant navy was one of the planks upon which industrial Britain 
-the "first industrial nation"- was built.31 In addition, there was still some feeling that the 
training merchant seamen gained during their peacetime engagements could be transferred 
easily to wartime service in the Royal Navy. Like its civilian counterpart, the Navy was a 
cornerstone of British policy (and power projection) throughout the nineteenth century. 32 
British politicians clung stubbornly to the idea of the merchant fleet as a "nursery for 
seamen" through to the Great War.33 The idea was likely outdated by the mid-Victorian era 
but continued to shape policy - particularly in terms of monitoring and controlling the 
progress of the mercantile navy. To this end successive British governments passed 
merchant shipping acts to regulate everything from the amount offood sailors were provided 
31 
See Peter Mathias, The First Industrial Nation. An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1914 (London, 1969). 
On British naval seafarers see Michael Arthur Lewis, The History of the British Navy (London, 1959). 
32 
This is not to say the Royal Navy was never neglected in this period. Although few argued for any serious 
reduction in its strength, not everyone was in favour of the high maintenance costs it entailed. Prime Minister 
Gladstone, known also as a "cheeseparing," but effective, Chancellor of the Exchequer, attempted to control 
naval spending on a number of occasions. On the relationship between politicians, the Royal Navy and business 
people see John F. Beeler, British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era, 1866-1880 (Stanford, Calif, 
1997). 
33 
Sarah Palmer, Politics, Shipping and the Repeal of the Navigation Laws, (Manchester, 1990), 63-65. The idea 
of merchant service as a nursery for seamen was an old one. 1711 Royal instructions to colonial governor Robert 
Hunter make it clear that the French cod fishery was seen as a threat due to its perceived role in training naval 
ratings. The instructions state that " ... the cod fishery .. .is the great nursery of their [the French's] seaman [sic], 
and is so necessary and advantageous to them in all their commerce ... " As quoted in Douglas Edward Leach, 
Arms for Empire. A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763 (New York, 1973), 
143-144; and GeraldS. Graham (ed.), The Walker Expedition to Quebec, 1711 (Toronto, 1953), 269. 
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to rules ensuring safety at sea. 34 The other pillar in this policy involved keeping tabs on the 
industry. Numerous forms and papers had to be filled out by almost everyone connected with 
the shipping industry, from government officials, to masters, to the vessel owners 
themselves. The bulk of voyages in this period were tracked by way of Crew Agreements, 
which recorded personal information about the crew and their service records during the 
voyage, as well as information on where the vessel sailed. For our purposes, the most 
important records were the BT 107 and 108 series. 35 
These documents were produced by the British Board of Trade from 1787 onward. 
They ran until1889, at which point they were replaced by a new series (BT 110) that was 
organized in a much less user-friendly manner in terms of individual port research. Although 
the BT 11 Os are divided by port, they were filed by the date of registry closure. This makes 
reconstruction of investment time series very difficult. For this reason I will stick to the 
earlier series and round out the picture with other records up to 1914. Just as the Crew 
34 
This latter subject especially, was the focus of much heated debate before it was finally passed. A number of 
influential persons, notably Joseph Chamberlain and MP Samuel Plimsoll, took an interest in the matter. See 
David Clarke "The 'Sailor's Friend:' A New Perspective on Samuel Plimsoll and Maritime Reform" (Honours 
Dissertation, Memorial University ofNewfoundland, 1995). 
35 
Although not a major source herein, certain of the tables presented are based on data from the Annual 
Statements ofNavigation and Shipping. These were first titled Annual Statements ofTrade and Navigation and 
first appeared as separate volumes produced by the Registrar-General of Shipping and Seamen (RGSS) and the 
Customs Service in 1853. From 1876 on, the statements were compiled by the Board of Trade from material 
supplied by theRGSS. Shipping movement statistics for the first time distinguished between vessels arriving with 
cargoes and in ballast, as well as noting the proportion of sail to steam. The volumes grew in size and complexity 
over the years, but as David Starkey notes, "the changes had largely been in degree rather than in kind, the 
Annual Statements constitute a long run of statistical evidence pertaining to many of Britain's maritime 
interests." David J. Starkey, eta/. ( eds. ), Shipping Movements of the United Kingdom, 1871-1913: A Statistical 
Profile (Exeter, 1999), xvii-xix. 
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Agreements (BT 99) detailed a vessel's voyages, these records kept the government 
informed on the craft's ownership. Each time a vessel was sold the investor or investors was 
required to fill out a form?6 Although somewhat less complex than the Crew Agreements, 
the BT series nonetheless contain a wealth of information not only on the craft but also on 
the investors themselves. Most of a vessel's physical characteristics were noted, including 
length, tonnage and rig (if a sailing vessel; horsepower was included for steamers). The 
second measurement is especially challenging because the exact calculation of a "ton" 
changed over time (See Appendix One). Nonetheless, the BT series is an invaluable marker 
for the physical capital involved in the British shipping industry. The researcher can know 
not only what type of vessel is being considered but also who owned it at various points in 
its career. Even this latter point is recorded as the BT forms include information on where, 
when and sometimes by whom the craft was built, and in almost all cases the vessel's end 
is noted somewhere on the form. For the physical makeup of vessels the forms are especially 
useful on the subject of technological change. The BT 107/1 08s are also a fairly precise 
gauge of the introduction of such innovations as steam, paddle wheels and the screw 
propellor. We can also note the increased horsepower of the average engine over the latter 
nineteenth century. The BT series are some of the best contemporary records on the 
36 
Initially, new forms had to be filled out even when minor alterations were carried out on a craft. This created 
voluminous paperwork simply for the re-registering of vessels that had previously been on registry in a port; 
these are known as de novo registrations. For the most part we will not be dealing with these registries but only 
with craft newly registered in the port; in essence, this is a surrogate for gross investment The entire system 
began to change with the passage of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, which dramatically altered the 
requirements for de novo registrations. 
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emergence of steam and the final decline of sail in the British context. This was in fact one 
of the pivotal technological changes with which owners had to deal over the course of the 
century, and their decisions in this regard shaped the character of fleets owned by firms like 
Brocklebanks and PSNC. 37 
These owners, like the vessels themselves, were also highlighted by the series. 
Through an examination of the forms mandated by the Board of Trade it is possible to 
discover the residence, occupation and number of shares owned by individual investors. By 
custom, the ownership of vessels was divided into sixty-fourths and everyone, from the sole 
owner to a person holding only a single share, was noted. By tracing subsequent registry 
forms we can note how the makeup of investors changed as shares were sold or the vessel 
changed hands outright. 38 It is also possible to note those investors who owned shares in 
tandem, such as in business partnerships. On earlier forms the firm name itself was also 
recorded. The BT forms give an investor's occupation, a characteristic that is especially 
useful in establishing the frequency of such important owner types as merchants and their 
decline over time. The records are also one of the best sources for determining the 
professionalization of shipowning as a distinct occupation. Insofar as the specialist owner 
was more likely to identify his/her occupation as "shipowner;" the incidence of this 
37 
The same is equally applicable to the minor case study firms profiled in Chapter Six. 
38 
Again, we should note that the emphasis here will be on ownership at the time of initial Liverpool registry rather 
than on trying to trace this over time. 
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designation increased markedly in the last few decades of the nineteenth century. By noting 
residence using the 107s and 108s it is possible to establish the geographic distribution of 
owners. Although most British owners chose to invest in shipping in their own or nearby 
ports, or in contiguous regional centres, the data do allow us to trace the origins of owners 
with much more precision than would otherwise be feasible and makes the point that a 
resident of Liverpool and a "Liverpool" owner were not always interchangeable. It is also 
important in the sense that geographic proximity to a port, and the knowledge this entailed, 
formed part of an investor's comparative advantage- in other words, it made sense to invest 
in an area where your familiarity, reputation and contacts were greatest. 39 
For the purposes of this thesis I have sampled the registries from the years 1820 to 
1889 and computerized them in a database (Paradox). This allows rapid computations of 
statistics over a period of sample years. It is possible, for example, to note the percentage 
of merchants who owned shipping in a given year as opposed to the number of total 
investors. This can be done not only in regards to the actual number of vessels that were 
39 
This is most poignantly brought out- as we will see in Chapters Five and Six- by the fact that the vast majority 
of Liverpool investors came from either the city itself, Lancashire, or neighbouring Cheshire. See BT 107/108 
series, various years. For a discussion of the role of information and business reputations, refer again to Gordon 
Boyce's and Graeme Milne's works cited earlier. By combining the Board of Trade's information with business 
records, personal correspondence and sources such as Lloyd's Registers of Shipping, it is possible to follow the 
endeavours of a number of the less well-researched shipping firms and investors over the course of a century of 
maritime change. These documents are themselves of great interest. Records known as the London "A" Bills 
of Entry, for example, record the products landed at various UK ports, their points of origin, and the vessels on 
which they were carried. They have recently been employed by historians such as Milne to reconstruct the 
activities and trades engaged in by various small firms on Merseyside. While he has done good work in 
reacquainting us with these forgotten entrepreneurs from the perspective of the mid-nineteenth century, Milne's 
work still represents only the tip of the iceberg. By studying these patterns up to World War I we can further 
round out his portrait. 
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newly-registered each year but also by the total annual tonnage. By this means it is possible 
to note easily the importance of the merchant shipowner over time and in this case to see 
how and when this group declined in importance as shipowning became professionalized. 
Due mainly to constraints of time and other equally scarce resources I decided to 
sample the Board of Trade registries each quinquennium, collecting data for years ending 
in zero and five only.40 This technique has some drawbacks, especially insofar as it does not 
allow one to track the growth of individual fleets (or indeed the entire fleet of vessels 
registered in Liverpool) over time with precision. 41 If we take the years 1870 and 1875 and 
find the number of investments in each made by a single owner, we can say something about 
this fleet, but of course any data on tonnage registered during the intervening years is 
missing. As an example of this we can observe the number ofzero-and-five-year registries 
that show up in the database for our two major case study firms. Sir Thomas and Ralph 
Brocklebank were found in the database as owners of four vessels during the 1880s -
specifically craft registered in 1880, 1885 and 1889. Likewise, the Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company appeared as the owner of five vessels in 1860, three in 1865, six in the 1870s and, 
finally, five in the 1880s samples. These numbers do give some indication of these firms' 
role as Liverpool investors, but tell an incomplete story. To combat this tendency, complete 
40 
An exception is the year 1825, which was unavailable at the time of research. As a result, 1826 has been 
employed as a substitute. And 1889 was also computerized since it marked the final year of the BT 108 series. 
41 
To put this another way, a corollary of the need to sample is that it is impossible to produce continuous time 
series of either gross or net investment. Gross investment essentially comprises the new investments in physical 
capital over time, while net investment is most easily thought of as fleet size. 
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fleet lists for the major case study firms have been collected from other sources and appear 
in the appendices. Still, even using the BT 107/108 data alone, we are unlikely to miss the 
presence of important owners. It has also been demonstrated that important insights into port 
business can be garnered by viewing a limited number of years as representative of the port 
at some point in time. 42 Perhaps the greatest benefit of sampling the Board of Trade series 
is that, for a major port like Liverpool over an extended period of time, it makes the project 
feasible. It must be remembered that in cases like Liverpool - especially in earlier sample 
years -there were literally hundreds of registries each calendar year. In all, the number of 
separate investments in new tonnage (representing well over 2,000 vessels) in the sample 
years is over 5,600- from a low of 122 in 1820 to a high of775 in 1855. For each of these 
separate investments I computerized twenty-four separate variables; in total these amounted 
to more than 130,000 individual variables to be computerized. Given such numbers, even 
compiling a quinquenial sample as I have done entailed months of work to collect and 
computerize. Nonetheless, by taking fifteen samples over a seventy-year period it is 
reasonable to assume that definitive indicators of change and growth will emerge, allowing 
42 
For example, Valerie Burton has presented a picture of Liverpool's mid-century coasting trade by using Bills 
of Entry data for 1853. See Valerie Burton, "Liverpool's Mid-Nineteenth Century Coasting Trade," in Burton 
(ed.), Liverpool, Shipping, Trade and Industry: Essays on the Maritime History of Merseyside 1780-1860, 
(Liverpool: 1989), 26-67. I will detail Burton's article and the Bills themselves in the pages to follow. Sarah 
Palmer has used the registries to study investors and mortgagees in London using the years 1820 and 1850 to 
profile the period. Although the study is less detailed on explanations, it was ground breaking in extensively using 
the Registries for quantitative analysis. See S.R. Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping, 1820-50," Maritime 
History, II (1972). My own study of the Cumbrian centre ofMaryport owes much to Palmer's methodology. 
Like Palmer, my examination of shipowners made extensive use of the registries of shipping, as will this current 
study. See David Clarke, "Coastwise from Cumberland: The Maryport Coasting Trade, 1850-1889" (M.A. 
thesis, Memorial University ofNewfoundland, 1998). 
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a good, if imperfect, record of the fate of the business of shipowning. Before proceeding 
with our examination of Liverpool shipowners and their fleets, however, we should first 
review the recent scholarly literature dealing with Liverpool and its investor community. In 
this way we can gain some insight into the way past researchers have conceived of the port 
and its shipowners.43 
43 
By "separate investments" I refer to each case where a person, partnership or firm bought shares in a newly-
registered vessel. In 1845, for example, the 505-ton ship Alexander Baring was registered at Liverpool with a 
total of eight investors. In this case six individuals owned eight shares each, while the partnership ofBrooke and 
Wilson owned sixteen shares in tandem. Since information was given for both partners, their investments were 
counted separately, but with their business status noted. Thus, the Alexander Baring's registration represents 
eight separate investments. Vessel information remains the same for each investor in that craft, and can be fairly 
quickly duplicated using Paradox. The information on individual investors is unique, however, so that vessels 
with multiple owners greatly increased the amount of data, and the time required, to computerize. While the 
Alexander Baring had more investors than many craft, vessels with two or more investors were very common, 
particularly in the earlier sample years. The twenty-four variables collected were: the vessel name; its official 
number; tonnage- gross, register or unspecified; vessel build/rig/type; vessel length; framework (ie. wood, iron, 
steel or composite); whether or not the vessel was a steamer; if it was steam, how it was propelled (by paddle 
wheels or screw propeller); the engine horsepower, if applicable; the date registered at Liverpool; port registry 
number; the number, date and port of previous registry (to provide registration specifics for second-hand vessels 
not previously registered at Liverpool); where the vessel was built; the year it was built/launched; the builder; 
owner name; the owner place of residence, or headquarters, in the case of company groupings; a residence 
county code, which allowed easy tabulation of investors in English counties; the owner occupation; the number 
of shares owned; the percentage of tonnage owned (for example, thirty-two shares of a 1, 000-ton vessel would 
mean ownership of 500 tons, or fifty percent of the vessel's total tonnage); a vessel's final fate or next 
registration; a note field was used to provide additional information, such as the names and make-up of 
partnerships. 
Chapter 2 
Liverpool and the Historians 
This chapter is in essence a critical examination of the historiography about Liverpool 
shipowners and the business of the port. Although I do not conceive of this study as a "port 
history," a number of the works discussed in this chapter do fall under this heading. Since 
a main plank of my thesis deals with comparative advantage there is a certain logic in this. 
As noted in the introductory chapter, an important part of an investor's comparative 
advantage was his/her residence and the networks that such people could build on this basis. 
More often than not the investor in a Liverpool-registered vessel was a local resident who 
was taking advantage of local knowledge. Thus, the story of their home port is also their 
story, albeit in a more general sense. At the beginning of A Christmas Carol Charles Dickens 
emphasized the fact that Jacob Marley was dead and that nothing wonderful could come out 
of the tale unless the reader bore this in mind. Likewise, a student of Liverpool shipowning 
should bear in mind the preeminence of the port. In the context ofBritish and world shipping 
in the nineteenth century, Liverpool certainly mattered, and it would not be amiss at this 
point to recall in concrete terms the size of Liverpool as a maritime economic entity 
compared not only to London but to the United Kingdom in general. Table 2.1 illustrates 
shipping movements in the foreign trades (with cargo) for London, Liverpool and the United 
Kingdom in the years 1875-1913. It clearly demonstrates the statistical importance of 
Liverpool as a port and its very close second-place standing next to London. 
Year 
1875 
1880 
1885 
1890 
1895 
1900 
1905 
1910 
1913 
Note: 
Source: 
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Table 2.1 
Net Tonnage Entering and Clearing, London, Liverpool and 
ngJan a es, 
-
E 1 d & W 1 1875 1913 
London Liverpool England & Wales 
12,910,707 11,885,277 61,244,810 
15,104,826 13,290,972 74,125,272 
17,761,185 13,411,165 80,649,386 
19,684,221 14,556,306 89,614,396 
21,824,162 14,692,712 96,020,227 
25,326,088 15,676,338 105,851,944 
25,839,654 18,643,085 117,301,912 
26,657,648 17,900,531 125,776,055 
25,778,406 19,018,589 144,999,206 
Tonnage entering and clearing in both the foreign and coastal trades "with 
cargo only." 
Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers (BP P), 
Annual Statements of Navigation and Shipping, 1876, LXXX; 1881, 
LXXXVII; 1886, LXIV; 1890-1, LXXXII; 1896, LXXXIII; 1901, LXXV; 
1911, LXXIX; and 1914, LXXXII. 
Liverpool, like the larger centre, was important throughout the period 1820-1914 as 
both a coasting port and a centre of international trade. In certain important trades Liverpool, 
not London, was preeminent. Included in this category were the famous passenger and 
emigrant trades and the timber trade with British North America. The emigrant trade was 
well organized by the 1860s, and through such lines as Inman, Cunard, and White Star the 
port handled about 4.75 million European emigrants to the U.S. of a total of 5.5 million 
departing from British ports in the period 1860-1900. In fact, Liverpool was the port of 
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embarkation for approximately a third of all immigrants entering the United States in this 
period from all sources. 1 The port's role in the British North American timber trade was no 
less impressive. It was in these trades, along with many that were even more far-flung, in 
which Liverpool made its name, and much of the impetus behind Liverpool's growth was 
made possible, at least in part, by its vigorous shipowning community. It is perhaps equally 
true that the converse was the case: by 1820, if not earlier, local insiders benefited from 
being part of this great entre pot of world trade. Belonging to a port community was itself 
an important comparative advantage, but belonging to one with world status, like Liverpool, 
was a further important boon. What individuals like Thomas and Jonathan Brocklebank 
chose to make of this advantage was left to their own resourcefulness. 2 Certainly the 
physical port and its shipowning industry were two separate entities, but neither was entirely 
removed from the other. Many of the entrepreneurs we will encounter operated out of the 
city, and their endeavours arguably shaped the course of business on Merseyside as much 
as did their better-known counterparts in larger firms. It is for such reasons that I have 
Francis Hyde, Cunard and the North Atlantic, 1840-197 3: A History of Shipping and Financial Management 
(London, 1975), 59-61; J. Matthew Gallman, Receiving Erin 's Children: Philadelphia, Liverpool, and the Irish 
Famine Migration, 1845-1855 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000); and Raymond L. Cohn, "Transatlantic U.S. Passenger 
Travel at the Dawn of the Steamship Era," International Journal of Maritime History, N, No. 1 (June 1992), 
42-64. 
2 
It is true that the Brocklebank family was not originally from Liverpool. Nonetheless, the family did hail from 
a registry port, Whitehaven, which was part of Liverpool's regional trading hinterland. As businessmen in the 
region advantages certainly accrued from their proximity to Liverpool- Thomas' relocation to the city as senior 
partner in 1820 is likely indicative of this. See John Frederick Gibson, "The House of Brocklebank (I)," Sea 
Breezes, New series, XVll (1954), 37 and W. Stewart Rees, "Brocklebanks," Liverpool Nautical Research 
Society Transactions, III (1946-1947), 30-31. 
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chosen to explore not only works dealing directly with Liverpool's business/shipowning 
community, such as the studies published by Graeme Milne and Peter Davies, but also those, 
like Adrian Jarvis,' dealing with the port in which their activities were based. 
This is not to say that all of the plethora of works on Liverpool and its seaward 
investor community need be considered. This chapter will largely focus on scholarly works 
written in the last three decades, leaving aside older, often antiquarian tomes. Many of the 
actual port histories span long periods in order to illustrate development and change over 
time. Although there are some temporally-limited studies, many of the more important book-
length works are dedicated to the long term. Francis Hyde's Liverpool and the Mersey, for 
example, spans nearly three hundred years. Even more chronologically-limited studies, such 
as Adrian Jarvis' Liverpool Central Docks, and its sequel, In Troubled Times, together 
encompass almost a century and a hale In the context of the way in which maritime 
historians have tended to periodise the past, this is a fairly generous and ambitious time 
frame. 
Traditionally, port histories have been based upon a somewhat limited number of 
sources, although what has been written about Liverpool does not fit this mould. In 1983 
3 
Francis E. Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey: The Development of a Port I 700-I 970 (Newton Abbot, 1971 ); 
Adrian Jarvis, Liverpool Central Docks, 1799-1905: An Illustrated History (Stroud, 1991); and Jarvis, In 
Troubled Times: The Port of Liverpool, 1905-1938 (St. John's, NL, 2003). For an examination of British ports 
and their development generally one can do no better than Gordon Jackson, The History and Archaeology of 
Ports (Tad worth, 1983 ). Although more than twenty years old and lacking the benefits of detailed port authority 
records, only recently available, and current computer database technology, Jackson's work, as Adrian Jarvis 
reminds us, retains its relevance. See Jarvis, "Port History: Some Thoughts on Where it Came from and Where 
it Might be Going," in Lewis R. Fischer and Adrian Jarvis (eds.), Harbours and Havens: Essays in Port History 
in Honour of Gordon Jackson (St. John's, NL, 1999), 13-34. 
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Gordon Jackson noted that "[d]espite the importance of trade to the British economy, 
relatively little has been written about the development of the ports through which it passes, 
either in general or in particular. •><~ Nonetheless, good studies of some British ports, 
including Liverpool and its investor community, appeared earlier and continue to be 
released, thus indicating a continuing scholarly interest.5 
This is not to imply, however, that this interest has generated many lively debates. 
There is little resembling established schools of thought in port history. A Marxist or liberal 
might bring their own assumptions about the role of ports in economic development into a 
book or article, but few port historians have actively set out to challenge the findings of 
colleagues. The debates, where they exist, are more implicit than explicit, more a question 
of style than ideological divergence. Precious little port history has been written thus far 
with the avowed purpose of actively challenging the approach of another scholar. At most, 
studies are undertaken to plug obvious holes in our knowledge rather than to examine 
contentious issues. Perhaps this is due to the nature of ports themselves. As crossroads for 
trade and commerce, workplaces, parts oflarger municipal entities, and influences on nearby 
4 
Gordon Jackson, History and Archaeology, 10. 
5 
See, for example, Graeme J. Milne, "Port Politics: Interest, Faction and Port Management in Mid-Victorian 
Liverpool," in Lewis R. Fischer and Adrian Jarvis (eds.), Harbours and Havens: Essays in Port History in 
Honour of Gordon Jackson (St. John's, NL, 1999), 35-62; Frank Broeze (ed.), Brides of the Sea. Port Cities 
of Asia from the J&h-20th Centuries (Sydney, 1989); and Broeze (ed.), Gateways of Asia: Port Cities of Asia 
in the 13th-20th Centuries (New York, 1996). Two scholarly works which combine port and maritime business 
history are Gordon Jackson, Grimsby and the Haven Company, 1796-1846 (Grimsby, 1971); and Peter N. 
Davies, "Aspinall, Comes and Company and the Early Development of the Port of Yokohama," in Fischer and 
Jarvis (eds.), Harbours and Havens, 139-158. 
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communities, ports offer a myriad of possibilities for research without "stepping on anyone's 
toes." Indeed, despite their similarities, the development of any one port over time is 
essentially unique; so also, we might add, are the careers of a port's shipowning community. 
This uniqueness itself played a role in the comparative advantages offered to maritime 
investors, who brought certain talents, knowledge and connections to the industry. At the 
same time, the port of which he was part offered its own opportunities to traders. 
Perhaps the most obvious demarcation in port history concerns the physical limits 
of what is being studied. Historians like Frank Broeze prefer the "port city" approach which 
examines shipping activity in a wider metropolitan context. Other scholars, such as Adrian 
Jarvis, prefer to concentrate on the actual functions of the port itself In fact, Broeze has 
identified four factors which he believes contribute to the prosperity, or lack thereof, of port 
cities. These factors reflect his broad-based approach to port history. The first is the city's 
actual physical site, while the second, situation, entails the port's relationship to a regional 
system. By definition one must look beyond the narrow geographic confines of the port (and 
even the city) to study "situation" in this manner. The third of Broeze's factors, 
entrepreneurship, takes in the function of shipowning, with which this work is most 
concerned. In keeping with Broeze's sweeping approach it also goes beyond this to 
"embrace ... strategic, economic and social policies aimed at, for example, maintaining the 
independence or at least autonomy of the port city, the construction of infrastructure, and 
the upholding of a suitable ... climate to attract merchants from abroad." The final growth 
factor in Broeze's scheme is identity- basically the self-perception of a port's elites and 
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their visions of the future. This outlook then helps decide the direction of future port 
policies. The elites creating this identity also formed the information networks, mentioned 
earlier, which were one comparative advantage for insiders in a particular port city, or 
region. Even here the dichotomy between such authors should not be taken too far. 
Especially in his recent work, In Troubled Times, Jarvis does wander beyond the confines 
ofLiverpool' s dock estate, the work coming perhaps the closest in Jarvis' output to Broeze' s 
viewpoint. Still, Jarvis' focus remains firmly on structures like the Mersey Docks and 
Harbours Board and its clientele.6 
This chapter's historiographic study ofLiverpool and its shipowners will include the 
most famous scholarly works on the subject, such as Hyde's Liverpool and the Mersey, 
which remains the classic Liverpool port study. Even more germane to the larger thesis are 
the works of business, company and shipowning history, all of which are important in 
understanding Liverpool shipping companies themselves and their development over time. 
The most obvious here are those histories produced by members of the "Liverpool School." 
These studies are considered benchmarks, even if only in a limited sense, for the port's 
maritime activity. We will also examine more closely Graeme Milne's recent book, the first 
in-depth scholarly study of the business of shipowning in Liverpool for more than thirty 
years. 
That historians of maritime Britain should take a keen interest in the nation's ports 
6 
See Frank Broeze, "Dubai: From Creek to Global Port City," in Fischer and Jarvis ( eds. ), Harbours and Havens, 
160-161 and Jarvis, In Troubled Times. 
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is hardly surprising. From the earliest recorded history the culture and economy of the island 
has been greatly affected by the seas that surround it. In Britain before the industrial age 
inland transport was difficult, especially for bulky commodities. Fortunately, most 
settlements were close to navigable water which enabled the expansion of trade. For much 
of recorded history, however, commercial ventures were concentrated in the summer since 
few of the harbours afforded shelter during inclement weather. For the most part traders used 
small vessels because many of the bays and inlets could not handle larger craft. Moreover, 
in some ports vessels had to be hauled up onto a beach for unloading or had to navigate 
significant distances up rivers. To ensure the safety of vessels some form of pier was often 
required, a feature which began to appear sporadically in the Middle Ages. Despite this, it 
was not until the development of new construction techniques in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries that modem, engineered ports became commonplace. Not surprisingly, 
it was at about this same juncture that writers became interested in studying ports. 7 
One of these ports was Liverpool. This town on the north shore of the River Mersey 
had been an important place for trade, some of it seaborne, from the late Middle Ages. The 
onset of the industrial revolution, especially in places like Manchester, provided additional 
impetus for this trade. Indeed, Liverpool attracted the interest of a number of writers 
7 
Jackson, History and Archaeology, 12. The development of early-modem ports is dealt with by T .S. Willan as 
part of his studies of Tudor through Georgian era transportation. See Willan, The English Coasting Trade 1600-
1750 (Manchester, 1967); and The Inland Trade. Studies in English Internal Trade in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries (Manchester, 1976). an early example of a British port study is J. Lyon, The History of 
the Town and PortofDover,2 vols (Dover, 1813-14). 
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concerned with the history of commercial activities (and the town in general) from the early 
nineteenth century onward.8 Nonetheless, Liverpool's modem scholarly history arguably 
originated after the Second World War with the rise of the so-called "Liverpool School." As 
represented by the eminent economic historian, Francis Hyde, and his colleagues and 
proteges, including John Harris, Sheila Marriner, Peter Neville Davies and David M. 
Williams, the historians who comprised the Liverpool School were the first modem scholars 
to pen serious studies of maritime business at Liverpool.9 Given the importance of liner 
shipping to the port of Liverpool discussed in Chapter One, and the fact that many of the 
companies that engaged in this type of shipping have left voluminous records, it is not 
surprising that one of the characteristics of the Liverpool School was a focus on some of the 
most important liner shipping companies operating out of Liverpool and the men who 
founded and guided them. Their research was modelled on the classic business histories 
developed in America before World War II. This type of history traced the evolution of 
companies largely using internally-generated sources, such as official company records, 
accounts and correspondence. As Graeme Milne has noted,"[ t ]hese books [by the Liverpool 
8 
There are a number of such works on Liverpool. See Anon., A General and Descriptive History of Liverpool 
(Liverpool, 1797); Anon., The Stranger in Liverpool; or, an historical and descriptive view of the town of 
Liverpool and its environs (Liverpool, 1823); H. Smithers, Liverpool, its Commerce, Statistics, and Institutions, 
with a History of the Cotton Trade (Liverpool, 1825); Thomas Baines, History of the Commerce and Town of 
Liverpool (Liverpool, 1853); R. Brooke, Liverpool During the l.ast Quarter of the Eighteenth Century 
(Liverpool, 1853); and Richard W. Williams, The Liverpool Docks Problem (Liverpool, 1912). 
9 
For examples ofHarris' work, see T.C. Barker and J.R Harris, A Merseyside Town in the Industrial Revolution: 
St. Helens, 1750-1900 (London, 1959); and J.R Harris (ed.), Liverpool and Merseyside: Essays in the 
Economic and Social History of the Port and its Hinterland (London, 1969). The contributions by the other 
authors mentioned here will be discussed extensively elsewhere in this and succeeding chapters. 
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School] remain at the heart of the extensive genre of shipping company history, and continue 
to inspire periodic re-evaluations of the histories of particular companies."10 
There were drawbacks to this type ofhistory, however. Most of the companies dealt 
with by the Liverpool School were large liner operators rather than smaller firms, and only 
one member of this School - Hyde - has ever attempted anything resembling a general 
survey of the Liverpool shipping community. But the key point here is that until the late 
nineteenth century, large liner operators were the exception rather than the rule, even in 
Liverpool. There are two corollaries to this observation that affect our evaluation of the 
Liverpool School. First, by focussing on large firms members of the School were examining 
the atypical rather than the typical. Second, and related to the first point, they were sketching 
a collective portrait of the maritime sector that distorted the reality of shipowning in the 
port. In fact, the activities of smaller operators, who often engaged in tramp rather than liner 
shipping, does not necessarily fit the mould of these larger concerns. II Whole categories of 
10 
Milne, Trade and Traders, 6. 
II 
Liner companies were those that operated vessels according to a set schedule. This was convenient for shippers 
and passengers who knew fairly precisely when to expect vessels, either for loading or discharge. For the 
shipowner such a service could have its drawbacks in that a vessel had to depart on time whether the holds and 
berths were filled or not. Tramps, on the other hand, did not adhere to a schedule. Instead, they operated either 
on charter parties or speculatively, going to wherever cargoes were likely to be found. Especially if operating 
speculatively, they could afford to wait until a full consignment of goods was on board before clearing a port. 
Even for tramps, however, time was money, and it was important to find cargos as efficiently as possible. The 
communications revolution of the latter nineteenth century was a boon to tramping companies. From this point 
on they could quickly get word of cargoes to be had in particular ports and despatch their tonnage accordingly. 
In modem scholarly parlance, tramps are often associated with sail tonnage, which - as the truism goes - was 
effectually exiled to tramping once steamers came along . Robin Craig reminds us, however, that the "tramp" 
and "liner" distinction did not emerge until the full flowering of steam; steamers themselves could be either 
tramps or liners. The distinction was never made in the sail era when such tonnage, at the mercy of winds and 
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occupations, like merchants, brokers and agents, rarely come to light in this type ofhistory. 12 
Another problem encountered in this genre of analysis concerns the expectations of the large 
firms. In many cases their archives were not available to all researchers, and those who 
obtained permission to use them were often under some pressure, even if it was only 
implicit, to present the company in a positive light. Moreover, many of these companies, as 
one might expect, wanted their records to be employed solely in a history of their firm and 
not in a broader project. Another problem is that the survival of an extensive archive does 
not guarantee that the firm was especially important to the business community as a whole. 
Conversely, many significant companies have been overlooked simply because many of their 
records have been destroyed. Another important limitation to the Liverpool School's work, 
as Milne has noted, is that reliance on the records of individual firms can produce excellent 
structural histories which are oddly removed from the larger world in which they operated. 
It was only when the nature of the business required an examination of its outside 
connections, as in Sheila Marriner's work on the Rathbones, that the larger network of 
business crept in. With these caveats in mind, we must remember that this School remains 
important because it opened the history of Liverpool's maritime business community, or a 
at least a portion of it, to serious scholarly scrutiny. Since the appearance of their work, 
tides, could only keep to the most general of schedules. Robin Craig, British Tramp Shipping, 1750-1914 (St. 
John's, NL, 2003), 15. See also the discussion in Shipping World, I, No. 1 (1883). 
12 
An exception to this generalization is Peter Davies' work on Liverpool-based shipping agent Henry Tyrer. See 
Peter N. Davies, Henry Tyrer: A Liverpool Shipping Agent and His Enterprise, 1879-1979 (London, 1979). 
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Liverpool has never again been the preserve of antiquarians or popular writers. As an 
example it might be instructive to look more deeply at one of the first books produced by 
the Liverpool School, Francis Hyde's 1957 work on perhaps the most famous of all 
Liverpool firms, Cunard, plus his classic study of the port. 13 We will then tum our attention 
to Peter Davies' monograph on Elder Dempster, perhaps the most widely read and cited of 
this group. 
Possibly the most distinctive feature of Hyde's Cunard and the North Atlantic is its 
emphasis on the individual entrepreneur. According to Hyde it was the skill and business 
acumen that entrepreneurs like Samuel Cunard possessed which enabled them to succeed 
13 
In 1956 Hyde produced his first major work on a Liverpool shipowning concern. This monograph highlights one 
of Liverpool's most important shipping lines, The Ocean Steamship Company, also known as Alfred Holt and 
Company or the Blue Funnel Line. Founded in 1865 by engineer Alfred Holt (1829-1911), aided by his brother 
Philip Henry (1831-1914), the Blue Funnel Line grew to be one ofLiverpool' s largest cargo lines. By 1914 Holts 
was sending more vessels through the Suez Canal than any other liner company and was Britain's premier carrier 
of cotton and woolen products to East Asia, their major market. The line was noted for a number of innovations, 
including their own vessel rating system, superior to Lloyds AI classification ("Holts Class"). Indeed, Holts were 
generally known for their impeccable standards in both ships and personnel. The company was likewise marked 
by its long association with its Far Eastern agents Butterfield and Swire. In fact, the agency's guiding light, John 
Samuel Swire (1825-1898), exerted a considerable influence on Blue Funnel, supporting the company's 
involvement in conference arrangements. Like Brocklebanks and PSNC, Holts can certainly be considered a 
successful enterprise. Today their successor, Ocean Transport and Trading Ltd., is still a going concern, even 
if it is no longer especially maritime in character. See Francis Hyde, with J. R. Harris, Blue Funnel. A History 
of Alfred Holt and Company of Liverpool from 1865 to 1914 (Liverpool, 1956). A more recent look at Holts 
deals primarily with the years 1914-1973, while also recounting the period dealt with by Hyde and Harris. In the 
1970s the company, having dropped the Holt name in 1965, while acquiring William Cory & Son in 1972, 
became more landward-oriented, although shipping still dominated their activities until the 1980s. See Malcolm 
Falkus, The Blue Funnel Legend. A History of the Ocean Steam-Ship Company 1865-1914 (Hampshire, 1990), 
7-8 and 370-377. For an overview of the company's history and the details of its fleet see Duncan Haws, 
Merchant Fleets: Blue Funnel Line (Burwash, East Sussex, 1984). On John Swire see Shelia Marriner and F. 
E. Hyde, The Senior: John Samuel Swire, 1825-98 (Liverpool, 1967). 
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by manipulating the external forces around them. 14 The individual is portrayed by Hyde as 
being of paramount importance, and his success or failure was personal, subject only to 
interference by government. In the case of the Cunard company, this meant that Hyde spent 
a good deal of time praising (and occasionally damning) Samuel Cunard, his collaborators 
and successors. The government was often seen as constructing barriers that the Cunard 
executives had to surmount. Even when discussing the quest by Sir Percy Bates - also of 
pivotal importance in the Brocklebanks story- to obtain aid to build the Queen Elizabeth 
and Queen Mary, Hyde portrayed the role of government as largely negative. In short, from 
Francis Hyde's perspective the story of Cunard was in large measure that of an uneasy 
relationship between a dynamic set of entrepreneurs and the stultifying and restrictive hand 
of government. Success, when it came, was clearly due to the drive of Cunard and his 
associates. Hyde writes of Cunard that "[he] had the foresight of genius coupled with the gift 
of choosing men of ability as his associates."15 
The Cunard Company was managed at the outset by the founder, Samuel Cunard, 
14 
Hyde's "credo" to this effect may be found in his work on Blue Funnel. He states that "what was happening in 
Liverpool in the nineteenth century leads one to the conclusion that... the ability and managerial skill of the 
Liverpool business man found scope for maximum employment...Nothing is inevitable in business life and 
because of this, the principal reason for the rise and decline of firms must be sought in the personalities of the 
men who manage them." Hyde, with Harris, Blue Funnel, xvi. 
Jj 
Hyde, Cunard, 323. Hyde's other major maritime business history- referred to in Chapter Six- is on the 
Harrisons. His analysis of enterprise by individual entrepreneurs is not unlike the stories ofWilliam Wheelwright 
and Daniel Brocklebank, whom we will meet in Chapters Seven and Nine. It should be noted that Samuel Cunard 
was actually a Canadian, but his shipping interests were long tied to Liverpool. For a concise overview of his 
career and that of his company see John M. Bassett, The Canadians: Samuel Cunard (Don Mills, Ontario, 
1976). 
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and his partners, David and Charles Maciver and George Bums. To Hyde the success oftheir 
venture was dependent upon their complimentary roles and personalities, which combined 
to maintain their system of management intact. From the 1840s to the 1880s the firm's 
operating capital increased from £270,000 to £1,369,034. Behind these simple numbers lay 
the organizational skill of shrewd businessmen, the competitive service provided by their 
line and their intuition as to which trades would be most profitable for expansion. It was 
these functions, Hyde believed, which held the key to Cunard's success during its initial 
years of operation. Yet this was still only one plank of the company's commercial success. 
Many of the largest and best capitalized companies on Merseyside and elsewhere were 
turning toward steam technology in the second half of the nineteenth century to open up new 
niches in world trade. As Hyde described it, Cunard did not rush to adopt steam, preferring 
to wait until both its commercial and technological feasibility had been thoroughly proven. 
There was a safety as well as a commercial concern in this approach: in an era when deaths 
at sea were a perennial theme of the press and government critics of the industry, Cunard 
wanted desperately to maintain his sterling reputation for safety. As a result, the company 
often passed on opportunities to be at the cutting edge of the technological revolution 
because of a fear of accident. Indeed, this policy led the company to continue to employ 
small, under-powered ships long after its competitors had switched to larger and more 
powerful vessels. 16 
16 
Hyde, Cunard, 26. See also Gerald S. Graham, "The Ascendancy of the Sailing Ship 1850-85," Economic 
History Review. 2nd ser., IX (1956). Like Samuel Cunard, the Holt brothers were also reluctant to modernize 
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To illustrate the Cunard approach and its underlying soundness, Hyde discussed the 
competition that evolved with the so-called "Collins Line" founded by the American 
shipowner, Edward Knight Collins. Speed was of the essence in Collins' service, a fact 
which spurred Cunard to invest in some of his first iron-screw vessels. But in the end 
Cunard's adherence to an emphasis on steadiness and regularity prevailed over Collins' 
focus on speed. Hit by a series of disasters in which he lost a number of his vessels, not to 
mention some members ofhis family, Collins eventually folded while Cunard soldiered on. 17 
During the 1860s and 1870s the company relied increasingly on income from the 
North Atlantic immigrant trade, which replaced government mail subsidies as the deciding 
factor in the line's operations. While in Hyde's view this was a positive shift since it freed 
Cunard from an unhealthy reliance on government largesse, the immigrant trade was subject 
to large fluctuations, and Cunard was not immune. In the mid-1880s steerage passengers 
accounted for about a quarter of Cunard's gross receipts, but a decade later this had fallen 
to less than fifteen percent. Still, until the Great War and subsequent American exclusionary 
their Blue Funnel vessels in the late 1870s. Holts were pioneers of steam links between Britain and East Asia 
in the 1860s. By the late-1870s, however, their vessels were becoming obsolete compared to those of the Castle, 
Glen and Shire Lines. Agent John Swire urged modernization, initially with little success. By the mid-1880s 
voyage losses were on the rise and in 1892 the decision was taken to invest in new, faster tonnage to better 
compete with their rivals. Falkus, Blue Funnel Legend, 6, I 06-113 and 124-125 and Haws, Blue Funnel Line, 
25. Hyde, Blue Funnel, 48-49, feels that Alfred and Philip Holt were unnecessarily conservative in this era, 
assuming that the design and power of their ships did not need updating. Still, they eventually recognized the 
seriousness of their position, with the 1892 building programme a partial result of this reassessment. Falkus (124-
125) sees some justification for this conservatism, stating that "if their slower ships were less than competitive 
with the fastest Glens and Shires for the homeward carriage of tea to London, they could still make profitable 
round voyages ... " 
17 
For a detailed account of the Collins Line disasters, see William Henry Flayhart III, Perils of the Atlantic: 
Steamship Disasters, 1850 to the Present (New York, 2003). 
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legislation constrained the trade, the carriage of immigrants remained lucrative for Cunard. 
This was well known long before Hyde's book appeared, but the contribution that Hyde 
made was to point out that from the 1880s Cunard relied less on the immigrant trade than 
did many of his competitors. This might be why, in Hyde's view, lines such as Inman and 
Guion went out of business: heavily dependent on the immigrant trade, they succumbed to 
French and German competition in the early twentieth century. Both the major German lines, 
Norddeutscher Lloyd and Hamburg-Amerika, used conferences to undermine the 
paramountcy of British companies in the trade. The Liverpool operators attempted to 
respond, but as larger ships came into operation the Mersey estuary and the complex dock 
system proved a handicap that syphoned off business to other ports. Cunard escaped the 
brunt of this situation, a fact that Hyde credited to its shrewd management practices. 18 
During its golden years the excellent reputation for safety, rather than for speed or 
the use of cutting-edge technology (at least prior to the introduction of Lusitania and 
Mauritania) became its credo. For Hyde, this strategy was the key to Cunard's success. 
Perhaps it was, but it is striking that Hyde tends to assert, rather than to prove, this point. For 
example, in Hyde's view the decision by Cunard's Directors not to "put all their eggs" into 
the immigrant "basket" was a triumph of the firm's management style and served the 
company well when the importance of the trade diminished. Yet given the exponential 
18 
Hyde, Cunard, 58-72. By this period Samuel Cunard was long absent from the company's helm, having died in 
1865. Charles Maciver (who managed Liverpool operations) continued as an influence on the company for forty 
years until his death in 1885. George Bums only passed away in 1890. Samuel's son Edward was assisting in 
running the Halifax end of the business by the 1860s. 
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growth of the transatlantic immigrant trade between 1880 and 1914 - the very years during 
which Cunard was cutting back its reliance on this sector - it is worth considering the 
possibility that the company's success was due to something other than the prescience of its 
Directors. 
The years from 1914 until the Second World War were not as kind to the Cunard 
firm. 19 After losing a number of vessels, most notably the liner Lusitania, during the war the 
firm was caught up in trade fluctuations, general stagnation and dislocations of its normal 
patterns of business activity. In the 1920s the company, now under the leadership of Sir 
Alfred Booth, finally embraced technological innovation, but in the next few years there 
were some seemingly intractable problems which by 1932 appeared to be leading Cunard 
into bankruptcy. While this would seem to disprove Hyde's thesis that management choices 
were the paramount factor in business success or failure, the firm did in fact survive. Hyde 
felt that the contemporary assessment of the company was actually quite superficial. As 
evidence of this he pointed to the fact that the firm survived. But why? Ever a model of 
consistency, Hyde returned to his central argument: the company made it because of "the 
strength and purpose of management and the generative power which that management was 
capable of sustaining. "20 
19 
The history of Cunard during the interwar years in key respects mirrored the fate of the British merchant marine 
in general. While the general outline of what befell the British merchant navy is well known, less well understood 
is why this occurred. The standard work on the period, which badly requires revision, remains S.G. Sturmey, 
British Shipping and World Competition (London, 1962). 
20 
Hyde, Cunard, 189. 
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Hyde's thesis about the power of management in controlling its own destiny, for 
good or ill, is intriguing, but he seldom provides evidence and sometimes fails to apply it in 
the same way over time. His assessment of successful management seems to point to a 
proactive approach in which the entrepreneur must anticipate market conditions and forces 
in order to be successful, but the examples he adduces of the Cunard style sometimes point 
toward reactive strategies as being more successful. The case of the competition with the 
Collins Line is a good example. As a new competitor which was attempting to use 
arguments about speed to win over passengers and freights, the Collins Line was essentially 
a market factor over which Cunard had no direct control. Where the shrewdness and 
ingenuity came in was when the Cunard owners had the sense to stick with what they knew 
(their comparative advantage), safety and reliability, rather than in any foreknowledge that 
the Collins approach was going to fail. Had it not been for the loss of several vessels by 
Collins, an element over which Cunard had absolutely no control, the story might have 
ended with Collins the victor, although Cunard might have survived in any event. Likewise, 
fluctuations in the immigrant trade were outside the company's control. Again, it had the 
good sense, unlike many of its rivals, to spread its risks, thus demonstrating commercial 
adaptability rather than consistency. While Hyde was correct in stressing the importance of 
having a sound management strategy, such decisions often were reactions to impersonal 
market forces rather than the results of solid planning or dynamic personalities. Still, this 
in no way detracts from the managers' role in making their strategy workable, nor does it 
negate their ability to adapt when market conditions changed. 
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In some ways this approach fits in well with Graeme Milne's recent work on 
Liverpool investing and business, which we will examine shortly. Hyde was concerned with 
the choices businessmen make, regardless of whether they end in success or ruin. Milne also 
felt that choice was a central factor in approaching the business of shipping. In fact, both 
authors have written about the mid-nineteenth century, the time when innovations such as 
the transition to steam and iron construction came about, although Hyde's work always had 
more temporal breadth. Hyde's research is an early example ofthe role that decision making 
and human agency played in a business that has often been viewed solely from a 
macroeconomic perspective. Where Hyde and Milne differ is in the latter's quest to 
incorporate the operations and decisions of lesser-known, but nonetheless important, 
companies which were often overlooked by the adherents of the Liverpool School. 
Still, not all of Hyde's work is characterized by this narrow perspective, for in the 
early 1970s he produced a work that went beyond the confines of institutional business 
history. Indeed, it can be claimed that Hyde's Liverpool and the Mersey was the first 
scholarly, book-length overview of Liverpool as a port. Unlike the Cunard study or his other 
earlier works, this was not a monograph of a large Liverpool firm. 21 Aside from breaking 
new ground for the author himself, the work remains relevant after more than thirty years. 
21 
For the contribution of the other member of the Liverpool school, see Sheila Marriner, Rathbones of Liverpool, 
1845-73 (Liverpool, 1961). 
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Hyde intended the book to update previous histories of the city. 22 As was and is typical in 
port history, Hyde made no direct challenge to earlier commentators but sought to expand 
the reader's understanding of the port's dynamics. 23 Many of the earlier studies concentrated 
on specific aspects of the port, such as its spatial characteristics, financial administration and 
types of vessels attracted. Hyde's introduction indicated a desire to combine these loose 
strands into a broader tapestry of city development. This is especially important given the 
300-year period during which Liverpool and the Mersey have been focal points for British 
trade, commerce and empire. He aimed to "broaden the scope of inquiry" into the port and 
to "link growth with the aims and aspirations of an acquisitive society. "24 
In this book Hyde covered a broad range of topics over a long period of time. 
Beginning before 1700, he brought the story ofLiverpool up to the 1960s. In the process he 
covered subjects ranging from port administration to various foreign trades to the future 
prospects for the port. This type of overview tends toward "top-down" history, but in taking 
a macro view the study of elites is understandable. Therefore, Hyde's large store of primary 
22 
One example of these was Baines, History of the Commerce and Town of Liverpool. Using municipal records, 
Baines looked at commercial wealth and its impact on Liverpool, plus how such aided the expansion ofthe city's 
influence overseas. Hyde, Liverpool, xv, claims that he wanted to build on this. 
23 
The number of debates in port history are extremely small. In addition to the debate over the port city or 
functional approach discussed earlier, the best example might be over the cause of the nineteenth-century rise 
of the port of New York. For the debate, see Robert G. Albion, The Rise of New York Port, 1815-1860 (New 
York, 1939); and Jean Heffer, Le port de New York et le commerce exterieur americain, 1860-1900 (Paris, 
1986). 
24 
Hyde, Liverpool, xv. 
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sources were largely employed to discuss the movers and shakers who led the port's 
commercial life, such as merchants, shipowners and engineers, rather than to understand the 
social dynamics of the "lower orders," such as the mariners and dock workers who 
contributed to Liverpool's growth as a trading centre (In its focus on shipowners this thesis 
naturally follows along these lines). Although it is an imperfect study, historians of the port 
of Liverpool owe Hyde a debt for his wide-ranging examination which certainly provided 
a better foundation than had existed previously. 
Hyde's overall characterization of the port was one of spectacular growth over two 
and a half centuries, but with Liverpool's future as a port always in some doubt. Hyde traced 
the growth principally through figures on shipping using the port. These indicate a sustained 
rise between 1860 and 1914 of2.1 percent per year, which then declined until the early 
1950s before recovering until a further decline set in after 1966. Hyde also employed 
investment figures for dock works and harbour facilities to reinforce this picture of growth. 
These too show steady growth for the pre-1914 period but are not as reliable an indicator of 
prosperity because such improvements were often undertaken to bolster the success of a 
flagging development. Nonetheless, combined with shipping statistics they do reinforce 
Hyde's thesis of the sustained prosperity ofLiverpool until the First World War and its role 
as an important engine for the national economy. This has often been taken as a truism by 
British port historians, but Hyde does a capable job of actually proving the point.25 
25 
Hyde, Liverpool, 204-207. The bulk of Hyde's study concentrates on the years after 1800, although there is 
some attention paid to earlier developments, especially in Chapters One and Two. Five years after Hyde's 
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As for the future Hyde was less certain, but he remained optimistic. Despite a 
considerable downturn in the fortunes of Liverpool in the years immediately preceding the 
appearance of Hyde's book, he believed in the capacity ofLiverpudlians to recover from 
adversity. Indeed, he ends his work with the following commentary: 
The hope must be that the native intelligence ofMerseyside's own citizens 
will be adequate for the promotion of her continuing prosperity, for the 
preservation of a dynamic self-interest and for the application of that self-
interest in the wider perspective of Britain and the world as a whole. 26 
Like Hyde, Peter Davies was at least guardedly optimistic about the future of 
Liverpool's shipping industry in the early 1970s. Unlike his mentor, who did not foresee 
Liverpool's new era, Davies in 2000 had the opportunity to publish a new edition of his 
classic 1973 study of Elder Dempster (ED), The Trade Makers. In an updated chapter that 
took the firm (and its successors) through the end of the twentieth century, Davies was able 
to revisit predictions he had made previously about the company's future. Since this work 
is arguably the best- known example of the Liverpool School, and since it represents one of 
monograph appeared Paul Clemens produced an article concentrating solely on the port ofLiverpool in the years 
before 1750, with an emphasis on the seventeenth century. It was in the last quarter of the seventeenth century 
that Liverpool rose to prominence as a port. Clemens' study is an important reminder of the role of comparative 
advantage and adaptability to a maritime commercial centre. Building on Liverpool's strengths, including its 
location and growing hinterland population, the port's mercantile community was able to take advantage of 
changing market conditions that saw commodities like sugar become commonplace imports. In time the growth 
of other trades, especially that in slaves, also favoured Liverpool. Building on its "dynamic urban growth and 
geographical position," Liverpool overtook rival Bristol in the trade following the outbreak of war in 1739 which 
hindered Bristol's own position. From the mid-1700s, and lasting until the trade was abolished, Liverpool 
became the world's premier slaving port. (Although the years after 1750 do not figure into Clemens article, it 
is worth noting that Liverpool's mercantile community was also able to adapt to the loss of this trade). Paul G. 
E. Clemens, "The Rise ofLiverpool, 1665-1750," Economic History Review, XXIX, no. 2 (May 1976), 211-213 
and 219. 
26 
Hyde, Liverpool, 214. 
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the most recent commentaries on the seemingly- terminal decline of the British shipping 
industry, it is useful to examine it in some detaiF7 
The focus of Elder Dempster's activities in the late nineteenth and the first seven 
decades of the twentieth century was West Africa. It is not necessary to go into deeply into 
ED's early history here, but Davies does make a number of important observations about its 
involvement in the Africa trade and the effects ofthis concentration. Davies argues that the 
provision of a satisfactory shipping service by the African Steam Ship Company from 1852 
and the British and African Steam Navigation Company after 1869 was an important factor 
in the development of West Africa. Indeed, a similar process occurred in Chile where, as we 
will see in Chapters Seven and Eight, the Pacific Steam Navigation Company provided a 
substantial amount of infrastructure, along with its transport services, to the west coast of 
South America. In the West African case, Davies argued, the crucial event occurred when 
the two steamer companies merged under the auspices of Elder Dempster and Company. As 
a result, there was a substantial investment in facilities that were essential for the expansion 
of trade. In the absence of a similar capital outlay by the colonial governments, these 
investments exerted a disproportionate influence on the late-Victorian "scramble for Africa." 
The case study chapters that follow detail a number of instances where external factors such 
27 
Peter Neville Davies, The Trade Makers: Elder Dempster in West Africa, 1852-1972 (London, 1973; revised 
ed., St. John's, NL, 2000). All subsequent references refer to the new edition. A good overview of Britain's 
decline as a seafaring nation is Tony Lane, Grey Dawn Breaking: British Merchant Seafarers in the Late 
Twentieth Century (Manchester, 1986). The introduction in particular focuses on the erosion of the British flag 
fleet after the 1960s. Lane's monograph was published at just about the time Brockle banks and the Pacific Stearn 
Navigation Company ceased to exist and only three years before Elder Dempster was sold to foreigners. 
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as warfare directly impacted on the commercial fortunes of shipowning firms like 
Brocklebanks. Davies' example here was a clear indication that the process worked in both 
directions. The activities of shipowners could and often did impact on the wider political 
situation. The British Empire was founded as much on trade as on anything else~ when we 
remember that ships - along with railroads - were responsible for the movement of 
practically all the world's long-distance trade goods, this influence is quite understandable. 28 
Although Elder Dempster was initially founded by Alexander Elder and John 
Dempster it eventually came under the control of Alfred Jones, who joined the firm in 1879 
as a junior partner.29 Jones was one of the most dynamic, influential and interesting figures 
to emerge from the Liverpool shipowning community. From the time he assumed full control 
of Elder Dempster in 1884, until his death, the company acted essentially as a holding 
company for Jones' commercial and shipping interests. From 1884 to 1909 he increased its 
28 
Davies, Trade Makers, xxxi-xxxii. On British imperialism generally see Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share: A 
Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1983 (London, 1984); Niall Ferguson, Empire. The Rise and Demise 
of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (London, 2002) and P. J. Cain and A G. Hopkins, 
British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914 (London, 1993 ). An interesting popular account of 
the empire is Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (New York, 1994). 
29 
Alfred Lewis Jones (1845-1909). Born to middle-class Welsh parents, his family moved to Liverpool when he 
was three. After a childhood he described as "uneventful," Jones went to sea as a cabin boy in 1859- making 
his only voyage to West Africa. Upon his return to Merseyside Jones was made an office boy with his vessel's 
agents, W. And H. Laird. Jones appeared frustrated with the firm's (now named Fletcher and Parr) lack of 
innovation. In 1878 he formed his own firm, Alfred L. Jones and Company. The following year he began running 
vessels to West Africa. Alexander Elder and John Dempster, who had worked with Jones at his old employer, 
saw in the small business a potential rival and made him an offer of a junior partnership. Knowing the pair 
personally, Jones accepted and became part of Elder Dempster and Company - the enterprise he would 
eventually control- on I October 1879. Davies, Trade Makers, 37-43. For more detail on Jones, see Davies, 
Sir Alfred Jones: Shipping Entrepreneur Par Excellence (London, 1978). 
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value from about £50,000 to £1,910,000, making large sums on products such as silver, coal 
and cement. After the mid-1890s Elder Dempster, under Jones' auspices, had a near 
monopoly on West African seaborne trade. Again, however, the most important point that 
Davies made about Elder Dempster concerned its wider impact on West Africa. Without the 
company's large-scale investment, viable economic growth in West African trades could not 
have occurred. Investment was encouraged by a rising demand for the region's exports, 
notably products derived from the palm plant. Jones founded the Bank of British West 
Africa, organized coasting companies and built up a system ofbranch-line steamers. He also 
owned an interest in the South Nigerian Railway. In short, Jones' activities gave a strong 
impetus to trade. By "priming the pump," as Davies put it, Elder Dempster and its associated 
shipping companies increased the tempo of change in West Africa and expanded the growth 
oflegitimate business. Without the services and investment provided by Elder Dempster, the 
region's economic development would have begun much later and would likely have been 
far slower in gathering momentum. 30 
30 
Davies, Trade Makers, 42-55, 83-87 and 125-129. Davies adds qualifications to the role played by Jones and 
Elder Dempster, however. He reminds readers that it was more likely the company's potential role in West 
Africa, rather than what it actually achieved there, which persuaded British governments to become involved 
in the region. Also, regarding the "scramble for Africa," he feels there was no way the Home Government could 
have stood idly by watching the activities offoreign nations in developing West Africa without taking some 
action - even without the presence of Elder Dempster and its associates. Nonetheless, their role remained 
important in determining the pace of regional development and the British influence there. For additional insight 
into Jones and Elder Dempster, see: Adrian Jarvis, "Alfred Jones: Integration and Adversity in Liverpool," in 
Lewis R. Fischer ( ed. ), From Wheel House to Counting House: Essays in Maritime Business History in Honour 
of Professor Peter Neville Davies (St. John's, NL, 1992), 245-266. In the article Jarvis focuses on Jones' (and 
ED's) relationship with bodies like the Mersey Docks and Harbours Board on such issues as berthage, cartage 
and rail linkages. Jarvis makes the important point that many Dock Board members became so concerned with 
the problems of ship handling that they often forgot that docks were not really made for the vessels but for the 
goods they carried. 
55 
Following Jones' death in 1909 ED was acquired by Lord Kylsant's Royal Mail 
Group, which we will encounter again in the discussion ofPSNC. Although Elder Dempster 
suffered great tonnage losses in World War One, it persevered. The Great Depression and 
the collapse of the Royal Mail Group in 1931 were also blows to the firm, but it survived as 
part of the West African Lines Company with Sir Richard Dunning Holt as Chairman of the 
Elder Dempster branch. The group ventured into aviation in the 1930s, endured the Second 
World War and thereafter entered a period of great prosperity. The company's fortunes 
declined during the 1960s, but by 1973 ED was still financially viable in its own right and 
quite competitive in the traditional West African trades. In addition, it was strengthened by 
an association with, and eventual takeover by, Ocean Transport and Trading Limited 
(formerly Holts). At this point Davies' original work ended, and he was clearly confident 
about Elder Dempster's chances of survival into the next century and beyond. This 
judgement, of course, did not and perhaps could not anticipate the tremendous changes 
about to occur in the context ofBritish shipping generally. 31 Such developments could never 
have been anticipated by earlier generations, particularly in the mid-nineteenth century, 
31 
This is a very truncated overview ofDavies' discussion, which should be read in full to appreciate the vicissitudes 
of the company's fortunes in the period, and in the years 1973 to 1989. In revisiting Elder Dempster for the latter 
period Davies found that although the enterprise performed relatively well into the early 1980s, ED soon ran into 
problems. Although the firm successfully made the switch to containers, this reorganization, along with the 
emergence of air transport, induced Elder Dempster to abandon its traditional passenger services. Likewise, 
falling conference profits and the inroads made by competitors impacted negatively on ED's West African 
operations. In the larger context, ED's parent company, the Ocean Group, was moving away from maritime 
enterprises. In 1989 - amid low freight rates, poor cargo levels, fierce competition and dismal economic 
forecasts - the French shipowners Delmas Vieljeux made an offer to Ocean for much of its Elder Dempster 
operations. Ocean accepted the offer, and Elder Dempster passed out of British control. Davies, Trade Makers, 
131-352,353-381 and 392-396. 
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which will be the focus of our next study. 
Valerie Burton's "Liverpool's Mid-Nineteenth Century Coasting Trade" is at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from Davies or Hyde's work. Where some historians such as 
Simon Ville have been concerned that port historians demonstrate change over long periods, 
Burton's study takes a snapshot of Liverpool at a moment in time. The main source for her 
research are the Liverpool Bills of Entry, which were compilations of customs information 
published daily for Liverpool and other ports from 1819. To gain an insight into Liverpool 
shipping Burton has sampled the Bills for the months of March, July and October 185 3. This 
form of survey does have its drawbacks, however. As Ville would no doubt point out, 
looking at a single year (or only three months in a year) cannot show any long-term 
evolution. Also, as Burton admits, the source and year of study also have their limitations. 
The Bills, although fairly comprehensive, do not always note the full range of traded 
commodities. Furthermore, Bills ofEntry for Liverpool do not cover the entire customs port. 
In addition to problems with the source, Burton also notes that 1853 was an atypical year for 
the British economy: a boom in foreign exports, combined with poor domestic harvests, may 
have affected coastal traffic, although to what extent is uncertain. 32 At the same time, the 
fact that she is focussing on the coastal trade helps to make this essay so important. 
The Bills record data on vessels and the cargoes they brought into major British 
ports, but they are particularly rich in data on the coasting trade. It is the coastal aspect of 
32 
Burton, "Liverpool's Mid-Nineteenth Century Coasting Trade," 27-28. It is also unfortunate for researchers that 
after 1853 the Bills become less comprehensive. 
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Liverpool's shipping on which Burton concentrates, noting rightly that much more attention 
has been paid to Liverpool's foreign-going commerce. This study can rightly claim to be 
ground-breaking. Although as of 1989, when Burton wrote, many studies had focussed on 
deep-sea shipping or, like Gordon Jackson's work on Hull, paid only limited attention to 
coasting, few, if any, had made the coasting trade their sole focus. As Burton noted, "[f]ew 
previous attempts have been made to describe, let alone quantify and analyse, the coasting 
trade of any [British] port in the nineteenth century."33 Burton's findings that Liverpool 
coaster owners were leaders in adopting steam and that Liverpool enjoyed an extensive 
distribution network for products traded coastwise, were some of the first scholarly 
observations on this aspect of the port's trade. 
Burton's article reflected another trend in the writing of port history: an increasing 
propensity to publish articles rather than full-length monographs. This is not to imply that 
this is evidence of stagnation; on the contrary, in the decade and a half since the appearance 
of Burton's essay there has been a plethora of scholarly articles and a few books on British 
ports and their shipping industries. 34 One that falls in the latter category is Tony Lane's 1987 
33 
Burton, "Liverpool's Mid-Nineteenth Century Coasting Trade," 27. 
34 
See Gordon Jackson, "Do Docks Make Trade? The Case of the Port of Great Grimsby," in Fischer (ed.), From 
Wheel House to Counting House, 17-41; P. L. Cottrell. "Liverpool Shipowners, the Mediterranean. and the 
Transition from Sail to Steam During the Mid-Nineteenth Century," ibid., 153-202; Alan G. Jamieson, "'Not 
More Ports, but Better Ports:' The Development of British Ports Since 1945," The Northern Marine riLe Marin 
du nord, VI (January 1996), 29-34; John Chartres, "Trade and Shipping in the Port of London: Wiggins Key 
in the Later Seventeenth Century," in John Armstrong (ed.), Coastal and Short Sea Shipping (Ipswich, 1996), 
1-19; Anthony R. Henderson and Sarah Palmer, "The Early Nineteenth Century Port of London: Management 
and Labour in Three Dock Companies, 1800-1825," in Simon P. Ville and David M. Williams (eds.), 
Management, Finance and Industrial Relations in Maritime Industries: Essays in International Maritime and 
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work, Liverpool: Gateway of Empire. Although Liverpool has been studied more than most 
British ports, Lane's approach is innovative. Previous researchers tended toward overviews 
of how the port developed, both in physical and economic terms, or on the development of 
associated infrastructure. Lane viewed Liverpool as a unique entity, fact that he attributes 
in no small part to its role as a port. 35 
Lane notes that in the nineteenth century the distinctiveness of most British cities 
tended to disappear under London's influence. People read the same newspapers and 
advertisements and bought the same goods. On the national level British urban life was 
becoming homogenized. But according to Lane this was not the whole story. The particular 
industries with which a town or city becomes associated determines its unique character, 
which is often long-lived. In Lane's view Liverpool was especially distinctive because of the 
work and employment patterns generated by the port. To illustrate this point Lane notes 
differences between Liverpool and Manchester. In 1901 Liverpool functioned as an entre pot 
for the cotton spun and woven in Manchester. As one city was a port and one a cotton town, 
Business History (St. John's, NL, 1994), 31-50; Adrian Jarvis, "Managing Change: The Organization of Port 
Authorities at the Turn of the Twentieth Century," The Northern Mariner!Le Marin du nord, VI (April1996), 
1-12; and Adrian Jarvis, The Liverpool Dock Engineers (Stroud, 1997). 
35 
Tony Lane, Liverpool: Gateway of Empire (London, 1987). Another study which views nineteenth-century cities 
- at least in part - from the perspective of their uniqueness is Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities (Harmondsworth, 
1963). Briggs writes (33-34) that British cities in Victoria's reign " ... not only had markedly different topography, 
different economic and social structures, and quite different degrees of interest in their surrounding regions, but 
they responded differently to the urban problems which they shared in common." 
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they evolved much differently. 36 Liverpool required a large, casually employed population 
who could man and repair ships as well as meet the demands of cargo handling. 
Employment was affected by the elements, the time of year and the tides. Work on the 
Liverpool docks was uncertain, quite unlike the steady employment offered by Manchester's 
cotton mills. For this reason, Lane argues, Liverpool maintained its own ethos and social 
character. According to Lane, "[ i]t was being a port city on a scale unseen anywhere else in 
Britain that made Liverpool such a particular place.'m Lane's study, more than many of its 
predecessors, incorporated the contributions of its more lowly citizens, especially to the 
municipal character. He notes that on Good Friday the children living on the docks' southern 
end would run through the streets carrying burning effigies of Judas Iscariot. Unknown in 
the rest ofLiverpool and the United Kingdom, this folk ritual penetrated the neighbourhood 
by way of the Portuguese fruit trade.38 
Although Lane's study was not lengthy, he did weave the experience of the working 
classes into Liverpool's history in a way that many earlier researchers did not. 39 This was a 
36 
Lane, Liverpool, 17-18. By 1901, of course, Manchester had the Manchester Ship Canal, and was itself a port 
as well as a manufacturing centre. We must bear in mind, however, that it by no means had the same long 
evolution as a major port city that marked Liverpool. 
37 
Lane, Liverpool, 17-18. 
38 
Ibid., 38. 
39 
An exception here is E.L. Taplin, who has studied the British labour movement in a maritime context. His studies 
examined the working-class in Liverpool and other British ports. See Taplin, "Dock Labour in Liverpool: 
Occupational Structure and Working Conditions in the late Nineteenth Century," Transactions of the Historic 
Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, CXXVll (1977), 133-54; The Dockers' Union :A Study of the National 
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trend which grew in popularity over the next decade. While Lane's study was not strictly a 
port history, it was testimony to the unique character of the city. The study has become, 
almost by necessity, port history. In this respect Lane's work runs along the same lines as 
Frank Broeze' s research in that it supports the view that ports cannot be properly viewed in 
isolation from their hinterland. Lane reminds us that this process was symbiotic: just as early 
settlers may found ports and later entrepreneurs add new trades and infrastructure, the port 
itself can affect the character of the people whose lives are intertwined with it. This, I would 
also argue, makes up part of the comparative advantage enjoyed in the shipping industry by 
people who have grown up, or at least resided in, port cities, especially world port cities like 
Liverpool. In effect, Lane's book attempted to cover new ground by looking at Liverpool as 
a city defined by its function. 4° Certainly, the idea of Liverpool as a place defined by its 
Union of Dock Labourers, 1889-1922 (Leicester, 1985); and Near to Revolution: The Liverpool General 
Transport Strike of 1911 (Liverpool, 1994 ). On the latter subject see also, H.R. Hikins, "The Liverpool General 
Transport Strike, 1911 ," Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, CXIll (1962), 169-
195. Recent scholarship on Liverpool's dock workers, at least a specific group of them, has been carried out by 
Rachel Mulhearn. Although her work is more concerned with the provision of housing for individuals such as 
harbour, pier and dock masters, plus dock gatemen, Mulhearn's article does touch on their conditions of work. 
See Mulhearn, "Dockside Dwellings: The Provision of Housing by the Liverpool Dock Authorities during the 
19th Century," in The NorthernMariner!Le marin du nord, xm, No.3 (July 2003), 21-32. 
40 
Another work on a major British port, in this case London, appeared In the same year as Lane's study. This was 
W. Paul Clegg, Docks and Ports 2: London (Shepperton, 1987). Clegg's book is mentioned, not so much by 
dint of its scholarly importance but for the timing of its appearance. Although many port histories of London 
appeared over the years, Clegg was the first to return to the subject after the closure of the Port of London 
Authority's upper docks system. Although his work is more of a coffee table book. Clegg has endeavoured to 
touch on ancillary activities including pleasure craft and port users, which he feels have seldom been discussed 
(6). Like Lane, Adrian Jarvis, In Troubled Times, 14-25, also touches on Liverpool's distinctive character. He 
contends that the interaction of dock and related activities helped to shape the city. Most people, as he shows, 
earned a living either directly or indirectly form port-related work. But Jarvis goes on to argue that 
manufacturing was more important in Liverpool than has generally been assumed. Naturally a port that imported 
great quantities of tobacco, as did Liverpool, had factories producing pipe tobacco and cigarettes. The same was 
true of flour-milling and tanning. Liverpudlians also viewed their city as a northern cultural centre. 
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function as a port is present in the work of Adrian Jarvis, although Jarvis tends to focus more 
on the actual port itself rather than the larger metropolitan entity. 
Jarvis' Liverpool Central Docks, 1799-1905, has a number oftraits in common with 
the earlier works by Hyde and Jackson already discussed. Jarvis' book covers a fairly long 
period, and the years examined encompass the transition from sail to steam, the emergence 
of railways, the preeminence of the coal trade and the development of modem port 
infrastructure. This century is one of the best suited to the application of the idea of change 
over the long term (not to mention the maritime business community's ability to adapt) and 
coincides with a period of great prosperity for Liverpool as a city and port. Jarvis' work is 
focussed on a particular group of elites within the port, engineer Jesse Hartley being one 
example, and on bodies like the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (MD & HB). As this 
history is greatly concerned with the development of port facilities, their role is paramount. 
In tackling such topics, rather than the more traditional city business community, Jarvis 
reflects a desire by port historians to explore new avenues of research. 41 
Jarvis confines his study to Liverpool's central docks rather than covering the whole 
port. This is advantageous because the sheer complexity of Liverpool's shipping industry 
often precludes taking Jarvis' micro-level view. Moreover, his book contains one of the few 
truly evocative re-creations of daily life on the docks of Liverpool or any port. He actually 
subtitles the chapter "A Day in the Life of a Dock," as "factional," to reflect its creative 
41 
Jarvis, Liverpool Central Docks. 
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interpretation of available evidence. Purists might dismiss such an approach as not being 
"true history," but Jarvis does instill the feeling for what life might have entailed for those 
who depended on the docks for a livelihood. The result is perhaps the closest a modem 
scholar can get to Henry Mayhew's first-hand tour of the waterfront. True history or not, 
Jarvis' reconstruction marks an innovative approach to port history.42 
Jarvis has recently built on this work, taking the story up to the outbreak of World 
War II. Although this monograph is more temporally limited than his previous works on 
Liverpool, it has a broader spatial scope, taking in practically all the Mersey Dock Estate, 
although with less emphasis on Birkenhead. Jarvis' title is In Troubled Times, and the work 
is mainly concerned with an era often viewed as the turbulent precursor to Britain's 
disappearance from oceanic commercial routes. Jarvis' quest is to place the Board's 
activities within this broader context, while fleshing out the decision making process of the 
42 
Ibid., 178. Henry Mayhew (1812-1887). Mayhew was the son of a well-to-do solicitor. Aged nineteen and 
already unsuccessful in legal and seafaring careers, young Mayhew decided on journalism. After publishing a 
number of magazines and other publications with varying success, between 1851 and 1862 he wrote his magnum 
opus, London Labour and the London Poor (4 vols., London, 1851-1862). Although Mayhew was largely 
forgotten in later life this work lived on as one of the great works of Victorian sociology. It revealed a world 
totally alien to most residents of London's fashionable West End neighbourhoods. Although it did not lead to 
immediate reforms, Mayhew's study was one of the first, and best, chronicles of the great mass of the British 
poor. From a maritime standpoint the most pertinent of Mayhew's chapters is titled "Docks, Dockers and 
Watermen." It not only profiles the physical character of the dock area itself but provides a first-hand account 
of daily life for people like lightermen and bargemen that is almost unequalled as a primary source. One 
especially evocative paragraph opens with the lines: 
As you enter the dock the sight of the forest of masts in the distance, and the tall chimneys 
vomiting clouds of black smoke, and the many coloured flags flying in the air, has a most 
peculiar effect; while the sheds with the monster wheels arching through the roofs look like 
the paddleboxes of large steamers. Along the quay you see, now men with their faces blue 
with indigo, and now gaugers, with their long brass-tipped rule dripping with spirit from the 
cask they have been probing ... 
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MD & HB. Of particular interest in the context of this study is the way in which Jarvis 
incorporates the role of other interests in actions taken by the Board. The Liverpool 
shipowning community was especially prominent, both as a pressure group and as a source 
of board members. Oddly enough, a relationship that was in theory symbiotic, ended up in 
practice being more parasitic. 43 
From its inception in 1858 the MD & HB tried, not always successfully, to integrate 
more closely the port into Liverpool's wider business community. In Jarvis' view this was 
due in part to perceived relationships among the city's business elites. Although they had 
their differences, shipowners and merchants still felt themselves superior to those who 
engaged solely in manufacturing and the trades. On balance Jarvis believes that the Board's 
"achievement of the period 1905-1938 is that in absolute terms as distinct from market share 
the port arguably did better than between ... 1875 and 1905 and did it in circumstances of 
acute difficulty. "44 
Part of the problem (not to discount outside economic conditions) concerned the 
relationship of the Board to a major part of its clientele - and some of its most important 
members- the shipowners. Jarvis ended Liverpool Central Docks with an analysis of the 
state of the port of Liverpool in 1905. Although superficially the picture looked rosy, there 
43 
Jarvis, In Troubled Times. Jarvis engages similar themes in his works "The Port ofLiverpool and the Shipowners 
in the Late Nineteenth Century," Great Circle, XVI, No. 1 (1994), 1-22; and "The Port of Liverpool and the 
Shipowners, c. 1910-38," The NorthemMariner/LeMarin du nord, XII (2002), 23-40. 
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Jarvis,/n Troubled Times, 12-13 and 210. 
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were certain troubling portents for the future. These included a perceived need to build ever 
larger dock structures to keep the business of the new Atlantic Leviathans and certain 
inefficiencies in the Board's own structure. Here the port's shipowners crop up as critics of 
the Board, and this theme is further expanded on in In Troubled Times. A central problem 
for the early twentieth-century Board was debt accumulation, both to finance new 
construction and to modernize of older facilities. The debt that accrued eventually 
contributed to the MD & HB's collapse in 1972. The situation was exacerbated by the 
attitude of shipowners, who were seldom if ever ready to pay port dues commensurate with 
what the Board needed for its projects. Whenever the Board did find itself with extra cash 
reserves shipowners clamoured for rate cuts, rather than accepting that the MD & HB use 
this revenue for debt reduction. Perhaps such an outlook was understandable considering 
that such dues cut into shipowners' profits. The strangest aspect of this equation was that so 
many Board members and chairmen over the years were themselves shipowners. Given such 
service, it might be expected that Liverpool's shipowners (or at least those who had served 
on the Board) would have been quite sensitive to the Dock Board's needs, but such was not 
the case. In many cases MD&HD members who were also shipowners made" ... repeated and 
sometimes unreasonable demands on the Board which, when acted upon, resulted in heavy 
expenditure on facilities which did not meet their own interest costs, much less allow for 
depreciation. "45 
45 
Ibid, 39-41, 128 and 138-139; and Jarvis, Liverpool Central Docks, 200-221. Jarvis' example here is Sir Alfred 
Read (b. 1871) who in 1917 was chair of the Coast Lines, then Britain's largest coasting group. While in this 
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The refusal of certain of the Board's shipowners to balance its problems against their 
own short-term interests mattered since shipowners, along with persons in commerce, 
banking and insurance, comprised a high proportion of Dock Board membership over the 
years. Although Jarvis considers the Board's performance over these troubled three decades 
on balance to have been positive, the attitude of the port's shipowners (especially Board 
members who should have known better) was certainly a detriment. On the positive side, if 
such individuals with their intimate ties to Liverpool's commerce had been unwilling to 
serve altogether, perhaps even less would have been achieved. 
Jarvis does not really weigh the relative importance of such factors to the success of 
the Docks Board from 1905 to 1938. Still, his discussion is important in reminding us of the 
interplay (not always positive) between the needs of a port and of those who invested in its 
tonnage or used its facilities. Neither could exist without the other. Although the trend 
toward shipowners taking an active role in public life was waning in the Edwardian period, 
at least some saw a continued need to serve on the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board. As 
part of the resident investor community, their role in Board operations was extensive, even 
if sometimes self-serving. 
Ports like Liverpool, along with their residents and commercial elites, have greatly 
influenced history but in more subtle ways than many institutions. This may be why their 
position Read also sat on the Mersey Docks & Harbour Board. Despite this overlap of interests he, like many 
of the board's other shipowners, seemed unable to balance its interests with their own. Jarvis, In Troubled Times, 
80-83. Jarvis' biographical details are taken from NML, MMM, MAL, Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (MD 
& HB), Antecedents A 212. 
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importance as objects of historical inquiry is only recently being systematically exploited. 
Yet we must remember that such places have existed for hundreds of years. Prior to the 
information age they were the principal centres for exchanging information, ideas and 
customs on a global scale. On a national level the same may be said for British ports. 
Through her ports were exported not only Britannia's goods but her language, ideals and 
even people. Given this importance and the work remaining to be done, it is not surprising 
that maritime historians continue to fill in pieces of the puzzle, even if their work has not 
yet gelled into firm strands of theory or produced easily recognizable schools of thought. 46 
Although still waiting for this development to occur, the historian of maritime 
Liverpool will be gratified to see the appearance of Graeme Milne's recent monograph, 
Trade and Traders in Mid-Victorian Liverpool. As Milne notes, Hyde's work was the last 
comprehensive economic history of Liverpool, even though it appeared over three decades 
ago. Although Liverpool has been subjected to much scrutiny over the years, Milne correctly 
makes the point that little of this work has been genuinely scholarly, and in recent years 
authors have tended to take a narrow focus, whether this be from a temporal or topical 
46 
Perhaps one theme which has been given some credence in recent scholarship is the idea of the port as a 
community (although Jarvis' example reminds us that it was not always a community of interests). The idea that 
this community and its related linkages were vital elements of shipowning crops up in Milne and Boyce in terms 
of information networks and the value of interpersonal relationships. Herein it most concretely relates to the 
notion that being resident in a particular port formed part of investors' comparative advantages. By being "in 
the know," or part of an established commercial network, an investor working within the milieu of his own port 
was much better placed to succeed in the business of shipping, although it must be reiterated that there were no 
guarantees on this score. The idea of a port community forms one of the overarching themes of Fischer and 
Jarvis (eds.), Harbours and Havens. In his own contribution to the work Jarvis contends that " ... the success of 
a port development...is partly determined by the ... cost of transmitting mercantile information ... " Jarvis, "Port 
History," 33. 
67 
standpoint. 
Another concept with which Milne tries to grapple is human agency. In this he 
perhaps comes as close as anyone during the last few decades to establishing a new 
paradigm for Liverpool scholarship. Two main themes of the work are "change and choice." 
Like many previous historians, he focusses on the concept of change as it applied to the 
Victorian shipping industry and, by extension, to shipping investors in Liverpool. What 
distinguishes Milne from many others is his focus on the human side of the industry, in other 
words, the choices made by real human beings. A problem he sees in previous scholarship 
on Liverpool (and other ports) is the tendency, especially among economic historians, to 
concentrate on broad tends and statistics without looking at the man on the spot, as it were. 
The central feature of any economic community is the players themselves, as it is they, their 
contacts and activities that comprise the statistics. Milne also tries to present these people 
as "proactive" in the sense that they were not merely objects being flung to and fro by the 
forces that surrounded them. Merseyside's shipping community was a complex web of 
persons, all of whom actively took steps to improve their chances of success in what was, 
by definition, a risky proposition in an industry always in flux. It is not that such ideas are 
unique to Milne but that he consciously, and fairly consistently, brings out the idea of human 
agency as it applied to shipowning which makes his work a useful model. In applying the 
notion of agency he gives weight not only to those businesses and owners who were 
successful but also to those that ruined themselves by making the wrong choices. Again the 
word choice must be emphasized. Milne uses these examples to reinforce the point that 
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success or failure both depended not so much on the market but on how shipowners chose 
to handle the market- something Milne feels many economic historians lose sight of amidst 
their often sophisticated calculations. 47 
Another reason Milne feels new work is needed concerns the nature of previous 
research. Yet from reading his monograph it is difficult to conclude that previous 
scholarship was inadequate; instead, it seems to be that much of it tended to focus on very 
specific areas of trade or on aspects of the port ofLiverpool, in the process leaving many 
vital questions unanswered. The following pages to some extent reflect my reading ofMilne. 
It encompasses an even longer period than the one about which Milne wrote, although 
admittedly I place more emphasis on the "success stories," especially in Chapters Seven to 
Ten. But I do not downplay the enterprises that failed; indeed, many of the investors 
examined in the aggregate in Chapters Five and Six do not, by most criteria, qualify as 
"successes." Yet like their more successful counterparts they played the game of business, 
but lost. This does not mean they had no importance to Liverpool's commercial life, as 
Milne is quick to point out. For present purposes, however, long-standing firms like 
Brocklebanks and PSNC may provide the best illustrations of the ability to find and exploit 
a comparative advantage in the shipowning business while also displaying the flexibility to 
adapt in times of flux. This does not necessarily mean that shipowners who went out of 
business failed to employ such methods, but only that they were necessarily less successful 
47 
Milne, Trade and Traders, 12-17. 
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over the long term (certainly to 1914). Depending on the specific trades involved, vessel 
owners made a wide variety of choices to try and succeed. In retrospect some of these 
approaches may seem hidebound or overly conservative, but in the end they were wholly 
practical solutions to a complex set of challenges, as we will observe in the chapters to 
come. 
But before studying the actual investors who owned and operated tonnage registered 
in the principal port on Merseyside, we will first look at the physical capital in which he (or 
sometimes she) invested - the vessels themselves. This is necessary because this form of 
capital is what separated the shipowner from other types of investors. Moreover, the 
deployment and composition of individual fleets were the vehicles through which owners 
could adapt to changing market conditions, another important theme in this thesis. 48 As we 
will see in Chapters Three and Four, Liverpool owners invested in a wide variety of different 
types of vessels, although there were also clearly patterns that separated them from owners 
elsewhere in Britain and around the world. 
48 
For example, an owner might chose (if possible) to downsize a fleet, shift it to other trades, or take advantage 
of economies of scale during times of low returns. Conversely, the shipowner could decide to invest in new 
technologies, such as metal construction or steam propulsion, when times improved. 
Chapter 3 
Capital- Liverpool's Sailing Fleet 
The following chapter will detail the actual capital in which Liverpool shipowners invested, 
the vessels themselves. The purpose is to introduce readers to the gross investment patterns 
which these owners pursued in the era of sail, at least from 1820 on (steam tonnage will be 
detailed in the following chapter). A number of themes herein are pertinent to the 
overarching ideas of comparative advantage and adaptability. As the decades passed, for 
example, Liverpudlians' gross investment in sail tonnage tended toward larger vessels, 
frequently ship or barque-rigged, with mid-sized tonnage (250-499 tons) becoming 
progressively rarer from the 1830s on. This related to Liverpool's traditional connection to 
intermediate and, increasingly, long-distance trades, a tendency that became more 
pronounced over time.' Liverpool's shipowning community, or a large segment thereof, 
found their comparative advantage in such trades, a trait they generally retained from 1820 
through 1914. 
Before 1850 practically all trades, except on the shortest routes, were undertaken by 
sail-powered craft. Sail is an ancient technology, even if improved upon over the 
generations. Nonetheless, Liverpool investors were certainly able to incorporate new 
technological developments like labour-saving devices and copper sheathing for hulls. The 
most striking innovations, however, were metal construction materials- iron and steel- for 
Intermediate (distance) trades may be considered those across the Atlantic, to the West Indies, the Mediterranean 
and to west Africa. Blue ocean trades might generally be regarded as those to the Antipodes, East Asia and the 
Indian subcontinent; the western coasts of the Americas would also fall into the latter category. 
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hulls and masts, allowing greater vessel dimensions, and thus utilization of economies of 
scale. In this way Liverpool shipowners, while retaining their comparative advantage in the 
blue-ocean sail trades, demonstrated a willingness to adapt their capital investments to better 
compete with the emerging steam trades. 2 
The growth and evolution of Liverpool's fleet from 1820 to 1889 (both sail and 
steam) came amidst a backdrop ofbroad shifts in international trade and British government 
policy toward shipping. Before dealing specifically with Liverpool's fleet these 
developments should be discussed. A good starting point is Lewis Fischer's and Helge 
Nordvik' s work on the economics oflate-nineteenth century trade, especially as this relates 
to the North Atlantic region. Fischer and Nordvik argue that at the beginning of the century 
most nations remained "tied to national, rather than international, economic perspectives. "3 
By the end of the century many countries had been integrated into an international, or world, 
economy. Fischer and Nordvik acknowledge a lack of consensus among economic historians 
as to the causes behind this integration, but feel that a number of preconditions underlie the 
shift. Large capital resources; the development of efficient markets to transfer this capital 
2 
Naturally, I do not argue that Liverpool owners were unique in adopting such innovations. On the efficacy of 
retaining sail tonnage during the first decades of steam competition see Gerald S. Graham, "The Ascendancy of 
the Sailing Ship 1850-85," Economic History Review, 2nd ser., IX (1956), 74-88. Graham (83) argues that it was 
only with the perfection of the compound engine that steam could finally outperform, and thus doom, sail on the 
longest routes. The process was incomplete through to the 1880s, making sail an efficient alternative to steam 
in the 1860s and 1870s. 
3 
Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W. Nordvik, "Maritime Transport and the Integration of the North Atlantic 
Economy, 1850-1914," in Wolfran Fischer, eta/. (eds.), The Emergence of a World Economy 1500-1914. 
Papers of the IX International Congress of Economic History (Bern, Switzerland, 1986), 519. 
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to meet regional demand; an expanding population; the procurement and exploitation of new 
sources of natural resources; plus a shift in the role of governments, especially relative to 
the development of economic liberalism, are all factors in promoting a modem international 
economy.4 
An international economy emerged as world trade increased. From 1800 to 1914 per 
capita foreign trade increased worldwide by approximately twenty-five times with Europe, 
the globe's most economically developed continent, at the centre of this exchange. 
Manufactured goods flowed outward from Europe, while food and raw materials were the 
most common continental imports. With this increased trade, expanding most rapidly around 
mid-century, came an enlarged demand for oceanic transport. The increasing scale of world 
trade generated a vast expansion in the world's merchant marine while, in a symbiotic 
relationship, the increased availability of cargo vessels itself fed the trend toward greater 
trade. 5 
Although the extent of the increase is debated, maritime historians generally agree 
4 
Fischer and Nordvik, "Maritime Transport," 519. On the idea of a "world economy," see Immanuel Wallerstein, 
The Politics of the World Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations (Cambridge, 1984), 13-
17. The model for this development is derived from W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-
Communist Manifesto (3rd ed., Cambridge, 1991), 17-35. For an easy introduction, see A. G. Kenwood and A.L. 
Lougheed, The Growth of the International Economy, 1820-1990 (3rd ed., London, 1992). We will return to this 
issue in Chapter Five. 
5 
Fischer and Nordvik, "Maritime Transport," 521-523; Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, 31; and Forrest 
Capie, "Britain and Empire Trade in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century, " in David Alexander and 
Rosemary Ommer, (eds.), Volumes Not Values: Canadian Sailing Ships and World Trade (St. John's, NL, 
1979), 7. Using Norwegian statistics, Fischer and Nordvik (525) estimate that world shipping tonnage grew by 
279 percent from 1850 to 1910. 
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that the size of the international merchant marine increased significantly after 1850. In the 
case of Britain, already the globe's leading maritime power, a carrying capacity of three 
million net tons in 1850 - a third of all world tonnage - expanded to over eleven million net 
tons on the eve ofWorld War I (When accounting for the greater efficiency of steam against 
sail, Britain's fleet accounted for half of all North Atlantic tonnage in 191 0). As was the case 
generally, this growth was spurred by, and encouraged, a greatly expanding trade. In the 
years from 1870 to 1914 alone, imports and exports to/from Great Britain more than doubled 
in value from less than £600 million to over £1 billion. In Britain's case, trade was allied to 
particular national advantages that propelled them past all maritime rivals. British 
dominance of shipping, Fischer and Nordvik contend, was based on their early lead in the 
industry and their pioneering role in the development of new technologies, especially steam. 
Of most relevance to our thesis is their idea that "British shipowners and agents had 
unparalleled contacts throughout the world, and this gave them a decisive comparative 
advantage [author's italics] in securing cargoes and charters. "6 
Along with increased trade, another factor that may have promoted the expansion of 
national merchant fleets over this period was government intervention. Fischer and Nordvik, 
6 
Fischer and Nordvik, "Maritime Transport," 526 and 532; and Capie, "Britain and Empire Trade," 5 (Capie's 
figures on the value of British overseas trade includes re-exports). See also Great Britain, House of Commons, 
Parliamentary Papers (BPP), LXLLL 1872; and XXXII 1916. Even taking inflation into account, the increased 
value of British trade over this period is notable. In terms of an expanded merchant marine no nation performed 
as well over this period as did Britain. Some merchant navies, like that of Germany, grew spectacularly in the 
decades prior to World War I. Norwegian tonnage capacity also expanded, via second-hand purchases and a 
robust shipbuilding programme. On the other hand, in the wake of their Civil War and new landward 
opportunities, the American deep-sea fleet displayed negative growth until the turn of the century when new 
government policies were enacted to expand the US presence on the North Atlantic. 
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in common with Gordon Boyce, dismiss the idea that providing subsidies invariably 
promoted an expanded merchant marine. Next to the UK Germany had the lowest rates of 
government subsidies but the most efficient merchant navy. The French employed this 
strategy but their fleet expanded at a slower rate than most of their North Atlantic rivals, 
with their government actually encouraging sail rather than steam operations. Of all the great 
maritime powers only Japan had any real success in using subsidies to encourage fleet 
expansion. As Boyce states, " ... subsidies and naval subventions were not effective 
substitutes for comparative advantage in the provision of shipping services. "7 Fischer and 
Nordvik argue that specific policies did not matter as much as how a government's 
commitment to their merchant navy was viewed by investors. Over the course of the 
nineteenth century, they contend, the British (and German) authorities conveyed " ... an on-
going commitment to a large merchant fleet. "8 
In fact, government intervention, as much as steam or the telegraph, was increasingly 
part of the reality of nineteenth-century British shipping. Early in the century government 
intervention in mercantile affairs was looked on with suspicion, despite the presence of Acts 
to encourage and promote British shipping, like the Navigation Laws. As late as 1837 a bill 
aimed at establishing a marine board to regulate the merchant navy was defeated in 
Parliament as it supposedly constituted an intrusion on the rights of shipowners. Only 
7 
Gordon H. Boyce, Information, Mediation and Institutional Development (Manchester, 1995), 21. 
8 
Fischer and Nordvik, "Maritime Transport," 533. 
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thirteen years later Parliament passed The Mercantile Marine Act of 1850. The Act 
established the Marine Department of the Board of Trade and transferred Admiralty powers 
relative to merchant mariners to the new body. The Act established local marine boards, and 
initiated compulsory examinations for masters and mates (although previously certified 
officers could be "grandfathered" in). Prior to engagement, seamen in overseas trades were 
now required to sign agreements witnessed by a shipping master selected by a local marine 
board. This Act marked a major shift in government policy toward the shipping industry. 
J.H. Wilde contends that it " ... may well be considered to mark the beginning of a new era 
in the regulation of British shipping, recognizing as it did that the state had some 
responsibility for securing the safety of life and property by sea as well as on land. "9 
The Act of 1850 was followed by a plethora of government regulation, including the 
Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 that extended the Board's powers and forced masters to 
specify in the Crew Agreements the food that would be provided to mariners during voyages. 
It may be this attitude, more than anything else, that persuaded investors of a government 
commitment to a strong national merchant marine, even while they frequently railed at 
"interference" in their business. After 1880 Germany emulated Britain's maritime success 
by also maintaining a consistent interest in, and commitment to, the shipping industry. On 
the other hand, nations like France who wavered in their support, despite generous subsidies, 
suffered from fluctuating investment patterns as far as the mercantile navy was concerned. 
9 
J.H. Wilde, "The Creation of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade," in David M. Williams (ed.) The 
World of Shipping (Aldershot, 1997), 193-194. 
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A similar situation developed in Canada where minimal government involvement in 
shipping, combined with the landward-oriented "National Policy," may have exacerbated 
declining investment. Such could not be said in the case of Britain's merchant marine. 10 
The discussion above should provide some context to the fairly consistent tonnage 
growth ofLiverpool' s fleet over the period 1820 to 1889. Without the stimulus of increased 
trade, and at least the perception of a national commitment to the merchant marine, it is 
unlikely that so many persons would have been considered investing in Liverpool shipping 
(or that of Britain generally). Thus the general state of British and world trade, plus 
increased government involvement in shipping, may have provided Liverpool shipowners 
with another kind of comparative advantage. With this in mind, we can now turn to 
examining the vessels themselves. 
Shipping, as Eric Sager and Gerald Panting have noted, is a service industry, and 
vessels are essentially "waterborne containers that perform the service oftransportation." 11 
Demand for transport is widespread and may derive from a number of sources, while the 
vessels often carry everything from people and products to information. In economic terms, 
10 
Ronald Hope, A New History of British Shipping (London, 1990), 287-288; and Wilde, "The Creation of the 
Marine Department," 23-24 and 29-31. On an earlier set of government regulations regarding shipping, 
especially apprenticeship, see V. C. Burton, "Apprenticeship Regulation and Maritime Labour in the Nineteenth 
Centuty British Merchant Marine," International Journal of Maritime History, I, No. I (June 1989), 29-50. On 
the subject ofhow specific government maritime legislation (in this case on education) related to Liverpool, see 
Alston Kennerley, "Merchant Marine Education in Liverpool and the Nautical College of 1892," International 
Journal of Maritime History, V, No.2 (December 1993), 103-134. 
II 
Eric W. Sager, with Gerald E. Panting, Maritime Capital: The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada I 820-1914 
(Montreal, 1990), 47. 
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as defined by both Marxists and neo-classicists, transport has a double function: on the one 
hand it is an independent offshoot of production while on the other it comprises a portion 
of the production process in other locales. Transportation can be used to link sources of raw 
materials with processing sites, manufacturing locales and markets. Transportation can 
likewise allow producers to assemble their raw materials and to take goods to intended 
markets. 12 
Regardless of the use to which the vessels were to be put, shipping investment at 
Liverpool (as we have noted) generally increased- although growth was not continual - in 
the years after 1820. This was despite an overall, though quite uneven, fall in freight rates 
in the decades after 1815. Much the same was true in the Atlantic Canadian Provinces, 
where the ports were studied extensively by members of the Atlantic Canada Shipping 
Project (ACSP). 13 Although growth in the investment in tonnage put onto the Liverpool 
register for the first time (gross investment) was not linear, the long-term trend was clearly 
positive through to mid-century; this was true both in terms of vessel numbers and carrying 
capacity (tonnage). Measured only by carrying capacity, the trend continued through to 1889 
(see Table 3.1, below). In 1820 gross investments in numbers totalled sixty-one vessels, a 
figure that was about fifty percent higher in 1830 and which had more than doubled again 
by 1840. As of 1850, the number of new investments in Liverpool was four times higher than 
12 
Ibid, 47. 
13 
On the ACSP, see Chapter One. 
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in 1820. The growth in gross investment in tonnage was even more dramatic. From just 
under 11,000tons in 1820, investment swelled to over 57,000 tons in 1840 and to more than 
80,000 tons by mid-century. Atlantic Canadian gross investment rates over approximately 
the same period were somewhat slower than in Liverpool, although the size of the region's 
combined fleet also rose fairly steadily. Taking registry data from eight Atlantic Canadian 
ports (whose fleets made up about eighty percent of all registries in the region) Sager and 
Panting, themselves ACSP members, found that in the years 1820 to 1849 annual gross 
tonnage investment in the eight ports grew by about 5. 5 percent per annum. 14 
Trends were somewhat different by the third quarter of the nineteenth century. In 
Liverpool, in 1860 the total number of vessels registered had actually declined somewhat 
from 1850 - to 216 - but gross tonnage investment increased significantly from a decade 
before, standing at 105,108 tons, a growth of almost ten-fold since 1820. In Atlantic Canada 
gross investment also declined with the largest class of newly-registered vessels (over 500 
tons) falling from approximately 30,000 tons in 1850 to about 25,000 in 1860. By 1870 there 
was some retrenchment in gross investment at Liverpool, as both vessel numbers and 
tonnage were down from a decade before in terms of new registries. Still, by 1889 numbers 
were again on the rise with tonnage figures especially buoyant (See Table 3.1). In Atlantic 
14 
Great Britain, Board of Trade (BT) 107 and 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; Sager, with 
Panting, Maritime Capital, 246. For additional insight into Atlantic Canadian fleet growth rates in this period 
see, Keith Matthews, "The Shipping Industry of Atlantic Canada: Themes and Problems," in Keith Matthews 
and Gerald Panting ( eds. ), Ships and Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region (St. John's, NL, 1978), 1-18. 
Matthews' tables included data for all modem regions of Canada, not simply Atlantic Canada. 
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Canada new registrations peaked around the mid-1860s, before quickly falling off By 1870 
the registries of larger vessels was recovering, although new investment in smaller craft 
(those of 499 tons and less) was generally falling. Here gross investment peaked in the mid-
1870s, with numbers generally declining thereafter. In overall terms Sager and Panting saw 
no acceleration in overall growth rates for gross investment in new tonnage after 1849. In 
fact, from then until the peak year of 1874 overall growth stood at only 0.9 percent per 
annum, far slower than the thirty years before mid-century. 15 
Table 3.1 
Liverpool Gross Shipping Investment, 1820-1889: New Vessel Registries 
by Number and Tonnage (Selected Years Only) 
1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1889 
Vessels 61 92 141 243 216 161 137 157 
Tons 
Source: 
10,976 17,642 57,005 80,822 105,108 100,362 111,258 173,600 
Great Britain, Board of Trade (BT) 107/108, Liverpool Shipping Registries, 
various years. 
These new investments were largely made in a period of declining freight rates. The 
decline in freight rates was both consistent and noticeable, suggesting that investment in 
tonnage was outstripping demand. This, in turn, would almost certainly have led to lower 
rates of return, barring major improvements in vessel productivity. Neo-classical theory 
15 
B T 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 95-96. In 
Atlantic Canada net registration continued to increase- the overall size of the Atlantic Canadian fleet was larger 
in 1860 than in 1850, for example, although new registries were down. Given that new (gross) vessel 
registrations were fairly stagnant after 1850 Sager and Panting feel that the net increase in fleet size was mainly 
due to the acquisition oflarger vessels of greater durability which were simply retained longer by their owners. 
See also Matthews, "The Shipping industry of Atlantic Canada," 9. 
80 
would suggest that investors would retrench in such a situation and would shift their capital 
into more lucrative industries. This was not the case: not only shipowning but also 
shipbuilding expanded during these years. The lower freight rates after 1820 did not simply 
indicate a greater supply of vessels but was also very much a product of declining production 
and distribution costs in international trade. Lower freight rates might be an indicator of 
productivity gains in transportation-serviced industries, with these gains providing the 
impetus for a growing investment in shipping. 16 
In the specific case ofLiverpool, like Atlantic Canada in this period, many different 
types of owners played a role in the process of fleet expansion. Unlike the Canadian case, 
however, the Liverpool shipowning community did not include any significant number of 
fishers or timber producers. Like the Atlantic Provinces, on the other hand, there were 
certainly coastal mariners who transported their own agricultural (or resource-based) 
products to markets or major distribution centres. Of greater importance, especially before 
the 1870s, was the predominance of the merchant shipowner, again much as in the Canadian 
16 
Sager, with Panting, 47-48 and 121. See also Douglass C. North, "Ocean Freight Rates and Economic 
Development, 1750-1913," Journal of Economic History, XVIII (1958), 537-555; North, "Sources of 
Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping, 1600-1850," Journal of Political Economy, LXXVI (1968), 953-970; 
C. Knick Harley, "Ocean Freight Rates and Productivity, 1740-1913: The Primacy of Mechanical Invention 
Reaffirmed," Journal of Economic History, XLVIII (1988), 851-876; and Harley, "Aspects of the Economics 
of Shipping," 167-186. Freight rates can only be considered as one among many factors coming into play when 
shipowners decided to expand their fleets (or not to do so). However, there does appear to be at least a rough 
correlation between rates and new vessel purchases, at least in Liverpool and Atlantic Canada. The year 187 4, 
which marked the peak of gross investment in Atlantic Canada, followed a period of rising freight rates Likewise, 
1889, a generally good year for new registries in Liverpool, also came in the wake of increased freight rates. 
While 1860, a year of relatively low gross investment in both Liverpool and Atlantic Canada, came in the midst 
of a marked upturn in freight rates, this improvement was only of recent vintage, since rates fell significantly 
during most of the second half of the 1850s. 
context. Sager and Panting described the situation for Atlantic Canada: 
The users of ships ... included merchant capitalists who resided in Britain or 
in the colonies. The merchants used ships to import goods, to transport goods 
from the regional entrepots to outports, and to export staple products. These 
primary producers and merchant capitalists all had a vested interest in low 
freight costs. Their use of ships in production and distribution came from a 
prior interest in trade goods and from the primary function of the merchant 
capitalist - to "buy cheap and sell dear." Lowering freight costs was one 
means toward profit in trade, and for this reason merchants sought 
unceasingly to guarantee their supply of shipping. 17 
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If we accept Sager and Panting's proposition that ships were essentially self-
propelled containers, the first question we might pose is which types of "containers" were 
most popular with owners in Liverpool and how, if at all, did these containers change over 
time. For most of the period a fair proportion of the vessels entering the Liverpool registry 
were propelled, as water craft had been for millennia, by wind power. In other words, they 
were sailing vessels. This designation, of course, fits all of the pre-steam tonnage registered 
in Liverpool, but it is also something of an oversimplification because owners invested in 
many different types of sailing vessels, depending upon their needs or on their perception 
of the demand in various markets. Figure 3.1, below, illustrates the various types of rigs 
most popular in the port. 
Sail was a pre-industrial technology, with propulsion deriving from a combination 
of wind and human exertion. This was no simple technology, however, and focussing wind 
power into a canvas sail was an art. For this reason, the sailing ship ranked among the most 
17 
Sager, with Panting, Merchant Capital, 48. The merchants' "prior interest in trade goods" can be seen as a 
component of their initial comparative advantage, leading to an involvement in shipowning. 
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advanced machines to appear before the industrial revolution. There were two main forms 
of sails. 18 The first was the square sail, in which the canvas hung from yard-arms set at right 
angles to the ship's length. The other important sail form was the fore-and-aft sail, raised 
on gaffs and booms behind the masts. Fore-and-aft sails were of most value in coasting, 
where their manoeuverability and ease of handling made them essential to navigating along 
often dangerous coastlines. The square sail was the preferred sail type on long ocean 
voyages because it produced greater power with the wind astern. For this reason, vessels 
with square sails on the fore and main masts, such as brigs, barques and ships, were 
generally the predominant blue-ocean traders after the Napoleonic wars. 19 
Liverpool owners, as we have noted, invested in a number of vessel types. But before 
getting into specific distributions and the popularity of each it would make sense to detail 
their particular qualities. One vessel favoured by many Liverpool investors was the classic 
vessel type, the ship. In fact, it has become so associated with seafaring and ocean transport 
that it is common to refer to all vessels, even in modem, unrigged forms, as "ships. "Craft 
rigged in this way were generally the largest found on any body of water in the pre-industrial 
18 
I exclude here the triangle-shaped lateen sail, which was used from classical times in the Mediterranean and can 
still can seen in parts of the Arab world. This sail form was unimportant in the nineteenth century European 
context. 
19 
Eric W. Sager and Lewis R. Fischer, Shipping and Shipbuilding in Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914 (Ottawa, 1986), 
9-10. For additional information on the development of sail vessels and rigs, see Philip Bosscher, eta/., 
Conway's History of the Ship. The Heyday of Sail: The Merchant Sailing Ship 1650-1830 (London, 1995); Basil 
Greenhill, The Ship: The Life and Death of the Merchant Sailing Ship 1815-1965 (London, 1980); Richard W. 
Unger, eta/., Conway's History of the Ship. Cogs, Caravels and Galleons: The Sailing Ship 1000-1650 
(London, 1994); and Leo Block, To Harness the Wind: A Short History of the Development of Sails (Annapolis, 
MD, 2003). 
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age and were even larger on average than early steam-powered tonnage. These were the 
great square riggers with their enormous spread of canvas on three (or more) masts to catch 
the aft or quarter winds which prevailed on long ocean trade routes. 
Source: 
Figure 3.1: Common Vessel Types on Liverpool Register, 1820-1889 
!Sarqutnrnw 
Eric W. Sager and Lewis R. Fischer, Shipping and Shipbuilding in Atlantic 
Canada, 1820-1914 (Ottawa, 1986), 9. Used by permission of the authors. 
Another ocean-going craft popular with Liverpool owners was the barque. Like the 
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ship, the barque often had three (or sometimes more) masts, although rather than carrying 
a full spread of square sails, the mizzen mast on a barque was given over to fore-and-aft 
sails. Vessels rigged as barques on average were somewhat smaller than ship-rigged craft 
but were still of a fairly impressive size. In the barque owners could combine a measure of 
the speed and size of the ship with a handling capability closer to that of smaller craft. Just 
as was the case for ship-rigged tonnage, barque owners were likely taking advantage of 
economies of scale- something even more practical in the case of barques, with their 
economy of manning compared to similar-sized ships. As can be seen in Table 3.2, below, 
the tonnage of new barques on the Liverpool register generally increased from 1820 to 1889, 
with the most marked increases in the 1870s, and especially, in the 1880s. This trend very 
much mirrored that for ship-rigged registries.20 
Aside from ships and barques, a very common type of ocean-going vessel on the 
Liverpool registry was the brig. This vessel, like the ship, took advantage of the prevailing 
winds on the trade routes by using square sails. The main differences between the brig and 
the ship were that the former had two masts and generally was much smaller in size. Their 
popularity (on both sides of the Atlantic) can likely be explained by the lower initial costs 
required to invest in this type of craft and the smaller number of crew members required to 
man them compared to barques or ships. Brigs went out of favour by mid-century, however. 
Although comprising over seven percent of all new registries by tonnage over the entire 
20 
Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 50-52; and BT 107 and 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
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study period, their contribution declined from about thirteen percent before mid-century to 
just over one percent after 1860. The combination of small size and the number of hands 
needed to work their square sails made the man-ton ratio of brigs less efficient than similar 
vessel types.21 
Although never enjoying the popularity of the brig in pre-1860s Liverpool, a 
compromise design was the brigantine. Closely related to the brig, the brigantine was 
another two-masted craft which carried fore-and-aft sails on its mainmast. Through this 
vessel an owner could achieve something of a happy medium between the ocean-going and 
coastal craft plying the Liverpool trades. Like the brig it was just large enough to prove 
useful on longer routes but small enough and with the extra manoeuverability needed to 
operate in the coastal and short-sea trades. 
Another important vessel in the port ofLiverpool was the schooner. This type of craft 
was the result of a long period of development for coastal vessels both in Europe and North 
America. On the Atlantic's northwestern littoral the rig was adapted to the lengthy coastlines 
of North America and the dangerous waters which surrounded the coasts. The rig was ideal 
for sailing along "sharply indented coastlines, in highly variable winds, and in cold 
temperatures, where ropes and canvas were often frozen and difficult to handle. "22 Men 
standing on a vessel's deck could do most of the sailhandling, unlike on larger craft, where 
21 
BT 107 and 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
22 
Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 53. 
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going aloft was the normal procedure for changing the spread of canvas. Similar 
considerations would also have motivated shipowners on the less malevolent but still 
relatively treacherous waters of the Irish sea. When adapted for longer coastal routes 
schooners might be rigged with one or more square topsails to better catch aft winds -
producing a vessel appropriately named the "topsail schooner." There were a number of 
schooner types, including the topsail: some were used primarily for fishing, others in coastal 
trading, while some might be used to hunt seals. Schooners based on the western Atlantic 
seaboard might be used in trades as far away as the West Indies and South America. 
One category of vessel that deserves special mention in the Liverpool context is the 
"flat," a type of craft that appears to have developed in response to the challenges of 
navigating the Mersey. These small vessels were often noted in the registries as being 
engaged in the "river trade and inland navigation. "23 This designation exempted the little 
craft from registration, and it would have only been when an owner wished to expand his 
range of use for a fleet of flats that the vessels would appear in the registry. In any event, the 
registry data do not do full justice to the importance of the flat-type craft on the Mersey. 
Although in numeric terms they comprised only ten percent of vessels officially registered 
in the port, and much less in tonnage terms, they were important cogs in the region's 
23 
BT 107 and 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
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seaward economy.24 
All these rigs retained some importance on the Liverpool registry well into the era 
of steam. In addition, there were a number of other small craft, such as cutters and smacks, 
which seem to have lent themselves most readily to the fisheries, including near-shore 
fishing and deep-water trawling.25 Graph 3.1 illustrates the relative share each vessel held 
of all sail registries in the various sample years from 1820-1889. The graph indicates that 
for the duration of the period, in both numbers and tonnage registered, Liverpool owners 
generally favoured the full-rigged ships, followed by barques and brigs. In purely numeric 
24 
Ibid. Flats were a form of barge that was unique to the River Mersey. They were designed specifically to 
distribute cargo to and from Liverpool and for use as lighters (barges that aid in the loading and unloading of 
larger vessels). This is fairly straightforward, butthe origins of these little craft are somewhat obscure. Evidence 
indicates that the flat existed as a separate vessel type at least by 1732 and most likely earlier. With their bluff-
ended, box-like shape, flats resembled mediaeval ship types based on clinker-built, single-masted square-riggers 
such as "busses." The flat may have sprung from Irish Sea vessels of the Middle Ages. Flats could carry from 
thirty to 150 tons of goods and operated in a wide range of environments, including inland waters and coastal 
seas. Flats were of strong construction, combining ample cargo space with good handling. Their design allowed 
for the fitting of a number of rigs. The flats might also be fitted with steam engines, especially in the later 
nineteenth century, and could be constructed of wood, iron, steel or some form of composite. In fact, although 
they all shared a similar form, there was no standard form of flat. With their flat bottoms, however, all were 
useful for navigating in the strong tides and currents of the Mersey estuary. The flatmen formed a distinct 
community along the Mersey, and the trade was often passed from father to son. Despite a rapid decline in 
sailing flats in the late nineteenth century, the profession, and its vessels, survived until the 1960s. Michael K. 
Stammers, Mersey Flats and Flatmen (Lavenham, Suffolk, 1993), 4-5, 9-10 and 16. On a related subject, see 
Michael K. Stammers, "The Mersey Boatmen and Their Gigs," Mariner's Mirror, LXI (1975), 283-288. 
25 
For further information on English fisheries, see David J. Starkey, Chris Reid and Neil Ashcroft (eds.), 
England's Sea Fisheries: The Commercial Sea Fisheries of England and Wales since 1300 (London, 2000); 
Robb Robinson, Trawling: The Rise and Fall of the British Trawl Fishery (Exeter. 1996); and Robinson, "The 
Development of the British North Sea Steam Trawling Fleet 1877-1900," in J. Edwards, eta/. ( eds. ), The North 
Sea (Aberdeen, 1995). By 1900 the British fishing industry, like much of the nation's maritime activities, was 
the world's largest and most successful. By this time the old sailing trawlers, the smacks, had been replaced by 
steamers. Many of the English-built smacks were later purchased by Scandinavians for their line fisheries. 
Although they had been ousted from the British fisheries, these craft were still superior to many pre-existing 
vessels in their new home ports. For a discussion of the evolution of rigs, see Robb Robinson, History of the 
Yorkshire Coast Fishing Industry 1780-1914 (Hull, 1987), especially Chapter One. 
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terms flats, schooners and brigantines were also important, although their smaller average 
size made them less significant when new registries are measured by tonnage. In the realm 
of pure sailing vessels then, Liverpool was something of a specialist in square-rigged, ocean-
going tonnage. 26 
Graph 3.1 
Sail Tonnage Newly-Registered in Liverpool by Rig, 1820-1889 
Vessels by No. Registered(%), 1820-1889 
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The percentage of vessel (and tonnage) registries for Liverpool include only 
newly-registered sail tonnage; this excludes not only steam (and auxiliary 
steamers) but also vessels registered de novo. These proportions, while a 
fairly accurate indication of the importance of each vessel type as part of the 
Liverpool sailing fleet in the period, are taken only for every fifth year (years 
ending in 0 or 5, with the exception of 1855 for tonnage, the substitution of 
1826 for 1825 and the inclusion of 1889 for both numbers and tonnage). 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. The second portion of Graph 3.1 deals with vessel 
tonnages. Due to a changeover in measurement standards partway through the year, 1855 has been omitted from 
Graph 3.1 entirely. Tonnage measurement has always been a problem for maritime historians. On the subject see 
Appendix One. 
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As we will see, of all the major Liverpool (sail) vessel types, it was the ship that 
experienced the most consistent rates of growth in average tonnage over the course of seven 
decades (Table 3.2, below). Along with the barque, it was the ship rig that was, of course, 
most associated with the world's longest trade routes. And it was here that many Liverpool 
owners- Brocklebanks being an example - along with some of their London rivals, found 
their comparative advantage in the years after mid-century. In the 1850s and 1860s 
commercial sail reached a peak, despite increasing investment in steam. The most visible 
symbol of this golden era was the clipper, perfected by theN ova Scotia-born builder, Donald 
Mackay, who built the White Diamond line of sailing packets for British owner Enoch Train 
and competed with the Cunard Line, which favoured steamers. In the late 1840s and 1850s 
tens of thousands of people set sail for the gold rushes in California and Australia but there 
was little in the way of return cargoes for the skippers that brought them there, so many 
crossed the Pacific to load tea. On one such voyage the American clipper Orienta/loaded 
1,600 tons at £6 per ton and arrived in London after a record-setting ninety-seven day 
passage. With prices often determined by who arrived earliest to market, the clippers' speed 
paid dividends. 27 
In 1852 the first Australian gold reached the English market, triggering a round of 
emigration to the then colony of New South Wales that rivalled the migration across the 
27 
Hope, British Shipping, 292-293; and Graham," The Ascendancy of the Sailing Ship," 75. See also Charles R. 
Schultz, Forty-niners 'Round the Hom (Columbia, SC, 1999); and Schultz, "Gold Rush Voyage of the Ship 
Sweden," International Journal of Maritime History, XV, No. 1 (June 2003), 91-127. 
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Atlantic. A return cargo was also "discovered" when the wool press increased the amounts 
of Australian wool that could be loaded onto vessels, making it feasible for this product to 
compete with exports from Spain and Germany. Notwithstanding the long voyage back to 
England, the Antipodean emigrant trade was accompanied by an annual race to be first in 
port with the season's wool.28 
British shipowners were up to the task and in London three major owners in the East 
India trade sent a number of vessels into service in the new Australian trade and built others 
especially for it. In Liverpool a number of owners also went into the Australian trade. These 
included Pilkington and Wilson, the initiators of the White Star Line, James Beagley and 
James Baines, founder of the Black Ball Line.29 Entrepreneurs such as these bought a fleet 
of American Atlantic packets and put them into service in the trade. New vessels were 
ordered as well, especially from builders in New Brunswick and Boston. Black Ball's 
Australian packets added four new vessels, Lightning, Champion of the Seas, James Baines 
28 
Hope, British Shipping, 293. On the wool trade, see Simon Ville, The Rural Entrepreneurs: A History of the 
Stock and Station Agent Industry in Australia and New Zealand (Oakleigh, VlC, 2000); and Kosmas Tsokhas, 
Markets, Money, and Empire: The Political Economy ofthe Australian Wool Industry (Carlton, VlC, 1990). 
On the immigrant trade, see Frank Broeze, "Private Enterprise and the Peopling of Australasia, 1831-1850," 
Economic History Review, 2nd series, XXXV (1982), 235-253; and John McDonald and Ralph Shlomowitz, 
"Mortality on Immigrant Voyages to Australia in the Nineteenth Century," Explorations in Economic History, 
XXVII (1990), 84-113. For first-hand accounts of the immigrant trade, see Claudia E. Skerry Cridland (ed.), 
The Journey of Mary Ann Eliza Daley, Wife of Amos Switzer of Limerick, Ireland and Some of Her 
Descendants: Her Emigration from Liverpool, England to Australia in the Year 1868 on the Clipper Ship White 
Star.(Salem, MA, 2003); and Andrew Hassam (ed.), Sailing to Australia. Shipboard Diaries by Nineteenth 
Century British Emigrants (Manchester, 1994). 
29 
On White Star, see Robin Gardiner, The History of the White Star Line (Hersham, 2001); and Duncan Haws, 
White Star Line (Hereford, 1990). On the Black Ball Line, see Michael K. Stammers, The Passage Makers. The 
History of the Black Ball Line of Australian Packets I 852-I 87 I (Brighton, 1978). 
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and Donald Mackay in 1854. The latter was named for their builder, and Lightning's sixty-
three day run from Melbourne to England was never equalled under sail. 30 These Liverpool 
craft all topped the 2,000-ton mark and practically owned the Australian emigrant traffic.· 
Relying on the trademark speed of his vessels, Baines contracted to deliver the mails to 
Australia in sixty-eight days, agreeing to a fine of £100 for each day over the mark. These 
developments revolutionized the sailing ship on long-haul runs in only a decade. In 1845 a 
vessel ofless than 300 tons would have been considered a first-rate vessel in the Australian 
trade. As Ronald Hope noted, it was very much the "dash" of the Liverpool owners and their 
commitment to the long routes that made this revolution possible. In later years a Liverpool 
investor noted that "the new Australian trade moulded professional deep-sea shipowning for 
a hundred years."31 Hope summed up the ties between this trade and the sailing vessels in 
these terms: 
30 
In these years [the 1850s and 60s] the voyage to Australia and New Zealand 
was suited to the sailing ship. There were few suitable refuelling stations for 
the steamer and the Cape of Good Hope to Melbourne crossing was more 
than twice the distance across the Atlantic. Moreover, the winds of the 
extreme southern hemisphere are consistent and westerly. Five hundred miles 
west of Tristan da Cunha a sailing ship can turn almost at a right angle and 
'run her easting down' with a favouring westerly wind for the whole 8,000 
Adam W. Kirkaldy, British Shipping. Its History, Organization and Importance (London, 1914), 374; and 
Hope, British Shipping, 293. Lightning's master, Anthony Enright, was notable himself. Hope called him a "born 
hotelier" as much as he was a shipmaster. Enright carried a full export cargo, along with saloon passengers, 
emigrants and crew. Also included on his manifest were bullocks, sheep, pigs and poultry to feed them; the vessel 
frequently had an accompanying band; deck games were organized; there was a library; and a daily newspaper 
was printed onboard. 
31 
Kirkaldy, British Shipping, 374; and Hope, British Shipping, 293. 
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miles to Melbourne. 32 
Liverpool's commitment to the blue ocean trades was not characteristic of all ports. 
Still, other ports did exhibit investment patterns that were similar to Liverpool, although the 
pattern was by no means the same in all cases. We can again compare the situation in 
Liverpool to the ACSP's findings for Atlantic Canada. For much of the nineteenth century 
the port of Saint John, New Brunswick, was the most important in Atlantic Canada, at least 
in terms of fleet size. Like Liverpool owners, those in Saint John specialized in the larger 
vessels, particularly large craft rigged as ships. Likewise, barques and brigs were a 
significant part of the Saint John fleet. Barques made up a very large proportion of Saint 
John's fleet and, as in Liverpool, brigs were most significant in the years before mid-century. 
Unlike Liverpool, however, schooners were more significant in tonnage terms. Still, the 
square-rigger was king in Saint John, just as it was in Liverpool (leaving aside steamers and 
auxiliary steamers). The large size of vessels trading from Saint John suggests further 
linkages with deep-sea trades. In fact, ACSP members found that less than three percent of 
sampled voyages made by Saint John-registered craft in the period from 1871 to 1891 were 
by vessels of under 250 tons and were thus likely to have been coasters. Sager and Panting 
believe that the emphasis on the large square riggers reflected the central importance of the 
timber trade to the port. As we will see, the timber trade gave Atlantic Canada a tangible 
32 
Hope, British Shipping, 294. 
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link to Liverpool, one ofBritain's most important Canadian timber entrepots.33 
This similarity with Liverpool did not characterize all the Atlantic Canadian ports. 
Indeed, most were much less like Liverpool in terms of overall fleet composition. In 
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island (P .E.I. ), for example, new registries from 1820-1914 
were dominated by brigantines, schooners and brigs. Although numerically significant, 
schooners were actually less important on the P.E.I. register over time than they were to 
many other Atlantic Canadian ports. In place of schooners Islanders invested heavily in 
brigantines, which performed similar tasks. Taken together seventy percent of all registries 
from 1840 to 1914 were made up by these two rigs. Islanders also retained the brig rig for 
much longer than most ports and after 1873 were significant users ofbarquentines, although 
that rig was uncommon in most ports of registry. Finally, unlike Liverpool or Saint John, 
Islanders largely rejected the full-rigged ship because many vessels built for their own use 
were intended for coastal trading, where the ship would have been uneconomical to operate. 
Also, they became known in the export markets for their inexpensive but well-built smaller 
craft, a natural comparative advantage since the large trees needed to build ships were 
depleted on the island as early as the 1850s.34 
33 
Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 50-52; and Lewis R. Fischer, Eric W. Sager and Rosemary E. Ommer, 
"The Shipping Industry and Regional Economic Development in Atlantic Canada, 1871-1891: Saint John as a 
Case Study," in Lewis R. Fischer and Eric W. Sager (eds.),Merchant Shipping and Economic Development in 
Atlantic Canada (St. John's, NL, 1982), 40. 
34 
Lewis R. Fischer, "The Port of Prince Edward Island, 1840-1889: A Preliminary Analysis," in Matthews and 
Panting (eds.), Ships and Shipbuilding, 45-46; and Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 51. Perhaps the 
greatest specialists in the Atlantic Canadian region were Newfoundlanders. Sager and Panting assert that from 
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Table 3.2 
Average Gross Tonnage of New Sailing Vessels in Liverpool by Decade by Rig 
Brigs 
Brigantines 
Schooners 
Ships 
Barques 
Flats 
All Others 
Note: 
Source: 
1820s 1830s 1840s 1860s 1870s 1880s 
212 199 187 227 226 254 
174 165 116 158 187 261 
81 110 91 125 81 134 
357 428 645 1,058 1,342 1,833 
344 330 413 447 647 1,025 
66 72 59 53 66 78 
132 144 212 63 202 106 
Each decade's numbers are taken from the various sample years. These 
generally were years ending in 0 or 5, except for 1826 and 1889; see the text 
for an explanation. Given its status as a transitional decade the 1850s has 
been omitted. From the 1860s the numbers are registered tons. In the case of 
sailing vessels, gross and registered tonnage were often about the same. 
See table 3.1 
Liverpool's general similarity to Saint John in terms of overall fleet proportions, and 
the marked differences between both ports and Prince Edward Island, serve as reminders 
that all ports had their own comparative advantages (and, conversely, limitations). 
1820-1914 sixty percent of all tonnage registered at the Island's one registry port, St. John's, was schooner-
rigged. (In an earlier study Sager found that about half ofNewfoundland's newly-registered tonnage consisted 
of schooners in the period 1840-1889). Largely used in local trades, and with Newfoundland possessing only 
small timber along its coasts, schooners of under 300 tons were an ideal solution for the island's shipping needs. 
Newfoundland also had a relatively high proportion of steamers compared to most Atlantic Canadian ports, most 
of which were used for the annual seal hunt. Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 51-53; and Eric W. Sager, 
"The Port of St. John's, Newfoundland, 1840-1889: A Preliminary Analysis," in Matthews and Panting ( eds. ), 
Ships and Shipbuilding, 21-22. Yarmouth, Nova Scotia was also marked by its investment in small schooners, 
although to a lesser degree than St. John's. See David Alexander, "The Port of Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, 1840-
1889," in Matthews and Panting (eds.), Ships and Shipbuilding, 81. 
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Depending on how shipowners chose to exploit or surmount these, the development of a 
port's fleet over time was to some degree unique. With this in mind we will return to the 
Mersey once more. An important feature of note concerning Liverpool's sail fleet over the 
period from 1820-1889 was that it was by no means static. Indeed, the fleet underwent some 
significant changes over these seven decades. As Sager and Panting point out, the sailing 
vessel was more than a simple machine; it was "an evolving technology that reflected the 
changing demands of particular trades and the demands that owners made of builders. "35 
During the nineteenth century virtually all export trades were marked by greater capital 
investment, and technological change in the shipping industry reflected this as well. Even 
though the method of propulsion remained pre-industrial, productivity gains were certainly 
possible, and these improvements were likely stimulated in the first instance by falling rates 
of return. In the context of shipping human labour would be replaced by technology, and the 
average size of vessels could be increased without the need for a commensurate increase in 
labour.36 
One way owners could increase performance was by changing the rigs of sailing 
vessels, which were not governed by any rigid standard. During the nineteenth century it was 
common to see shipowners investing in vessels with increasing numbers of masts; this was 
exemplified by the shift from brigs to barques, barquentines or ships. In fact, there were 
35 
Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 54. 
36 
Ibid. 
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many changes in the plan and operation of sail as the century progressed. This, however, was 
not the most important factor in determining a vessel's productivity. Again we should keep 
in mind that vessels, even today, are essentially containers. It therefore stands to reason that 
the volume of cargo carried played a crucial role in productivity since this enabled owners 
to take advantage of economies of scale. This was reinforced by the fact that larger hull sizes 
did not lead to equivalent increases in either the initial price of a vessel or in its operating 
expenses. A large ship, for example, generally coast less per ton to purchase than smaller 
craft such as brigantines. The size of the hull could also be increased to a point without the 
need for extra masts or sails, thus negating additional labour requirements that might be 
expected to accompany a larger vessel.37 Table 3.2, above, gives the average tonnage of 
newly-registered vessels in Liverpool by decade. 
Although the average tonnage of all vessel types did not always increase from one 
decade to the next (indeed, there was occasionally a decline), it is clear that Liverpool 
owners, like those on the other side of the Atlantic, were taking advantage of the benefits 
offered by operating larger tonnage, on average, as the decades passed. Apart from those 
craft, like cutters, snows, yawls and smacks, classified collectively as "others," all vessel 
types in Liverpool were larger in the 1880s than they had been in the 1820s and 1830s. The 
principle of economies of scale clearly appealed to the investor on Merseyside. What is 
37 
Ibid, 54-55. Regarding the relative costs oflarger vessels, this generalization depends to a certain extent on the 
quality and complexity of the sails used. Ships in particular were sometimes sold "unrigged" just because owners 
were divided about this issue. 
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perhaps most notable concerning size increases among the various vessel forms was the 
consistency with which the largest type of craft- ships - grew in the span of seventy years. 
From the 1820s to the 1880s the average size of a newly-registered ship in Liverpool 
expanded by more than five times; unlike other vessel types the ships never experienced 
negative growth from decade to decade. This fits in well with Sager and Panting's thesis 
concerning the value of larger vessels to owners, especially in times of diminishing returns. 
Larger vessels could generally operate more efficiently in terms of operating cost per ton. 
It was only natural that owners might wish to take that type of craft which was already 
largest and increase its capacity still further. 38 
Indeed, Sager and Panting's analysis of new Atlantic Canadian vessels from the 
1820s to 1914 revealed similar patterns. From the 1820s to the 1880s ship-rigged vessels 
increased dramatically in size, as they did in Liverpool, although the increase here was not 
quite as marked - more on the order of four times larger. David Alexander's work on 
Yarmouth, Nova Scotia noted similar trends. Yarmouth was marked by its reliance on 
schooner-rigged vessels over the period 1840-1889, but square or mixed-rig forms like ships, 
barques and brigs were also of some importance. From 1840 to the 1870s the average 
tonnage of such craft registered at Yarmouth increased by 40-50 percent in the case of brigs 
and barques; average ships' tonnages increased even more significantly. Schooners, likely 
to be smaller and used more for coasting, did not see any real increase in size until the 
38 
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1880s.39 
On the Liverpool register, the increase in size among the larger vessel classes was 
accompanied by a dramatic decline in numbers of what had been some of the most 
numerous, if smaller, vessel types- especially the brig. For the period as a whole brigs 
represented 14.2 percent of all new registries in Liverpool by number (see graph 3.1) and by 
the 1870s this had risen to about nineteen percent. By the 1880s, however, only four percent 
of new registries were accounted for by brigs. The dominance of the largest vessel types, 
especially ships, in terms of tonnage was consolidated from the 1860s onward. Given the 
nature of the vessel types it is only natural that ships should occupy the lion's share of 
tonnage on register. As Graph 3.1 demonstrates, ships constituted over half of all newly-
registered tonnage at Liverpool from 1820 to 1889. The dominance of ships was even more 
marked in the years after 1860, however. In the period 1820-1850 ships comprised an 
average of thirty-nine percent of all new registries by tonnage, but this grew to over sixty-
eight percent in the last three study decades. In retrospect this clearly displays one business 
39 
Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 55; and Alexander, "The Port of Yarmouth," 83. Sager and Panting's 
analysis was based on the ports of Charlottetown, Halifax, Miramichi, Saint John, St. John's, Windsor and 
Yarmouth. One major difference between Atlantic Canada and Liverpool in terms of average vessel size was that 
all but the largest craft peaked in size in the 1860s and 1870s, with tonnages falling thereafter. In Liverpool the 
average size of the smaller brigs, brigantines, schooners and even flats all increased in the 1880s as compared 
to the 1860s and 1870s. BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; and see Table 3.2. As was the 
case in Yarmouth, average barque tonnages for Liverpool increased fairly significantly after 1870. If an owner 
could afford to sacrifice a certain amount of speed compared to the ship-rig, the barque was probably the best 
solution in terms of economy. 
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strategy taken by Liverpool investors in sailing tonnage as the century wore on. 40 
Closely related to the overall size of new vessels on the Liverpool registry is the issue 
of tonnage class. We have noted that the average size of newly-registered sailing vessels 
tended to increase over time. (As we will see, the same rule applied to steam tonnage). By 
breaking all new registries in our sample years into a number of size classifications we may 
gain some insight into how such vessels were used. It is fairly certain that throughout the 
period vessels of less than 250 tons were being used primarily in coastal trades, while those 
of greater than 500 tons were most likely to have been employed in deep-sea trades. Vessels 
falling between 250 and 500 tons are more problematic; they may have been suitable for 
either coasting, short-sea, or blue-ocean voyages. As a general rule of thumb we might 
include these as deep-sea vessels before about 1840. Thereafter craft of under 500 tons were 
more likely to have been used coastwise.41 
Given the general tonnage increase from 1820 to 1889, what constituted a "large" 
vessel changed over time. Nevertheless, it is likely that vessels over 500 tons were mainly 
employed in longer distance trades, even in the 1880s. In the decades prior to 1850 a 
demarcation between vessels above and below 250 tons may be a more suitable measure of 
which were most likely to be employed as coasters. In the 1820s, for instance, only two 
40 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. Regarding the decline of brigs, keep in mind that a 
similar process was at work in Saint John, although it occurred much sooner. There brigs accounted for over 
half of all newly-registered tonnage in the 1820s, but much less in later decades. Sager, with Panting, 52. 
41 
To judge vessel usage exactly the voyage patterns of each craft must be observed over its career. In the British 
case even some of the largest vessels on registry made voyages between national ports under coasting articles. 
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vessels of above 500 tons were registered, and both were less than 600 tons. By the 1830s 
sixteen of 250 newly-registered vessels were over 500 tons. All of these were ship- and 
barque-rigged, and so almost certainly deep-sea vessels. Among "middling" vessels (those 
between 250 and 499 tons) eighty-six were registered in the 1830s sample years, with fifty-
eight being either ship- or barque-rigged. Again, it is likely that most vessels in this tonnage 
class were primarily used in the blue-ocean trades. The pattern began to change in the 1840s. 
From this decade on the ship rig practically disappeared among vessels of under 500 tons, 
although the barque rig remained popular for mid-sized craft. Throughout the years 1820 to 
1889 the smallest class of vessels - those under 250 tons - were dominated by the brig, 
brigantine and schooner rigs, along with small coasting steamers from mid-century on. Rigs 
like sloops, cutters, snows and flats were also relatively common. Mid-sized craft tended to 
be a mix of rigs but, again, with ships fairly rare in later decades. The largest vessel class 
was almost exclusively dominated by ships and barques, with steamers comprising a 
significant share of the larger vessels that were newly-registered from the third quarter of 
the nineteenth century on. 42 
In general terms, most gross investment at Liverpool in the 1820s and 1830s was in 
vessels of under 250 tons, although craft over this mark were making inroads by the 1830s. 
Even if we assume that in this era most vessels over 250 tons were likely to be employed on 
blue-ocean routes, then Liverpool owners of the 1820s and 1830s were still not making 
42 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
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more than a third of their gross investments in vessels primarily intended for deep-sea 
trading. By the 1840s the numbers of newly-registered craft above and below 250 tons was 
more nearly equal, with vessels of under 250 tons representing just over fifty percent of all 
new registries. Discounting the 1850s, in which tonnage measurement is problematic (refer 
to Appendix One), we see that by the 1860s Liverpool's gross investments broke down 
nearly evenly between vessels above and below 500 tons, with the smaller craft having a 
slight edge. By this decade new investment in vessels under 250 tons had fallen to one-third 
of all registries. By the 1870s the number of new investments in the smallest vessels 
stabilized, but investment in the "mid-sized" forms of tonnage had dropped by about half, 
with vessels of over 500 tons making up more than fifty percent of all new registries in the 
decade's sample years. In the 1880s the proportion of new registries remained about the 
same for the largest and smallest vessels with a slight gain and loss, respectively. Gross 
investment in vessels falling into the 250 to 499 ton-class dropped by just under half once 
again43 (See Table 3.3). 
What then do these figures tell us about gross investment at Liverpool? First, we can 
see that although the average tonnage of all new registries at Liverpool grew from 1820 to 
1889, vessels of under 250 tons remained important. Notwithstanding that, as Table 3.3 
demonstrates, their importance in terms of new registries diminished by just over half in 
these seven decades: these small vessels still comprised a third of all vessels added to 
43 
Ibid. 
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Liverpool's fleet in the 1880s samples. Given Liverpool's role as a regional entre pot and the 
lack oflarge facilities that still characterized many smaller British ports, these craft retained 
a comparative advantage in their very lack of size. We should also bear in mind that the little 
Mersey flats, whether steam or sail-powered, remained important well into the twentieth 
century. Indeed, sixty-two flats, only one of which was over 200 tons, were newly-registered 
in the 1880s sample years. 44 
Table 3.3 
Liverpool Vessels: Gross Investment by Tonna2e-Class (%of Total New Re2istries) 
Decade 
1820s 
1830s 
1840s 
1860s 
1870s 
1880s 
Note: 
Source: 
Vessels Under 250 Tons 250-499 Tons Greater than 500 Tons 
68.4 30.4 1.1 
59.2 34.4 6.4 
53.9 23.8 23.8 
33.4 20.9 45.4 
33.5 11.4 55 
32.9 6.7 59.8 
Percentages are taken from sample years only. As it was a transitional decade 
in tonnage terms, the 1850s sample years have been omitted. Vessel tonnages 
through the 1840s were calculated with the unspecified tonnage measure 
used in the Board of Trade 107 series up to 1855 and by register tonnage 
thereafter. Due to rounding rows may not equal 100% 
See Table 3.1 
The mid-sized class of vessel never represented much more than a third of all of 
Liverpool's gross investment and by the 1880s made up less than seven percent of new 
44 
Ibid. 
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registries. In the minds of Liverpool shipowners it may have been that the days of such 
vessels were past. Too large to access the smallest British ports, they were no longer 
considered big enough for use in deep-sea trades. For the larger and better equipped British 
ports it is also likely that (despite our earlier demarcation) the smallest of the 500-plus ton 
vessels were sometimes pressed into coastal service by this date. 45 
Perhaps the most striking feature of tonnage-class alignments over time concerns the 
dominance of vessels of over 500 tons from 1870 on. This certainly bears some relation to 
the general increase in vessel size over the nineteenth century, and not just in Liverpool. 
Still, it is also likely that the pre-eminence of the largest vessel types from mid-century on 
points toward Liverpool's growing reliance on long-distance trading. It is also important to 
note that by the 1880s steamers (auxiliary and otherwise) comprised almost sixty percent of 
all new registries in the 500-plus tonnage class. This was up from about thirty-two percent 
of all large vessel registries in the 1870s samples. As Francis Hyde noted, from the 1830s 
on a growing amount of steam tonnage was seen along the Mersey. Prior to 1860, however, 
much of this was coastal, and sail tonnage still dominated the longest trade routes. The 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 combined with improved steam technology to give 
steamers an opening on these routes, even if this was not fully realized until after 1900. The 
proportional increase in gross investment in vessels over 500 tons testifies to the willingness 
ofLiverpool shipowners to pursue opportunities in locales such as the Antipodes and the Far 
45 
Ibid. 
104 
East. The marked mcrease m steamers within this grouping further testifies to such 
adaptability.46 
Bigger vessels and an increasing concentration on the largest forms of tonnage were 
not the only changes Liverpool owners were likely to have made at this time. Owners 
employed wire to replace hemp in rigging; introduced pumps, winches, donkey engines, 
windlasses and other labour-saving equipment; and, perhaps more important, improved 
vessel construction. In the 1820s the average life ofNova Scotia and New Brunswick vessels 
(from which a large share of the Liverpool sail fleet originated) was only nine years. By the 
1850s builders were paying more attention to the seasoning and preserving of ship's timbers; 
they constructed stronger hulls; used iron fastenings; and sheathed hulls in copper. By the 
1880s the average lifespan of these Canadian-built vessels stood at fifteen years. Thus 
vessels were able to make more passages in cargo over their careers, making it more likely 
46 
Ibid. We will discuss steamers in greater depth in Chapter Four. Prior to the nineteenth century the main 
concentration of Liverpool's trading activities was in the North Atlantic, Carribean and the Mediterranean. It 
was largely based on such commodities as sugar, tobacco, salt and (if one can really call humans commodities), 
slaves. By the early nineteenth century, however, Liverpool shipowners were already looking for new 
opportunities, especially as the slave tmde was being curtailed. Liverpool merchants were long-time advocates 
of rescinding the East India Company's monopoly on East Asian trade. In 1813 and 1833, respectively, trade 
to India and China was subjected to free competition. Liverpool shipowners like the Brocklebanks, Holts, 
Harrisons and Rathbones soon threw open the Far East and Antipodes to Liverpool capital. Francis Hyde, 
Liverpool and the Mersey. An Economic History of a Port 1700-I970 (Newton Abbot, 1971 ), 26-27, 42 and 
95. Tonnage class breakdown for Liverpool's largest vessels is even more striking if we note that of 428 craft 
over 500 tons newly-registered in the 1870s and 1880s sample years, a full 311 were actually over I, 000 tons, 
at an average register tonnage of 1.630. In broad terms. gross investment in Atlantic Canada (at least after 1850) 
was similar to Liverpool, with vessels larger than 500 tons dominating, followed by vessels ofless than 250 tons. 
Medium-sized craft tended to be the least important, as they were in Liverpool after the mid-nineteenth century. 
At some points, however, including the late-1860s and 1880s, Atlantic Canadian gross investment in the largest 
vessels actually fell below that in the smallest vessels. Here the predominance of the largest vessel types was 
most marked in the mid-1870s when new registrations of all vessel types peaked sharply. From that point on, 
however, gross investment in 500-plus ton craft fell, reaching a nadir in the mid-1890s. Sager, with Panting, 
Maritime Capital, 55. 
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that investors would see positive returns, at least barring a collapse in freight rates. As Sager 
and Fischer noted,"[ s ]ailing vessels were more productive and more durable as time passed, 
and this helped them to remain competitive even when iron steamers entered the North 
American [and other] trades.47 
A number of the changes noted above were technological in nature, and perhaps the 
most obvious adaptation of this type, certainly the one scholars have commented on the 
most, was the switch from sail to steam as a mode of propulsion. This subject is also of great 
importance in understanding the nature ofLiverpool' s fleet in this period and we will return 
to it in Chapter Four; first we might examine another technological innovation. This product 
of industry is closely associated with steam itself, but it also formed an important part of 
technological innovation when wedded to the pre-industrial sail vessels. Here, the product 
we are concerned with is that most associated with Great Britain and the industrial 
revolution- iron and later steel. 
All seagoing vessels prior to the nineteenth century were built of various types of 
wood, either softwoods like pine and spruce, the types most associated with Canadian-built 
tonnage, or hardwoods like oak. Once the new products of industry started coming into their 
own in the early nineteenth century, however, thought was being given to applying the new 
materials to a variety of uses. Many areas of infrastructure, such as bridges and buildings, 
were revolutionized by the use of iron. With hindsight it seems natural that this new material 
47 
Sager and Fischer, Shipping and Shipbuilding, 10. 
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would be used at sea as well, but at the time it was not generally believed that an iron vessel 
would float. In the particular context ofLiverpool, where shipowners wished to deploy large 
vessels in deep-sea trades, iron presented another potential problem. Contemporaries feared 
that compass deviation caused by iron hulls could create potential disaster on long-haul 
routes where vessels were out of sight of land for long periods of time. Liverpool's trading 
community was sufficiently worried about this potential problem that they formed a 
committee to look into the matter and to lobby the Board ofTrade.48 
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, good timber was becoming more costly, and 
increasing amounts of iron were being used in vessel construction. As early as 1818 the 
Vulcan, constructed in Scotland, was built entirely of iron; a steamer, the Aaron Manby, 
which crossed the English Channel to Paris, followed in 1821. In some cases a continued 
commitment to wooden vessels had political underpinnings. Government-subsidized mail 
steamers could be requisitioned in wartime. Their construction was subject to Admiralty 
approval and until the Navy embraced iron construction mail steamers had to be built of 
wood. Those not possessed of mail contracts were more free to experiment. The first ocean-
going iron vessel, the Rainbow, was launched in 1837 and built across the Mersey from 
Liverpool at Birkenhead by John Laird. Innovation thus won out, and by mid-century vessels 
constructed of iron were becoming common. In most cases the application of iron to 
seafaring craft has been linked with steamers, but it was likewise important in the 
48 
Graeme Milne, Trade and Traders in Mid-Victorian Liverpool. Mercantile Business and the Making of a World 
Port (Liverpool, 2000), 40-41. 
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construction of sail tonnage and certainly played a role in allowing the older technology to 
compete for the length of time it did. Still, iron did have some real drawbacks. Due to 
fouling of their hulls, iron vessels prior to the 1870s could rarely match copper-sheathed 
wooden vessels, or those of composite construction, in terms of speed. Later in the 
nineteenth century steel, like iron before it, was the focus of misgivings, mainly due to the 
large variability in the quality of early steel. By 1877, however, a better grade of steel was 
approved by the Committee of Lloyd's Register of Shipping. This "mild" steel was soon 
being marketed at a lower cost than wrought iron and quickly became the preferred metal 
building material for vessels. 49 
Metal construction techniques had a number of advantages over wood; one of the 
most important related to vessel size. Table 3.2 above illustrates how the average tonnage 
of newly-registered vessels at Liverpool changed from the 1820s to the 1880s. The most 
marked size increase (among sail tonnage) was in ship-rigged vessels. One of the factors that 
allowed these craft to reach the great size they attained in the "golden age of sail" was the 
use of metals as building materials for not only the hull but also for the masts. Past a certain 
size a wooden vessel becomes structurally unsound and is furthermore difficult to build. For 
this reason the use of wood puts definite limits on how much increased size can be used as 
49 
Hope, British Shipping, 266; Samuel J.P. Thearle, The Modem Practice of Shipbuiiding in Iron and Steel 
(London, 1891 ), 7-9; Graham," The Ascendancy of the Sailing Ship," 76; Robert Gardiner and Basil Greenhill 
( eds. ), The Advent of Steam: The Merchant Steamship Before I 900 (London, 1993), 21 ;and J. Graeme Bruce, 
"The Contribution of Cross-Channel and Coastal Vessel to Developments in Marine Practice," Journal of 
Transport History, N (1959), 67. See also, J.F. Clarke, Occasional Papers in the History of Science and 
Technology No. 3. The Changeover from Wood to Iron Steamships (Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, 1986). 
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a competitive strategy. Metal construction adds to the overall strength of a vessel while at 
the same time reducing its weight. 50 
Graph 3.2 
Liverpool Sail Tonnage: Newly-Registered Iron and Steel Vessels as a percentage of 
Gross Registrations, 1860-1889 (Select Years) 
Note: 
Source: 
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BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1860-1889, various years. 
Thus, with the coming of iron, and later steel, shipowners in Liverpool and elsewhere 
could greatly expand the average size of their sailing tonnage, thereby potentially 
50 
Bruce, "Developments in Marine Practice," 66; and Thearle, Shipbuilding, 8 and 221. It is well known (if 
something of a truism) that shipowners and builders in our comparison region, Atlantic Canada, never fully made 
the switch to metal construction, or the ownership of such craft, prior to World War I. There are many works 
which discuss Atlantic Canada's failure to move into metal ship production and why this was so. See, for 
example, Eric W. Sager and Gerald E. Panting, "Staple Economies and the Rise and Decline of the Shipping 
Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914," in Fischer and Panting ( eds. ), Change and Adaptation, 22; Sager and 
Fischer, Shipping and Shipbuilding, 15-19; and Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 12-15 and 166-169. 
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maximizing per-voyage profits. The first sample year in which iron sailing vessels showed 
up on the Liverpool registry was 1860, with the first steel craft making its appearance by 
1880. Graph 3.2 illustrates the numbers of iron and steel sailing vessels newly-registered in 
Liverpool for sampled years from 1860 to 1889, expressed as a percentage of all new sailing 
registries. The graph shows that metal-hulled craft formed an important component of 
Liverpool's sail fleet, especially in the years from 1865 on, with a peak being reached in 
1885. In the next sample year (1889) this figure dropped, but still remained at about fifty 
percent of all new sail registries. The graph below may actually under -represent the amount 
of sail tonnage accounted for as a proportion of the new sail fleet. The overwhelming 
majority of all metal sailing vessels registered in Liverpool were rigged as either ship or 
barques (10 of 14 in 1860; 62 of71 in 1865; 18 of21 in 1870; 62 of66 in 1875; 20 of23 in 
1880; 46 of 50 1885; and 28 of32 in 1889). As these on average were always the largest, the 
percentage dominance by tonnage, rather than number, were certainly much higher. 51 
In discussing the new technology of metal ship construction I have made a number 
of references to that innovation most linked to the use of iron and steel hulls- steam power. 
It is with this technology that we will take up our discussion ofthe Liverpool-registered fleet 
in Chapter Four. 
51 
BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
Chapter4 
Capital ll- Steamers and Vessel Origins 
In terms of marine technology, that of steam propulsion has probably occupied the attention 
of maritime historians more than any other. This is perhaps understandable; after thousands 
of years in which sea-going craft could move only by human exertion or wind power, for the 
first time there was a true revolution in the way ships were propelled. Once established, 
steam went on to supplant its pre-industrial rival within a few decades and was itself later 
replaced by gasoline and diesel engines. In this change the industrial revolution had put to 
sea. 
In keeping with this theme, the first portion of this chapter will detail Liverpool's 
steam fleet over the years 1820 to1889, at least in terms of gross investment.' Initially, 
steamers' inefficient engines confined their use to coastal and short-sea trades but by the late 
1870s developments like the compound engine meant that steam became increasingly 
competitive in all but the very longest trades. Indeed, it was in this very era that Liverpool 
owners, with their extensive presence on the longer trade routes, began making the switch 
from sail.2 In this way they proved amenable (if at their own pace) to new opportunities 
while remaining true to the trades that formed their comparative advantages. Likewise, 
The second section deals with the build regions of vessels appearing on the Liverpool register (see below). 
2 
This is not to suggest that Liverpool owners made little or no investment in coasting, even if deep-sea trading 
was the port's mainstay. The numbers of smaller vessel types, under 250 tons, on the Liverpool register and the 
presence of vessels like flats (see Chapter Three) indicates an ongoing commitment to such trades. In an entre pot 
like Liverpool the situation was unlikely to be otherwise. For a brief introduction to Liverpool's coasting trade, 
at least as it existed in the mid-1850s, see Valerie Burton, "Liverpool's Mid-Nineteenth Century Coasting 
Trade." In Valerie Burton (ed.), Liverpool Shipping, Trade and Industry: Essays on the Maritime History of 
Merseyside 1780-1860 (Liverpool, 1989), 26-67. At this time Liverpool owners also made the switch to new 
technologies associated with steam, like paddle wheels and later the screw propellor. 
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Liverpool owners, as will be demonstrated, preferred to "hedge their bets" between the 
proven older technology and innovation. Through to 1889 gross steam investment in the port 
was largely in auxiliaries - fully-rigged steam vessels - rather than craft driven solely by 
machine power. The striking of a balance between comparative advantage and flexibility 
remained an important part ofLiverpudlians' gross investment strategy throughout the study 
period, and especially as such pertained to the introduction of steam. 
The emergence ofthe steam age was greatly aided by the innovative Scotsman James 
Watt under the aegis of Boulton, Watts & Co. On a more negative note, however, Watt was 
so thorough with his patents that he greatly restricted the freedom of other inventors in the 
field. The Scot William Symington, often called the "father" of marine engineering, was 
forced to infringe on Watt's patents. In 1788 Symington built his first practical steamboat. 
A few years later he produced the Charlotte Dundas, a stem-wheel towboat for use on the 
Forth and Clyde Canal. The experiment turned out to be a failure, and Symington died in 
poverty. The engines he used were manufactured by Boulton & Watt, as were those used in 
Robert Fulton's famous Clermont. This latter craft, which was in operation on the Hudson 
River by 1807, predated successful European steamers by five years. Yet even this vessel 
was not the first of its kind, for in 1804 Fulton's rival John Stevens had produced the 
steamer Little Julianna, although he was hobbled by the resources available to him and did 
not progress much further. 3 
3 
J. Graeme Bruce, "The Contribution of Cross-Channel and Coastal Vessel to Developments in Marine Practice," 
Journal ofTransport History, IV (1959), 66; P.W. Brock and Basil Greenhill, Steam and Sail: In Britain and 
North America (Princeton, 1973 ), 1 0-11; and George Blake, British Ships and Shipbuilders (London, 1946), 
23-24. For a concise overview of James Watt's life and career, including the issue of patents, see Robert N. 
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The expiry of Watt's master patents in 1800 allowed these new innovators to turn 
their attention to the development of marine engineering, and new experiments were not 
long in coming. In the early years the level of technical sophistication limited the scope of 
these endeavours largely to coastal and river traffic. In 1812, for example, Henry Bell 
introduced the Comet, the first successful passenger -carrying steamer in Europe. 4 According 
to Graeme Bruce, this vessel 
heralded the dawn of steam navigation, setting the stage for the Clyde's pre-
eminence in shipbuilding and marine engineering ... The building of steam-
propelled vessels for the Clyde, West Highland, and Irish Sea trade then 
began at an unprecedented rate. The confinement of steam to short-sea routes 
did not last long, however, and steamers soon began tentative forays into the 
oceanic trades. 5 
As early as 1819 an American wooden vessel named the Savannah crossed the 
Atlantic using an auxiliary engine to supplement her sails. The engine was little used on this 
trip, however, accounting for only eighty-five hours in twenty-nine days at sea. This 
experiment amounted to little, though, and the craft's engine was removed on her return to 
the United States. Following this passage the Americans dropped out of the race to produce 
ocean-going steamers until long after the British had firmly established a lead. 6 
Webb, James Watt. Inventor of a Steam Engine (New York, 1970). The only modem scholarly study ofFulton' s 
work is Cynthia Owen Philip, Robert Fulton: A Biography (New York, 1985). 
4 
On the Comet, see James Williamson, The Clyde Passenger Steamer. Its Rise and Progress during the 
Nineteenth Century, }rom the Cometof/812 to the King Edward of 1901 (Stevenage, 1987). 
5 
Bruce, "Developments in Marine Practice," 66; and Blake, British Ships, 23-25. 
6 
Ronald Hope, A New History of British Shipping (London, 1990), 266; and Melvin Maddocks, et al., The Great 
Liners (Alexandria, VA, 1982), 20. The Savannah was the brainchild of coastal steamer captain Moses Rogers, 
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While the Savannah made her historic voyage, steam use on shorter routes continued 
apace in the British Isles. In 1815 the paddle-wheeler Thames travelled from Glasgow to 
London. The following year the Elise became the first steam packet to cross the English 
Channel. By 1819 the Belfast firm Langtry placed the schooner-rigged, paddle-steamer 
Waterloo on a schedule oftwo round trips per week between Ireland and Liverpool. In 1821-
2 the British-built Chilean steam warship Rising Star crossed the Atlantic westbound, albeit 
mainly under sail, and became the first steamer to enter the Pacific. By 1825 another British 
steamer reached India. 7 
These early successes still could not disguise the limitations of the technology at this 
point in time. In the 1820s and 1830s the engines of all steamers were grossly inefficient. 
Steam was then produced using salt sea-water, and safe boiler pressure was no more than 
five pounds per square inch, with coal consumption running at ten pounds per horsepower 
per hour. 8 The engines were also cumbersome, and a steamer would have much of its under 
deck space taken up by them and the tremendous quantities of coal needed on longer routes. 
Thus early paddle-wheelers could only compete with sail on short-sea and coastal routes. 
The first of the Atlantic "Leviathans," the Great Eastern, launched in 1858, carried 3,000 
who envisioned a trans-Atlantic steamship line. The vessel was under construction as a sail packet at New York 
in 1818 when Rogers saw it and decided to purchase it for conversion to a steamer. The idea was ahead of its 
time, and following the experiment's failure, Rogers returned to commanding river steamers. He fell ill with fever 
and died just as the Savannah itself was grounded and breaking apart in the surf off Long Island. 
7 
Hope, British Shipping, 266; and Maddocks, eta/., Great Liners, 20. 
8 
Hope, British Shipping, 266. 
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tons of coal and still was relatively underpowered.9 
Within the next two decades these problems were largely overcome and steam came 
into its own, although it was not until about 1900 that overall steam tonnage owned in 
Britain actually exceeded sail tonnage. 10 After the mid-1880s sail could only compete on the 
longer routes, such as the various Antipodean trades. It made sense therefore for owners to 
demand that sail tonnage now be able to handle ever larger loads and to be equipped for the 
longest ocean routes. By the turn of the twentieth century the process had been nearly 
completed, steam had triumphed, and sail was gone on almost all its traditional routes. 
Notwithstanding the inefficiency of the early steam engines, the new passenger 
services they made possible were popular with the travelling public. Used as tugs, the new 
craft were able to increase the productivity of sailing vessels by helping them in and out of 
harbours. By 1825 forty-five steamship firms were established in London alone. In 1824 the 
City of Dublin Steam Packet Company, operating between Dublin and Liverpool, was 
founded and by 1850 was the sole authorized agent for the carriage of British mails across 
9 
Maddocks, et al., Great Liners, 42; Robert Gardiner and Basil Greenhill (eds.), The Advent of Steam: The 
Merchant Steamship Before 1900 (London, 1993), 95-97; Blake, British Ships, 32-33; Patrick Beaver, The Big 
Ship. Bronel 's Great Eastern, A Pictorial History (London, 1969); and Edward Mueller, "Revisiting the Great 
Eastern," Steamboat Bill, LIT (Fall 1995), 202-213. The huge vessel- the brainchild oflsambard Kingdom 
Brunei - had a career of more than thirty years but never did pay her own way. On one voyage in 1861 a storm 
caused damages of about £60,000. The vessel was similarly plagued throughout her career and never once filled 
her 4,000 berths. Historian George Blake called her " ... the most ludicrous and ill-starred vessel ever produced 
by the British shipbuilding industry ... " (32) 
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the Irish Sea. 11 Free from the vagaries of the wind, steamers were able to offer something 
that no sailing vessel could - reliable service. In the passenger and mail trades this was a 
tremendous boon. Weighed against this was the high cost of construction and the 
aforementioned inefficiency of early steam engines. In the bulk carrying trades the first 
steamers were not economical, and it took half a century for steam to be truly competitive 
on an equal footing with sail. Still, the advantages of steam were obvious, and the British 
made sustained efforts to develop oceanic steamers. As the "first industrial nation" they had 
a huge advantage over any potential rivals. 
In Liverpool, The Board of Trade registry series makes it clear that new steam 
investment did not become significant until about mid-century, with the numbers only 
increasing significantly from about the mid-1860s. As Graph 4.1, below, demonstrates, even 
after this date there were three points in the sample data- 1860, 1875 and 1885 -where the 
number of new steam acquisitions on the Liverpool registry dropped off significantly from 
the surrounding sample years. It should be noted that the tonnage figures in Graph 4.1 have 
to be treated with caution. Although the numbers do give a reasonable picture of the time 
frame in which steam tonnage investment began in earnest at the port, we must always keep 
in mind the changes in tonnage measurement- such as in 1854 -which affected the results 
(See Appendix One). 1855 is especially problematic because the BT 108 forms were 
changed in the middle of the year. Moreover, for the first part of the year it is not really clear 
whether the tonnage reported is gross or registered, although likely the former. Both would 
11 
Bruce, "Developments in Marine Practice," 66-67. 
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have been applied to steamers, but I have opted to use the registered measurement in this 
instance. 1855 was also exceptional in registry terms and, as a result, may give the 
impression that the next sample year, 1860, was less impressive than it actually was in terms 
of new steam tonnage registered. To better compare this year and those preceding, we can 
consider this: in 1850, still a large year for registries, only 2,558 steam tons were registered 
compared to 11,678 in 1860. 12 
The first sample year in which steamers appeared on the Liverpool registry was 1826, 
although they did not represent any significant amount of tonnage until about 1855. Still, 
new steam tonnage added to Liverpool's registry almost doubled from 1826 to 1850, rising 
from 1,344 to 2,558 tons. The gradual introduction of this type of vessel was logical given 
that steam was an emerging technology and still very much unproven until after mid-century. 
In the 1830s another factor came into play that may have set Liverpool's nascent steam 
sector back a number of years. The two major steamship owners based on Merseyside were 
actually Anglo-Irish firms, and it was at precisely this time that they transferred their vessel 
registries from Liverpool to either Cork or Dublin. 13 
12 
Great Britain, Board of Trade (BT) 107 and 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1820-1889, various years. For 
my sample gross tonnage might seem the logical choice for such comparisons if the years prior to 1855 were 
measured in something akin to gross tonnage. However, for the 1860s sample years only register tons are given 
for all vessels, making it a better standard measure for the post-1855 years. In the case of sail tonnage the 
difference between gross and register tonnage was small, but should still be taken into account where possible. 
13 
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Since Graph 4.1 is based on new vessel registries, any decline would not be a direct result of the withdrawal of 
older tonnage from the Liverpool registry by these companies. Nonetheless, by the 1840s they would also not 
be adding any registries to the Liverpool fleet- a presence to be missed in terms of new steam numbers. 
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Concerning the fall in steam investments in 1875 and 1885, the trend was likely 
connected to the shipping market. The decision whether or not to invest in steam tonnage 
at any given time was a function of market forces, particularly rising and falling freight rates 
and the cost of steamers. In general, it might be assumed that investors would choose to add 
steam tonnage during periods of maximum return on their investment, when the rates were 
peaking and vice versa when rates were in decline. There was a general downward trend in 
freight rates for the entire second half of the nineteenth century, notwithstanding many short-
term recoveries along the way. Freight rates declined sharply from 1874 until 1879, and this 
was reflected in the trough of new steam registries in 1875. By the next year in our series, 
1880, investors were likely influenced in their buying behaviour by a slight upturn in the rate 
118 
cycle which had started at the end of the decade and, indeed, 1880 was a marked peak in the 
graph. Ironically, within a year or two rates hit their lowest point prior to the 1890s. Indeed, 
the fluctuations in freight rates were a constant factor in the economics of transport. 
Between 1882 and 1886 the value of shipping may have declined by as much as thirty 
percent, and once again the sample year which falls into this portion of the cycle ( 1885) 
represents a trough for new steam investment. Once the decline ended late in the decade 
investor confidence obviously rose. By 1889, investment in new steam tonnage at Liverpool 
reached an all-time high, although by then rates were already entering a downturn which 
would not be reversed until the tum of the century. 14 
These peaks and valleys all relate to the concrete realities of business. By the mid-
1880s it was probably true, as one shipowner remarked, that steam tonnage outperformed 
sail by a factor of about three and a half times. These cost reductions were a long time 
coming, however, and even as late as the 1870s did not tip the balance decisively toward 
steam. It was the short-term forces such as freight rates that often governed entrpreneurial 
decisions. As Philip Cottrell has written, "freight rates are notoriously volatile over the 
course of the trade cycle."15 Steam was at a disadvantage compared to sail in bulk trades 
14 
Cottrell, "Steamship on the Mersey," 144; BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; and C. Knick 
Harley, "Aspects of the Economics of Shipping, 1850-19 13," in Lewis R. Fischer and Gerald E. Panting ( eds. ), 
Change and Adaptation in Maritime History. The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century (St. John's, 
NL, I 985), I 70. It was at this very point in the freight cycle that sail came into its own. It was during the rate 
slump of 1874-1879 that many of the metal sail craft discussed earlier appeared. In addition, certain steamers, 
purchased during an early 1870s boom, were converted to sail craft. 
15 
Cottrell, "The Steamship on the Mersey," 144. See also Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, 
Parliamentary Papers (BPP) 1884-1885, XXXV, "First Report of the Royal Commission on Loss of Life at 
Sea," C-4577," evidence of F. Yeoman, steamship owner and broker, secretary of Hartlepool Shipowners' 
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during the downturns due to higher capital and operating costs. When the bottom fell out of 
the market, steamers often had to be laid up, and few British owners would have wished to 
add to a steam fleet during such times. 16 
This being said, there were certainly innovators to be found when conditions 
allowed, and a number of Liverpool owners were among the pioneers in the iron steamship. 
Examples include the investors in the Alburkah in 1832, the Scamander in the first half of 
the 1850s and Alfred Holt's Cleator, built in 1854 and equipped with compound engines in 
1864. Yet as we have seen, it was not until the 1850s that Liverpool owners made any real 
commitment to steam. The Pacific Steam Navigation Company was founded in 1840 for the 
express purpose of operating a steam-propelled service, but its own great expansion did not 
begin until the 1850s (see Chapters Nine and Ten). This process continued for another three 
decades and was not really completed until the 1880s and early 1890s. Liverpool owners 
generally did not exhibit any real haste to abandon sail until almost the end of the nineteenth 
Society, qq. 7450-7451. 
16 
Buying tonnage, particularly steam, at low points in the rate cycle was known as anti-cyclical purchasing. It 
allowed the buyer to take advantage of the "rock bottom" prices being offered as owners tried to sell off tonnage 
that was, for the moment, unuseable. This was not exploited in any real way by British owners of the day, 
although Liverpool provides at least one notable exception, Holts' Blue Funnel line. Holts traditionally purchased 
tonnage at low points in the trade cycle, as they did in 1892-1896, taking advantage of low interest rates and 
building costs. In the twentieth century both the Greeks and Norwegians employed the strategy. See Francis 
Hyde, Blue Funnel (Liverpool, 1956), 91; Malcolm Falkus, The Blue Funnel Legend. A History of the Ocean 
Steam Ship Company, 1865-1973 (London, 1990), 112-113; Gelina Harlaftis, A History of Greek-Owned 
Shipping: The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present Day (London, 1996); Harlaftis, 
Greek Shipowners and Greece 1945-1975: From Separate Development to Mutual Interdependence (London, 
1993); Helge Nordvik, "Entrepreneurship and Risk Taking in the Norwegian Shipping Industry in the Early Part 
of the Twentieth Century: The Case of Lauritz Kloster, Stavanger," in Fischer ( ed. ), From Wheel House to 
Counting House, 323-348; and Ole Gjalberg, "The Substitution of Steam For Sail in Norwegian Ocean Shipping, 
1866-1914: A Study in The Economics of Diffusion," Scandinavian Economic History Review, XXVIll, No. 
2 (1980), 133-146. 
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century. This may have had something to do with the port's extensive interests in long-
distance trades outside the Atlantic. 17 
The conservatism of Liverpool shipowners regarding steam can be seen in the 
tendency to invest in auxiliary rather than full steamers right through to the end of the Board 
of Trade 108 registry series. Auxiliary steamers were those vessels having some type of 
steam engine which could be used for propulsion but which also carried a full spread of 
sails. In the mid-nineteenth century large sail vessels often had a small steam engine to 
manoeuver in port and to use when becalmed. There were some drawbacks to this hybrid 
technology. Operating expenses tended to be higher than for either pure steamers or pure sail 
tonnage. An engine powerful enough to do more than just aid in docking was costly, and 
skilled crews were needed to run and maintain them. Likewise the full spread of sails carried 
by such vessels also needed specialized crewmen to work them efficiently. Nonetheless, a 
switch from the exclusive use of sail to some employment of steam technology may have 
seemed a natural progression for some vessel owners. Sail auxiliary tonnage, as Graeme 
Milne described it, "combined the economy of a sailing ship with the ability of a steamer 
to make progress in calm weather."18 Furthermore, in the age before the technology was 
17 
Cottrell, "Steamship on the Mersey," 141-142; Hyde, Blue Funnel, 17 and 19; Falkus, Blue Funnel Legend., 
94 and Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets: Blue Funnel Line (Burwash, East Sussex, 1984), 39. In a number of 
early steam trades, especially where profits could be made without government subsidies, Liverpool owners were 
often innovators regarding the use of steam. The Mediterranean trades were a good example of this tendency. 
Cottrell, "Liverpool Shipowners, the Mediterranean, and the Transition from Sail to Steam During the Mid-
Nineteenth Century," in Fischer (ed.), From Wheel House to Counting House, 154. 
18 
Graeme Milne, Trade and Traders in Mid-Victorian Liverpool. Mercantile Business and the Making of a World 
Port (Liverpool, 2000), 23 and 41; and BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
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perfected, merging steam power with sail was essential at sea. With only limited ship to 
shore communications, no nineteenth owner could ignore the value of backup propulsion 
on his capital-intensive investments. Gerald Peter Allington feels that without wind power 
as an alternative the development oflong-distance steam trades would have been stifled. 19 
Perhaps such considerations were of greatest importance to some Liverpool 
shipowners. In fact, auxiliary steam tonnage does seem to have been preferred by many 
Liverpool investors, at least prior to the 1890s. Registry data indicates that in the sample 
years from 1826 to 1850 sixty-two steam-powered vessels were registered at Liverpool, 
comprising a total of 8,911 tons. In the sample years through 1845 all of Liverpool's gross 
steam investment consisted of auxiliary vessels, with the first unrigged steam craft not 
appearing until1850. These comprised a mere two of fifteen new steamers with a combined 
total of only 186 of2,558 steam tons registered that year. From the 1860s through to 1889 
the numbers and tonnage of newly-registered unrigged steamers remained small compared 
to the auxiliary-type vessels. Generally, steam registries rose markedly in this era, as Graph 
4.1 above illustrates. Nonetheless, of 454 steamers registered in the sample years from 1860 
to 1889 only eighteen were unrigged, discounting eleven steam-powered flats and one 
"derrick mast steamer" registered in the 1880s samples. These unrigged steamers made up 
a minuscule 1,192 of393,886 register steam tons put onto the Liverpool register from 1860 
19 
Gerald Peter Allington, "Sailing Rigs and Their Use on Ocean-going Merchant Steamships, 1820-1910," 
International Journal of Maritime History, XVI, No. 1 (June 2004), 152. 
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through 1889. (The gross tonnages were 2,831 and 614,220, respectively).20 
Milne makes the point that large iron sailing vessels became something of a 
speciality among Liverpool owners around the 1860s, and these were mainly used for deep-
sea bulk trades. Conversely, the domination of this market meant that Liverpool, unlike 
London, never made a real commitment to auxiliary vessels. The first part of Milne's 
contention is likely true when measured by the yardstick of shipping using Liverpool, 
whether registered there or not. Indeed, up to the late 1870s Liverpool- again in contrast to 
London - remained largely a sail port even when this is calculated in terms of gross 
investment. In terms of a commitment to the auxiliary steamer, on the other hand, new 
tonnage investment at Liverpool tells a different story. In the 1860s (one of Milne's primary 
decades of study) new steamer registries at Liverpool were almost exclusively of the 
auxiliary type. While the absolute numbers of unrigged craft rose slightly in the 1870s and 
1880s they still made up a fairly insignificant proportion of gross steam investment in the 
port. Investors in new Liverpool-registered tonnage therefore cannot be regarded as having 
little commitment to the auxiliary steamer, even if such was the case for shipping 
frequenting the port in general. 21 
Another interesting feature ofLiverpool's auxiliary steam fleet from 1820 to 1889 
concerns the choice of rigs. In terms of gross sail investment, the ship rig clearly 
20 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
21 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; Milne, Trade and Traders, 41; and Cottrell, "Liverpool 
Shipowners, the Mediterranean," 154. 
123 
predominated throughout the period, even considered simply in terms of vessel numbers. 
The contrast with the rigs of auxiliary steamers is marked. Of the total454 steamers newly 
registered at Liverpool in this era a full3 28 were schooner -rigged. The fore-and-aft schooner 
rig was a practical choice~ the windage of the yards needed to mount square sails created a 
great deal of drag on an auxiliary vessel running on steam power alone. By the second half 
of the century schooners were less dominant, but this change was also based in practical 
considerations. The schooner rig still dominated steam registries (211 of326) in the 1870s 
and 1880s, but there were now many more types of rigs used for auxiliary craft, not to 
mention the few "thoroughbred" steamers. In the 1880s auxiliary vessels were rigged not 
only as schooners but also as barquentines, brigantines and sloops, plus the occasional 
appearance of other rigs. According to Allington, rigs that combined fore-and-aft with square 
sails were probably the best compromise for an auxiliary craft. While the former rig form 
promoted low windage, the latter was a better choice for propelling a vessel whose engines 
had completely failed. 22 
Aside from the tendency toward schooner rigs at Liverpool, in the earlier years these 
craft were also generally small. In the first sample year that steam appeared - 1826 -
auxiliary schooners averaged only about 134 tons. As late as 1850, when the first unrigged 
steamers appeared, these vessels still averaged only around 155 tons. This was, of course, 
the era when most steamers were employed in coasting and short-sea trades, not to mention 
22 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; and Allington, "Sailing Rigs," 131. Fore-and-aft sails 
had other benefits such as smaller crew size and lowered building costs, always useful considerations when 
investing in capital-intensive steamers. 
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towing and pilotage, and Liverpool owners were certainly employing these vessels in this 
way. On average the tonnage of auxiliary steamers grew exponentially after 1850. The 
average auxiliary barque of the 1880s came in at 2,797 register tons, or 4,550 gross tons. 
Brig and schooner-rigged auxiliary vessels were on average just under and just over 2,000 
gross tons, respectively.23 
Clearly, such craft were no longer being used primarily for coasting, whatever their 
rig. By this stage steam engines were winning the technological race with sail. The Suez 
Canal had opened, and steamers had penetrated all but the longest routes. Still, Liverpool 
owners clearly saw no reason at this stage to completely abandon the use of sails. Perhaps 
their notorious conservatism was at play here, but an example presented by Graeme Milne 
(admittedly from the 1860s) may shed a different light on the matter. The proposed 
Australian & Eastern Line sought to inaugurate an immigrant service to Australia using 
auxiliary steam clippers. This represented the best compromise from the technical standpoint 
of the 1860s, and the company prospectus stressed that they would not be using full 
steamers. The changeover would thus not be too radical or experimental - such a measure 
presumably reassuring potential shareholders. Although steam was much improved over the 
next twenty years, the same considerations may have been relevant to those investing in new 
steam tonnage at Liverpool. The port had made its reputation in deep-sea sail trades. By this 
23 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. Through to 1889 Liverpool's unrigged steamers 
continued to be used mainly for "in-shore" tasks. Of five unrigged steamers newly-registered in the 1880s 
samples, one, the 161 tonAngincourt, was a steam tug, while two were owned by the Wallasey Local Board; 
a third was owned by the municipality of Birkenhead, and the final craft by the Leeds and Liverpool Canal 
Company. 
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stage steam was the ascendant technology, and some adaptability to it was clearly needed 
to compete. However, investors were certainly hesitant about moving completely away from 
what had long been their comparative advantage, hence the compromise auxiliary steamer. 
Even the issue of crew costs appears to have been dealt with in some measure by the use of 
fore-and-aft sail types like the schooner, which generally required less handling expertise 
and manpower than square sails. By the early 1900s the auxiliary steamers were largely gone 
from the port of Liverpool, but their significance in gross investment terms prior to 1890 
should not be underestimated. 24 
The transitional form of the auxiliary steamer was part and parcel of the gradual 
transfer from sail to steam. According to C. Knick Harley, the available evidence suggests 
that this switch generally "was accomplished in a shipping market that adjusted well to 
equilibrium. "25 Sail was replaced by steam as transportation costs for the latter fell in 
24 
Milne, Trade and Traders, 163. Milne's argument here is similar to that made by Gerald Peter Allington and 
noted above. See Allington, "Sailing Rigs," 152. In the case of Atlantic Canada the port of Saint John was again 
the most similar to Liverpool in regard to auxiliary steam. Although small in comparison to new sailing vessel 
registries, gross investment in auxiliary (and paddle) steamers at Saint John from 1820 to 1914 was by no means 
insignificant. This was in contrast to most other Atlantic Canadian ports in which no forms of steam tonnage 
made up a significant proportion of new registries - Halifax, and St. John's steam sealing fleet excepted. Eric 
W. Sager, with Gerald E. Panting, Maritime Capital: The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada 1820-1914 
(Montreal, 1990), 51. If we assume that the large (2,000 plus ton) auxiliary schooners of the 1880s were not 
used for coasting, their rig is probably best explained in terms of costs rather than efficiency. Stanly Gerr 
contended that the fore and aft rig acted as a kind of"energy sponge," applying great stress to a vessel's hull. 
Over time, Gerr felt, this created a much higher rate ofloss among large (wooden) deep-sea schooners. Although 
eminently useful in coastal trading, the fore and aft rig "was basically not a suitable type of vessel for long-
distance deep-water voyaging." Stanley Gerr, "The Suitability of the Big Wooden Schooner for Long-Distance 
Deep-sea Trading," The Mariner's Mirror, LXI, No. 4 (November 1975), 399-400 and 403. The use of metal 
construction materials and the fitting of steam engines likely went some way toward negating this serious defect. 
25 
Charles K. Harley, "The Shift from Sailing Ships to Steamships, 1850-1890: A Study in Technological change 
and Its Diffusion," in D. N. McCloskey ( ed. ), Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain After 1840 (London, 1979), 
228. 
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relation to sail. This lends practical support to the propensity ofMerseyside investors in the 
early years to pull back from a commitment to steam whenever freight rates fell to the point 
where steam tonnage might become unprofitable. Robin Craig has argued that sail tonnage 
looked more attractive to buyers not only at times of low freight rates but also when coal 
prices rose. He asserted that this "reflects how perilous was the cost advantage of the 
steamship even in the 1870s and 1880s. "26 It also means that sail likely remained a practical 
investment in certain trades, and for particular firms, for a long time - as our discussion of 
Brocklebanks in Chapters Seven and Eight illustrates. By the latter years of the century 
steam had developed to the point that sail was clearly on the way out, even in times of 
market downturns or higher fuel prices. As Harley remarked, a portion, although not the 
lion's share, of the credit for falling steam costs relative to sail must be credited to 
improvements in marine engine technology, the most important of these being the compound 
engine which greatly reduced fuel consumption, allowing steamers to compete with sail on 
longer routes. This points to a situation where investors were influenced by not only business 
and economic factors but also by scientific concerns. 27 
26 
Robin Craig, "William Gray & Company: A West Hartlepool Shipbuilding Enterprise, 1864-1913," in Cottrell 
and Aldcroft (eds.), Shipping, Trade and Commerce, 171. 
27 
Harley, "Shift," 228. The compound engine was the first to employ a second cylinder. This made more efficient 
use of a given quantity of steam (by using it more than once). The compound engine reduced fuel consumption 
by nearly sixty percent over the old single cylinder engines. Compound engines were likewise made possible by 
other improvements such as the surface condenser which recirculated fresh water through the steam engine. This 
kept the main boilers clean while avoiding the loss of heat that accompanied the hourly blowing out of brine 
necessary when using sea water to produce steam (the effect of salt water on their casings also shortened the 
life of marine engines and made catastrophic failures a real possibility). The most important spin-off of the 
surface condenser was that its use made increased boiler pressures- and thus the compound engine- possible. 
The compound engine was later superceded by versions with three and four cylinders, the triple and quadruple-
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Table 4.1 
Annual Rates of Change in Freights & the Contribution of Various Factors to the 
Decline 
I Freight 
Contribution of 
Ship Prices 
Ship Size 
Coal Consumption 
Weight of Ship 
Crew Size 
Other Input Prices 
"Residual" 
1-3.8 
-1.1 
-0.9 
-
-0.4 
-0.4 
-0.5 
-0.5 
Sail: California 
1875-1890 
1-5.7 
-1.9 
-0.7 
-1.1 
-0.4 
-0.4 
-0.7 
-0.5 
Steam: Bombay 
1873-1890 
Source: C. Knick Harley," The Shift from Sailing Ships to Steamships, 1850-1890: 
A Study in Technological Change and its Diffusion," in D. N. McCloskey 
( ed. ), Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840 (London, 1979), 228. 
In his discussion of this change Harley presented evidence from the California grain 
trade and the Bombay trade to assess the relative importance of various factors, including 
decreased coal consumption, on falling freight rates. Table 4.1 shows the impact of 
decreased coal consumption on the relative cost of operating steam tonnage. We can also 
plainly see that this change, although important, was not the dominant cause of declining 
expansion engines. GeraldS. Graham contends that the compound engine sounded the death knell of the sailing 
ship, and that had it been developed twenty years earlier the great age of sail in the 1860s and 1870s would never 
have happened. Graham, "The Ascendency of the Sailing Ship 1850-85," Economic History Review, zrut Ser., 
IX, (1956), 83; Bruce, "Developments in Marine Practice," 70-71; and Hope, British Shipping, 300-301. 
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freight rates. Lower ship costs due to declining iron prices and technological changes in 
shipbuilding, along with technological changes leading to lower ship weight and smaller 
crews for both sail and steam, were also important contributors. The Bombay trade was the 
longest on which steam dominated in the early 1870s~ it was also the one in which lower 
coal consumption had the biggest impact. Table 4.1 therefore must be taken as the best case 
scenario in assessing the importance of lower coal costs to rate declines. 28 
On longer voyages, in which many Liverpool owners specialized, early savings in 
steam tonnage costs did not have a decisive impact on freight rates. It was only after steam 
became dominant in a trade that bulk rates actually fell. Thus, the process was gradual, and 
there was room for shipowners in Liverpool to invest successfully in these long-distance sail 
trades rather than making an immediate switch to steam. Liverpool owners thus had practical 
reasons for continued investment in sail and were certainly not hidebound conservatives. 29 
This should also not obscure the fact that investors on Merseyside made investments 
in steam tonnage as early as the 1850s, especially if their primary interests lay in short-sea 
trades. Although Cottrell gave the impression ofLiverpool owners as being somewhat tardy 
in steam investment, it must be remembered that as late as 1870 the gross tonnage of the 
British merchant fleet comprised almost two-thirds sail tonnage, even when the figure has 
28 
Ibid, 229. The Bombay case is pertinent to the Brocklebank Company. Although Calcutta, not Bombay, was 
its principal port of call, the company took advantage of certain non-steam-driven innovations, including iron 
construction and economies of scale in tonnage and manning (see Chapter Seven). On the Bombay trade in 
general, see J. Forbes Munro, Maritime Enterprise and Empire: Sir William Mackinnon and His Business 
Network, 1823-93 (Woodbridge, 2003). 
29 
Harley, "Shift," 229. 
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been converted into "steam equivalent" tons. 30 It was only by 1890 (at the termination of the 
Board of Trade 108 record series) that the steam fleet had significantly outpaced sail by all 
measures, except perhaps on the longest routes. With this in mind, we might not be so quick 
to think that Liverpool owners were much behind the times (see Table 4.2). 
Year 
1814 
1835 
1850 
1870 
1890 
Source: 
Table 4.2 
Growth of Sail and Steam· The British Merchant Fleet 1814 1890 . h -
Sail (Net Tons) Steam (Gross tons) Steam Equivalent (Gross Tons) 
2,329,000 - 776,300 
2,750,000 - 833,000 
3,618,000 275,000 1,481,000 
4,876,000 1,819,000 3,444,000 
3,127,000 8,240,000 9,448,000 
Ronald Hope, A New History of British Shipping (London, 1990), 296. See 
also Statistical Abstracts of the UK, 1814, 1835, 1850, 1870 and 1890. 
As an adjunct to the larger question of the growth of steam tonnage, there is another 
technological innovation which Liverpool owners, like those in Britain generally, were 
beginning to adopt at this time. When steam engines made artificial propulsion at sea 
possible, there naturally followed the question of mechanics. Over the years a number of 
variations have been attempted in the quest to propel seaborne craft, but the basic forms 
boiled down into only two- the paddle wheel and the screw propeller. Although the screw 
principle (though not the marine propellor) has been known since the ancient Greeks, it was 
the paddle wheel that powered the first steamships. Practically all the early steamers were 
30 
Steam tonnage by this measure equalled about three times sail tonnage. 
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paddle driven, with the Clermont and Comet having their wheels on the side. Originally the 
Comet was fitted with two sets of paddles, but this was found to give no mechanical 
advantage, and most subsequent side wheelers carried only one wheel. The other major 
variation was to have one large wheel fitted to a vessel's stern, as was often seen on the 
famous Mississippi river boats.31 
Early marine engines could often use either paddle wheels or screw propellers. 
Paddle steamers had an advantage in shallow waters; increasing the width of the paddle 
blades allowed for increased power. Screw vessels tended to roll badly at sea if built to 
shallow draught, but on the other hand were less liable to damage if they struck solid 
objects. A second drawback of paddle wheelers was that the engines had to be located high 
up in the vessel about amidships; screw drives allowed this space to be freed up since the 
machinery could usually be placed lower in the hull near the stem. The rear -wheeled paddle 
vessels were actually developed to combat the problem of the engines occupying the best 
space on the craft. As well, this arrangement worked well for flat-bottomed, shallow-draught 
vessels, like the river steamers. Finally, on a stern-wheeled vessel the hull acted to protect 
31 
In fact, the screw propellor did not exist as a practical proposition until a few decades after the Clermont and 
Comet appeared. Allan D. Frazer, "The Clermont Revisited," Steamboat Bill, LIV (Spring I997), 26-3I; K. T. 
Rowland, Steam at Sea. A History of Steam Navigation (Newton Abbot, I970), 48-50; Bruce, "Developments 
in Marine Practice," 67-68; and Gardiner and Greenhill Advent of Steam, II and 63-64. On the steamboats that 
plied the rivers in the interior of the United States, see Harry P. Owens, Steamboats and the Cotton Economy: 
River Trade in the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta (Jackson. MS, I990); Mary Helen Dohan, Mr. Roosevelt's 
Steamboat (New York, I98I ); James Hall, The West: Its Commerce and Navigation (New York, I970); and 
James T. Flexner, Steamboats Come True (New York, I944). 
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the paddle from flotsam damage. 32 
Source: 
Graph 4.2 
Liverpool Steamers by Propulsion Method 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
r--
--
- r--- f--
I 
-'- '--
- • I 
185018551860186518701875188018851889 
Sample Years 
• Screw Propeller • Paddle Wheels 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
For a number of years a debate ensued on the respective merits of the paddle wheel 
versus the screw propeller. The Admiralty was undecided on which to employ in future 
steam-driven warships and conducted a test in 1845. Two vessels, H.M.S. Alecto, a paddle 
wheeler, and the propeller-driven H.M. S. Rattler, were lashed together and engaged in a tug-
of-war. The Rattler's engines were stopped while Alecto went full-speed ahead. The 
Rattler's engines were then engaged, andAlecto was soon being pulled along at two knots, 
32 
Edward A Mueller, "The Recessed Steamboat Osceola," Steamboat Bill, XL Vll (Fall 1990), 205-213; Edward 
0. Clark, "Pioneer Steamboat John Stevens," Steamboat Bill, XLV (Fall 1988), 173-185; and Bruce, 
"Developments in Marine Practice," 68; 
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her paddles churning the water, but she was unable to match her competitor. With these 
results the Admiralty decided to adopt screw propulsion for new naval vessels. In addition 
to the obvious superiority in terms of power, the engines could be placed lower in the vessel, 
allowing better protection from enemy fire. Thus, by mid-century the Royal Navy was 
already a supporter of the propeller. For merchant tonnage paddle wheels remained in use 
much longer. The changeover was often gradual. Pacific Stearn Navigation, although one 
of the great technological innovators among Liverpool firms, continued purchasing a mix 
of paddle and screw vessels for a number of years after its first investment in the latter. 33 
Given the registry data and the specific example of the Pacific Stearn Navigation 
Company, it seems that Liverpool shipowners were no exception in retaining paddle wheels 
for quite some time after steam first appeared in the port. As Graph 4.2 above illustrates, 
screw propeller use in the port only began in earnest in the years after 1850. As late as 1865 
paddle wheelers remained the propulsion of choice among steamers, although from 1870 the 
numbers of paddle wheelers newly registered in the port dropped precipitously, never again 
amounting to more than ten percent of all new steam registries. As in most ports, the screw 
propeller finally and decisively replaced the paddle wheel, just as it had done in the world's 
navies several decades earlier. In this instance, perhaps more so than for steam tonnage 
33 
Bruce "Developments in Marine Practice", 68; Brock and Greenhill, Steam and Sail, 14; Rowland Steam at Sea, 
96-1 00; and Andrew Lambert, The Last Sailing Battlejleet: Maintaining Naval Mastery 1815-1850 (London, 
1991 ). On the politics of the adoption of the screw propeller by the Royal Navy, see Basil Greenhill and Ann 
Giffard, Steam, Politics and Patronage: The Transformation of the Royal Navy 1815-54 (London, 1994). 
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generally, Liverpool is as a good example of the conservatism noted by Graeme Bruce.34 
Having now explored the physical features of the Liverpool fleet, we will examine the 
sources of this capital; that is, from where did Liverpool investors acquire their vessels? 
Again, the notions of comparative advantage and flexibility should be kept in mind. A theme 
throughout the thesis is that one source of comparative advantage emanated from the 
investor's information networks, as Gordon Boyce demonstrates. When purchasing tonnage 
having an "insider's edge" could be very important. It made perfect sense for a shipowner 
to buy tonnage locally where he might be well placed to pick up the best deals and to have 
the greatest insight into the builders with whom he was dealing (an example of the kind of 
trust relationship Graeme Milne explores). 35 As shipbuilding declined on Merseyside over 
the course of the nineteenth century local buyers naturally turned to new sources of supply. 
Even here, however, they did not stray too far afield, most frequently purchasing from 
builders in the northeast of England. Others important sources of tonnage were also linked 
to the port, especially via trade ties. As technology and North Atlantic trade patterns altered 
over the period 1820 to 1889 so too did Liverpool investors' buying patterns. Again, they 
adopted a survival strategy based on flexibility. As will be demonstrated, from buying many 
Canadian wooden bottoms prior to mid-century, Liverpool shipowners graduated to the 
34 
BT 1071108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. Regarding the conservatism ofLiverpool investors, the 
same might be said for Liverpool shipowners' long retention of the auxiliary steamer. 
35 
This trait was common to many ports including London and the Atlantic Canadian ports studied by the ACSP 
(see below). 
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metal steamers so associated with yards on the Clyde, northern England and major Ulster 
builders like Harland & Wolff. 
In fact, examination of the Board of Trade Registries indicates that Liverpool 
tonnage came from many locales, including the United States, Germany, Australia and India. 
In the 1820s, in particular, a number of vessels were listed as "prizes," usually tonnage 
originally captured during the recent Napoleonic Wars or from the Americans in the War of 
1812.36 These craft reached their peak in the 1820s when they comprised just over four 
percent of new registries in Liverpool, both in numeric and tonnage terms. The timing here 
was not surprising, as the capture of prizes was most important up to 1815 and declined once 
peace was restored. By the 1830s prizes represented only two percent of all new registries 
in the port measured by tonnage and even less in terms of the actual number of vessels 
registered. Prizes and foreign-built tonnage were not especially significant in terms of newly-
36 
There are innumerable works on the naval aspects of the Napoleonic wars, especially events surrounding its most 
famous naval personality, Lord Nelson. See, for example, Lord Charles Beresford and W. H. Wilson, Nelson 
and His Times (London, 1897); Tom Pocock, Horatio Nelson (London, 1987); Andrew Lambert, Nelson : 
Britannia's God of War (London, 2004); David Davies, Fighting Ships (London, 1996); and Nathan Miller, 
Broadsides. The Age of Fighting Sail, 1775-1815 (Edison, NJ, 2005). There are also numerous sources on the 
naval war of 1812. See Michael Blumenthal, et a/., The Frigates (Alexandria, VA, 1979); and Robert 
Malcomson,LordsoftheLake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario, 1812-1814 (Toronto, 1998). The Warof1812 
was the last in which privately outfitted vessels of war, liketheLiverpool-sponsoredB/ackJoke, played a major 
role. A good scholarly look at these craft and the capture of prizes is Faye Margaret Kert, Prize and Prejudice: 
Privateering and Naval Prize in the War of 1812 (St. John's, NL, 1997); and Kert, "The Fortunes of War: 
Commercial Warfare and Maritime Risk in the War of 1812," The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du Nord, Vlll, 
No. 4 (October 1998), 1-16. See also Harold Horwood and Ed Butts, Bandits and Privateers: Canada in the 
Age of Gunpowder (Halifax, NS, 1987). The naval portion of this war is often viewed as a complete victory for 
the American Navy. The Americans were, in fact, quite successful in ship-to-ship frigate actions and won a 
number of crucial lake battles during the war. The Royal Navy, while chastised to a degree by these 
engagements, was still able to practically strangle American seaborne commerce from 1812-1815, and Anglo-
Canadian privateers captured about four times as many American vessels as were taken by their opponents. 
Horwood and Butts, Bandits and Privateers, 72. On privateering generally see David J. Starkey, E.S. van Eyck 
van Heslinga and J.A. de Moor (eds.), Pirates and Privateers :New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Exeter, 1997). 
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registered vessels in Liverpool, however. 37 
The only slight exception to this generalization was the United States and this only 
in the years surrounding the American Civil War. In the early years of the nineteenth century 
America emerged as a powerful maritime rival to Britain, but by the third-quarter of the 
century its vessels were largely absent from deep-sea trades, although not from its own 
coastal and inland waterways. The Civil War impacted the US merchant marine severely, 
not only through the depredations of Confederate commerce raiders but also through a 
transfer of tonnage to the neutral British register. It is perhaps no coincidence that in the 
1860s sample years American-built tonnage comprised almost six percent of all new 
registries at Liverpool and over seven percent in tonnage terms. Overall, American craft 
accounted for just two percent of all vessels newly-registered at Liverpool from 1820 to 
1889, and only just over this mark when measured by tonnage. 38 
37 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. All figures in this section exclude the 1850s sample 
years due to the problems of tonnage measurement in the transitional year 1855. See Appendix One. After the 
1820s prizes, when they did appear, were just as likely to be court prizes, usually those seized while engaged 
in the slave trade - which was illegal from the early nineteenth century - with sanctions being vigorously 
enforced by the Royal Navy. An example here is the 335-ton brig Formidable, registered in Liverpool in 1835. 
The vessel was condemned by the British and Spanish Court ofMixed Commission at Sierra Leone "for breach 
of the laws for the prevention of the slave trade." BT 107, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1835. See Christopher 
Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade: the Suppression of the African Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century 
(London, 1968); William E.F. Ward, The Royal Navy and the Slavers: the Suppression of the Atlantic Slave 
Trade (New York, 1970) and David Eltis, Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade 
(New York, 1987). My MA thesis looked at tonnage origins for Maryport (for coasters) and, in broad terms, 
the findings were similar that in Liverpool. See Clarke, "Coastwise from Cumberland: The Maryport Coasting 
Trade, 1850-1889" (M.A. thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1998). 
38 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. See also David G. Surdam, Northern Naval Superiority 
and the Economics of the American Civil War (Columbia, SC, 2001); and Neil Ashcroft, "British Trade with 
the Confederacy and the Effectiveness ofUnion Maritime Strategy during the Civil War," International Journal 
of Maritime History, X, No.2 (December 1998), 155-176. Vessel transfers in the sample year 1860 were 
obviously not affected by the Civil War directly, although it is likely that certain American vessel owners were 
prescient enough to see that trouble was in the making. Since the years 1861-1864 were not included as part of 
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Given the paucity of foreign tonnage entering the Liverpool market, sources of origin 
must have been either domestic or colonial~ this was, in fact, exactly the case. In all, over 
the span of thirteen sample years from 1820 through 1889 - excluding the 1850s samples 
-overall gross investment at Liverpool amounted to 2,032 vessels totalling 1,299,028 tons. 
Of these vessels a full 92.9 percent of registries originated either in the British Isles or in 
Canada.39 (In tonnage terms these craft made up ninety-five percent of new-registrations). 
British-built vessels appearing on Liverpool registry for the first time might come from any 
part of the UK, but as one might expect, the majority came from areas closest to the port, 
including western Scotland and a number of locales in eastern Ireland (Ireland then being 
a political unit of the United Kingdom) that were within Liverpool's short-sea trading 
sphere. Appendix Two illustrates the relative importance of areas of origin as a percentage 
of newly-registered shipping in the port from the 1820s through to 1889, both in terms of 
numbers and tonnage. For our purposes Appendix Two breaks England up into four vessel 
origin regions, loosely mirroring those used by Simon Ville and his collaborators in their 
my sample it is likely that the amount of American tonnage transferred to Liverpool in the 1860s is an under-
representation. It was a policy of the post-war US Congress not to allow such "traitorous" vessels back in after 
1865. See Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan, The Abandoned Ocean :a History of United States Maritime 
Policy (Columbia, SC, 2001) and David H. Bess and Martin T. Farris, US Maritime Policy: History and 
Prospects (New York, 1981 ). 
39 
For general surveys of the transfer of British North America-built vessels to Liverpool, see Lewis R. Fischer, 
"A Bridge Across the Water: Liverpool Ship brokers and the Transfer ofEastem Canadian Sailing Vessels, 1855-
1880," The Northern Mariner!Le Marin du Nord, ill (1993), 49-59; Richard Rice, "Shipbuilding in British 
America, 1787-1890: An Introductory Study" (PhD thesis, University ofLiverpool, 1977); and Rice, "Measuring 
British Dominance of Shipbuilding in the Maritimes, 1787 -1890," in Keith Matthews and Gerald Panting ( eds. ), 
Ships and Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region (St. John's, NL, 1978), 109-155. All told 524 vessels were 
newly-registered at Liverpool in the 1850s. In 1850 this represented 80,822 tons as calculated under the old 
method of measurement. In 1855 70,339 tons were registered under this system, along with 85,372 register tons 
later in the year. 
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collection of essays on British shipbuilding. 40 The Northwest of England was represented 
by the old counties of Cumberland, Lancashire and Cheshire, along with the Isle of Man. 
Northeast England comprised Northumberland, Durham and Yorkshire. Vessels registered 
at Liverpool from Southwest England came from the counties of Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, 
Gloucester, Hampshire and Somerset. The Southeast largely represented registries 
originating in London and the home counties, along with counties such as Norfolk, Suffolk 
and Lincoln, plus the Channel Islands.41 
Of these four regions, it was very much northern-built tonnage that dominated 
Liverpool's new registrations. From 1820 to 1889 about forty-eight percent of Liverpool's 
newly-registered vessels originated in northern England, with the numbers only slightly 
smaller as measured by tonnage. In terms of sample years, this represented almost 1,000 
vessels of more than 600,000 tons. The regional dominance ofthe North reached its peak 
in the 1880s samples when over sixty percent of gross investment at Liverpool was 
comprised of northern English-built vessels. Tonnage figures were marginally less 
impressive but still stood at about fifty-four percent. Indeed, if one studies a map of northern 
Britain, the places of origin for most ofLiverpool' s British-built fleet radiate outward from 
Liverpool like the spokes of a wheel, forming a kind of hinterland for the production of 
shipping for the metropole. This analogy should not be carried too far, however, since 
40 
Simon Ville, (ed.), Shipbuilding in the United Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century: A Regional Approach (St. 
John's, NL, 1993). 
41 
BT I 07/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. Of all England's northern counties only Westmoreland, 
with the shortest coastline of the Northwest counties, provided no tonnage to the Liverpool register. 
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Liverpool was not the only market for tonnage from these places. Nevertheless, it is an apt 
generalization. 42 
Of the northern counties, Lancashire itself was generally the most important source 
of tonnage for the Liverpool registry. The county provided about thirty-two percent of all 
northern English craft newly-registered at Liverpool in the sampled years from 1820 to 1889. 
Measured by tonnage, this amounted to 31.8 percent of northern English builds - almost 
200,000 tons all told. Durham, on the east coast, was also significant. Its vessel numbers and 
tonnages, as a percentage of northern output were 22.6 and 39. 7, respectively. Although less 
important than Lancashire in terms of numeric output, Durham builders were obviously 
selling larger craft to Liverpool buyers, on average, than were shipyards in the port's own 
county. To the south of Liverpool (with Birkenhead essentially comprising part of its larger 
port system), Cheshire was also an important vessel emporium for Liverpool shipowners. 
In absolute terms Cheshire shipbuilders provided Liverpool with a greater percentage of new 
bottoms in the sampled years than did Durham. In the Cheshire case the disparity between 
numbers and tonnages was even greater than in Durham, although in the opposite direction. 
42 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. Throughout the study period southern England supplied 
Liverpool with about six percent of all newly-registered vessels. In tonnage tenns its contribution stood at only 
4.1 percent. A high point in terms of Liverpool registrations came in the 1830s and 1840s when around ten 
percent of new registries in the port came from southern England. For a good discussion of southern England's 
shipbuilding see David J. Starkey, "The Shipbuilding Industry of Southwest England, 1790-1913," in Ville ( ed. ), 
Shipbuilding, 75-110; and Sarah Palmer, "Shipbuilding in Southeast England, 1800-1913," in Ville (ed.), 
Shipbuilding, 45-74. Registration figures for Liverpool reflect Starkey's contention that Southwest shipbuilding 
seriously contracted later in the nineteenth century. They also fit well with Palmer's overall assessment of 
Southeast England as a shipbuilding region in decline - in the case of London from the late 1860s on. See also 
Starkey, "Devon's Shipbuilding Industry, 1786-1970," in Michael Duffy et al ( eds. ), The New Maritime History 
of Devon (2 vols., London, 1992); Philip Banbury, Shipbuilders of the Thames and Medway (Newton Abbot, 
1971 ); Michael Bouquet, Southeastern Sail from the Medway to the So lent 1840-1940 (Newton Abbot, 1972); 
and Adrian B. Rance, Shipbuilding in Victorian Southampton (Southampton, 1981 ). 
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Despite providing Liverpool with twenty-eight percent of its northern-built vessels, in 
tonnage terms this amounted to less than nine percent of gross investment. This seeming 
incongruity is explained by a specialization in small craft. In the 1880s sample years, for 
example, of seventy-seven vessels newly registered at Liverpool from Cheshire, fifty were 
flats. Based mainly at Northwich, Winsford, Birkenhead and Seacombe, Chester's builders 
produced vessels that were, on average, less than eighty tons each; this at a time when the 
average new vessel registered at Liverpool was larger than ever before. 43 
Although seldom supplying an absolute majority of the port's new tonnage, a 
significant proportion ofLiverpool' s gross investment originated in northern England. There 
is a logic in the geographical pattern. Simon Ville feels that buying locally had certain 
advantages to the perspective shipowner. Although Ville's argument is concerned more with 
a local market in a narrow sense, it might also be applied in part to Liverpool's regional 
market. When vessels were purchased or commissioned in an investor's own locale the 
owner was in a better position to oversee construction and to prevent the unreasonable 
extension of delivery schedules (again we return to the idea of a comparative advantage 
being conferred via one's place of residence). Before the onset of steam and metal, in 
particular, the industry was very much craft-based, which increased the need for supervision. 
As Ville remarks, "the owner who bought locally was also able to observe changes in 
technology and to take advantage of bargains. Personal relationships with local builders 
43 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. Other vessels types produced in Cheshire included 
cutters, schooners, ketchs and sloops, along with a number of small auxiliary steamers. Cumberland, 
Northumberland and Yorkshire were less important as sources of tonnage in Liverpool, but combined still added 
144 vessels (112,882 tons) to Liverpool's registry over the sample years, excluding the 1850s. 
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through regular orders also led to discounted prices, extended credit and other benefits. "44 
Such considerations aside, northern England was a natural supply area for British 
shipowners generally, even if those farther afield lacked the advantages oflocal knowledge. 
The Northeast was the nation's most prolific shipbuilding region in the Victorian era. By the 
outbreak of World War I Northeast England accounted for more than half of all Britain's 
tonnage output. The main centres of this thriving industry were Newcastle and Sunderland, 
on the Tyne and Wear rivers, with locales like South Shields also of some importance. Thus, 
it is hardly surprising that Durham dominated new registries at Liverpool - at least those 
originating in the Northeast. Prior to mid-century most regional output was produced for a 
purely local market. By the second half of the nineteenth century, however, local demand 
lagged behind output and new markets had to be found. Liverpool became a major customer 
at the time. In fact, prior to mid-century the Northeast never supplied much more than ten 
percent of all new vessels/tonnage on the Liverpool register. In the 1860s through 1880s 
sample years, however, the region provided Liverpool with nearly twenty percent of all new 
vessels, accounting for 23.5 percent of gross tonnage investment. As a percentage share the 
northeastern contribution to the Liverpool register grew in each decade from the 1860s 
onward. Companies like Hawthorn-Leslie became associated with Liverpool's Holts and 
Rathbones, while Sunderland's William Doxford and Sons, and South Shield's John 
44 
Simon Ville, "Shipbuilding in the Northeast of England in the Nineteenth Century," in Simon Ville (ed.), 
Shipbuilding in the United Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century: A Regional Approach (St. John's, NL, 1993), 
15. 
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Readhead and Company, were also important suppliers of tonnage to Liverpool.45 
Liverpool's home region, the Northwest, remained an important supplier of tonnage 
throughout the years 1820-1889, although its high-water mark in terms of new registries was 
in the 1830s when more than forty percent of all new vessels originated in the region. 
According to Frank Neal, a striking feature of northwestern shipbuilding was its decline over 
time, especially on Merseyside. Although having the comparative advantage of proximity 
to sources and production of iron, local shipbuilding does not seem to have been a long-term 
success. In the case of Liverpool - unlike what the ACSP found for Atlantic Canada- this 
was not based on a failure to adopt metal construction techniques. Instead, Liverpool 
shipyards were plagued by having little local influence compared to shipowners and traders 
when all were competing for scarce land resources. A good example of the impact this had 
on local shipbuilders is Thomas Bland Royden (b. 1831 ). By the 1840s the Royden yard, 
under Thomas Bland's father, was Liverpool's largest producer of tonnage, and in the 1870s 
sample years contributed 12,737 tons to the Liverpool registry. In the late nineteenth century 
Bland closed his yard when it appeared likely the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board would 
requisition its space for a dock extension. From that point Sir Thomas, by then a Baronet, 
concentrated on running his own tonnage, the "Indra" line of steamers. Royden's experience 
45 
BT 107/1 08, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; and Ville, "Shipbuilding in the Northeast of England,'' 
2. See also David Dougan, The History of Northeast Shipbuilding (London, 1968); G.B. Hunter and E. W. 
DeRusett, "Sixty Years of Merchant Shipbuilding on the North-East Coast," Transactions of the Institute of 
Engineers and Shipbuilders in Scotland, LIT (1909), 323-346; J.F. Clarke, Building Ships on the North East 
Coast. A Labour of Love, Risk and Pain (Whitley Bay, 1997). On Sunderland see Ville, "Shipping in the Port 
of Sunderland 1815-45: A Counter-cyclical Trend," Business History, x:xxn, No. 1 (1990), 32-51. On 
Doxford' sand John Readhead see Leonard Gray, The Dmiford Turret Ships (Kendal, 1975); and John Readhead 
& Sons Ltd., South Shields, 1865-1965 (South Shields, 1965). 
142 
was probably not atypical. Following the 1820s, Liverpool builders never accounted for 
more than twenty percent of new tonnage appearing on the port's register. In the 1860s and 
1880s in particular, this proportion fell to less than ten percent. In the national context, 
northwestern shipbuilding was marked by its small scale. Despite this, the regional 
contribution to Liverpool's gross investment remained healthy through to 1889. In fact, 
northwestern shipyards provided more than thirty percent of Liverpool's newly-registered 
tonnage in the 1870s and 1880s samples (twenty-two percent in tonnage terms).46 
Apart from England itself, the contribution of other parts of the UK to the Liverpool 
registry was less important, although Scottish tonnage made significant inroads as a source 
of new tonnage in Liverpool from the third quarter of the nineteenth century onward. 47 In the 
46 
BT 1071108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; Frank Neal, "Shipbuilding in the Northwest ofEngland 
in the Nineteenth Century," in Ville (ed.), Shipbuilding, 113-114, 117-121 and 133-136; and B. Guiness 
Orchard, Liverpool's Legion of Honour (Birkenhead, 1893), 602-603 . See also Ernest Royden, Thomas Royden 
& Sons. Shipbuilders, Liverpool1818-189 3 (Liverpool, 195 3 ). Royden's yard was not the only significant local 
shipyard. Across the Mersey at Birkenhead Carnmell Laird emerged as an important builder late in the nineteenth 
century, and were most closely associated with warships, of which forty-six were produced in the 1890s. Anon., 
Builders of Great Ships. Cammel/ Laird & Company (Birkenhead, 1959), 34. On the land issue at Liverpool 
refer to Adrian Jarvis, "Land Policies in the Port of Liverpool, 1857-1930," International Journal of Maritime 
History, XIV, No. 1 (June 2002), 115-133. 
47 
Despite its close proximity to, and close connections with, Liverpool, Welsh tonnage did not make a significant 
contribution to the port's register books, never surpassing two percent of all new registries and/ or tonnage. Irish 
shipyards were somewhat more important, especially in the later sample years. By the 1880s 6. 7 percent of all 
new registries at Liverpool carne from Ireland, or 12.7 percent in tonnage terms. Although cities like Dublin 
encouraged shipbuilding, most of the craft sold to Liverpool came from Belfast in Ulster. The main impetus for 
this tie was the Harland & Wolff yard which had close connections to John Bibby and Company through Bibby 
partner (and uncle of Gustav Wilhelm Wolfl) Gustav Schwabe. Schwabe also had interests in the Oceanic Stearn 
Navigation Company and the Asiatic Steam Navigation Company. From 1859 to 1899 these two companies, 
along with Bibby's, accounted for well over eighty percent of all Harland & Wolff's contracts. Of the rump that 
remained, a significant proportion of contracts after 1879 were placed by Thos. & Jno. Brocklebanks, the subject 
of Chapter Five. Michael S. Moss, "Shipbuilding in Ireland in the Nineteenth Century," in Ville ( ed. ), 
Shipbuilding, 180-185; and Moss and John R Hume, Shipbuilders to the World -125 Years of Harland and 
Wolff, Belfast, 1861-1986 (Belfast, 1986), 506-565. The other major Belfast builder was Workman Clark and 
Company, founded 1880. Workman Clark concentrated on building general cargo vessels, rather than the 
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1820s and 1830s Scots-built vessels did not comprise a significant proportion of Liverpool 
shipowners' gross investment. All told their vessels made up less than five percent of new 
registrations at Liverpool in these sample years. Tonnage figures were even lower. By mid-
century the numbers were up to just over nine percent of all gross investment, with the 
tonnage share standing at eleven percent in the 1860s samples. The real increase came from 
the 1870s on, when Scottish bottoms (numerically and by tonnage) contributed about one-
sixth to one-quarter of Liverpool's new vessels. 48 
Early in the nineteenth century total Scottish tonnage output was less than on the 
Tyne, with much of this activity centred on the east coast. After 1830, however, this shifted 
to the Clyde, which became the world's most productive shipbuilding river by 1914. Cities 
like Greenock and Glasgow were for many years synonymous with shipbuilding. Clydeside 
was a hotbed of innovation in the nineteenth century, with iron replacing wood as a building 
material by the 1850s, and steel supplanting iron in the 1870s. Steam technology was also 
important to regional development and in fostering ties to Liverpool. In 1854 Liverpool's 
Pacific Steam Navigation Company became one of the first shipowning concerns to adopt 
Charles Randolph and John Elder's new marine compound expansion engine. Typical of 
"upscale" tonnage of Harland & Wolff. Workman Clark was also much less reliant on family-linked contracts 
than their rivals. See Workman and Clark (1928) Ltd., Shipbuilding at Belfast (Belfast, 1934). A more recent 
examination of the finn is Andrew Armitage, '"Shipbuilding at Belfast: Workman Clark and Company, 1880· 
1935," in Fischer (ed.), From Wheel House to Counting House, 97-124. Another modem account (though not 
focussing exclusively on shipbuilding) can be found in Liam Kennedy and P. Ollerenshaw, An Economic History 
of Ulster 1820-1939 (Manchester, 1985). On shipbuilding at Dublin see John Smellie, Shipbuilding and 
Repairing in Dublin. A Record of Work Carried out by the Dublin Dockyard Co. 1901-19 23 (Glasgow, 1923). 
48 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
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many Clydeside shipyards, the Gourlay firm of Dundee was quick to seize upon the new 
steam technology, as well as the screw propeller. Metal sail tonnage also enjoyed a brief 
resurgence on the Clyde during the 1870s through the early 1890s, and Liverpool shipowners 
invested in both this type of vessel and Clyde-built steamers. 49 
To a large extent Scotland and northern England were, if not precisely local, at least 
a regional source of tonnage for Liverpool. The only really important place of origin for 
craft built outside Britain was British North America (after 186 7, the Dominion of Canada). 
From the 1820s through the 1870s tonnage from the Atlantic colonies and Quebec comprised 
from just under twenty to about thirty-five percent of all new registries in Liverpool. In 
tonnage terms, Canadian builds were almost as important overall, and represented over half 
of Liverpool's gross investment in the 1840s sample years. Much of the trade in Canadian 
vessels was, in fact, connected with the timber trade from Atlantic Canada and Quebec. 50 
Although Europeans had been visiting North America for more than two hundred years to 
49 
Anthony Slaven, "Shipbuilding in Nineteenth-Century Scotland," in Ville ( ed. ), Shipbuilding, 153-161 and 164-
165; and S.G.E. Lythe, Gourlays of Dundee. The Rise and Fall of a Scottish Shipbuilding Firm (Dundee, 1964), 
7-8 and 10. See also J. Forbes Munro and Tony Slaven, "Networks and Markets in Clyde Shipping: The 
Donaldsons and the Hogarths, 1870-1939," Business History, XLID, No. 2 (2001), 19-50; Anon., Two 
Centuries of Shipbuilding by the Scots at Greenock (London, 1906); Brian D. Osbourne, lain Quinn and Donald 
Robertson, Glasgow's River (Glasgow, 1996); Anon., The Development of Shipbuilding on the Upper Reaches 
of the Clyde: Messrs Barklay Curle & Co. Ltd. (?, 1911 ); and Ian Johnston, Beardmore Built: The Rise and Fall 
of a Clydeside Shipyard (Clydebank, 1993). Technological innovation was not typical of Scotland generally. 
Areas like Aberdeen and the northeast continued to produce almost half their tonnage in wood and about as 
much in sail. For a discussion of eastern Scottish shipbuilding see Gordon Jackson, The Trade and Shipping of 
Dundee, 1750-1850 (Dundee, 1991). 
50 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. The trade continued into the twentieth century. On the 
history of the timber trade, see, for example, Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problems 
of the Royal Navy, 1652-1862 (Cambridge, MA, 1926); Arthur R.M. Lower, Great Britain's Woodyard: British 
America and the Timber Trade, 1763-1867 (Montreal, 1973 ); and Graeme Wynn, Timber Colony: A Historical 
Geography of Early Nineteenth Century New Brunswick (Toronto, 1981 ). 
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fish and trade, most trans-Atlantic tonnage was still European-built as late as the early 
eighteenth century.51 Atlantic Canadian shipbuilding remained a small-scale activity, and the 
number of vessels owned in the Maritimes was only about 300 by the late eighteenth 
century. The first wave of building activity in the region was spurred by the immigration of 
American Loyalists and others, along with increased coasting and the staple trade in fish. 
Colonial builders were also aided by a 1786 law that limited the ability to place vessels on 
British registry to those constructed in Britain or in the empire. In the early nineteenth 
century, however, shipbuilding experienced its first major growth period accompanying the 
expansion of the region's timber trade. The British authorities encouraged the trade by the 
use of bounties, subsidies and reduced duties after Napoleon's Continental System 
threatened to cut off the nation's traditional wood supplies from the Baltic. 52 With the 
breakdown of the Continental System, Britain soon resumed its Baltic timber trade but 
resolved never again to become dependant on outside sources of timber. Tariffs on colonial 
wood were shelved, while those on Baltic products were increased. As the Maritime and 
51 
Most shipbuilding in North America prior to the American Revolution took place in the colonies that later 
became part of the United States. See John J. McCusker, "The Rise of the Shipping Industry in Colonial 
America," in Kilmarx ( ed. ), America 's Maritime Legacy, 1-23; Joseph A Goldenberg, Shipbuilding in Colonial 
America (Charlottesville, VA. 1976); and James F. Shepherd and Gary M. Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, 
and the Economic Development of Colonial North America (Cambridge, 1972). 
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Eric W. Sager and Lewis R. Fischer, Shipping and Shipbuilding in Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914 (Ottawa, 1986), 
5. The Continental System was an attempt by Napoleon to use economic warfare against the British. In effect 
from 1806 to 1813, the idea was to destroy Britain's all- important trade networks by denying the country access 
to its European trading partners. Although the system did indirectly help touch off the War of 1812 with 
America, it was eventually brought down by British naval supremacy. See J.P. Kenyon (ed.), The Wordsworth 
Dictionary of British History (Ware, Hertfordshire, 1996), 91; Geoffrey Ellis, The Napoleonic Empire (2nd ed., 
New York, 2003); and Frank Edgar Melvin, Napoleon's Navigation System: A Study of Trade Control during 
the Continental Blockade (New York, 1970). 
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Quebec timber trades expanded, so did regional shipbuilding. Being a bulky commodity, 
timber needed fairly large vessels for transport, and during the Napoleonic wars British 
output did not keep up with the timber industry's demand. 53 
Shipyards in British North America were frequently established by men with 
connections to the timber trade - in the early years these were normally persons with 
business ties in Britain. A good example of a Liverpool firm in this context was Rankin, 
Gilmour and Company, which originated as Pollock, Gilmour and Company in Glasgow. 
Founded in 1804 by two brothers, John and Arthur Pollock and their boyhood friend, Allan 
Gilmour Sr., the firm began its connection to the timber trade in the Baltic, later moving into 
the New Brunswick timber trade. 54 Many of the products of shipyards in the Maritimes and 
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NB, 1960); Basil Greenhill and Ann Giffard, Westcountrymen in Prince Edward's Isle: A Fragment of the Great 
Migration (Toronto, 1967); Nicolas J. de Jong and Marven E. Moore, Shipbuilding on Prince Edward Island: 
Enterprise in a Maritime Setting, 1787-1920 (Hull, QC, 1994); Wayne M. O'Leary, The Tancook Schooners: 
An Island and Its Boats (Montreal, 1994); Stanley T. Spicer, Sails of Fundy: The Schooners and Square-riggers 
of the Parrsboro Shore (Hantsport, NS, 1984); Spicer, Masters of Sail: The Era of Square-rigged Vessels in 
the Maritime Provinces (2nd ed., Halifax, 1981); John P. Parker, Ships and Men: The Golden Age of Wooden 
Ships in Cape Breton Island (Wreck Cove, NS, 2003); and Parker, Cape Breton Ships and Men (Aylesbury, 
1967). 
54 
Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 5-6; and John Rankin, A History of Our Firm: Being Some Account of 
the Firm of Pollock, Gilmour and Co. And its Offshoots and Connections (Liverpool, 1908), 10 and 19-27. As 
early as 1824 Pollock, Gilmour's own fleet consisted of seventy-eight vessels, the largest being about 700 tons. 
By the 1830s the company shipped as many as 500 cargoes per season. Its first iron vessel, the Saint Mungo, 
was built in 1865, and the company eventually owned ten iron sailing craft. By 1880, however, it made the 
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Quebec, such as those operated by Rankin, Gilmour, ended up on the Liverpool registry. 
This was not surprising given the port's close connection to the colonial timber trade. 
Timber, along with com, comprised a large portion of Liverpool's trade as early as the 
sixteenth century, when much ofthe product was coastal. Liverpool began to import foreign 
timber in the eighteenth century and was soon Britain's most important west coast timber 
port, due largely to its supplies of salt for outward cargoes. In the early nineteenth century 
North American timber remained fairly unimportant as an import, comprising less than one 
percent of total imports in the first decade of the century; east coast ports, like Hull, closer 
to the Continental sources of supply, were better locales. With the great expansion in 
colonial timber exports during and after the Napoleonic wars, Liverpool was well placed to 
supplant the eastern ports as the centre ofBritain' s timber imports. Indeed, in the thirty years 
after 1820 imports of North American timber into Liverpool almost tripled, rising from 
73,781 to 203,683 tons. For much of the nineteenth century Liverpool was one of Britain's 
main timber import centres, with volumes consistently higher than those of London. In fact, 
in 1850 Liverpool's timber imports comprised more than ten percent of the national total, 
an astonishing figure considering that ports all along the United Kingdom's west coast 
imported Canadian wood for local use and that the city imported almost no wood from 
anywhere else. For most years up to mid-century timber was second only to American cotton 
among Liverpool's merchandise imports. (For the quantities of timber- Canadian and other 
switch to steam. Basil Lubbock, The Last of the Windjammers (Glasgow, 1975), 78-79. 
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- imported into Britain generally, see Appendix Three). 55 
The bulk of this chapter has been concerned with vessels, specifically the nature of 
Liverpool's steam fleet and the origins of all new tonnage appearing on the register, rather 
than with trades. Nonetheless, in the case of Canadian vessels the ties between the industry 
and the market for tonnage was sufficiently strong to warrant the discussion above. As we 
have observed, it was the rise in the timber export trade from both the Maritimes and 
Quebec that provided the impetus for an increase in local shipbuilding. The industry also 
provided the mechanism by which much Canadian tonnage appeared on the Liverpool 
registry, especially around mid-century. Following the end of the Napoleonic wars, the 
British market for tonnage revived and the North American colonies, with their large stands 
of timber and a protected imperial market, were well placed to benefit. Up to 1850 about 
half of all shipping tonnage produced in the Maritimes ended up on the British register. 
Richard Rice feels this dominance may have been even more marked. In the years 1809-
1864, he contends, a minimum of three out of five to a maximum of four out of five tons of 
shipping produced in the Maritimes went to the British market. Many timber merchants 
trading to Britain became short-term shipowners, and in fact timber, as a bulk commodity, 
was one of the most suitable trades in which to combine the roles of exporter and merchant. 
55 
David M. Williams, "Merchanting in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Liverpool Timber Trade," 
Business History, VIII (1966), 104-105; and Williams, "Bulk Trades and the Development of the Port of 
Liverpool in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century," in Burton ( ed. ), Liverpool Shipping, Trade and Industry. 
Essays on the Maritime History ofMerseyside /780-1860 (Liverpool, 1989), 12-13. See also BPP, 183 5, XIX, 
Report from the Select Committee on Timber Duties, q. 11. For a concise contemporary account of the timber 
trade in the mid-Victorian period, see J. R. McCulloch, A Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical and Historical of 
Commerce and Commercial Navigation (London, 1853), 1304-1311. 
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The sellers were most interested in marketing their product and found that owning tonnage 
helped to reduce costs. In periods when vessel prices were high these merchants found they 
could add to their earnings on a voyage by simply selling the container (the vessel) along 
with its cargo when the craft docked at Liverpool. The accepted contemporary wisdom was 
that much of Liverpool's timber tonnage was old and unfit for any other trade. Some old 
vessels were certainly used, but the Canadian bottoms, so important in the context of timber 
imports, were often quite new. The tonnage sold at Liverpool after the cargo was discharged 
frequently had been newly-built in Quebec or the Maritimes. In certain years, more than 
seventy-two percent of newly-registered tonnage imported from British North America had 
been launched either in the year it was registered at the port or the previous one. 56 
56 
Sager and Fischer, Shipping and Shipbuilding, 6; Williams, "Merchanting," 112-114; Rice, "Measuring British 
Dominance ofShipbuilding in the 'Maritimes,"' 142-143; and BT I 07/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various 
years. British buyers appear to have been interested in all types of Canadian craft from East lndiamen down to 
small timber droghers. Rice, "Measuring British Dominance,"l45. See also Rice, "Shipbuilding in British 
America." Naturally not all Canadian tonnage appearing on the Liverpool register would have been a direct 
product of the timber trade. Still, it was undoubtably the most important mechanism in encouraging sales of such 
tonnage. See Fischer, "Bridge Across the Water," 49-59. As Appendix Two shows, Canadian-built tonnage 
declined precipitously as a proportion of new registries at Liverpool in the 1870s and 1880s sample years. By 
this period Liverpool owners were investing more heavily in steamers (especially auxiliaries) and metal sailing 
vessels - a change Atlantic Canadian yards in general never made successfully. Given the importance of the 
timber trade to Liverpool, we will return to it in our discussion of investors. The decline of Atlantic Canada's 
shipping industry has long been a source of conjecture for maritime historians. Sager and Fischer, Shipping and 
Shipbuilding, 17, speculate that Canadian merchant shipowners increasingly withdrew their capital from maritime 
to landward investments (in which they already had a stake) as the nineteenth century progressed. Sager returns 
to this theme in his work with Panting. Sager, with Panting, Merchant Capital, 150-160. They argue (157) that 
a similar process was at work in the eastern US where shipowners also turned toward landward opportunities 
despite the potential profits from shipowning. Given the arguments expounded herein, it is interesting that Sager 
and Panting point toward local information networks, even if flawed, as engendering a sense that Canadian 
shipping might be doomed with the advent of iron and steam. In other words, "control of information [a vital 
comparative advantage] was critical." (157). For a discussion of the many investment choices offered to 
entrepreneurs, in this case British, see Lance E. Davis and Robert A Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of 
Empire. The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860-1912 (Cambridge, 1986). Aside from shipping, 
Davis and Huttenback discuss canals, banking, real estate, railroads and many other investment opportunities. 
These are examined not only from the domestic perspective but also in terms of imperial and foreign 
shareholding. 
150 
Naturally, all of Atlantic Canada's tonnage, whether old or new, was not sold or 
transferred onto British registry, despite the close ties between the region and ports like 
Liverpool via the timber trade. From 1820 to 1889 just over thirty-eight percent of all 
Canadian tonnage produced in the ports of Saint John, Yarmouth, Halifax, Windsor, 
Miramichi and Pictou were, in fact, transferred to Great Britain and Ireland. Nonetheless, 
a great deal of tonnage was retained for the local market. Most BNA shipowners, like those 
in Liverpool, bought tonnage near their homes and usual registry ports. Local investment in 
Atlantic Canada was, if anything, even more marked than at Liverpool. From 1820-1914 
almost fifty-four percent of gross investment at Saint John originated in Saint John County. 
This tendency was even more pronounced in Yarmouth where over the same period seventy-
seven percent of newly-registered tonnage originated in Yarmouth or Digby counties. Fifty 
percent of Windsor's new tonnage had been built in Hants County. Halifax was something 
of a different case, not being located within a major shipbuilding area. Still, many Halifax 
merchants had ties to Fundy Shore builders from whom they bought most of their large 
tonnage. 57 
57 
Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 71-77; and Eric W. Sager and Gerald E. Panting, "Staple Economies 
and the Rise and Decline of the Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914," in Fischer and Panting ( eds. ), 
Change and Adaptation, 7. It is noteworthy that Saint John, the Atlantic Canadian port which most resembled 
Liverpool in terms of vessel types, and which was one of the Canadian ports most connected to the timber trade, 
registered a fairly large number of British-built vessels from 1820-1914. There was also some British-built 
tonnage on the Halifax registry. Given the nature of Anglo-Canadian trade, especially as connected to timber 
- in which tonnage sales mainly ran from west to east - it is not surprising that such registrations made up a 
much smaller share of Canadian investment than was the reverse at Liverpool. In the Atlantic Canadian case 
shipbuilders tended to be a significant grouping among vessel owners in the years 1850-1899, which may also 
have contributed to local ownership patterns in the region. In a number of the region's major ports shipbuilders 
habitually registered more new tonnage than those who gave their occupations as mariners, traders, fishermen 
and farmers, though the gap narrowed over time. (Still, the gross tonnage investment by shipowners, and more 
especially merchants, was much more significant). Lewis Fischer found a similar situation in the specific case of 
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Liverpool's situation was roughly akin to Atlantic Canada, at least insofar as 
shipowners tended to buy their tonnage close to home. From 1820 to 1889, however, the 
proportion of new Liverpool vessels actually originating in the Northwest of England stood 
at 33.6 percent in numeric terms- 22.6 percent of new tonnage. In terms of purely local 
investment this was significant, but lower than in ports like Saint John and Yarmouth. Given 
that regional shipbuilding was in decline over much of the period, it is not surprising that 
Liverpudlians, much like their Haligonian counterparts, did the next best thing by buying 
tonnage in adjacent regions. In Halifax it was the Bay of Fundy; at Liverpool Northeast 
England (especially the Tyne and Wear) and Clydeside in Scotland, rounded out the port's 
major suppliers of tonnage - excepting Canada, of course. 58 
Essentially, then, Liverpool's fleet was of local/regional build, or originated in its 
colonial trading partner, Canada. A tradition of regional construction was a fairly stable 
feature ofLiverpool's fleet from 1820 to 1889. Still, there were some variations as the only 
important source oftonnage outside Britain, Canada, declined and was replaced to a limited 
extent by new regional supply areas like Clydeside and parts oflreland (see Appendix Two). 
Indeed, as this and the previous chapter demonstrate, change was a hallmark of Liverpool's 
Prince Edward Island. Again, merchants owned far and away the greatest amount of tonnage, but here followed 
by farmers. Shipbuilders came in a respectable third, representing 11.5 percent of owners on the island from 1840 
to 1889. In the case of shipbuilders, however, gross investment should be used very cautiously as a yardstick. 
It is quite likely that many builders registered tonnage in the short-term (perhaps employing it themselves, as did 
Brocklebanks) until a buyer could be found. Fischer noted that almost ninety percent ofP.EJ. 's newly-registered 
tonnage was built and registered on the island, but quickly sold or tmnsferred to other ports. Lewis R. Fischer, 
"The Port of Prince Edward Island, 1840-1889: A Preliminary Analysis," in Matthews and Panting ( eds. ), Ships 
and Shipbuilding, 51; and Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 148-149. 
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BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
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maritime capital from 1820 through 1889, though the pace of such was tempered by business 
realities. Over these seven decades Liverpool-registered vessels grew larger in aggregate, 
while those vessel types most associated with blue ocean trades - ships and barques -
became increasingly prominent among the port's newly-registered craft. This is not to say 
that the smaller vessel types most associated with coasting disappeared, but the investment 
trend was certainly toward larger tonnage intended for long-distance trading, as seen in 
Table 3.3. As Liverpool's sail craft grew larger the use of metal for hulls and masts became 
increasingly important. By the 1880s half or more ofLiverpool' s new sail registrations were 
constructed of metal (see Graph 3 .2). Another important adaptation was the advent of steam 
power. As Graph 4.1 shows, Liverpool investors did not make any real commitment to steam 
until the 1850s, and from then through 1889 this was mainly in the form of auxiliaries. 
Investment in these vessels, normally screw-propelled after 1870, generally increased from 
the 1860s on, though growth was uneven, reflecting freight rate cycles. 
Liverpudlian owners were willing to adopt new technology, but only at their own 
pace. Perhaps being heavily involved in long-distance trades, where metal-hulled ships 
outperformed steamers for many years had much to do with this. Liverpool's investors were 
certainly capable of adapting to changing times but their capital requirements made some 
conservatism the sensible option. Here the theme of flexibility, or adaptability, must be 
reiterated. As the BT 107/108 data illustrates, in an era of change Liverpool's investor 
community showed a definite willingness to "roll with the times," so to speak. By 1889 the 
port's registered fleet (at least as measured in gross investment terms) was increasingly 
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comprised of screw-propelled steam tonnage, although, again, most of these vessels were 
auxiliaries. Still, as long as sail remained competitive on long-distance routes investors 
continued to invest in large metal sailing ships and barques. Conservative they may have 
been, but the average Liverpool investor also appeared quite cognisant of the winds of 
change and the proper time to adapt to such. Having now discussed their fleets in detail we 
will turn our full attention to these Liverpool shipowners. 
Chapter 5 
Investors - Ownership and Origins 
This chapter and that following will examine Liverpool's investors, bearing in mind the 
themes of comparative advantage and adaptability. This chapter will explore some of the 
various ways in which Liverpudlians chose to invest in tonnage and how such changed from 
1820 through 1889. In the days before limited liability was common it made sense for a 
number of persons from many walks of life to invest in vessels, ships being one of the few 
investments in which one was not liable to their last "shilling and acre." Buying tonnage 
shares with a number of other investors further spread risks. By the 1870s the pattern 
changed and companies increasingly became the preferred vehicle for investment. This 
showed flexibility in terms of investment strategy. Thus, another mechanism for risk 
spreading created a new comparative advantage - risk still being a major factor in 
shipowning, despite marine insurance and limited liability - while allowing for more 
efficient fund-raising in the capital intensive world of steam shipping. As a spin-off of this 
greater efficiency and the need for more capital resources, Liverpool's ownership pattern 
tended toward a noticeable concentration of ownership over time. In other words, fewer 
investors owned a greater share of new tonnage. 1 
A further investment trend, more stable from 1820 to 1889, related to geography. Just 
as vessels tended to come from (essentially) local sources, so too did most investors in new 
tonnage at Liverpool make their home in the port or its hinterland. As noted, buying vessels 
As we will see, this statement is not as straightforward as it sounds. A vessel might have a "single" corporate 
owner, while the company itself likely had a plethora of investors. 
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from regional suppliers made good use of one's comparative advantage in terms of 
information. Likewise, being part of a local community with its attendant web of contacts 
was crucial to Liverpool investors. From 1820 through 1889 the vast majority of tonnage 
registered in the port was owned by "local" investors, at least in the broad geographical 
context of North Wales to northwestern England. This residency pattern was often aligned 
with an occupational connection to the port and maritime trades in general (investors' 
occupational characteristics forming a major component of Chapter Six). Certain of these 
trends, especially in regards to residency patterns, were a common investor strategy both in 
the ports of Atlantic Canada (as studied by the ACSP) and in Liverpool's sister port, London. 
It is with Sarah Palmer's pioneering study of London shipowners that our discussion will 
begin. 
In 1972 Palmer published a groundbreaking profile of investors in London shipping, 
one of the first attempts to study a port's shipowning community. 2 While there were previous 
studies on various aspects of the major British ports, the problem was that they tended to 
focus largely on the physical development of ports but were less successful in discussing 
commercial activities. 3 Palmer believed, however, that we needed to know about the people 
2 
Sarah R. Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping, 1820-50," Maritime History, IT (1972), 46-68. 
3 
See, for example, Liverpool and Slavery: An Historical Account of the Liverpool-African Slave trade. Was it 
the Cause of the Prosperity of the Town? (Liverpool, 1884); James Touzeau, The Rise and Progress of 
Liverpool from 1551 to 1835 (2 vols., Liverpool, 191 0); Richard W eatherside, The Ancient Port of Whitby and 
its Shipping (Whitby, 1908); and Charles Wells, A Short History of the Port of Bristol (Bristol, 1909). By the 
time Palmer's article appeared the number of works on British ports was growing considerably, including such 
scholarly works as H.E.S. Fisher, Ports and Shipping in the South-West (Exeter, 1971 ); Francis Hyde, Liverpool 
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who actually purchased shares in the shipping registered at the port of London. Because of 
the complexity ofboth the collection and analysis of the data (not to mention contemporary 
limitations on computer technology), she was only able to examine shipowning in three 
years, 1824, 1836 and 1848.4 In the years since Palmer's article appeared a great deal of 
work has been done on most of the important and not so important British ports covering 
almost every period. One study which remains unwritten, however, is the one that Palmer 
herself envisioned: an in-depth look at the shipping investors at a major British port over an 
extended period of time. 5 
The importance of viewing Liverpool over a period of several decades is directly 
related to the vicissitudes of the shipping industry. Like most occupations, shipowning 
evolved continually as times changed and the needs of the larger society shifted. The British 
and the Mersey: The Development of a Port 1700-1970 (Newton Abbot, 1971 ); and Gordon Jackson, Hull in 
the Eighteenth Century (London, 1972). 
4 
Palmer conducted her study in the days before personal computers which made the manipulation of data 
extremely difficult. For a fascinating description of the difficulties of manipulating maritime data in the pre-
computer days, see Bernard Bailyn and Lotte Bailyn, Massachusetts Shipping, 1697-1714: A Statistical Study 
(Cambridge, MA, 1959). For a discussion of the difference that computers made, see Lewis R. Fischer and Eric 
W. Sager, "An Approach to the Quantitative Analysis of British Shipping Records," Business History, XXII, 
No.2 (July 1980), 135-151. 
There is still a shortage of studies of shipping investors, especially in the UK. Indeed, the only analysis which 
looks at the investors in a single port over an extended period oftime remains Stephanie K. Jones, "A Maritime 
History of the Port ofWhitby, 1700-1914" (PhD thesis, University ofLondon, 1982). Outside Britain there is 
the work of members of the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project at Memorial University of Newfoundland. As 
noted, the scope of the ACSP's research makes Atlantic Canada the best candidate for comparison with 
Liverpool in the context ofshipowning. Much ofthe work ofthese scholars is cited throughout this thesis, but 
the results are summarized in Eric W. Sager, with Gerald E. Panting, Maritime Capital: The Shipping Industry 
in Atlantic Canada 1820-1914 (Montreal, 1990). There is also a single Norwegian study which looks at 
investors for the decade of the 1870s in a single port; see Harald Hamre, Skipsfarten i Stavanger i 1870-ara: 
en ntemringsokonomisk undersokelse (Stavanger, 1985). 
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people, occupying some relatively small islands, have long been regarded as a "natural" 
maritime race; indeed, there has been some form of"proto-English Navy" off and on since 
at least the time of Alfred the Great. Nonetheless, the modem seafaring people of "Rule 
Britannia" fame have existed only since the Tudor period, when the first English explorers 
set out to find and exploit their share of the New World, and Elizabeth's ships defeated the 
Armada. Even at this point Britain's supremacy at sea was uncertain in the face of foreign 
rivals like the Dutch and neglect at home, especially under the Stuart monarch, James I. 
Nonetheless, British merchantmen from this point on were familiar sights on the world's 
oceans; the modem activity of shipowning had its genesis in this setting. Strangely enough, 
however, shipowning as a modem profession was almost as late to appear as the engineer.6 
As Ralph Davis has noted, London was a great seaport as early as the eighteenth 
century. Contemporary records list an impressive array of maritime-related trades, including 
shipwrights, ship-brokers and anchorsmiths, which carried out their business by the Thames. 
Strangely, the shipowner was nowhere to be found. It was not until early in the nineteenth 
century that anyone considered shipowning, or investing in shipping tonnage, as a trade in 
its own right. In the London and Liverpool business directories, for example, the term 
6 
See N.A.M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain. Vol. I: 660-1649 (London, 1997); 
and David Howarth, British Sea Power: How Britain Became Sovereign of the Seas (London, 2003). Until 
sometime in the nineteenth century shipowning was viewed by most as an adjunct to merchanting, and most non-
mariners who invested in vessels were in fact merchants interested in carrying their own goods. 
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"shipowner" as an occupation did not even appear until 1815.7 Those who invested in 
shipping did so only as an adjunct, often minor, to their primary interests and investments. 
Most shipowners tended to be merchants, but shipowning itself represented only a limited 
portion of any man's capital and was treated accordingly. In the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries this was not at all peculiar, and commerce was probably not yet ready for much 
specialization. 8 
Two forms of business organization were predominant in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century shipowning. One was the individual trader and the other the partnership~ 
in the latter case the partners were generally few enough in number that all could play active 
roles in the business. In the days before the idea oflimited liability caught hold, there were 
at least more legal protections for investors than in most sectors of the economy. In part this 
was because the shipping industry operated under Admiralty Law, which centred on the ship 
rather than the investors. This meant, among other things, that shares could be easily 
transferred by a bill of sale. The Registration Act of 1786 granted further protection by 
recording the names, addresses and occupations of investors and giving identifying 
7 
An exception to this rule might be Hull, where at least a few men were calling themselves shipowners in the 
1760s; see Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century, 140-144. 
8 
Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (London, 
1962), 81-82; and Simon Ville, English Shipowning during the Industrial Revolution: Michael Henley and Son, 
London Shipowners, I770-1830 (Manchester, 1987), 3. 
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particulars of the vessel. 9 A typical shipowning concern of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century might be fairly large, however, often with ten to a dozen members, and 
its affairs were frequently managed by one or two of their number, or sometimes by a ship's 
master who might not himself be a partner. In many cases control remained with the person 
who had initiated the purchase of the vessel and who thereafter offered shares to others. 10 
This separation of ownership and management was unusual in the commercial milieu ofthe 
day and formed an "important exception to commercial practice in England."11 
Each vessel was a venture unto itself and investors often liked to "hedge their bets" 
by purchasing a small number of shares in a large number of vessels, thereby reducing their 
risk should any one craft meet with disaster. Even in the seventeenth century, when insuring 
9 
Even before the Registration Act, however, there was a Statutory Register that listed many of the same things. 
See R.C. Jarvis, "Liverpool Statutory Register of British Merchant Ships," Transactions of the Historic Society 
ofLancashire and Cheshire, CV (1963), 107-122. The history of registration can be traced conveniently in a 
series of articles by Rupert Jarvis; see Jarvis, "British Ship Registry: The Quantification of Source Material," in 
H.E.S. Fisher (ed.), Ports and Shipping in the South West (Exeter, 1971), 149-171; Jarvis, "Ship Registry- to 
1707," Maritime History, I (1971 ), 29-45; Jarvis, "Ship Registry- 1707-86," Maritime History, II (1972), 151-
167; and Jarvis, "Ship Registry- 1786," Maritime History, IV (1974), 12-30. 
10 
Davis, Rise, 81-82; and Ville, English Shipowning, 2. Another restriction for the potential eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century investor was the "Bubble Act" of 1720 which curtailed industrial investment. The act 
restricted the formation of joint-stock companies in the wake of the South Sea Company's notorious failure. The 
joint-stock company had begun in 1711, mainly as a slave trading venture to Spanish South America. Nine years 
later the company offered to take over the national debt. Acceptance of the offer by Parliament grossly inflated 
its share values. When the stock slumped, the south sea "bubble" burst, and many investors were driven to ruin, 
while members of the government were implicated on charges of corruption. See John Carswell, The South Sea 
Bubble (London, 1960; reprint, Stroud, 1993); Randall McGowen, "Credit and Culture in Early Modern 
England," Journal of British Studies, XLI, No. 1 (2002), 120-131; Ann M. Carlos, Nathalie Moyen and 
Jonathan Hill, "Royal African Company Share Prices during the South Sea Bubble," Explorations in Economic 
History, XXXIX, No. 1 (2002), 61-87; and Larry Neal, "The Money Pitt: Lord Londonderry and the South Sea 
Bubble; Or, How to Manage Risk in an Emerging Market," Enterprise and Society, I, No.4 (2000), 659-674. 
ll 
Davis, Rise, 82. 
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goods transported by sea was becoming more common, the vessels that did the transporting 
were most often uninsured. Until about 1720 marine insurance was simply not sufficiently 
developed to obviate the need for a division of ownership to facilitate risk-spreading. 12 Apart 
from cases of a single investor, or partnership, vessels usually had a unique set of owners 
who might have nothing more in common than their joint interest in the craft. As Ralph 
Davis found, this process was often started by active or retired ship masters. If secure in his 
ability, there was no more sound investment for a master than his own craft. Active seafarers 
had a strong inducement to invest because it was the surest way toward their own command, 
12 
Ibid., 87-88. The risk associated with owning tonnage, not to mention sailing on it, remained high well into the 
nineteenth century when the introduction of such safety measures as the compulsory load-line lessened the 
percentages of vessels which met with misfortune. See Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers, 
Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships: Digest of Evidence (London, 1873); Samuel Plimsoll, Our Seamen: 
AnAppeal (London, 1873 ); David M. Williams, "State Regulation ofMerchant Shipping 1839-1914: The Bulk 
Carrying Trades," in Sarah Palmer and Glyndwr Williams (eds.), Charted and Uncharted Waters (London, 
1981 ), 55-80; Geoffrey Alderman, "Samuel Plimsoll and the Shipping Interest," Maritime History, I (1971 ), 73-
95; Alderman, "Joseph Chamberlain's Attempted Reform of the British Merchant Marine," Journal ofTransport 
History, III (1972), 169-184; and David Clarke, '"The "Sailor's Friend:' A New Perspective on Samuel Plimsoll 
and Maritime Reform (Honours Diss. Memorial University ofNewfoundland, 1995). The idea of risk spreading, 
the forerunner of modem insurance, actually originated in the late Tudor era. Britain's most famous marine 
insurer began its operations about a century later. By 1688 businessmen willing to insure seagoing vessels met 
at Edward Lloyd's London coffee house. Shipowners would arrive with the name of their vessel, its captain and 
destination, plus the value of ship and cargo, written on a slip of paper. Coffee house patrons could then 
underwrite the voyage by initialling the paper and indicating the percentage of the risk they would assume. The 
shipowner would make the establishment's rounds until enough signatures had been collected to cover the costs 
of the venture. The setup for Lloyd's insurance remained much the same into modem times. It was not the 
company itself, but its individual underwriters, or combinations thereof, who assumed the risks for any particular 
voyage. In certain cases persons were ruined by underwriting too much of a venture that failed, but for the most 
part the system worked remarkably well and has never let its clients down. Lloyd's most famous offshoots are 
its "Lloyd's List" of shipping intelligence, and from 1760 the separate society, Lloyd's Register, which still 
surveys and classifies vessels to ensure standards of seaworthiness. See Godfrey Hodgson, Lloyd's of London: 
A Reputation at Risk (Harrnondsworth, 1986); Alan Cameron and Roy Famdon. Scenes from Sea and City: 
Lloyd's List, 17 34-1984 (Colchester, 1984); and Howarth, British Seapower, 364-365. The problem of insurance 
in the eighteenth century was not merely a British concern; for a study that examines in detail what happened 
when a Dutch vessel was lost off the coast ofF inland, see Oscar Gelderblom, "Coping with the Perils of the Sea: 
The Last Voyage of the Vrouw Maria in 1771," International Journal of Maritime History, XV, No. 2 
(December 2003), 95-115. 
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which would bring an attendant increase in salary and social status. Retired mariners, by dint 
of their nautical experience, often had a comparative advantage if they chose to put their 
skills into organizing and running shipping partnerships. Such shipping managers often took 
partners in order to raise the requisite capital for their ventures. This consideration likely 
influenced all types of owners, but appears to have been especially important in the case of 
master-owners. 13 
There were few substantial shifts in the structure of ownership through the eighteenth 
century. In the seventeenth century the trend had been toward an increasing number of 
owners who on average owned fewer shares each. Davis believed that this might have been 
simply a corollary ofthe growing size ofvessels. Yet the trend reversed after 1700, when 
the average number of owners per vessel began to decline at the same time that average size 
continued to increase. Larger vessels were, more frequently than before, being owned by 
single investors or groups of two or three persons who had formed long-term trade 
partnerships. These tendencies were spurred on by the emergence of marine insurance, 
which made it less of a necessity to spread risk (or, its corollary, having to split profits with 
silent partners). These changes were markers toward the future but at this stage were no 
more than small indicators of things to come~ even Davis warned against over-estimating 
their importance at this early stage. Things were clearly beginning to change, however, and 
13 
Davis, Rise, 84-86; and Ville, English Shipowning, 5. On the professional aspirations of masters, see Valerie 
Burton,"The Making of a Nineteenth-century Profession: Shipmasters and the British Shipping Industry," 
Journal of the Canadian Historical Association (1990), 97-118. 
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in Liverpool half the tonnage was owned by one or two investors as early as 1787. 14 
The most wide-ranging changes in shipowning began just prior to the turn of the 
nineteenth century. Simon Ville has argued that the impetus for these can be found in the 
wars against Revolutionary France and, later, the Napoleonic Empire. The emergence of 
reliable marine insurance, which Davis noted, was at least partially responsible for the 
decline in the average number of investors per vessel. Still, Ville believed that investors 
continued to keep a broad base of shipping investments because they recognized that profits 
could vary widely from voyage to voyage. Even with insurance shipowning was still a high-
risk occupation, and this encouraged the type of investor who was willing to risk capital for 
potentially greater returns. During the wars risks to shipping were heightened, which led to 
increased freight rates and higher profit margins for successful voyages. Those most likely 
to succeed in the face of high shipping costs and manpower shortages were generally those 
with a background, and thus a comparative advantage, in maritime commerce - precisely 
the type of person whom Davis stressed in his study. 15 
One of the major stimuli to the early emergence of shipowning as a profession was 
the need for wartime transport. In 1794 the British Government formed the Transport Board, 
which gave an impetus for insightful entrepreneurs to act only as shipowners rather than 
14 
Davis, Rise, 88-89. As we will see, however, the single-owner vessel did not come to dominate Liverpool 
registries until late in the nineteenth century. 
15 
Ville, English Shipowning, 3-4. On the behaviour of British shipowners, see Simon Ville, Transport and the 
Development of the European Economy, 1750-1918 (London, 1990). 
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merchants. These transports were often in service for a number of years so that their owners 
became more specialized in the business of shipping than in the sale of commodities. 
Because owning transports required little time, the investors were often free to pursue other 
economic opportunities at the same time, another driving force behind the "new" industry. 
According to Ville, the expansion of the Atlantic trades in this period provides a perfect 
example of the way this worked. In addition to the opportunities presented by transport 
services, the shipowner might also take advantage of prizes captured from the enemy to 
provide a cheap source of tonnage. As Chapter Four illustrates, such wartime prizes 
appeared on the Liverpool registry into the 1820s. The nature of the wooden sailing vessel 
at the time meant that practically any type of craft, even a small warship, might be turned 
into useful service in the merchant navy. During the American Revolution many new 
shipowners became involved in whaling using tonnage such as old privateers and 
inexpensive transports. 16 
Simon Ville's research indicates that many of the new shipowners came from the 
merchant and associated classes. These people likely had some prior knowledge of the 
business of shipping, often having owned a few craft as part of their larger business strategy. 
With fluctuations in markets the small merchant was usually able to shift from one type of 
venture to another without too much trouble. In Liverpool the important Rathbone 
16 
Ibid., 4; and Great Britain, Board of Trade (BT) 107, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1820 and 1826. On the 
relationship between privateering and British shipowning, see David J. Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise 
in the Eighteenth Century (Exeter, 1990). 
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shipowning family had started out as merchants. This process was a good example of how 
to make use of comparative advantages, and the shift from one related trade to another 
displayed commercial adaptability. Still, the numbers of professional shipowners stayed 
small throughout the eighteenth century and remained so early in the nineteenth. But the 
importance of this group should not be discounted. According to Ville, many of these 
pioneers were the sole owners of large fleets, making for a far greater influence than mere 
numbers might suggest. It was at just this time that the business of shipping began to change, 
spurred on by an expanding world economy and technological advances. The industry was 
becoming more capital intensive and increasingly required a specialist's touch. The 
professional shipowner came into his own most quickly in the larger centres, where a 
mercantile class already existed that was ready to take advantage of new opportunities. In 
addition, it was these centres which were home to the marine insurance firms and large 
commercial coffee houses. 17 Ville sums up the process in these terms: 
17 
What appeared to be happening in the half century after 1780 was the 
entrance of a new type of person into the shipping industry, prepared and 
able to take advantage of the vastly increasing trade of this period. The old 
fashioned merchant organization of shipowning was unable to cope with the 
huge increase in the shipping industry required by the trade expansion and 
th~ wartime boom ofthe period. Shipowning as an independent occupation 
thus appears as a necessary organizational advance in order to increase the 
Ibid., 4-5; and John J. McCusker, "The Early History of'Lloyd's List,"' Historical Research, LXIV (1991 ), 427-
431; and McCusker, European Bills of Entry and Marine Lists: Early Commercial Publications and the Origins 
of the Business Press (Cambridge, MA, 1985). 
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provision of shipping space. 18 
Ville's argument about the relationship between wartime transport and the 
professionalization of shipowning is compelling. The emergence of the shipowner as a 
separate profession has often been linked to the development of a world economy, and 
Ville's work does not contradict it. Both factors likely played some role in the process. By 
the early nineteenth century physical capital and labour crossed national frontiers, as they 
had done for centuries. Despite this, economic integration was undeveloped in the global 
context, and markets had changed little for centuries. Britain had made efforts to change this 
situation under the guiding philosophy of mercantilism. Even in this case, however, the level 
of economic integration within the empire remained modest at best. Much of the globe's 
economic outlook remained rooted in local and national rather than international 
perspectives. 19 
It is thus reasonable to characterize the world economy in 1800 as unintegrated; it 
would be a few decades yet before many countries would be drawn into a more integrated 
world economic order. There has been much debate over the weight to be attached to 
individual factors which explain this process, although economic historians like W. W. 
18 
Ville, English Shipowning, 5. 
19 
Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W. Nordvik, "Maritime Transport and the Integration of the North Atlantic 
Economy, 1850-1914," in Wolfram Fischer, eta/. (eds.), The Emergence of a World Economy 1500-1914 (2 
vols., Wiesbaden, 1986), IT, 519; and Jan Lucassen, Migrant Labour in Europe, 1600-1900: The Drift to the 
North Sea (London, 1987). This labour migration is illustrated in the essays in Paul C. van Royen, Jaap R. Bruijn 
and Jan Lucassen ( eds. ), "Those Emblems of Hell"? European Sailors and the Maritime Labour Market, 1570-
1870 (St. John's, NL, 1997). 
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Rostow have attempted to define the preconditions necessary for it to occur. According to 
Rostow, there must be a great increase in the rate of technological change; a massing of 
large capital reservoirs; the emergence of fairly efficient markets to allow the transfer of 
innovations to regions of high demand; a growing and shifting global population; new 
discoveries of natural resources and finally a trend towards some degree of economic 
liberalism. All these characteristics were available at some point in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.20 
As a function of the increasingly integrated world economy, the decades after 1800 
were marked by an unprecedented growth in world trade. By 1914 the volume of foreign 
trade per capita had grown by about twenty-five times, although output had expanded by 
only about 220 percent. Lewis Fischer and Helge Nordvik have described this explosion in 
international exchange as "the outstanding characteristic of the burgeoning international 
economy in the second half of the nineteenth century. "21 At the centre of the robust 
international commerce was, not surprisingly, the world's most economically advanced 
continent, Europe. 22 Trade that touched upon the continent accounted for a full eighty 
percent of all international transactions. At the same time European nations, spurred in 
20 
Refer to Chapter Three. See also Fischer and Nordvik, "Maritime Transport, .. 519; and W.W. Rostow, 1he 
Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 3'd ed. (Cambridge, 1991 ), 17-35. 
21 
Fischer and Nordvik, "Maritime Transport," 520. 
22 
Strictly speaking Europe is not itself a continent, Eurasia is. 
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particular by rapid industrial expansion, increasingly widened their horizons to include 
overseas markets. In order to supply their industrial complexes and feed growing populations 
these same nations were simultaneously importing greater quantities of raw materials. This 
trade in the export of industrial products from Europe and the import of raw materials and 
food was one of the most notable traits of the emerging system of world trade in the era. 
Still, by any measure Europe continued as the focal point of all world trade; as late as 1913 
the continent still accounted for three-fifths of exports and two-thirds of imports by value. 
North America in particular had increased its share in the world economy, but European 
dominance was not erased. With the level of technology available in the nineteenth century, 
the growth of inter-continental trade made the major trading nations greatly dependent on 
oceanic transport. Most ofEurope' s raw materials came from Asia, the Americas, Africa and 
Oceania, while her manufactured goods found markets in these same areas; to reach these 
markets in either direction required maritime transport. 23 
Sarah Palmer's study of Britain's largest port, London, focussed on the very period 
when such developments were ongoing. Its examination began around 1820, during the early 
years of a period characterized by far-reaching changes not only in patterns of investment 
but in the very nature ofthe shipping industry. Much of this chapter and the next will pose 
similar questions to those which Palmer asked in her study at London, but I will focus 
instead on England's second most important port, Liverpool, and those who invested in 
23 
Fischer and Nordvik, "Maritime Transport," 520. See alsoP. Lamartine Yates, Forty Years of Foreign Trade 
(London, 1959}, 32-33. 
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shipping there. Spanning the period from 1820 to 1889 investment patterns at Liverpool 
were not static, any more than were the forms and sizes of vessels. Amid the processes of 
change a number of trends stand out, including the decline of the merchant shipowner 
(hitherto the most important occupational group of Liverpool investors) after the mid-
nineteenth century, and their supersession by the professional shipowner, a process in 
marked contrast to developments in Atlantic Canada. 24 Likewise, at least as early as 1870, 
the individual investor- the most common grouping on the Liverpool registry- increasingly 
gave way to company forms of ownership, especially of the limited liability type, as 
illustrated in Table 5.1.25 
Table 5.1 
Characteristics of Shipowning in the Port of Liverpool, 1830-1889 {Select Years) 
Year 
1830 
1850 
1870 
1889 
Notes: 
Source: 
24 
Individuals Trading Partnerships Companies (Ltd. & Others) 
127 
339 
142 
76 
29 0 
61 2 
14 13 
5 41 
The numbers for 1850 are as high as they are because it was a particularly 
busy year for registrations. 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1830; 1850; 1870 and 1889. 
To appreciate these changes a number of the basics must be reiterated. As noted, 
These trends will be taken up in Chapter Six's discussion of investors by occupational groups. 
25 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. See Appendix Four and Graph AI, (following the 
Appendices). 
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there were a number of ways in which shares in vessels might be held. In most cases, as was 
the pattern at Liverpool, shares were held by individuals on their own account~ a share, or 
shares might be held jointly by persons who had formed a trading partnership, or they could 
be held by a joint-stock enterprise, or later in the nineteenth century perhaps in the form of 
a limited company. Vessels were most often divided into sixty-fourths, although this practice 
did not become law until 1854. Part owners of vessels were considered "tenants-in-
common" under the law~ each had a separate interest, and the owner of shares could sell or 
mortgage his part of a vessel without consulting the other owners. Likewise, no investor was 
free to dispose of another's share. The relative importance of each form of ownership at 
Liverpool, in select years, is presented in Table 5.1. The table illustrates the overall 
predominance of the individual investor relative to other forms of ownership, as measured 
by the number of separate investors appearing in the registries. In 1830, for example, 
individuals represented more than eighty percent of all investors in new tonnage ( 127 of 156 
separate investors), with the balance accounted for by trading partnerships. In 1850 the 
dominance of the individual investor rose slightly to around eighty-four percent (339 of 
402), a number that remained about static in 1870, and which fell against company 
investment thereafter. 26 
26 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. The data in Table 5.1 represents the separate 
individuals, trading partnerships and companies that invested in new Liverpool tonnage for any given year. It 
does not represent the proportion of tonnage held by each. In 1850, for example, merchant John Starr de Wolf, 
owned all sixty-four shares in three newly-registered craft, along with forty-eight and thirty-two shares in 
another pair of vessels. In total this represented 1,588.5 tons of shipping owned by de Wolf. Master mariner 
Henry Harvey owned eight shares in one vessel of I 02 tons for a total of 12.75 tons controlled by him. For the 
purposes of the table, however, the two men are counted only once each for the year as an individual investor. 
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From 1820 until well after mid-century the most common form of vessel ownership 
in Liverpool was that in which individual investors (or sometimes partnerships) held shares 
in a vessel along with a number of other investors. As Palmer noted, the main advantages 
of multiple investors were cost sharing and risk minimization. In fact, the typical newly-
registered vessel at Liverpool tended to have more than one owner- an average of 2.6 
investors per vessel in 1826, the first sample year that share breakdowns were given. In that 
year nearly 300 separate individuals, some involved in partnerships, along with a small 
number of companies, invested in 123 new vessels at Liverpool. The "typical" investor held 
just over thirty-eight percent of a vessel's shares and tonnage. For the most part these 
investors did not purchase shares in more than one newly-registered craft per year. In fact, 
only two individuals and one partnership had interests in more than one newly-registered 
vessel, all of which were over 500 tons. Still, none of these investments topped 1,000 tons. 
Excluding partnerships, six companies appeared on the Liverpool registry in 1826. None was 
incorporated or was a "major investor." Significantly, all six invested in steamers.27 
By 1850 - a much larger year for new registrations than 1826 - over 400 investors 
(including those involved in partnerships, along with companies) bought shares in 243 craft 
newly-registered at Liverpool, with the typical investment now amounting to about half of 
When a person owned shares as part of a partnership the partnership itself, not the individual investors, is 
counted. 
27 
BT 107, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1826.; and Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping," 52. By 1830 the 
average investment in a new vessel amounted to about forty-four percent. 
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the average vessel's shares and tonnage. The average number of investors per vessel was 
also two.28 
By 1870 gross investment patterns at Liverpool were changing. It was at about this 
time that investments by companies first became significant (See Table 5.1, Appendix Four 
and Graph A1). By 1870 almost eight percent of all investors in new tonnage were 
companies. This was still a relatively small share of the total number of investors but was 
significantly greater than in the 1820s and 1830s. In terms of tonnage, company investment 
was much more important in 1870, accounting for nearly a third of the tonnage newly-
registered that year. As Appendix Four shows, company ownership had come a long way 
since the late Georgian era. In the 1820s samples, companies (excluding partnerships) 
comprised only 1.2 percent of all investors. By the 1830s this figure actually declined to less 
than one percent, with no companies investing in 1830. In 1850 companies still comprised 
less than one half of one percent of all investors in new vessels at Liverpool. Twenty years 
later this figure had increased significantly to 7. 7 percent. In terms in Liverpool shipowning, 
the company form of shareholding really came into its own in the 1880s, accounting for 
more than a quarter of all separate investors. In the final sample year ( 1889) almost a third 
of all Liverpool investors were companies rather than partnerships or persons investing on 
their own account, and their share of gross registrations amounted to almost fifty percent 
28 
BT 107, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1850. 
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(See Table 5.1 and Appendix Four).29 
The emergence of the company as a vehicle for investment was connected to the 
gradual adoption of steam technology insofar as, at Liverpool, companies tended to be some 
of the most important investors in steam. Conversely, most of the companies appearing as 
registered owners of new tonnage at Liverpool were connected to steam ventures. As early 
as 1826, of six companies appearing on the Liverpool registry as owners of new tonnage, 
five, including the Saint George Steam Packet Company and the Carlisle and Liverpool 
Steam Navigation Company, were certainly steam shipping ventures. Palmer noted that 334 
steamers appeared on the London registry in 1852, and of these a full 217 were owned by 
joint-stock companies. By the same token, Sager and Panting found that incorporated and 
joint-stock companies were dominant in the Canadian Maritimes only as the owners of 
steamers~ over the period 1820-1914 they accounted for fifty-four percent of gross steam 
investment (including auxiliaries). At Liverpool, as the proportion of steam vessels increased 
among new registries after 1850, the percentage of companies owning such vessels generally 
rose. Here companies did not come to dominate, even in steam tonnage, until after the 
1850s, although as we have seen many ofthe port's early joint-stock companies were formed 
specifically to operate steamers. Company investment in new steam tonnage began in 
earnest with the 1865 sample when ninety-five steamers were newly-registered. Of these 
29 
BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. In the discussion above any joint-stock or incorporated 
company is counted as a single "investor" for each year that firm purchased tonnage. Depending on the number 
of owners or shareholders, a company grouping might thus represent any number of individuals acting in concert. 
I have chosen to handle companies in this way since the registries are silent on their precise composition. 
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about twenty-two percent were owned by companies rather than individuals or trading 
partnerships. A quarter-century later company ownership of steamers stood at over half of 
the 120,350 register steam tons added to the Liverpool registry. Companies never dominated 
the ownership of steam vessels at Liverpool before the 1880s as they did at London as early 
as 1852. Nevertheless, their investment share in steamers (and all new tonnage) from 1870 
on was quite significant. 30 
The switch from sail to steam entailed higher capital and operating expenses, and 
this could certainly have provided an impetus for joint-stock (and later limited-liability) 
investment. In her London study Palmer admitted that the cost differential between sail and 
steam may have given some impetus to company formation, but she believes that other 
factors were more important. Before mid-century steamers often involved a great deal of 
uninsurable risk, which added to their variable costs. In London a number of the early 
steamer firms specialized in tourist traffic on the Thames, which at that time was still very 
much a novelty. Since these trades were speculative, they were not well regarded by insurers. 
For this reason it was natural to raise capital using joint-stock companies in order to spread 
the risks. This finding might also shed some light on why this type of ownership never 
became predominant in the early Liverpool steam trades. If we accept that the risks 
associated with steam as a speculative enterprise were a motivating factor in the use of joint-
stock mechanisms through the 1850s, it does not appear to have been a deterrent thereafter 
30 
BT I 07/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping," 52; and Sager, 
with Panting, Maritime Capital, 149-150. 
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as companies emerged as a significant form of ownership in Liverpool. By the later 
nineteenth century the speed and reliability of steam, even on fairly long routes, was well 
established. The steam engine itself was no longer an uncertain novelty, especially with the 
perfection of the compound engine in the 1860s, and it could be counted on increasingly as 
the primary source of motive power rather than as an adjunct to sail (although as shown in 
the previous chapter, Liverpool owners liked to hedge their bets on this score). It is likely, 
therefore, that non-insurable risks associated with steam ownership were not themselves 
sufficient to induce investment by companies by the time steamers became common in 
Liverpool. Nevertheless, shipowning remained risky even with the advent of suitable marine 
insurance. Moreover, the additional funds available to companies from the sale of stocks and 
debentures provided much-needed revenue in the capital-intensive world of steam 
shipping. 31 
Comprised of groups of shareholders, presumably with greater capital resources, 
Liverpool shipowning companies generally purchased their tonnage outright (i.e., they 
bought all sixty-four shares in a particular vessel). In 1870, for example, companies 
registered more than 30,000 tons of shipping at Liverpool, of which only two vessels, 
amounting to 4,802 tons, were not owned outright. Even in the case ofthese craft the owner, 
the Liverpool and Great Western Steam Company Ltd., held three-quarters of the shares. 
31 
Palmer, "investors in London Shipping," 52-53; and P.L. Cottrell, "Liverpool Shipowners, the Mediterranean 
and the Transition from Sail to Steam during the Mid-Nineteenth Century," in Lewis R. Fischer (ed.), From 
Wheel House to Counting House: Essays in Maritime Business History in Honour of Professor Peter Neville 
Davies (St. John's, NL, 1992), 154 and 196. 
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Similarly, in 1889 companies registered almost 85,000 tons of shipping of which only a 
single vessel, at about 200 tons, was not owned outright. 32 
The older pattern of multiple owners, which was prevalent in the pre-steam era, 
likely derived from a desire to share costs and to minimize risks. After the 1820s, however, 
the price per ton of sailing vessels fell and outright ownership of new tonnage may have 
become less costly to individual investors. At the same time mortgages became more widely 
available, and certain companies were willing to lend only on entire vessels, which may have 
influenced ownership patterns. The continued expansion of the marine insurance market 
during these years no doubt affected the coverage of accidental loss. 33 
After mid-century a new investment trend emerged at Liverpool. Ownership became 
more concentrated, and fewer investors accounted for a greater share of the total gross 
investment. 34 As late as 1850 only five individuals invested in three or more newly-registered 
vessels, with their purchases amounting to over 1 ,000 tons in each case. The most important 
was the merchant Edward Oliver, who was the sole owner of four vessels with a combined 
32 
BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1870 and 1889. 
33 
Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping," 52; BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1889. See also Great Britain, 
Parliament, House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers (BPP), Select Committee on Manufactures, Commerce 
and Shipping (1833), VI, q. 5677; and Select Committee on Employment of British Shipping (1844), VIII, qq. 
741, 1378. 
34 
Again, it must remembered that we are considering companies as a unit, rather than measuring the numbers of 
their individual owners or stockholders. Company registrations thus represent the concentration of tonnage into 
the hands of a single corporate entity. 
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tonnage of 3,303. Second to Oliver was a merchant with ties to the Canadian timber trade, 
Duncan Gibb, with 2,374 tons of newly-registered shipping spread over three vessels. In 
their purchases Oliver and Gibb typified trends that would become increasingly important 
later in the century. Both registered multiple craft in 1850, accounted for a fairly large 
volume oftonnage, and were the sole owners of all their vessels. Between them Oliver, Gibb 
and the other three "major investors" registered 10,166 tons of shipping, an impressive 
figure but hardly the lion's share in a year in which over 80,000 tons of shipping was added 
to the Liverpool register. 35 
Twenty years later eleven Liverpool shipowners, including three companies, invested 
in two or more craft, representing over 2,000 tons of shipping in each case. All told, these 
eleven investors owned a total of 36,5 83 of the 100,362 tons of shipping newly-registered 
at Liverpool in 1870- over a third of all gross tonnage investment that year. The majority 
owned their tonnage outright. Of eight individual investors the greatest amount of tonnage 
- 6,125 tons spread over five vessels- was owned by Thomas Harrison. Second to Harrison 
among individual investors was Edward Bates, who owned six vessels outright with a 
combined register tonnage of 3,124. Of the three major companies that registered craft in 
1870, by far the most significant, and the focus of Chapters Nine and Ten, was the Pacific 
35 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. What constituted a "major investor" was not always 
straightforward. In 1850, for instance, the partnership of James, William and William Hill Brancker registered 
their fleet of twenty-seven flats at Liverpool. However, the little fleet amounted to only 797 tons- short of the 
1,000 ton standard I have used to demarcate major investors in 1850. In the later sample years investors holding 
an interest in more than one newly-registered vessel per sample year were relatively common. On the other hand, 
the more typical investor still held a share or shares in only a single vessel registered in a sample year. 
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Steam Navigation Company Ltd. (PSNC), which placed six vessels totalling 6,435 tons on 
the Liverpool register. 36 
By 1889 fifteen individuals and companies could be considered major investors if 
we use the standard of registering two or more vessels in a single year totalling over 2,000 
tons. Combined, these investors registered about 72,061 tons of shipping in 1889 out of a 
total of 173,600 tons that were newly-registered in that year, or more than forty percent of 
all new tonnage. Once again PSNC, one of six companies that were major investors in new 
tonnage, added the most tonnage to its fleet- 8,945 tons, spread over four vessels (As we 
will see, PSNC was noted for its large tonnage acquisitions). PSNC was followed closely by 
Oceanic Steam Navigation Company Ltd., which registered only two craft but with a 
combined register tonnage of 7,290. Other important owners included Robert Patterson 
Houston, Charente Steamship Company (Harrisons), and Alfred Lewis Jones. These 
investors were distinguished by being professional shipowners, and in the case of all but one 
registration (thirty-two shares) by Joseph Henry Iredale, they owned their tonnage outright. 37 
Whatever their nature- individual, partnership or company, major or minor investor 
36 
BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1870. 
37 
BT I 08, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1889. My study ofMaryport found that in some cases (at least in a small 
port) a single individual or company might come to dominate shipowning. From the late-1870s through to the 
1880s Wilfred Hine owned on average about fourteen ships at any one time. His Holme Line was by far the 
largest shipping concern in the port and dominated Maryport' s gross registrations from 1877 onward. See David 
Clarke, "Coastwise from Cumberland: The Maryport Coasting Trade, 1850-1889" (MA thesis, Memorial 
University ofNewfoundland, 1998), 81-82. 
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- the geographic and occupational distributions of Liverpool's shipowners were fairly 
straightforward. The BT 107/108 registries provide the names, occupations, and place of 
residence (or headquarters, in the case of companies) of each shipping investor. Using this 
information it is possible to trace both distributions for the port of Liverpool. 38 In Sarah 
Palmer's study individuals and trading partnerships were treated separately. However, since 
it is possible to learn about the individuals who comprised a partnership, each partner 
involved in joint shareholding will be considered as a separate investor in this instance. 
Ralph and Thomas Brocklebank, for example, invested in new tonnage in the 1880s samples, 
owning their shares in partnership. Both will be treated separately in this case and the 
Brocklebanks will thus count as two investors based at Liverpool in any sample year they 
registered new tonnage in partnership. Joint-stock and limited companies are also taken into 
account, based on where they were headquartered. Unlike the investors in simple 
partnerships, individual companies will be counted as a single entity. Thus, Pacific Steam 
Navigation Company, which appears in the samples from the 1840s onward, would be 
counted as one investor from Liverpool in each sample year the company registered new 
tonnage. For each sample year each individual investor will be counted only once, even if 
the person invested in more than one vessel. This will avoid, as Palmer stated, "making one 
occupation or area of residence prominent only by virtue of one unit's exceptional 
38 
The discussion of investors by occupational groupings will be taken up in Chapter Six. 
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participation." (See Appendix Five). 39 
As was the case in London, investors in Liverpool-registered shipping came mainly 
from the immediate area; if not actually from Liverpool itself they were most likely to hail 
from Lancashire or Cheshire. 40 We may count this latter area essentially as local, given that 
most of Cheshire's investors were drawn from the area around Birkenhead, which was 
functionally part of the port of Liverpool. Appendix Five shows that in the 1820s investors 
from Liverpool, plus the counties of Lancashire and Cheshire, comprised about eighty 
percent of all individual investors registering new tonnage at Liverpool. By the 1850s this 
region accounted for 81.9 percent; in the 1880s samples, Liverpool, Lancashire and Cheshire 
remained by far the dominant geographic region, and local investment was at an all-time 
high. When including the county of Cumberland, north of Lancashire, in this grouping the 
percentage of total investors drawn from this region, apart from the 1870s, always stood at 
over eighty percent. This closely parallels what Palmer found for London, where the city and 
the Home Counties (Middlesex, Kent, Surrey, Essex) also accounted for over eighty percent 
39 
Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping," 54. In particular, professional shipowners, as one might expect, were 
over-represented in tonnage terms, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
40 
This is a common theme of British shipowning investment and is, indeed, a logical choice. As I have stated 
earlier, this spatial distribution and its attendant information networks formed part of the local investor's 
comparative advantage. It simply made good business sense to invest in the area one knew best, and where an 
investor would have the greatest number of beneficial personal relationships. To the north of Liverpool in the 
port of Maryport, for example, local investment in town-registered shipping ranged from a low of sixty six 
percent to a full one hundred percent in the period 1870-1889. BT 108, Maryport Vessel Registries, 1870-1889; 
and Clarke, "Coastwise from Cumberland," 74. 
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of investors in each year she studied.41 
There may be a number of reasons for this, not least the simple fact that persons from 
a certain locale might naturally gravitate toward investing in local business and commercial 
enterprises. What better way, in that era, to keep tabs on one's investment than by owning 
shares in local tonnage of which it was relatively easy to keep track? There may be a more 
fundamental reason for this spatial investment pattern, however. Palmer noted that, just as 
the proportion of investors in London and the Home Counties was high, so too were the 
numbers of investors with occupational links to the local shipping industry. What Palmer 
suggests for London may in fact hold true for Liverpool~ persons such as merchants and 
mariners who had previously established links with the port's shipping industry were often 
those who owned the most tonnage in the port. For investors with seaward ties, gravitation 
toward shipowning may have formed a natural comparative advantage, especially combined 
with their local commercial knowledge. 42 
Apart from Liverpool and Lancashire, investors might be drawn from any region in 
England, and in fact practically all the English counties appear in the registries as the home 
of at least a few Liverpool investors. The most well-represented region, unsurprisingly, was 
always the northwest. This is predictable in part because Liverpool was the major 
41 
Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping," 54-55; and BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
42 
Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping," 54-55. 
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transhipment centre for coastwise trade along that part of the coast. It would therefore have 
been reasonable for people from these areas to have had connections with the port's 
maritime industries and to choose to invest in shipping there. Geographic proximity to their 
vessels' port of registry, in other words, was part of their comparative advantage as 
shipowners. The first two generations of the Brocklebank family (after they started in 
shipbuilding) came from the Northwest (specifically Cumberland) and maintained business 
ties there for many years.43 
Apart from northwestern England there were few places especially prominent by 
their participation in Liverpool shipowning. Surprisingly, the northeast ofEngland accounted 
for less than four percent of all Liverpool's investors in the years 1820 to 1889. Southern 
England, including London, often accounted for more investors collectively than did the 
Northeast, but even here the proportion only topped five percent in the 1850s samples. A 
number of investors came from Scotland, Wales and eastern Ireland (especially Belfast and 
Dublin), perhaps because these locales were active participants in the Irish Sea trades that 
used Liverpool as a hub. In individual cases investors had definite maritime connections 
with Liverpool that can be seen from the registries. In 1880, for example, four shipbuilders 
at Harland & Wolff retained a quarter share of their 1,697 ton ship Dawpool, whose main 
investors were Thomas Henry Ismay and William Imrie of Liverpool. Thus, these four 
43 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
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Belfast shipbuilders appeared as Liverpool investors in the 1880s samples.44 
The only really large spike in non-northwestern investment came from Wales in the 
1870s samples. As Appendix Five illustrates, over fourteen percent of investors were Welsh 
residents in the 1870s samples, the growth being largely at the expense of Liverpool itself 
Interestingly, Welsh investors of the 1870s samples seem a very diverse occupational group, 
many of whom appear to have had few ties with maritime industries. Among their number 
were a hatter, a chemist, farmers, gentlemen, a banker and a widow. In a sense these 
investors were still very much in the orbit of Liverpool because they largely hailed from the 
northern Welsh counties of Anglesea, Carnarvon (especially well represented in the 1870s ), 
Denbigh and Flint, just southwest of Cheshire. By the 1880s samples the percentage of 
Welsh investors had dropped again, although it remained at over six percent, with Liverpool 
and the Northwest again accounting for well over eighty percent ofinvestors.45 
The Liverpool-North Wales link is unsurprising in light of information uncovered by 
AledEames. Eames' research suggests that the presence ofWelsh investors at Liverpool was 
almost certainly a by-product of the two locales' extensive maritime linkages. In the years 
from 1780 to 1800, for example, Liverpool slate merchants Samuel Worthington and Samuel 
Holland, and merchant shipowner Michael Humble were all important in the development 
44 
Ibid. 
45 
Ibid. For information on where, and in what, British investors invested generally see Lance E. Davis and Robert 
A Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire. The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860-1912 
(Cambridge, 1986). 
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of Port Penrhyn' s shipping industry. After 1793 fear of French warships and privateers, and 
the attendant rise in insurance rates, led to a shift in Port Penrhyn slate cargoes away from 
London and into Liverpool (along with Runcom). Slate traffic to Liverpool continued into 
the 1820s, while in 1831 Samuel Holland successfully led a movement to repeal duties on 
coastwise slate cargoes. The slate traffic was, in fact, part of a larger coastwise trade pattern 
that Eames calls the "Holyhead-Liverpool-Menai Straits triangle. "46 
The slate trade was not the only direct link between Liverpool and Wales. Work on 
the coasters often provided a training ground for Welsh lads who frequently went on to man 
deep-sea vessels sailing from the Mersey. After 1850 many of these same men would lodge 
at Liverpool and there study for master's and mate's certification. Some of the Welsh 
captains, like their Liverpool counterparts, went on to become shipowners (see Chapter Six). 
Experience gained at sea, plus familiarity with the Mersey' s trades provided a comparative 
advantage that sometimes led to prosperous careers as "Liverpool" shipowners. A good 
example here is Caemarfon' s Thomas Williams, a commander for the Black Ball Line, who 
went on to invest in well-known vessels like the Donald McKay, itself part of Black Ball's 
fleet. 47 
Welsh connections with Liverpool were quite common in the nineteenth century. 
46 
Aled Eames, "Liverpool and North Wales: Seafarers and Shipping Entrepreneurs," in Valerie Burton (ed.), 
Liverpool Shipping, Trade and Industry (Liverpool: 1989), 69-71. See also Eames, Ventures in Sail: Aspects 
of the Maritime History of Gwynedd 1840-1914 and the Liverpool Connection (Gwynedd, 1987), 148-149; and 
M. Elis-Williams, Bangor Port of Beaumaris (Caernarfon, 1988), 22-36. 
47 
Eames, "Liverpool and North Wales," 72 and 75. 
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Travelling to the Mersey was routine for North Wales residents, and early steamer 
excursions there were a popular entertainment. Liverpudlians and the Welsh also had 
frequent maritime business contacts. In 1824, for example, merchants from both Liverpool 
and Anglesea were listed as investors in the vessel St. David. In fact, many maritime 
tradesmen travelled from Wales to the great port in search of work, often journeying there 
in family-owned vessels even after completion of a rail link to Holyhead. Some marine 
tradesmen who remained in Wales nonetheless cultivated links with Liverpool. Relatively 
cheap Welsh tonnage was bought by certain Liverpool owners like the Melhuish family, who 
were involved in the Calcutta trade. Although Wales-built tonnage was not especially 
prominent on the Liverpool register (see Appendix Two), some Welsh builders like Henry 
Jones at Porthmadog were successful in attracting customers on the Mersey. Such links 
fostered a real maritime connection between North Wales and Liverpool. Welsh investors 
would have had almost as much of a comparative advantage in buying tonnage on 
Merseyside as did many Liverpudlians. As Eames puts it, "when the great expansion of the 
shipping of Liverpool... took place in the second half of the [nineteenth] century, Welsh 
seamen and owners saw Liverpool as the natural centre for their activity ... "48 
One Welshman with ties to Liverpool was Nicholas Treweek, agent there for the 
copper mines of Anglesey. Treweek sold some twenty new vessels over the period 1840 to 
48 
Eames, "Liverpool and North Wales," 74-76; Eames, Ventures in Sail, 25-30; and BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel 
Registries, various years. 
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1860.49 Most of these craft were purchased from Atlantic Canada, which, apart from Britain 
itself, was the only place of any importance as a source of investors at Liverpool. Although 
Canadians did not comprise an especially large share ofLiverpool investors -less than three 
percent of the total in any given decade - they were more prominent than any place else 
beyond the British Isles and were even more important numerically than many British 
counties. When one remembers the importance of the timber trade in both Liverpool and 
British North America, this ought not to strike the reader as too unusual. Indeed, many 
Canadian entrepreneurs had commercial links with Liverpool. 50 
A comparison of the data in Appendix Five and Appendix Two shows that although 
regions with a tradition of supplying Liverpool with tonnage generally had some presence 
as investors at the port, the relationship between the two facets of shipowning was not great. 
Some shipbuilders did retain an interest in tonnage sold to Liverpool, as the Harland & 
Wolff example illustrates. Likewise, shipbuilder John McFee of Saint John, New Brunswick, 
retained shares in two ship-rigged vessels registered at Liverpool in 1875. Still, a take-off 
49 
The careers ofTreweek and certain other northern Welsh investors illustrates some of the linkages between 
Liverpool, the outports, and wider North Atlantic commerce. Like their Liverpool counterparts, many investors 
from North Wales turned to Canadian-built tonnage (even cheaper than Welsh) from the 1840s on. The Davies 
family ofMenai Bridge, the Owens of Caernarfon and William Jones ofPwllheli were all examples of owners 
who built up fleets of Canadian-built vessels through to the 1860s. Many of these vessels were purchased 
through Liverpool brokers and agents, and sometimes held in partnership with Liverpool investors. Nicholas 
Treweek provides yet another, if less fortuitous, link with Liverpool's business community, having had dealings 
with Edward Oliver before Oliver's shipowning business collapsed. According to Eames the evidence is clear 
that, although still based in Wales, these maritime entrepreneurs had "considerable contacts" at Liverpool. 
Eames, "Liverpool and North Wales," 74-75. See also Eames, Ships and Seamen of Anglesey (London, 1981 ). 
50 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
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in the amount of tonnage contributed to the Liverpool registry did not mean that an area also 
became especially important as a source of investors at the port. By the 1880s, for example, 
more than a third of Liverpool's newly-registered tonnage was built in the Northeast, 
especially Durham (Appendix Two). In the same period, however, Durham investors made 
up less than one percent of those with an interest in the Liverpool-registered fleet. Canada's 
case was similar, providing more than half ofLiverpoo1's newly-registered tonnage in the 
1840s but contributing only about one percent of the port's shipping investors. 51 
Clearly, it made sense to invest in one's own local area where a person's knowledge 
base and those webs of interpersonal connections, alluded to by Graeme Milne and Gordon 
Boyce, were greatest. Even when investors did come from outside a purely local area, they 
still tended to live relatively close to the registry port in areas with extensive commercial 
links to Liverpool, as was the case with the many northern Welsh investors in the 1870s. In 
some instances close commercial ties (without geographic proximity), such as those Canada 
and Liverpool shared through the timber trade, might provide the impetus for investment. 
In the 1820s samples, for instance, a period when Liverpool retained strong trade 
connections to the West Indies, more residents ofBarbados appeared as investors than hailed 
from Scotland, Ireland or any of the northeastern English counties. Although the registries 
do not tell us, it is quite possible that many such people were actually expatriate 
Liverpudlians engaged in trade with their old home. There are many examples of the scions 
51 
Ibid. 
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of Liverpool's trading houses being sent overseas to work in branch offices and later 
becoming shipowners in their own right. Two Liverpool firms with close connections to the 
island of Newfoundland were Bowrings and Jobs. In 1830 Robert and Thomas Bulley Job, 
residents of St. John's, registered the 183-ton, snow-rigged Horatio, owned outright along 
with Samuel and Robert Job Jr., and Thomas Bulley (all residents of Liverpool) under the 
name Job, Bulley and Company. Likewise, in 1835 Job, Bulley and Company registered the 
198-ton barque Waterville, which they also owned outright. That same year the firm of 
Benjamin Bowring and Sons registered a sixty-four share interest in the 145-ton brig 
Velocity. In this case the partners were Benjamin and Charles Tricks Bowring, resident in 
Liverpool and St. John's, Newfoundland, respectively. Robert and Thomas Bulley Job and 
Charles Tricks Bowring would thus have comprised part of the 1.6 percent of Atlantic 
Canadian investors in Liverpool's 1830s samples (see Appendix Five). In a very real sense 
-through familial connections, and probably by birth and upbringing as well- this trio were 
all Liverpudlians, despite their place of residence at the time of registration. Such 
connections underscore the concrete ties that the vast majority of Liverpool's shipowning 
community had with the port. 52 
52 
Ibid. There are many examples similar to that of the Bowrings and Jobs. Around the same period as these 
companies registered Horatio, Waterville and Velocity, the Brocklebanks firm sent John Brocklebank out to 
Newfoundland to oversee their own interests there. As was typical of persons with John Brocklebank's 
connections to the shipowning and merchanting communities, he became the owner of a number of fishing 
vessels registered at St. John's on his own behalf. Again, the idea of the maritime entrepreneur exploiting his 
comparative advantages resurfaces. It is also interesting to note in this context that the Liverpool merchant 
houses seem to have maintained their traditional commercial ties vis a vis their Newfoundland operations; 
Brocklebanks' Newfoundland branch had an account with St. John's-based Benjamin Bowring and Son (see 
Chapter Five). John Frederick Gibson, Brack/ebanks: 1770-1950 (2 vols., Liverpool, 1953), I, 106. In the 
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The most striking aspect of Liverpool's investor community from a geographic 
perspective, then, was that it was comprised mainly of locals- a feature shared with many 
other ports worldwide. Over eighty percent of London's investor community in Palmer's 
study years, for instance, came from London or the Home Counties. The same was true for 
David Alexander's study ofY armouth, Nova Scotia, in which he found that around the same 
proportion of investors in the years 1840 to 1889 were drawn from Yarmouth County. At 
Liverpool somewhere around eighty percent of investors in most sample years from 1820 
to 1889 were similarly drawn from what was basically the city's local hinterland. As Chapter 
Six will demonstrate, their occupational make up was much less homogeneous. 53 
specific context of the Canada-Liverpool timber trade, a good example of this type of linkage was Rankin, 
Gilmour and Company, mentioned in Chapter Three. Starting in Glasgow, and expanding into Liverpool in 183 8, 
the firm produced numerous offshoots. The first of these was founded at Miramichi, New Brunswick in 1814 
after founder Allan Gilmour Sr. travelled there and realized the potential of the regional timber industry. These 
junior firms were all capitalized by the parent firm, but constituted as a separate partnerships to limit liability. 
Known as the "Foreign Houses," they all exported to the head company while also trading on their own account. 
By 1853 Rankin, Gilmour and Company's branches were as follows: Allan Gilmour & Co., Quebec (1828-1878); 
Gilmour & Co., Montreal and Ottawa; Gilmour, Rankin & Co., Miramichi (1812-1870); Robert Rankin & Co, 
St. John, N.B. (1822-1876); Ferguson, Rankin & Co., Bathurst, N.B.; Houghton, Rankin & Co., New Orleans; 
and Pollock, Houghton & Co., Mobile. The Atlantic Canadian branches all appear to have been tied into the 
timber trade to some extent. It was a normal practice for members of the Rankin and Gilmour families to put 
in time working at their subsidiaries' ship- and lumber-yards. Basil Lubbock estimated that the firm and its 
offshoots owned hundreds of vessels during its existence; as many as seventy-eight craft were in service as early 
as 1824, the largest then being 700 tons. By the 1830s the company shipped as many as 500 cargoes per season. 
Its first iron vessel, the Saint Mungo, was built in 1865, and the company eventually owned ten iron sailing craft. 
By 1880, however, it made the switch to steam. Although obviously a major investor, in these respects Rankin, 
Gilmour was fairly typical of the "average" Liverpool shipowner. John Rankin, A History of Our Firm: Being 
Some Account of the Firm of Pollock, Gilmour and Co. And its Offshoots and Connections (Liverpool, 1908), 
10 and 19-27; and Basil Lubbock, The Last of the Windjammers (Glasgow, 1975), 77-79. 
53 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping," 53; and 
Alexander, "The Port of Yarmouth," 87. When counting Shelburne and Digby Counties along with Yarmouth 
the proportion of local investment stood at over ninety-five percent. The city of Yarmouth alone accounted for 
some thirty-five percent of all investors, somewhat less than at Liverpool where the percentage of investors 
resident in Liverpool never fell below sixty percent in the 1820 through 1889 samples. Likewise, Lewis Fischer 
found that on Prince Edward Island (which counted as a single registry port) only about three percent of new 
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registrations by tonnage were accounted for by non-residents of the island. Lewis R. Fischer, "The Port ofPrince 
Edward Island, 1840-1889: A Preliminary Analysis," in Keith Matthews and Gerald Panting ( eds. ), Ships and 
Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region (St. John's, NL, 1978), 52. Residence patterns for Liverpool's 
investor community were similar in Maryport as well, where local investment in the town's shipping from 1870 
to 1889 averaged about eighty-five percent. Clarke, "Coastwise from Cumberland," 74. 
Chapter 6 
Investors ll- Occupations and Professionalization1 
This chapter profiles Liverpool's shipowners over the period 1820 through1889, with an 
emphasis on the professionalization of shipowning, particularly the decline of merchant 
investment vis a vis those whose primary occupation was vessel ownership (i.e. professional 
shipowners). Simon Ville has linked the growth of professional shipowning to the need for 
transports in the Napoleonic wars, but it has also been associated with the growth of a world 
economy (see below), as discussed by Lewis Fischer and Helge Nordvik, among others. In 
this way Liverpool investors once more displayed flexibility in changing along with 
prevailing economic conditions. At the same time professional owners often emerged out 
of that merchanting background from which, as Eric Sager and Gerald Panting demonstrate 
so aptly for Atlantic Canada, shipowning was a natural progression. In this way the transition 
from merchant to shipowner was not such a great leap, allowing the retention of one's 
comparative advantages. Indeed, many Liverpool investors came from those occupations like 
mariners, shipbrokers and marine tradesmen which entailed intimate connections and 
familiarity with the port and its business. Among investors they were the most likely to 
possess the kind of insider knowledge that formed such an important part of one's 
comparative advantage (in the case of steam shipping, engineers like Alfred Holt and R. P. 
Houston possessed their own particular advantages). At the same time such investors were 
In the context of shipowning, I do not use the term "professionalization" to refer to the creation of a profession, 
such as medicine or law, with its own training standards and codes of conduct. Instead, professionalization 
should here betaken as synonymous with "specialization," in terms of making one's primary living as a vessel 
owner. 
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opportunely placed, by dint of their careers, to have a good grounding in general maritime 
affairs. In other words, their occupations often placed Liverpool's investors at the very heart 
of the port community, the networks thereby engendered also forming part of their 
comparative advantage.2 
As we saw in Chapter Five, the spatial concentration of Liverpool's investor 
community was similar to London (not to mention Yarmouth). Liverpool's investors shared 
yet another characteristic with those in its sister port, which on the surface might appear 
incongruous with the traits described above: occupational diffusion.3 The owners listed in 
the registries encompassed a wide range of the occupational spectrum of nineteenth-century 
Britain. As an example, in 1855 (admittedly the largest sample year) there were more than 
forty separate occupations listed for Liverpool's shipping investors. Many of these, as might 
be expected, had definite maritime linkages: of the forty occupations, fourteen were drawn 
from industries with seaward ties. These included persons who made their living on the sea, 
such as fishermen and mariners, and a number of trades that provided services to the 
maritime industry, such as shipbuilders, brokers, chandlers, shipwrights, sailmakers and 
2 
The final progression in the chain was the movement of shipowners away from investing on their own, or in 
partnerships, toward company-based investment, more suitable for capital-intensive steamers. Once again an 
example of owners adopting a survival strategy based, even if not consciously, on adaptability. 
3 
As we will see, professional shipowners (later companies) and merchants, along with marine tradesmen, 
accounted for the lion's share of Liverpool's new registries in all decades, despite the presence of many 
occupational groups buying the occasional vessel shares. 
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boarding house keepers (the latter may also have engaged in the business of crimping).4 
Apart from these trades, investors might come from practically any walk oflife and included 
clergymen, gentlemen and farmers. In these cases, investment in shipping may have been 
for much the same reasons as Simon Ville found for Newcastle - that these people were 
"taking advantage of the opportunities offered to the small, passive, non-specialist 
investor. "5 In other words, they were acting like rentiers. 
In her study of London from 1820 to 1850, Palmer concluded that the presence of 
these other occupations indicates that shipowning, as a specialist occupation, was not yet 
fully established. This may also have been the case in Liverpool before 1850, but by the 
latter decades of the century shipowning became one of, if not the most, important 
occupation among investors. In 1820 no Liverpool investors listed their occupation as 
shipowner. If we assume that what an individual listed as his or her occupation in the 
registry was that person's main employment and source of income, then for these persons 
shipowning was only an ancillary occupation. By 1889, however, almost half of all investors 
4 
Great Britain, Board of Trade (BT) 107, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1855. See also Appendix Four. On 
crimping, see Stan Hugill, Sailortown (London, 1967); Judith Fingard, Jack in Port: Sailortowns of Eastern 
Canada (Toronto, 1982); Fingard, The Dark Side of Life in Victorian Halifax (Porter's Lake, NS, 1989); and 
Fingard, "'Those Crimps ofHell and Goblins Damned:' The Image and Reality of Quebec's Sailortown Bosses," 
in Rosemary Ommer and Gerald Panting (eds.), Working Men Who Got Wet (St. John's, NL, 1980), 321-333. 
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Simon P. Ville, "Patterns of Shipping Investment in the Port of Newcastle on Tyne, 1750-1850," Northern 
History, XXV (1989), 212-213; and BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1855. Sager and Panting found much 
the same profusion of occupational groupings in Atlantic Canada prior to 1850, with maritime-related 
occupations like mariners and fishermen especially prominent as vessel owners. Eric W. Sager, with Gerald E. 
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considered shipowning to be their primary business. In terms of tonnage share shipowners 
were still quite important but their dominance in this sense was less pervasive than it had 
been in 1870, likely due to the presence of corporate investors who held a majority of 
tonnage. In 1889 shipowners held 35.8 percent of newly-registered tonnage, amounting to 
62, 13 5 register tons. These numbers give a clear picture of the emergence of the professional 
shipowner. Equally, however, the proportion- admittedly small by then- of non-specialists 
who continued owning tonnage as late as 1889 makes it clear that the process was still 
ongoing late in the Victorian period. (See Appendix Four. For a visual representation of 
tonnage owned by each occupational group from 1850-1889 see Graph AI, following the 
Appendices). 6 
These statistics, while clearly demonstrating the professionalization of ownership in 
Liverpool, still underestimate the professional owner's pervasive influence by the late 
Victorian period. All figures for "shipowners" are, naturally, taken from those who listed 
themselves as such on the registries. In a strict sense, this would not apply to company 
groupings (mentioned earlier) like the increasingly common limited-liability firms, a number 
of which were clearly shipowning concerns, while others may have owned tonnage in 
addition to having other employment. Included in the former category were companies such 
as Pacific Steam Navigation and the Booth Steamship Company. Companies like the 
6 
Sarah R Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping, 1820-50," Maritime History, II (1972), 55-56; BT 107/108, 
Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1820 and 1889. In terms of gross tonnage, shipowners held 38,777 ofl28,852 tons 
newly-registered at Liverpool in 1870. As of 1889 shipowners' share of the port's gross tonnage was 77,964 
of249,881. 
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Liverpool Steam Fishing Company Ltd. and Liverpool Grain Storage and Transit Company 
Ltd. were obviously engaged in trades requiring tonnage, although it is unlikely that the 
owners considered themselves primarily as shipowners. 
Despite the numbers of (and tonnage owned by) individual shipowners and 
companies in the latter part of the period, shipowning up to 1850 was very much the same 
in Liverpool as in London - a non-specialist occupation. Thereafter there was a definite 
trend toward specialization, with over 60,000 tons of newly-registered shipping placed on 
the registry by professionals in 1889, not to mention the 85,131 register tons of company-
owned tonnage that was added in that year. In the case of Liverpool, it is clear that it was in 
the decades after 1850 that the real emergence of professional shipowning occurred, 
although even then this group by no means had a monopoly on investment in new tonnage. 
Nonetheless, for most of the period few other occupations had such a dominant place on the 
Liverpool registries; the only rival the specialist owner had was from the merchants. 7 
Many of these merchant firms were "fly by night" operations with little long-term 
impact on Liverpool, while others were well-established and continue to gamer commentary 
to this day. In some cases, however, merchant houses that were influential on Merseyside 
for generations are all but forgotten today except by a few specialists. One such firm was 
7 
BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1889. Combined, professional shipowners and company groupings 
registered 147,266 of 173,600 register tons added to the Liverpool fleet in 1889- representing a full 84.8 
percent of gross investment for the year (In terms of gross tonnage companies owned 129,764 of249,881 tons 
newly-registered). Of the company investors appearing on the register in 1889, only one of forty-one was not 
of the limited-liability type. These companies owned sixty-eight vessels and of these forty-seven were steamers, 
with only one (thirty-four shares) not owned outright. 
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Sandbach, Tinne and Company, which began trading to the West Indies in the late 1700s. 
It was founded in 1782 by a Mr. (James?) Mcinroy, who took on G. Robertson, Charles 
Parker and Samuel Sandbach, the last a former trader in Grenada, as partners in 1790. The 
firm, then known as Mcinroy, Sandbach and Co., opened a Liverpool office in 1813. That 
same year Demerara became a British colony, and P.F. Tinne, who had been a government 
official there under the Dutch, became Sandbach's English partner. The Demerara branch 
of their operations was Sandbach, Parker and Co., while the head office had by then had 
assumed its more familiar name. The company managed West Indian sugar plantations and 
also acted as produce brokers and general merchants well into the twentieth century. The 
monetary value of the plantations to the company can be seen in the details of a sale in 
which Sandbach, Tinne sold the Plantation "Industry" to Quinton Hogg in 187 5 for the sum 
of£16,500. The company dealt not only in sugar but also in practically all the products of 
the West Indies. The ship James Mcinroy, due to sail for the Clyde in September 1833, 
carried what was likely a typical cargo: 317 hogsheads of sugar, 424 bags of coffee and 
forty-seven casks of molasses. In addition to these goods already loaded, another 240 
hogsheads of sugar, 100 bags of coffee and thirty-eight casks of molasses were expected. By 
1901, however, Sandbach, Tinne sold off its fleet and retired from shipowning. At this time, 
in fact, the company's fleet was quite old, its last vessels having been built in 1882. 
Sandbach, Tinne switched largely to iron construction for its vessels by the early 1860s but 
never did make the transition to steam. It also opened a Canadian branch in 1909 and one 
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in Trinidad in 1923.8 
For much of the latter nineteenth century Sandbach, Tinne was closely connected to 
the coolie trade, which brought Indian and Chinese workers from East and South Asia, along 
with Africans, to the West Indies. They were needed as workers on the region's sugar 
plantations to replace slaves who had done the work until the abolition of the "peculiar 
institution" in the 1830s. British and colonial governments normally financed the transport 
of these workers, although government vessels were not used, except in the case of a small 
number of voyages with African workers.9 The government would negotiate long-term 
contracts (for about three to five years) with shipowners or might tender for the transport of 
such passengers. In the latter case separate bids would be made for each voyage, and the 
charter price would include the cost of food. There were around a half dozen bids on most 
tenders, with successful bidders chosen both on the basis of price and factors such as vessel 
quality. Proposals often varied considerably, suggesting that there was little in the way of 
8 
E.W. Argyle, "The 'Sandbach' of Liverpool," Sea Breezes, New series, IX (January-June 1950), 141-143; 
"Sandbach, Tinne and Co.," Sea Breezes, XXXIII (1939), 395; William Speed, "A Note on Sandbach, Tinne 
and Co.," Mersey: The Magazine of the Mersey Dock Board Staff Guild, I (December 1921 ), 1 00; E.A. Woods, 
"Sandbach, Tinne & Co's Fleet," Sea Breezes, XII (August 1929), 243-244; E.A. Woods, "Liverpool Fleet 
Lists" (2 vols., unpublished Mss., Liverpool Record Office, 1939), IT, 273-276; National Museums Liverpool 
(NML), Merseyside Maritime Museum (MMM), Maritime Archives and Library (MAL), D/B/176/A-C, 
Mcinroy, Sandbach & Company, Demerara, to Sandbach, Tinne & Company, Liverpool, 31 August 1833; and 
"Memorandum of Agreement Between Sandbach, Tinne & Co. and Quinton Hogg, 25 February 1876. Samuel 
Sandbach, like many investors, did not confine his interests solely to business and became Mayor of Liverpool 
in 1831. The year in which the firm sold off all its vessels has also been given as 1902. It appears these last craft 
were sold off over the period 1901-1902. At the time the firm owned Brenda, Godiva, Shiela, Stronsa, (190 1 ), 
Oreal/a and Genista (1902). Woods, "Sandbach, Tinne," 244. 
9 
On the transport of Africans, see Ralph Shlomowitz, "Mortality and Voyages ofLiberated Africans to the West 
Indies, 1841-1867," Slavery and Abolition, XI, No. 1 (1990), 30-41. 
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collusion among bidders. 10 
John McDonald and Ralph Shlomowitz found that the transport of such labourers 
from India to the West Indies often formed part of a multi-component trade. Certain craft 
left the West Indies and sailed directly to India with homeward-bound workers. In most 
cases, however, the actual coolie trade was but one part of a triangular or even quadrilateral 
trade. Vessels might depart Britain for India with cargoes of goods. Labourers would then 
be brought from India, along with Indian goods- especially rice- to the West Indies. Island 
products such as sugar and rum might then be exported back to England. In some cases an 
extra cargo might be sought in American ports before the vessel returned home. In their 
study of 285 voyages from 1858 to 1873 McDonald and Schlomowitz found that, on 
average, charter companies earned just over £12 per adult for transport from India to the 
West Indies, carrying an average of363 persons per voyage. Unlike the homeward freight 
rate for Australian and North American voyages, charter prices- both nominal and real-
to the West Indies do not appear to have fallen during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. 11 
10 
My discussion of the coolie trade is taken from Edward Jenkins, The Coolie, His Rights and Wrongs. Notes of 
a Journey to British Guiana, with a Review of the System and of the Recent Commission of Inquiry (London, 
1871 ); Basil Lubbock, Coolie Ships and Oil Sailers (Glasgow, 1935); Persia Crawford Campbell, Chinese Coolie 
Emigration to Countries within the British Empire (New York, 1969); Robert L. Irick, Ch 'ing Policy toward 
the Coolie Trade 1847-1878 (Taipei, 1982); G.S. Arora, Indian Emigration (New Delhi, 1991); Evelyn Hu-
Dehart, "Chinese Coolie Labour in Cuba in the Nineteenth Century: Free Labour or Neo-slavery?" Slavery and 
Abolition, XIV, No. 1 (1993), 67-86; and Lisa Yun and Ricardo Rene Laremont, "Chinese Coolies and African 
Slaves in Cuba, 1847-74," Journal of Asian American Studies, IV, No.2 (2001), 99-122. 
11 
John McDonald and Ralph Schlomowitz, "Fares Charged for Transporting Indian Indentured Labour to 
Mauritius and the West Indies, 1850-1873," International Journal of Maritime History, ill (June 1991 ), 82 and 
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The use of coolies remains controversial, but the company does appear to have 
provided reasonable accommodations and food for these immigrants, plus an on-board 
hospital and doctor. Despite the continued buoyancy of transport rates for indentured 
workers, all was not smooth sailing in the latter nineteenth century. Some of Sandbach, 
Tinne's surviving correspondence reveals the difficulties encountered in such trades. For 
much of 1876 the company kept up a correspondence with Attorney General W.F.H. Smith 
over fixing a rate for coolie transport that was high enough for the company to make a profit 
yet low enough for Smith's superior, Lord Carnarvon, to accept. The last two sailing vessels 
built by the company for the trade were the Sheila and Brenda, but by then it was clear that 
steam would soon replace fast sailers in the carriage of human cargoes. In fact, the presence 
of steamers by the late-1860s left the Demerara office feeling "uneasy about the future of 
our business. " 12 In the end, the company survived long past the initial transfer to steam and, 
despite the fin de siecle sell-off of its fleet, can be deemed a success story in the annals of 
Liverpool merchanting and shipowning. The firm exploited opportunities in its specialty 
West Indies trades, based on the prior experience of men like Sandbach and Tinne, both of 
84-89; McDonald and Shlomowitz, "Mortality on Chinese And Indian Voyages to The West Indies and South 
America, 1847-1874," Social and Economic Studies, XLI, No. 2 (1992), 203-240; and Lance Brennan, 
McDonald and Shlomowitz, "The Geographic and Social Origins of Indian Indentured Labourers in Mauritius, 
Natal, Fiji, Guyana and Jamaica," South Asia, XI (1998), 39-71. An in-depth study of a British colony in the 
region (although farther north than those of the proper West Indies) is H. C. Wilkinson, Bermuda .from Sail to 
Steam: A History of the Island from /784 to 1901 (2 vols., London, 1973). 
12 
Argyle, "Sandbach," 143; and NGL, MMM, MAL, D/B/176/A-C, Sandbach, Parker and Co., Demerara, to 
Sandbach, Tinne and Co., Liverpool, 2 and 4 December 1869; 21 February, 25 August, 4 September, and 5 
October 1876; Captain T.B. Harrison, London, to Sandbach, Tinne and Co., 19 April 1870; and Sandbach, 
Parker and Co., Demerara, to Ron. W.F.H. Smith, Attorney General, 16 and 23 August 1876. 
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whom were familiar with the region and its commodities. Over time Sandbach, Tinne's 
development led it away from shipowning, but it nonetheless continued for some time as a 
merchant house. 13 
In fact, merchant shipowning has long been known to have accounted for a 
significant portion of capital investment in seaborne transportation, especially before the 
middle of the nineteenth century. This is a phenomenon that most, if not all, maritime 
historians acknowledge, and it would be impossible to discuss shipowning without at least 
a brief discussion of the role of the merchant. Still, there have been only a limited number 
ofbook-length studies which deal primarily with the role of merchant capital in shipowning. 
For this reason it is probably not surprising that firms like Sandbach, Tinne have faded 
almost completely into obscurity. Simon Ville's English Shipowning During the Industrial 
Revolution is valuable for its in-depth examination of one such man, Michael Henley. The 
work provides a significant insight into the business rationale behind shipowning by his 
merchant house. On the other hand, what Ville's study can tell us about the wider world of 
merchant shipowning is more limited. As a case study, the findings presented may apply 
only to the particular case of Henley and Son, although Ville does offer some broader 
speculations. 14 
13 
Argyle, "Sandbach," 143. 
14 
This is particularly so in the case ofBritain' s declining role as innovator in the international business world from 
the late 1800s. Using Henley's as an example, Simon Ville found that by the third generation the Henley heir, 
in this case Joseph Warner, had become more preoccupied with politics than commerce. Indeed, this seems a 
common theme among the British mercantile class. Despite sometimes enormous wealth, the man of business 
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Perhaps the most in-depth scholarly treatment of merchant capital in shipowning, 
although centring on the Atlantic provinces of Canadian rather than on Britain, is Eric Sager 
and Gerald Panting's study, Maritime Capital, which chronicles Atlantic Canada's shipping 
industry from 1820 until 1914, long after Canada's prominence as a shipping nation had 
ended. Although the observations the authors make cannot be applied in their entirety to 
Liverpool, the authors do make a number of pertinent comments on the general business of 
merchant shipowning which may apply, especially on the issue of why merchants chose to 
invest in the first place. According to Sager and Panting a merchant conducting business in 
the international (or even local) arena did not necessarily need to be a shipowner, since 
merchants could always charter vessels from outside owners. Observation of the late 
Georgian merchant class, however, demonstrates why such ownership was necessary. As the 
authors state: 
Profits from staple trading depended on many things: specialized knowledge 
of many commodities and their prices in distant markets, a network of 
trusted agents in the markets, speedy communication with those agents, and 
successful management of subordinates, including the "supercargo" who 
went with the goods being shipped and acted as the merchant's agent in the 
could only go so far socially, at least until late in the century. In order to climb the social ladder subsequent 
generations were often educated in public schools and able to pursue more "gentlemanly" matters such as politics 
to the detriment of British commerce and industry. In the Liverpool context we have the prominent merchant 
family the Gladstones, who went on to produce William Ewart, Britain's greatest Victorian statesman. As Ville 
stated, " ... Principal among [industrial] weaknesses has been the social aspirations of the industrial middle classes. 
Indeed, the legacy of men like Joseph Warner Henley continues to haunt the British economy ... " Simon Ville, 
English Shipowning during the Industrial Revolution: Michael Henley and Son, London Shipowners, 1770-1830 
(Manchester, 1987), 159-161. This theme also appears in Asa Briggs' work, although he ties the decline in 
British commerce to the failure of the educational system, among other factors; Asa Briggs, A Social History 
of England (London, 1983), 196-198. Still, not all family-run companies succumbed to the temptation toward 
politics and other non-commercial affairs, even if these were often part of an individual's interests. Nonetheless, 
in many cases the general rule did hold true. 
market. Profits required, above all, successful timing of purchase and sale, 
to maximize the difference between buying and selling prices. To achieve 
this last condition the merchant was prepared to own and manage ships and 
to hire wage labour to run them. 15 
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Operating their own tonnage allowed owners and supercargoes a flexibility that 
chartering might not have permitted. Minimizing costs in the operation of vessels was 
crucial to earning a profit, and employees, from vessel masters on down, were ultimately 
responsible for this. Prior to the emergence of shipowning as a separate profession, it was 
in the interests of merchants to own their own tonnage (Appendix Four). This may be 
especially relevant to Liverpool given the port's close connection with the timber trade, 
noted in Chapter Four. According to David Williams, until at least 1850 the import of timber 
was closely linked to shipowning. While in the thirty years after 1820 importing and 
shipowning increasingly became distinct professions, many Liverpool merchants who 
functioned as timber importers also owned tonnage. The timber business was one of the few 
trades where the interests of the merchant as both owner and importer converged. In the 
1700s these links tended to be greatest in bulk commodity trades, and the large London 
merchant houses of the day often had extensive shipowning interests. Liverpool timber 
merchants, having great quantities of wood products moving over a single route, had a 
natural interest in shipping. Table 6.1 is based on Williams' work and illustrates Liverpool's 
twenty leading timber importers in select years between 1820 and 1850, dividing them into 
shipowners and non-shipowners. The table shows that the number of timber merchants 
15 
Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 85. 
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having shipping interests increased during this period. The most important factor in this 
trend was the growth in imports by individual merchants, thereby increasing the benefits 
garnered by owning the means of transport. 16 
Table 6.1 
Top Twenty Importers of Timber in Liverpool Divided into Shipowners and Non-
Shipowners, 1820-1850 (Selected Years) 
1820 
1830 
1839 
1850 
Source: 
Shipowners Non-Shipowners 
11 9 
16 4 
13 7 
19 1 
David M. Williams, "Merchanting in the First Half of the Nineteenth 
Century: The Liverpool Timber Trade," Business History, VIII (1966), 112. 
Contemporary sources tell us that one reason so many importers had interests in the 
timber trade was that investors got into the business simply to find employment for their 
tonnage. The London timber merchant Henry Warburton in the 1830s expressed the view 
that it was common for shipowners to become timber importers in order to find cargoes for 
their bottoms at times of low freight rates. In Williams' opinion this "over-capacity" 
argument might have held water for smaller British ports but could not be extended to 
Liverpool's timber merchants. In practically all cases Liverpool's merchants were importing 
timber prior to becoming investors in shipping. In the 1830s and 1840s many of these same 
16 
David M. Williams, "Merchanting in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Liverpool Timber Trade." 
Business History, Vlli (1966)," 111-112; and Sager, with Panting, Merchant Capital, 85-86. 
203 
individuals extended their shipping interests, proving that they were not shipowners looking 
to use idle tonnage but instead were importers who became shipowners as the general trade 
and their own investments increased. 17 It is worth remembering the connection between 
merchanting, the timber trade and Liverpool as a trading centre. 
A good example of the type of investor associated with the timber trade was Duncan 
Gibb, associated with the firm ofPollock, Gilmour, briefly profiled in Chapter Four. Duncan 
Gibb was born in the late 1780s and from about 1820 until the founding of the firm's 
Liverpool branch in 1839 acted as its agent there. Despite his loss of the agency, he 
remained close to the business and was a friend of Robert Rankin II until his death. As a 
young man he was shipwrecked in Newfoundland while travelling on business for the 
company. Although many of the initial survivors of the wreck succumbed to cold and 
starvation, Gibb was rescued by local Amerindians to whom he thereafter sent annual 
presents. One story concerning him has it that Samuel Cunard was able to escape creditors 
through Gibb' s intervention. Although almost totally forgotten today- much like Sandbach, 
Tinne- Gibb was one of the largest shipowners of his era and an active Tory politician. A 
friend of Gladstone, Canning and William Huskisson in his younger days, Gibb was present 
when the latter was killed at the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway. 
Unusually for a merchant of the period, he was twice offered a knighthood but declined. In 
later years Gibb' s fortunes took a downturn, and he spent his remaining years on a small 
17 
Williams, "Merchanting," 112-113. 
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property on the Isle ofMan. 18 
Gibb was atypical of timber merchants in the scale of his operations. His main focus 
was on the trade to Canada. The year 1830 was a high water mark for him, since he imported 
just over 13,000 tons of Canadian timber, accounting for eleven percent of all timber 
imported into Liverpool in that year. He was then the largest timber importer in the port. In 
addition to timber Gibb's vessels also imported 1,539 barrels of American cotton, 1,845 
barrels of flour from New York and Montreal, plus wheat and ashes from the latter port. In 
addition, Gibb's tonnage also transported small quantities of mahogany, pork, rum, sugar, 
teak, ebony, groceries and salt. By 1839 Gibb's timber imports had fallen in both absolute 
and relative terms, with a total of 8, 7 41 tons of Canadian wood, accounting for 4. 78 percent 
of Liverpool's timber imports. By 1850 Gibb' s fortunes had fallen yet again, and his 5,104 
18 
John Rankin, A History of Our Firm: Being Some Account of the Firm of Pollock, Gilmour and Co. And its 
Offshoots and Connections (Liverpool, 1908), 187-191. This work by a member of the Rankin family, now out 
of print, is one of the few detailed accounts of Duncan Gibb' s life. Even here much of it is based on family 
reminiscences and the author's own memories of almost forty years earlier. Gibb' s current obscurity is a sad, 
but not uncommon, fate for a onetime member ofLiverpool' s shipowning elite. William Huskisson (1770-1830) 
was a prominent late-Georgian politician. Apart from his tragic death, he is best remembered as a President of 
the Board of Trade, Treasurer of the Navy and Colonial Secretary. Huskisson's political career had a close 
association with commerce and shipping. He was known for his avid support of free trade. He espoused the 
relaxation of import duties and was a proponent of repealing the Navigation Acts. On Huskisson see Alexander 
Brady, William Huskisson and Liberal Reform; an Essay on the Changes in Economic Policy in the Twenties 
of the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1967) and Charles R Fay, Huskisson and His Age (London, 1951). For 
Huskisson's own opinions on the Navigation Laws see, Huskisson, Navigation Laws. Speech of the Right Hon. 
W. Huskisson in the House of Commons, Friday, the 12'h of May, 1826, on the Present State of the Shipping 
Interest. With an Appendix. Containing the Several Accounts R4erred to (Baltimore, 1826). In this speech to 
the House Huskisson (5) asserted that: 
... when I state that the first object of our Navigation System was to create and uphold a great 
commercial marine, I think I may add ... that this object could not have been effected solely by 
regulations, restrictions, or prohibitions, however judiciously devised. The only true and 
durable foundation of a large commercial marine is to be laid in the means of affording to it 
beneficial employment. Without...extensive commerce, and great capital, to sustain and 
invigorate that commerce - no laws, merely protective, will avail. 
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tons of timber comprised only about two percent of the port's total timber imports. Despite 
the downward trend, there can be no doubt of Duncan Gibb' s importance as a timber 
importer, and his record as an investor was no less impressive. 19 
The relationship between timber importing and vessel ownership has been discussed 
both in Chapter Four and above (see Table 6.1). Gibb certainly reflected the tendency of 
timber merchants to own tonnage. Over the period 1826-1850 he was one of the more 
important individual investors in shipping registered in the port of Liverpool. In the sample 
years alone, Gibb appeared as the owner or part-owner of nine vessels. Of these craft Gibb 
held all sixty-four shares in six, full ownership being common among timber merchants. The 
registries give no indication as to precisely how each vessel was employed, but the Bills of 
Entry certainly confirm that much ofGibb's business was indeed geared toward Canadian 
timber imports. It is thus no surprise that six of these craft were built in Canada, although 
this number does not coincide with the six vessels Gibb owned outright. Gibb owned thirty-
two of the shares in the ship Minerva, built in Montreal. Likewise, he owned the ship 
Napoleon the Third, also from the colony of Quebec, but in this case the entire vessel was 
held in partnership with Donald Kennedy under Donald Kennedy and Company. In terms 
of their actual place of origin, Gibb' s fleet, at least as represented in the sample, was heavily 
geared toward the colony of Lower Canada, or Quebec. Five vessels originated there, one 
19 
Williams, "Merchanting," 119-121. In 1830 Gibb's closest rival as a timber importer (from both Baltic and 
Canadian sources), W. Fairclough & Co., imported only 6,006 tons of timber into Liverpool, less than half 
Gibb's total. Nine years later Gibb ranked number seven among Liverpool's top twenty timber importers as 
measured by his timber imports into the port. By 1850 Gibb came in at only eleventh. 
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was built at River John, Nova Scotia, and the remainder came from Caithness County, 
Greenock and Liverpool itself Gibb, in fact, ordered much of his new tonnage directly from 
Canadian builders. The nine sample vessels reflect this trend, with the Greenock-built 
barque Trinidad the only vessel that was more than one year old at the time of its registry 
by Gibb in Liverpool. Gibb also appears to have held on to much of his tonnage for more 
than a single voyage; of these nine craft only two were registered de novo in the same year 
as his own purchase. Gibb retained such tonnage for about five and a half years, on average. 
Only two of the nine sample vessels remained as part ofGibb's fleet for a decade or more, 
with another under his ownership for nine years. Of these craft the 608-ton ship-rigged Tory 
had the greatest staying power. Gibb bought the Tory new in 1835, only selling it in 1852, 
near the end of his shipowning career. In aggregate the sample vessels represented 6,039 
tons of shipping at an average tonnage of 671. Still, this was only the tip of the iceberg in 
terms of Duncan Gibb's entire fleet. In the thirty years after 1820 he invested in 
approximately fifty-five vessels and was the sole owner offorty-five.20 
The timber trade of which Gibb was a part, along with the com and cotton trades, 
provided Liverpool with its most important imports prior to 1850. In addition to his work 
20 
BT 107, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; and Williams, "Merchanting," 113. The story of how Gibb 
and Kennedy began their business association is interesting. if possibly apocryphal. Apparently Gibb. who resided 
at the comer of Parliament and Windsor Streets, was known for his hospitality. In the years prior to 1850 the 
best leg up a young Scot could have to enter Liverpool's shipping trade was a letter of introduction to Duncan 
Gibb. He would often invite these young men, for whom he was trying to find work, to Sunday dinner. One trait 
Gibb seems to have especially admired was honesty. At one such dinner young Kennedy freely admitted to the 
staunch Presbyterian Gibb that he had just attended Catholic Mass. Impressed by Kennedy's candour, Gibb hired 
the youth himself, and the two eventually became business partners and lifelong friends. Rankin, History of Our 
Firm, 189. 
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specifically on timber merchants, Williams has made a number of seminal observations on 
the importing community and its general development. Import merchants, like many others 
engaged in business on Merseyside, made use of the principle of comparative advantage. 
Being specialists in the main, perhaps eighty percent of them concentrated on a single 
commodity from one particular source. Still, individual merchants were usually flexible and 
did not slavishly follow any one model of trading. The merchant importer was always 
willing to vary the scope and size ofhis activities to adapt to fluctuating market conditions. 21 
As the trades became more complex, smaller concerns began to decline and the 
occasional trader disappeared altogether. Williams referred to a small group of the largest 
traders as Liverpool's "merchant elite;" it was this group, he argued, which came to 
dominate a contracted merchant community by mid-century. Essentially, importing became 
concentrated in the hands of a small group oflarge operators. Although Williams was more 
tentative in his conclusions generally, he did feel that the specialists were coming to 
dominate all sectors of Liverpool trade, not simply importing.22 Williams' study ends in 
1850, before the real decline of the merchant shipowner had taken hold in Liverpool. 
Nonetheless, his observations on the growing specialization in the port's commerce shed 
some light on the conditions that allowed the professional shipowner to come into his own. 
21 
David M. Williams, "The Function of the Merchant in Specific Liverpool Import Trades, 1820-50" (MA Thesis, 
University of Liverpool, 1963), 86-88. 
22 
Ibid., 89. 
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As to the specific role of merchants as shipowners, Williams' study drew few firm 
conclusions. This is understandable since this was not the main focus of his work. Still, he 
did note that the owners in his sample, again mainly importers, were normally engaged in 
blue-water trades and that few had interests in coastal or Irish Sea commerce. The same 
applied to the Mediterranean and Baltic. Although there was no set rule for ownership, 
Williams' suggested that owning vessels outright, rather than as a minority owner with just 
a few shares, was the norm for nineteenth-century merchants. 23 
To an extent the Liverpool registry data bear out Williams' assessment. On the 
surface individual merchants did not normally appear to own tonnage outright. In fact, in 
1826 - the first sample year in which shareholdings were broken down in the registries -
Liverpool merchants invested in 152 vessels, with total tonnage amounting to 36,219. Of 
these vessels only 27, totalling 5,389 tons, were owned outright by merchants. The figures 
were similar in the 1830s samples when merchants had some shareholdings in 94,385 tons 
of shipping, or 371 vessels. Of these a mere sixty, at 12,464 tons, were owned outright by 
individual merchants. Similarly, in the 1840s samples merchants were noted as investors in 
527 vessels with a combined tonnage of 175,673. Again, individual merchant owners only 
held all sixty-four shares in sixty-one of these craft totalling 21,33 8 tons. Little had changed 
by 1850 when Liverpool's merchant community invested in 364 vessels at 140,365 tons. In 
this year fifty-eight vessels were owned outright by individual merchants, accounting for 
23 
Ibid. 
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28,842 tons. When viewing merchants as part oftrading partnerships, however, the situation 
changed somewhat. In 1850, for instance, merchant partnerships owned a further thirty-one 
vessels outright (or at least a majority share in them), amounting to 14,506 tons. Still, taken 
together with vessels owned outright by individual merchants, this represented less than a 
third of the tonnage invested in by merchants and newly-registered that year; the proportions 
were similar in earlier sample years. In the period from 1820 to 1850 merchants were one 
of the most important occupational groups in Liverpool in terms of gross tonnage 
registrations. Even taking partnerships into account, however, Liverpool merchants do not 
appear to have held most of their new tonnage outright (or as majority shareholders) as 
Williams speculated they might. Nonetheless, a significant number of their gross 
registrations were accounted for in this way.24 
In other cases as well the role of merchants as owners of Liverpool-registered 
tonnage may have been different than what Williams conceptualized. He argued that "during 
the thirty year period 1820-50, there was no decline either in the extent of merchants who 
possessed shipping interests, or in the extent of their shipping interests ... Figures for 1850 
were on both counts slightly higher than in pervious years. "25 Admittedly, his frame of 
reference may be somewhat different than what I have used here, and his main concern was 
24 
BT 107, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. Again, the case may have been somewhat different for 
merchants engaged mainly in deep-sea importing trades. There were also quite a few cases in which merchants 
or merchant partnerships held a half-share in newly-registered tonnage. 
25 
Williams, "The Function of the Merchant in Specific Liverpool Import Trades," 86-88. 
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with importers rather than Liverpool's merchant community in general. It was also the case 
that a Liverpool merchant's "shipping interests" did not necessarily equate with newly-
registered tonnage in the port. Merchant investors may have been more inclined to register 
vessels in other ports, even in Atlantic Canada in the case of timber merchants. By the same 
token, merchant owners could well have held onto tonnage longer than the average investor, 
eliminating the need to register new craft. These caveats notwithstanding, there was still 
some decline in the proportion of merchants registering new tonnage in 1850 as compared 
to 1820 (the figures were 48.1 and 55.3 percent, respectively; see Appendix Four). This 
finding is not far off from what Williams reported, as the decline in the merchant shipowner 
(even by these indices) was slight over the period, with the real decline taking place after 
1850, as illustrated by Appendix Four.26 
Over the period 1820-1889 - and especially in the last forty years - the percentage 
of Liverpool owners who considered their primary occupation as merchants was in fairly 
steady decline, and this seems a direct offshoot of the parallel growth of specialization. 27 
Earlier I suggested that the growth of specialist shipowning came about as the result of an 
overall increase in world trade and the need for increased carrying capacity. Quite simply, 
there was now enough work available in simply owning tonnage for others' use to make this 
26 
Ibid., 89; and BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
27 
There are numerous firms and individuals who might be used to illustrate the merchant as shipowner. One such, 
Thos. & Jno. Brocklebanks, will form a major case study in later chapters. Interestingly, this business was just 
as firmly connected, if not more so, with another maritime trade- shipbuilding. This aspect of the business will 
also be explored in some detail. 
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the central focus of one's business activity. Conversely, it became unnecessary to buy 
vessels as part of a larger mercantile concern; the merchant (or increasingly, an agent) could 
normally find a specialist shipowning company to transport his goods. 
The real value of British trade may have increased more than seven-fold in the 
seventy years prior to 1850, according to Ralph Davis. 28 At the same time the average length 
of haul likely increased, and a larger share of British shipping was employed on long-
distance voyages in the decades after 1820. The expansion of British trade triggered a 
prolonged period of growth in shipping. Previous periods of expansion had produced no 
organizational changes in shipping; indeed, more groups of small investors and vertically-
integrated businesses had entered the trade. After 1750 new trends changed the nature of 
shipping in the British context. These included the rate of long-term expansion, increasing 
localization, and a larger range of trade products and routes. An era of sustained growth in 
shipping demand prompted permanent organizational changes in the industry. As Ville 
states, "a process of vertical disintegration, particularly of trading companies and merchant 
firms, and horizontal integration of individually operated vessels led to these structures 
being superceded by specialist shipowning firms. "29 
28 
Ralph Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade (Leicester, 1979), 86. Visible exports and 
re-exports grew from £17.2 million in 1784-1786 to £123.5 million in 1854-1856, while merchandise imports 
rose from £22.8 million to £151.6 million over the same period. See also Simon Ville, "The Growth of 
Specialization in English Shipowning, 1750-1850," Economic History Review, 2nd series, XL Vl (1993), 710. 
29 
Ville, "Growth of Specialization," 713-714 and 719. 
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Graph 6.1 
Specialists (Shipowners) and Merchants as a Proportion of Total Shipping investors in 
Liverpool, 1820-1889 (Selected Years) 
Note: 
Source: 
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BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
A need was created for those who made the industry their primary occupation. In 
Liverpool, as was likely the case in many other British ports, a major incentive developed 
for certain merchants to put maritime connections into use as specialist owners and for 
others to leave the business of shipping to the "professionals." In effect, the old merchant 
shipowner faced a "fork in the road" at this point. He possessed a comparative advantage 
both in terms of merchanting and vessel ownership. With the two functions splitting more 
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and more into distinct industries, individuals could chose to go in either direction, depending 
in which business they felt more at home. Perhaps making this assessment itself, and doing 
so in a timely manner, was an early component of the adaptability that would be increasingly 
needed over the course of the nineteenth century. In a few cases, like Brockle banks, both 
functions were successfully retained for many years after most merchant shipowners were 
gone. The period after 1820 has been looked at from the point of view of specialization, but 
it is equally the era in which other types of ownership, especially that once most closely 
associated with vessel ownership- merchanting- gave way to the new type of organization. 
The change in organization can also be seen by the appearance in the registries of a 
figure of a clearly transitional nature - the owner who called himself a "merchant and 
shipowner." Although never a large group among Liverpool investors, their presence 
indicated a transfer of allegiance from merchanting to shipowning. For these investors the 
break from one pursuit to the other had not been fully completed and might never be. Yet 
it is significant that this designation did not appear until after the 1850s, precisely the time 
at which merchant ownership began a serious decline and shipowning was coming into its 
own as an occupation. This process was not inevitable, however, and in the nineteenth 
century may have been confined largely to British ports. Indeed, the rise ofthe professional 
shipowner and the concurrent decline of merchant capital in shipowning is one of( if not the) 
major differences in the Liverpool pattern of shipowning and that which the ACSP found 
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for Atlantic Canada. 30 
From 1820 to 1850 shipowning patterns in Atlantic Canada based on occupational 
distribution were generally similar to those in Liverpool. There were a variety of 
occupational groups investing in tonnage in these years, including mariners, traders, farmers 
and fishermen. Those individuals classed as mariners by Sager and Panting in their study of 
seven major Canadian ports represented around thirty-five percent of all vessel 
shareholdings in the period. Mariners were also very much in evidence as shareholders at 
Liverpool, though their proportions never appear to have been as significant as in Atlantic 
Canada. Sager and Panting found that in the seven main ports of the Maritimes almost a 
quarter of all new tonnage from 1820 to about 1850 was owned by mariners, fishermen, 
traders, or farmers. At Liverpool as late as 1850 mariners and other smallholders including 
fishmongers, gentlemen, insurance brokers and even widows accounted for a similar 
proportion of gross registrations.31 
In Atlantic Canada, as in Liverpool, however, it was the merchant-owner who 
dominated the business of shipowning from 1820 to 1850. Shareholdings by Atlantic 
Canadian merchants in this period stood at around one-third of the total, but a full two-thirds 
of all gross tonnage investment in the region's major ports was made by merchants. Again, 
30 
BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
31 
Ibid, 1850; and Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 79-80. Sager and Panting's study ports here are 
Charlottetown, Halifax, Saint John, Miramichi, Yarmouth, Pictou and Windsor. 
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a similar proportion of gross investment by merchants appears to have been the norm at 
Liverpool, although in the years 1820 and 1850, for instance, merchants made up a larger 
share of the individuals investing than in Atlantic Canada (see Appendix Four). The 
proportions were not exactly the same in all eastern Canadian ports. In Halifax, for instance, 
the small investor was more prominent than at Saint John, but merchants still accounted for 
about half of all newly-registered tonnage. As Sager and Panting summarize the role of the 
Atlantic Canadian merchant in the early nineteenth century, "the great shipowners of 
Atlantic Canada were merchants first and shipowners second. "32 Up to 1850 much the same 
might be said of Liverpool. 
It was in the second half of the century that the occupational makeup of shipping 
investors at Liverpool and Atlantic Canada really diverged. I have noted above how in 
Liverpool the merchant shipowner came to be replaced, first by the professional shipowner 
and ultimately by company groupings. Although the use of select years makes the process 
appear smoother than it was in reality, Graph 6.1 above nonetheless vividly illustrates the 
diminishing importance of the merchant-investor and the concurrent rise of the shipowning 
professional at Liverpool after 1850. In most of Atlantic Canada this transition never took 
place, at least prior to the twentieth century when the eastern Canadian fleet was much 
diminished. As in Liverpool, Atlantic Canada's fleets became concentrated in fewer hands 
and smallholders were increasingly displaced. Liverpool merchants were not the major 
32 
Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 79-81; and BT 107, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1820 and 1850. At 
Newfoundland merchants were, if anything, even more prominent as vessel owners than elsewhere in the region. 
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player in this process that their counterparts were in Atlantic Canada. Sager and Panting 
noted a rise in the number of investors calling themselves shipbuilders and "shipowners." 
Still, even in the 1880s and 1890s merchants continued to account for about thirty percent 
of newly-registered tonnage in Atlantic Canada's major ports. Contrast this to Liverpool 
where, as Appendix Four illustrates, merchants accounted for less than four percent of new 
registrations in 1889. In the Canadian case, Sager and Panting feel that merchant domination 
of shipowning remained even more pronounced than the actual registrations indicate. They 
contend that even near the end of the nineteenth century many of those listing themselves 
as shipowners continued to function essentially as merchants rather than as professional 
owners. That was, in fact, how the region's major "shipowners" actually perceived 
themselves. Indeed, only in the port of Yarmouth did a real specialization in the ownership 
of ocean-going tonnage emerge, and even here such persons were largely members of 
mercantile families trading on their own account. Even in cases where steam and iron 
appeared on the Atlantic Canadian registries, merchant owners retained a significant share. 33 
Perhaps the difference with Liverpool (and British ports generally) relates to the 
33 
Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 14 7 -150; and BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
Sager and Panting's contention that many supposed shipowners in Atlantic Canada were really merchants has 
an echo in Liverpool, although in a different way. By the 1880s samples only a handful of vessel shareholders 
still referred to themselves as merchants- especially in 1889. Of their investments, five vessels totalling 10,826 
register tons were owned by members of the Brocklebank family. Although continuing to list themselves as 
merchants the Brocklebanks could certainly be considered professional shipowners by this stage. (Refer to 
Chapter Eight). On one registry, in fact, Ralph and Thomas Brocklebank listed their occupations using the 
transitional phrase "merchants and shipowners." On Yarmouth refer again to Alexander,"The Port of 
Yarmouth." Although Alexander does not specifically engage with the question as to why professional 
shipowning became so important in the port, his analysis of Yarmouth as a leading shipping port and its 
involvement in deep-sea trades does give valuable insight into its character. 
217 
process of industrialization. Sager and Panting contend that had eastern Canada become 
industrialized to the degree that locales in Britain had, most shipping would have been 
owned by a small clique of incorporated companies by 1914. In the Maritimes and 
Newfoundland ownership by merchant families remained the norm until after the tum of the 
twentieth century. Incorporated companies did not account for a majority of capital 
formation in Atlantic Canada's shipping industry until 1907, by which time the Canadian 
fleet was in serious decline. The professional revolution that marked shipowning in late-
nineteenth century Liverpool came late to Atlantic Canada and even then in an incomplete 
form. The ships of eastern Canada remained essentially "merchant capital."34 
Although Liverpool's own merchants were eventually superceded by professional 
shipowners (or actually became shipowners themselves), these two occupations taken 
together were the most important investors in Liverpool throughout the entire period from 
1820 to 1889 (companies excepted), often comprising more than half of all shares in newly-
registered vessels. That being said, however, a plethora of other occupations owned the 
remainder ofLiverpool' s tonnage. 35 I have alluded to a number of these above, and although 
most were not statistically dominant, they do figure into some of the literature on Liverpool 
and shipowning in general. For this reason it is useful to look in more depth at some ofthem. 
Perhaps the most important class of investor in Liverpool's shipping, apart from the 
34 
Sager, with Panting, Maritime Capital, 147. 
35 
See Appendix Four. 
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professional owners and merchants, at least until mid-century, were mariners- most often 
masters (again, much as in Atlantic Canada). Their presence as investors is not surprising 
given the intimate ties mariners would have had with Liverpool's seaward industries and 
their knowledge of maritime affairs. It is important to detail this group of investors, as 
mariners were precisely the type of persons whose comparative advantage as part of 
Liverpool's marine community made tonnage investment a natural choice. 
In 1820 twenty-five mariners, of whom thirteen were masters, invested in Liverpool 
shipping, amounting to about one-sixth of all owners for the year. By 1850 fifty-six mariners, 
all but four of whom were masters, were listed as investors and owned 5,821 tons of 
shipping. The percentages in these cases were 11.4 and 7.2, respectively. In 1870 thirteen 
mariners, all masters, owned 1,802 register tons (2,179 gross) of new shipping, or 6.5 and 
1.8 percent of total investors and tonnage. By the final sample year, 1889, the number of 
mariners stood at only two masters, 1.5 percent, investing in a paltry fifty-four register tons 
(sixty-five gross), or less than half of one percent of that year's newly-registered tonnage. 36 
Upon reviewing the registry data it is clear that the percentage of tonnage owned by 
mariners tended to be smaller in proportion to their strength as investors than was the case 
for shipowners and merchants. This was likely due to the fact that mariners generally owned 
fewer shares in any particular vessel on average than did either merchants or professional 
shipowners. When one looks at the numbers of mariners owning tonnage outright compared 
36 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1820, 1850, 1870 and 1889. 
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to the latter groups, the contrast is quite marked. In 1850, for example, just over a fifth of 
all shipowners held all sixty-four shares in a vessel; the same held true for about sixteen 
percent of merchants; but only about nine percent of mariners. In 1870 the proportions were 
even more deviant: just over and just under half of shipowners and merchants, respectively, 
controlled all sixty-four shares oftheir vessels. Such was the case, however, for less than a 
third of mariners. By 1889 the number of mariners fell too low to make such comparisons 
worthwhile. 37 
There were a number of factors which might persuade career mariners to become 
investors, especially the comparative advantage that grew out of their seaward experience. 
In this way, moving into ownership might provide a profitable income once a seaman retired 
from active service. Also, becoming an investor was socially in keeping with a master's 
status as something of a gentleman in his community. Aside from these considerations, there 
were at least two reasons why mariners would figure prominently as owners. First, a number 
of mariners might earn their living by fishing and own their own craft, thus appearing as 
owners - often the sole owner- although the tonnage was not usually great. A number of 
these persons appeared as investors in the port of Liverpool via their interest in a fishing 
venture. Overall, however, such owners were not common. Palmer found that this category 
for London was comprised mainly of Barking fishers, who in 183 3 owned about 120 vessels 
37 
Ibid. The data above are more in line with the tendency David Williams discussed regarding the propensity of 
merchants to own tonnage outright in the years up to 1850, but in a year when they were much less important 
as a proportion of total investors. 
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of about forty to sixty tons and often listed themselves as "master mariners." Vessel 
ownership by fishers was also significant in Atlantic Canada, especially in the case of 
schooners. As Palmer mentioned, however, this situation was not applicable to every port, 
and it likely was not in Liverpool. In 1850, for instance, only three persons with definite ties 
to the fishing industry appeared as investors on the Liverpool register (less than one percent 
of the year's individual investors). Ofthese, only one listed himself as a "fisherman," while 
the other three were "fishmongers." These individuals invested in four vessels of ninety-six 
tons in total, all owned outright and which averaged twenty-four tons- somewhat smaller 
than the fishing craft Palmer noted at Barking. In many sample years no fishers or 
fishmongers appeared as Liverpool investors at all. 38 
A factor which does appear important in the context of Merseyside concerns the 
common practice of owners giving their masters a number of shares in their commands as 
a portion of their salary. In going through the Liverpool registries it is quite common to find 
that a master mariner listed as one of its investors was also the vessel's captain at the time 
of registration, although this was by no means always the case. At sea and in foreign ports 
a master had a great deal ofleeway concerning freights and cargoes. By granting him a stake 
in the success of the voyage owners gave the master "an inducement...to get the maximum 
38 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping," 58; and Sager, 
with Panting, Maritime Capital, 78, and 148-149. Naturally, the importance of fishers on the Liverpool register 
may be under-represented if, like those at Barking, many described themselves as "master mariners." 
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profit for the enterprise. "39 In most instances, the number of shares granted to a master via 
this process was quite small, usually no more than two or three. This likely was part of the 
reason that mariners tended to have smaller holdings in newly-registered tonnage than did 
professional owners or merchants. 40 
In some cases the seagoing enterprises of Liverpool masters (or former masters) 
could be quite extensive. An example was Charles Cotesworth. As in the case of master-
owners generally, it is well to bear in mind that the prior connections men like Cotesworth 
had with maritime trading and their position as members of the port's seaward-looking 
community were important comparative advantages in shipowning. Born in 1792, 
Cotesworth commanded a number of vessels out of Liverpool before going into business as 
an owner on his own account.41 He began his new career in 1827 in partnership with James 
Smith. Their first vessel was the 250-ton wooden ship Brazilian, three years old and built 
by Clarke & Nickson's yard in Liverpool. This craft remained in service for more than a 
quarter century until it was lost off Lisbon on 20 November 1853. Up to 1839 the company 
39 
Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping," 58. See also BPP, Select Committee on Employment of British 
Shipping (1844), VIII, qq. 321-322. 
40 
BT 1071108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. Another important factor in this trend was certainly the 
cost. It is highly unlikely that most mariners, even master mariners, would have had the resources at hand to 
purchase all sixty-four shares in a particular vessel, unlike many professional owners and merchants. Nonetheless, 
some master mariners, including Charles Cotesworth (detailed above), did become substantial owners in their 
own right. 
41 
Surviving material on Cotes worth does not make it explicit as to why he made the switch from commanding to 
owning vessels. It may simply be the case of an ambitious man applying his prior familiarity with the shipping 
business (comparative advantage) to a related occupation that, in his mind, promised greater rewards. 
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owned or held shares in eleven vessels, mainly brigs, but including two each of barques, 
schooners and ships. In 1839 the firm name was changed to Cotesworth and Company. 
Smith had retired and died in 1840. That same year Robert Wynne was made a partner; 
Joseph Lynne, who joined later, became a partner in 1851. From this point the firm was 
renamed Cotesworth, Wynne and Lynne. Wynne died in 1851 at the early age of forty-six, 
although the business soldiered on, now referred to as Cotesworth, Lynne & Co. In 1857 
Cotes worth passed away at the age of sixty-five. The company did not dissolve immediately 
upon its founder's death, however, continuing on until 1895 when the last of its vessels was 
sold and the firm passed out of existence. Its last purchase had been a new 1 ,031-ton iron 
barque named the Charles Cotesworth in honour of the late founder. This vessel was 
acquired from the Royden yard in Liverpool in 1876, almost twenty years prior to the firm's 
dissolution. During its existence the Cotesworth partnerships had owned, at various times, 
forty-five sailing vessels. Starting in 1839, and continuing for many years thereafter, the 
Cotesworth companies were involved in the Calcutta trade in competition with 
Brocklebanks. Beginning as loading brokers for others firms, Cotesworths went on to run 
a large fleet of its own in the trade.42 
42 
Woods, "Liverpool Fleet Lists," I, 93-97; and NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Historical Notes, Liverpool-
Calcutta Trade, 3. The Calcutta trade will be discussed in Chapter Seven as part of the examination of 
Brocklebanks. Another person who successfully turned his comparative advantages as a master mariner into a 
shipowning career was Peter Iredale, founder of P. Iredale & Co. Born in Great Broughton, Cumberland in 
1823, he turned from skippering vessels to ownership in 1864. By 1881 the company owned eleven vessels and 
his son, J.H., was a partner. From then until1890 the firm was officially known asP. Iredale & Son. In that year 
the younger Iredale struck out on his own, and the partnership was dissolved. John Porter of Carrickfergus, 
himself son of a master mariner, became Iredale Sr.'s new partner, the business' name being changed toP. 
Iredale & Porter. Peter Idedale died in 1899 at the age of seventy-six, and J.H. had by then rejoined the firm. 
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In the nineteenth century traditional mariners were joined at sea by another type of 
professional whose existence both presaged and followed in the wake of technological 
change- the marine engineer. Inventors and engineers created the steam revolution, profiled 
in Chapter Four, that eventually displaced sail. The use of steam expanded in earnest in the 
years after 1850 as the new technology became increasingly efficient on ever-longer 
voyages. At the same time, the growth in steam use naturally created a need for even more 
engineers. All these new vessels needed a different kind of person to run and maintain their 
engines, just as they had always needed a bridge crew and ratings to guide them safely from 
port to port. There was at first some friction between these new men and their established 
colleagues. This was certainly the case in the Royal Navy, for example, which began 
investing in steam as early as 1819. In the beginning the engineers had no officer corps of 
their own, although some training was provided as early as 1828. Engineering staff were 
normally supplied by whomever built a vessel's engines, and they had no formal status~ in 
many cases they were simply engine drivers rather than proper engineers. Two Orders in 
Council in 183 7 and 184 7 gave the navy's engineers warrant and then commissioned rank. 
Even then, they messed apart from the rest of the crew, and some friction continued into the 
twentieth century. Some of this animosity may have come from wage rates. By the 1840s, 
when steam was making its first real inroads into merchant shipping, engineers were 
Porter retired in 1904 and passed away in 1934. J.H. himself retired in 1917 after the loss of the vesselArethusa, 
and the company was wound down. Thirty-four craft were owned by the company over its life, plus eleven 
purchased by J.H. on his own from 1890to 1892. For reference to earlier company history see B. Guiness 
Orchard, Liverpool's Legion of Honour (Birkenhead, 1893). 
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considered skilled professionals whose services were much in demand - a chief engineer 
was normally paid more than a first officer. Whatever the difficulties, the age of the 
maritime engineer was at hand after mid-century, and it is not surprising that this group 
should be found among investors just as were more traditional mariners.43 
Given the relative paucity of steam tonnage prior to the 1850s, it is not surprising that 
the engineer did not figure in any real way as a Liverpool investor prior to this time. In all 
sample years before 1850 only one investor, James Logan, described himself as an engineer, 
and it is not clear that his expertise was in any way maritime. In 1826 Logan owned thirty-
two shares in a 36-ton sloop. The next year engineers appeared in the registries was in 1850, 
when four owned a total of about 394 tons of shipping- all steamers. The period from 1850 
to 1870 was the heyday of the engineer as investor. In 1855, 1860 and 1865 six or seven 
engineers appeared as the owners of new tonnage each year. Their overall share of new 
registries in Liverpool was never large, reaching a peak of seven vessels and 1,014 register 
tons in 1860. In both 1870 and 1889 only one engineer invested in new tonnage at Liverpool. 
43 
Ronald Hope, A New History of British Shipping (London, 1990), 274; John Winton, An Illustrated History of 
the Royal Navy (London, 2000), 1 03; and H. C. McMurray, "Technology and Social Change at Sea: The Status 
and Position on Board of the Ship's Engineer, circa 1830-60," in Ommer and Panting ( eds.), Working Men Who 
Got Wet (St. John's, NL, 1980), 35-50. For evidence of the diverging wage histories of engineers as compared 
to traditional ship's officers, see Lewis R. Fischer, "Seamen in a Space Economy: International Regional Patterns 
of Maritime Wages on Sailing Vessels, 1863-1900," in Stephen Fisher (ed.), Lisbon as a Port Town. the British 
Seaman and Other Maritime Themes (Exeter, 1988), 57-92; and Fischer, "International Maritime Labour, 1863-
1900: World Wages and Trends," The Great Circle, X, No. 1 (Spring 1988), 1-21 This was not simply a British 
problem; see Fischer and Helge W. Nordvik, "From Namsos to Halden: Myths and Realities in the History of 
Norwegian Seamen's Wages, 1850-1914," Scandinavian Economic History Review, XXXV, No.1 (1987), 41-
65; and Fischer and Nordvik, "Salaries of the Sea: Maritime Wages in Stavanger, 1892-1914," Stavanger 
HistoriskArbok 1987 (Stavanger, 1988), 103-132. In addition to the engineers, there were a numbers of new 
jobs created by the advent of steam, such as firemen, stokers and trimmers. 
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This was to be expected, since by this time full-time shipowners and formally organized 
companies dominated. The demise of the engineer-investor was in keeping with the decline 
in the non-professional investor in general and largely coincided with the figures for 
mariners, although the latter group was somewhat more important as owners. This being 
said, certain investors with close ties to marine engineering did have some real impact as 
owners.44 
One of the investors who listed himself as a shipowner in the 1880s was R.P. 
Houston, who registered four screw steamers in the sample years 1885 and 1889 (Houston 
owned more than thirty vessels over his career).45 On the surface, Houston appears to have 
been (and was) a professional shipowner. But he got his start in the marine sector through 
the family profession of engineering. Robert Paterson Houston (often referred to as R.P.H.) 
was the son of a Renfrewshire marine engineer, Robert Houston Sr. The younger Houston 
was born at Bootie, Liverpool, on 31 May 1853. He initially followed his father's profession 
and was apprenticed as a marine engineer and shipbuilder. While Houston was still fairly 
young his father died and his mother married Alexander Maclennan, a superintending 
engineer with the National Line. At the age of twenty-one Houston replaced his stepfather 
44 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. Not all the engineer-investors were marine engineers. 
Two listed themselves as "civil engineers," and one entered his occupation as "consulting engineer." Blue Funnel 
Line founder Alfred Holt, although most noted (as an engineer) for his marine innovations, started out in railway 
engineering. 
45 
Ibid., 1880, 1885 and 1889. The steamers were Heliades, He/lopes, Hippomenes and Hydarnes. The vessels 
totaled 7,246 register tons (11,207 gross tons), of which Houston was outright owner of all but the 1,922 
register ton Heliades, which he co-owned with Frederic Smitton. 
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with the National. Despite this success the young man's interest lay more in shipowning, and 
he soon determined to build his own fleet. Houston never forgot his grounding in marine 
engineering, however, and almost all the steamers built for his company up to the turn of the 
twentieth century were designed by him personally. 46 
The theme of comparative advantage has been repeated throughout this study, and 
such is especially pertinent to this chapter in terms of advantages accrued through one's 
place of residence and occupational background. R.P. Houston certainly possessed such 
advantages, being a marine engineer, as well the son and stepson of others; he was also a 
native of Liverpool. Houston may well be a good example of another type of comparative 
advantage, although one which cannot be easily quantified - personality. His feisty 
temperament and natural determination seem to have been key elements in his success as 
a shipowner. This designation fits many of Liverpool's vessel owners, who might today be 
classed as "type A personalities." 
Under the auspices of its "feisty" founder, the Houston line got its start in 1877 when 
R.P.H. bought a part share in a small iron screw steamer. Houston went into business on his 
46 
Robert Greenhill, "Sir Robert Paterson Houston," in David J. Jeremy ( ed. ), Dictionary of Business Biography 
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own in 1880 as R.P. Houston and Company, placing an order for an 1,100-ton iron screw 
steamer with Whitehaven Shipbuilding Company. Launched as Hercules in 1881, this vessel 
started the tradition of naming the fleet after Greco-Roman deities, all starting with the letter 
"H." This first H-class vessel traded to the Far East as a tramp, and Houston also received 
contracts from the Panama Canal and West African Companies, although he was primarily 
interested in the South American trades. By this stage, however, many of the established 
companies trading to the region had formed conferences to keep out interlopers. Houston 
was undeterred and launched a determined fight against the cartel. He soon carved out a 
prosperous niche in the River Plate trade, inaugurating weekly sailings that lasted until 1926. 
With his engineering background Houston became a pioneer in the refrigerated meat trade 
from Argentina. In 1884 four of his vessels were fitted with refrigerating machinery, and 
Houston began his meat and livestock service to the UK. By 1898 R.P.H. 's South American 
trade had grown to the point where he was investing in ever-larger vessels, and the fleet was 
brought under the aegis of his new British and South American Steam Navigation Company 
Limited, with R.P. Houston and Company as managers. Prior to this time R.P. Houston & 
Co. had been a partnership in which R.P.H. himself was senior, and the firm simply 
managed a number of single-ship companies.47 
In 1899 Houston turned his energy in a new direction and inaugurated a New York-
River Plate service using the new steamer Hermes II, the first of eight vessels ordered in that 
47 
McRoberts, "Houston Story (1 )," 297-301; Kennedy, History of Steam Navigation, 237-239; Greenhill, "Sir 
Robert Paterson Houston," 371; and Sloman, "Some Lesser-Known Liverpool Shipping Companies," 22-23. 
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year. At the same time Houston became one of the first British shipowners to offer his 
vessels for government service at the outbreak of the Boer War. The Houston steamers were 
employed carrying men, horses and mules to South Africa, and the Admiralty was quite 
pleased with their performance and safety records. Although Houston was an ardent 
imperialist, his fortune stemmed largely from these wartime contracts. Indeed, his detractors 
often claimed that profit was the only reason he offered his tonnage. Be that as it may, few 
of the contractors in those days made a secret of their drive for financial gain, and R.P.H. 
did the work well. Because of the fleet's war service Houstons was short of tonnage for 
trading on its own account and purchased a number of other vessels by the end of 190 1. 48 
Houston's experience with South Africa's wartime transport convinced him of the 
value of placing the trade on a regular footing after the return of peace in 1902. As in South 
America, however, the decision pitted Houston against an established conference- a fight 
he was once again determined to win. The conference members introduced "penalty 
freights" against R.P.H. 's vessels so that any shippers employing Houston tonnage would 
subsequently be charged a double rate if they used conference vessels. When the conflict 
turned bitter Houston engaged the services of the lawyer F.E. Smith, who took the 
conference operators to court. Houston eventually wore down his competitors and was 
48 
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grudgingly admitted to conference membership. By 1914 the Houston Line consisted of 
about twenty vessels totalling some 80,000 gross tons. The line sometimes chartered 
shipping, but Houston preferred to run new rather than second-hand tonnage, although the 
latter route was sometimes necessary during the early days in South Africa. Houston did not 
tie himself to any particular builder, preferring instead to shop around for the best deals that 
were capable of thirteen or fourteen knots. Until ordering his last new tonnage after the tum 
of the century, R.P.H. always tried to reinvest profits into modernizing his fleet while 
disposing of outdated bottoms (this practical strategy was also employed by PSNC). Aside 
from Houston's original Liverpool-River Plate service, the line ran vessels between a 
number of major UK and American ports to South America by the outbreak of the Great 
War, also calling at ports in South and East Africa and Continental Europe. During the war 
the line lost about 28,000 tons of shipping that had ben requisitioned by the Admiralty. By 
1918 the fleet was old and in need of replacement, and Houston himself was tired. Thus, 
when former South African trade rivals Cayzer Irving, operators of the Clan Line, offered 
a reported £2,000,000, Houston sold out, ending its career of almost forty years.49 
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Engineers like Robert Houston were closely associated with the design and building 
of vessels and their engines in the steam era. Aside from engineers, however, there were 
many other occupations -largely craft-based and frequently associated with sail- concerned 
with the construction and outfitting of vessels. In Liverpool these included sailmakers, ship 
chandlers, shipbuilders, shipwrights, coopers and anchorsmiths. As Palmer found in London, 
the number of such investors in Liverpool was relatively small, both in terms of numbers and 
tonnage. Still, their presence was by no means negligible. Indeed "marine tradesmen" often 
accounted for more than five percent of the individual investors in newly-registered shipping 
at Liverpool, and in the sample year 1870 this number stood at more than ten percent. 
Generally speaking, their share oftotal tonnage registered was smaller, especially by the last 
sample year (See Appendix Four). In some cases a craftsman might be paid for his work in 
vessel shares rather than cash, thus automatically making him a shipowner. Other tradesmen 
might have wished to have an interest in a vessel to insure the awarding of repair and 
outfitting contracts, although there is no evidence that such motives were still a factor by the 
1830s. In most cases it is likely that such persons simply got into investing by way of 
"personal contacts within the port."50 In other words, the nature of the marine tradesman's 
business, including the network of personal relationships it generated, formed a natural 
1977 (Ringwood, 1995); and C.J. Harris and Brian D. Ingpen. Mailships of the Union-Castle Line (Sparkford, 
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comparative advantage facilitating entry into shipowning. 
A further occupation with close contacts with the shipping industry was shipbroking. 
Like the building and outfitting trades, brokers never owned a significant share of tonnage, 
but as this occupation became increasingly important in the second half of the century, the 
number of brokers increased dramatically. For this reason it would not be out of place to 
discuss their role in Liverpool shipowning. 51 
Shipbroking had existed for centuries in one form or another. In the years before 
1000 CE Norse society included a profession known as brokunar-madr, or "go-betweens," 
who acted as intermediaries between shipowners, builders and merchants. The activities of 
shipbrokers were important enough for governments to regulate the business as early as the 
1600s. Still, as late as the early 1800s family and community relationships were often 
enough to facilitate the buying and selling of tonnage. By 1850 this pattern had begun to 
change with the emergence of the modern international economy and new trends in shipping. 
The growth of free trade in Britain, and later in many other trading nations, encouraged 
maritime commerce, with the attendant heightened demand for vessels. In the short-term this 
created a tonnage deficit, which in turn attracted large numbers of new investors. Many of 
51 
Lewis R. Fischer, "A Bridge Across the Water: Liverpool Shipbrokers and the Transfer of Eastern Canadian 
Sailing Vessels, 1855-1880," The Northern Marine riLe Marin du Nord, III (1993), 51. Fischer's thesis revolves 
around the sale of Canadian tonnage. On the history of shipbroking, see Fischer and Helge W. Nordvik, 
"Economic Theory, Information and Management in Shipbroking: Fearnley and Eger as a Case Study, 1869-
1972," in Simon P. Ville and David M. Williams (eds.), Management, Finance and Industrial Relations in 
Maritime Industries: Essays in International Maritime and Business History (St. John's, NL, 1994), especially 
3-6. See also Lars Gorton, Rolf Ihre and Arne Sanderson, Shipbroking and Chartering Practice (London, 
1990). 
232 
these neophytes lacked the expertise to purchase vessels on their own, and for such persons 
shipbrokers were indispensable. With the coming of iron and steel sailing craft and the 
growth of steam, owners had more potential design options to chose from in purchasing 
tonnage than previously. Once more, brokers were helpful in advising shipowners 
concerning tonnage purchases. With generally fluid markets many builders constructed new 
craft on speculation, with no sure buyer. In these cases brokers were the best source of 
locating potential clients. In short, these changes created a demand for middlemen able to 
match buyers and sellers. The growth of brokerage after 1850 was thus no coincidence. 52 
The term shipbroker has been widely used by scholars and in contemporary writings, 
but Lewis Fischer has specified four tasks that define their activities. First is the chartering 
of vessels, in other words matching shipowners with tonnage to offer with men or firms that 
have cargoes to be transported. The second is to act as a customs' broker, facilitating 
entrances and clearances of vessels and their cargoes. The third is to arrange the sale and/or 
purchase of tonnage. Finally, shipbrokers often provide ancillary services, such as financing 
and sometimes insurance cover. While chartering generally occupied the greatest share of 
a broker's time, it was the sale-and-purchase function that was the most lucrative. Individual 
charter-parties rarely earned a broker more than a few hundred pounds, even when freight 
rates were high, since in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries commissions 
seldom exceeded two percent, even on longer routes. But fees for buying or selling tonnage 
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were often in the range of five or six percent, and the contracts normally involved much 
larger sums. Moreover, it was not unheard of for a broker in a single transaction to represent 
both the buyer and the seller- and to earn commissions from both participants in the deal. 
Although brokers made their living from dealing with physical capital, it was in the realm 
of the intangible that they really operated.53 According to Fischer and Anders Fon, 
"[s]hipbrokers in the nineteenth century, as well as the present, have made their fortunes by 
controlling information flows. Brokers have no visible commodities to sell; in essence, their 
task is to bring together buyers and sellers. "54 
Despite their growing centrality to the industry, Liverpool shipbrokers were never 
major investors in shipping, at least on an individual basis. Even after 1850, when trade 
expanded exponentially, the percentage of investors who called themselves brokers 
remained well under ten percent, and by 1889 there was not a single shipbroker who 
invested in new tonnage at Liverpool (Appendix Four). Because shipbrokers often derived 
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a portion of their livelihood from shipowning, their appearance in the Liverpool registries, 
if in fairly small numbers, is not surprising. Brokerage in itself was attractive to 
businesspeople because the capital required for entry was negligible and certainly much less 
than shipowning. Still, the latter trade, with its potentially high profit margins, often proved 
a powerful lure for the broker. Moreover, since in the international context brokerage and 
shipowning almost always went hand in hand, the distinction between brokers and 
shipowners could be very amorphous indeed. 55 
The linkage between shipbroking and shipowning characterized the careers of two 
well known Liverpool owners, Thomas and James Harrison. Although there is ample 
material available on their activities for a major case study, it has already been the subject 
of an in-depth scholarly treatment by Francis Hyde. 56 Although more than thirty years old, 
this book remains one of the classics of scholarship on Liverpool trade and provides a 
glimpse into the sometimes complex interchanges between two important, and hardly 
mutually exclusive, groups of investors. 
Thomas, born in 1815, and James, born in 1821, were the sons of a prosperous 
Lancashire farmer for whom James was named. They were apprenticed to the ship and 
general brokerage firm of Samuel Brown & Company, which had ties to the Williamson 
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family, small-scale shipowners and masters from Scarborough. Brown's main business 
involved the importation ofbrandy from Charente and the export of coal, mainly for the use 
of the distillers. By 1820 the firm was trading partly out of Liverpool, with the Brown 
Company acting as its brokers. By mid-decade the Browns owned shares in the Williamson 
craft in their own right. Richard Williamson, Jr. settled at Tonay-Charente, and by 1836 the 
Harrisons began investing in tonnage in partnership with him. In 1842 the brothers owned 
shares in four small craft57 
Thomas became a partner in Browns in 1846, when the company took the name 
Brown Harrison. The firm soon deployed its tonnage on routes to Europe, Brazil, the Crimea 
(for war charters) and China. When George Brown died in 1853, the Harrisons assumed full 
control of the brokerage firm, then known as T. & J. Harrison. Following the ratification of 
the Cobden-Chevalier treaty in 1860, the Harrisons decided to switch to steam for the brandy 
trade using the aptly-named Cognac, along with Gladiator and Dragon. 58 Always looking 
for new opportunities, the Harrisons began putting steamers into the New Orleans cotton 
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trade just after the Civil War and even set up a branch office in that southern Louisiana 
city. 59 
In 1871 the brothers formed a separate shipowning company under the name 
Charente Steamship Co., with a capital investment of£512,000.60 In 1884 when Thomas' 
health began to fail, the company was turned into a limited-liability entity. Officially Thos. 
& Jas. Harrison acted as managers for the shipping company, with the Harrison brothers 
being the principle shareholders in the latter concern. They were joined as shareholders 
(albeit minor ones) by their brothers, E.H. and John. John died that same year, and his shares 
were bought by John William Hughes, a former clerk and now a major investor in the 
company. In this period Harrisons entered the Indian trade and were noted for a relatively 
humane coolie trade. The firm also expanded to New York in search of import cargoes for 
Liverpool. It likewise became involved in trade with Central America, the Carribean and the 
Pacific, and their vessels departed Liverpool for Barbados, Trinidad, Port-au-Prince, 
Kingston Vera Cruz and New Orleans. Harrisons managed their own Calcutta steamers, but 
from the 1880s this function was left toR. Bulman and Co. for the West Indian trades and 
59 
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toW. Killey and Co. for their Pernambuco steamers.61 
Thomas Harrison died in 1888, followed by James in 1891. The company continued 
on, however, with the brothers' sons in charge, assisted by Hughes. From the late 1880s the 
tonnage and power of Harrison's vessels increased, from an average of around 2,000 tons 
to about 4,000, growing steadily in the early twentieth century. In 1889 the company 
purchased the Star Line from Rathbone Brothers and Company, adding to this in 1911 with 
the Aberdeen Direct Line. As we will see in the next chapter, this kind of acquisitive 
behaviour was typical of shipowners in the late-Victorian to Edwardian period. The line 
remained successful at the outbreak of the Great War. Thereafter, the business continued to 
prosper, despite losses in both the World Wars. As late as the 1970s, Harrisons 
supplemented a conventional fleet with container ships, and their livery continued to be seen 
on the world's trade routes until late in the century.62 
Aside from their ties with Liverpool and shipowning, the Harrisons shared another 
trait in common with all of the owners profiled thus far - they were men. Although not 
especially well represented as investors, there were some female vessel shareholders at 
Liverpool as well. Their categorization by "occupation" is somewhat problematic, and they 
were mainly listed as "widows" and "spinsters." These designations represent virtually all 
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tonnage owned by women in Liverpool in an era when they were designated by their 
relationships to a male partner (or lack thereof) rather than on their own merits. 63 Although 
like shipbrokers, women did not comprise an especially large proportion of investors in new 
tonnage, they did appear with some regularity in the registries. In each sample year from 
1820 to 1889 there was at least one female investor, although their numbers never topped 
twenty. The highest number of female investors was in 1835, when they comprised eighteen 
out of 212, or about 8. 5 percent of all individuals (or companies) investing in new tonnage 
that year. In 1865 there were almost as many women listed among investors, but here, with 
a larger number of investors overall, they comprised only 3.2 percent of individual investors. 
In most other years there were less than ten individual women found in the registries, apart 
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from in 1850, which was one of the largest years for shipping investment. 64 
There is little direct evidence in the registers as to why these women became 
investors in shipping, but in a previous study of shipping in Maryport I did indicate a number 
of possibilities. As part of a dowry a new bride might receive vessel shares which, following 
the practice of the day, would likely be listed as belonging to the husband until his death; 
at which time the shares would revert to the widow. Moreover, it is almost certain that many 
widows inherited their vessel tonnage, along with other goods and chattels, as part of their 
husband's estates. In some cases there is direct evidence in the registries of the role widows 
played in estate management after a husband's death. For example, in 1850 Maria Louise 
Swire of Liverpool was listed as being executrix of the estate of her husband, the late John 
Swire. There was also a great need for this form of provision for surviving female spouses 
in the nineteenth century. In an era when working women were rare, as indeed were social 
welfare programmes, widows may often have depended upon such estate income for support 
following a spouse's death. Similarly, unmarried women, or "spinsters" in contemporary 
language, may have relied on returns from shipping for a living. Since the expectation was 
that most Victorian women would rely on a spouse's income, at least past a certain age, the 
failure to marry might have had serious consequences for those women listed as spinsters 
in the registries. It would be a sensible precaution for such persons to have invested in 
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shipping in the hope of a continuing return on the initial investment. 65 
It is likely that these women, for the most part, had familial connections to maritime 
industry - thus, like their male counterparts, they had a comparative advantage in this type 
of investment. Although not recorded in the registries, these connections were probably put 
to use either by another family member on their behalf or by the women themselves, 
drawing on resources of their own to try to ensure an ongoing source of revenue and support. 
Supplementary data backs such a contention. The Swire family, for example, were well 
established as part of Liverpool's maritime business community. The best-known member 
of the clan was John Samuel, "The Senior," whose longtime connection with Ocean Steam 
Ship through his agency, Butterfield and Swire, was referred to in Chapter Two. Swire's 
father, also called John, was the son of merchant Samuel Swire of Halifax. John came to 
Liverpool in 1812 to work for a cousin who was established there as a merchant. In 1832 
John started the firm of John Swire & Sons, and had been trading on his own from 1816. 
John Swire & Sons imported goods from New York and Leghorn, as well as acting as 
loading broker for ships bound for the West Indies. His wife Maria Louisa's family also had 
impeccable maritime credentials. Maria's father, Jonathan Roose, was a general merchant 
who owned tonnage and acted as a ship's agent. Maria appeared in the 1850 register as 
owner of four shares in the 1,063 ton barque, Theodore, built the previous year in Quebec, 
Canada. Mrs. Swire was one of thirteen investors in the craft. Her sons John Samuel and his 
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younger brother William Hudson Swire owned four shares in the vessel in partnership with 
one Thomas Rogers Junior. It is very likely then that Maria Louisa Swire bought, or was 
given, these shares to ensure an independent income following John's death in 1847. With 
her strong family connections to shipowning, this method of earning a living would have 
been very familiar to Maria Louisa Swire.66 
This would have been no less the case for the female members of the Brocklebank 
family. Their business forming one of our major case studies, the Brocklebanks also provide 
direct evidence of how certain women in shipowning families were provided for by the 
ownership of vessel shares. In 1820, about the time Thomas Brocklebank moved his firm's 
headquarters to Liverpool, his widowed mother and two unmarried sisters were earning 
small incomes via shares in Irish Sea schooners and brigs. One example of these vessels was 
the schooner Evergreen, in which the Brocklebank sisters held shares. 67 
What seems clear from the registry data, as well as accounts of the shipping business 
in general, is that women (even members of such important maritime families as the 
Brocklebanks and Swires) did not play an especially influential role as part of the investor 
community, except perhaps through their roles as wives and mothers. Again, this is not 
surprising given the Victorian attitude toward the "proper" place of women in society. 
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Nonetheless, it is interesting to speculate how great a role some of these women might have 
played in the industry had they been given the chance. 68 
Whether female or male, Liverpool's investors were generally drawn from the port or its 
regional hinterland, as illustrated in Chapter Five. This situation was similar to what Palmer 
found for London and what the ACSP demonstrated in regard to Atlantic Canada. 
Throughout our study period three quarters or more ofLiverpool investors always came from 
Lancashire (including Liverpool), Cheshire and Cumberland, with significant numbers from 
northern Wales in the 1870s. It may be that regional familiarity served as its own form of 
comparative advantage when choosing to invest. Such local knowledge might act as an 
important information network when, for example, deciding on the best tonnage in which 
to invest. Being part of the local maritime community also forged valuable interpersonal and 
business connections of the type discussed by Gordon Boyce. This comparative advantage 
could mean the difference between success and failure as a shipowner. In addition, the 
resident owner had the further advantage of being physically near his home port's seaward 
activity. 
Despite this residential homogeneity, Liverpool's investor community was much 
more disparate in occupational terms. Still, particularly in the fifty years after 1820, those 
buying new vessel shares were often connected to seafaring and other maritime trades. Often 
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locals themselves, these mariners, ship chandlers, sailmakers, stevedores and others 
possessed the insider knowledge that came from being part of Liverpool's maritime 
community. As Simon Ville suggests, they may even have gravitated toward ownership to 
gain additional employment or have been paid in the form of shares.69 As investors 
Liverpool's merchant class were even more important than maritime tradesmen and 
mariners. For merchants, transporting many of their goods by sea, tonnage ownership was 
a natural corollary of their businesses. One of the great shifts in Liverpool's investor 
community occurred as merchant ownership gave way to specialization. The individual 
professional shipowner remained an important figure at Liverpool right through to 1889. 
Increasingly, however, these persons acting on their own account were superceded by the 
company form of ownership. Acting as company shareholders investors could pool resources 
as the more capital intensive steamers became the norm on British registries. 
To reiterate, in the years from 1820 to 1889 Liverpool's investor community 
underwent a number of important changes. At the start of this period a vessel, usually 
wooden sail, was typically owned by a number of individuals and partnerships from many 
walks of life, though often those with seaward connections. By 1889 more and more of 
Liverpool's new registrations, now frequently auxiliary steamers, were owned outright by 
professionals or companies. As the global economy and the business of shipping changed 
so did Liverpool's shipowning community, displaying the all important trait of adaptability 
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to shifting trends, even if such was not consciously planned. 
Having now examined these owners in terms of their choice of how to invest, 
geographic distribution and occupational groupings, our attention will tum to a specific pair 
of investors on the Liverpool registry - Brocklebanks and Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company - using these firms as case studies. They will illustrate some of the varied 
strategies employed to succeed in the business of shipowning. Both companies found a 
comparative advantage (or advantages) as seaward commercial enterprises and displayed a 
marked talent for adaptability over the course of many decades. Depending on the cargoes 
being carried, the distances sailed and the influence of factors such as local conditions, what 
gave such companies an "edge" could vary widely. In the end, however, Brocklebanks and 
PSNC were successful shipowners, adapting in various ways to the specific challenges 
generated by their chosen trades. 
Chapter 7 
Brocklebanks- Under Sail 
The subject of this chapter and that which follows was one ofthe most successful Liverpool 
shipping firms. The history of Brocklebanks can illustrate a good deal not only about 
shipowning and trade but also about a number of ancillary maritime sectors, such as 
shipbuilding. In addition, Brocklebanks are a good illustration of the tendency to find a 
comparative advantage in shipping and (hopefully) to exploit it to a firm's best advantage. 
As seen in our profiles of Liverpool investors, having an established connection to some 
maritime industry was an obvious comparative advantage, allowing an entry route into 
shipowning while providing a background knowledge (and information) base likely to 
increase one's chances of success as an owner. In fact, Brocklebank family patriarch Daniel 
was involved with vessel ownership as part of his building enterprise from the very 
beginning, although like most owners of his day, he never considered himself specifically 
a shipowner. By the second generation the Brocklebank family maintained a headquarters 
in Liverpool. Like their initial entry into shipowning, this move must have been a natural one 
given Liverpool's standing as western Britain's premier overseas port. A theme of this thesis 
has been the value, or comparative advantage, of being part of a port community. Certainly 
the integration of the family into Liverpool's commercial and social milieu could have only 
enhanced Brocklebanks' viability. 1 
Much of the material on Brocklebanks is not especially detailed on their activities as part of the wider Liverpool 
community, but certainly these ties were there. Ralph Brocklebank (1803-1892) was especially well connected 
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Once established in Liverpool Brocklebank.s soon displayed the adaptability that so 
often characterized the successful shipowning concern. 2 Once their traditional West Indian 
trades no longer appeared profitable the company shifted their emphasis toward Indian 
trading. Focussing on Calcutta, the firm established a new comparative advantage as a safe 
and reliable shipper of low-end goods like rice and jute. For many years Brocklebanks 
remained true to established traditions, long retaining sail tonnage and the merchanting side 
of their business. 
Eventually the opening of Suez and improvements in steam technology overtook the 
older methods, and Brocklebanks again displayed considerable flexibility. In time the firm 
adopted many of the new technologies and business techniques that developed in nineteenth-
century shipping, but only at their own pace and only when such adaptation seemed most 
advantageous. Over a span of more than two hundred years the company's familiar blue-and-
white livery could be seen from the Mersey to ports in India, China and throughout the 
western hemisphere. Making the most of their comparative advantages and proving 
in terms of his community and the port ofLiverpool itself A member of the Dock Committee from 1851, he was 
an early member of the new Docks and Harbour Board, founded in 1858. Brocklebank Chaired the Board from 
1863 to 1869 and had one of the city's north docks named in his honour. He retired from the Board in 1883, 
having served a quarter of a century. While on the Board Brocklebank also sat on the works, marine and 
warehouse committees. Ralph Brocklebank was active in the Mercantile Marine Service Association and 
patronized the Liverpool Seaman's Orphanage and the Sailor's Home. Michael Stammers, "Brocklebank, Ralph 
(1803-1892) Shipowner," in David J. Jeremy (ed.). Dictionary of Business Biography (6 vols., London, 1984-
1986), I, 460. Of Ralph and his cousin Thomas (Fisher) Brocklebank John Frederick Gibson writes "Both men 
were very active in the life ofLiverpool and in all its connections with maritime trade." Gibson, Brocklebanks: 
1770-1950 (2 vols., Liverpool, 1953), I, 146. 
2 
It should be reiterated here (and it perhaps cannot be stressed enough) that neither of these factors could 
guarantee that a business succeeded. 
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adaptable when necessary, the firm arguably was the greatest success story in the long 
history of Liverpool shipowning. But strangely enough they have never been the focus of a 
full-length, scholarly study. 3 
In addition to the enterprise's longevity, the family itself was directly involved, if not 
always as outright owners, for six generations. It is a truism (with some foundation) in 
business circles that family-run firms do not survive beyond the third generation. The 
founder is likely to be followed by a vigorous successor, but then the business will 
degenerate or at least be taken in vastly different directions by the third person in the line.4 
While it is easy enough to find examples to sustain this generalization, especially in the 
British context, Brocklebanks clearly avoided falling victim to this trend. Indeed, the 
company is also an excellent example of business innovation. Starting off with interests in 
3 
The two standard works on the firm- neither of which is scholarly- are Gibson, Brockle banks; and D. Hollett, 
From Cumberland to Cape Hom: The Complete History of the Sailing Fleet of Thomas & John Brocklebank 
ofWhitehaven and Liverpool- 'The World's Oldest Shipping Company (Norwich, 1984). During the company's 
existence a plethora of shorter works that discuss various aspects of the form's history have appeared. These 
include Denis H. Bates, "Liverpool Shipping Company's 167 Years ofProgress," The Liverpolitan (September 
1937), 29-30. This article, while brief, is of interest because it is written by the man who would guide the 
company for many years after 1911; see "Fully Armed," Post and Mercury, 22 February 1934. This small piece 
noted that Brocklebanks was perhaps the only shipping firm of the day to possess their own heavy ordnance, 
a pair of Vickers naval guns purchased before 1916, which stood outside the company's Liverpool office. 
"Oldest British Shipping Firm," Journal of Commerce, 16 May 1935); Dudley Reeves, "From Sail to Steam: 
Brocklebank's Part in Maritime History," Town and Country News, 15 August 1930); "The House of 
Brocklebank (1770-1927): A Century-and-a-Halfs Unbroken Record," Liverpool Daily Post, (1927), 
supplement; Clement Jones, "Origin and Development of the House of Brocklebank: The Oldest Shipping Firm 
in the Kingdom," Journal of Commerce, 25 November 1938; "Britain's Oldest Shipping Company Sailors, 
Shipbuilders and Shipowners," Sea Breezes, XI (1928), 73-74; and "The Story of the Brocklebank Line," Sea 
Breezes, XX (1935), 13-16. 
4 
On the theory of entrepreneurial transition, see Ronan Macdonald, "Schumpeter and Max Weber: Central 
Visions and Social Theories," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXIX, No. 3 (1965), 373-396. 
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building and operating vessels, they gravitated increasingly toward shipowning as the years 
progressed. Happily, perhaps because of their start outside Liverpool, the firm was not a 
direct participant in the slave trade, although they were founded during the trade's heyday 
on the Mersey. Brocklebanks took their own path to success and are one of the best cases 
for those who defend the decision to invest in steam tonnage cautiously and judiciously. 
Sticking to one of their early comparative advantages, Brocklebanks were also quite late to 
abandon their merchanting function in favour of pure shipownership. For much of their 
history the firm was noted for in the main operating tonnage to carry its own goods. The 
company also provides evidence of the growth in specialization noted by David Williams. 
In addition to their interests outside ownership in the earlier period, Brocklebanks was at 
first, and for many decades, involved in a variety of global trades: their craft ranged from the 
Mediterranean to the Baltic, to Newfoundland and the west coast of South America. From 
the 1850s, however, their attention was increasingly focussed on trade with China and India. 
The latter was more important, and particularly the port of Calcutta. In time, and as trade 
patterns evolved, the company would broaden their horizons again and then return once 
more to a concentration on the India trade (see figure 7.1 for a depiction of all routes 
inaugurated prior to 1914). The company survived war losses in the twentieth century, and 
their colours could still be seen sailing the world's oceans until the early 19 80s. 5 
s 
Stammers, "Brocklebank, Ralph (1803-1892); and David M. Williams, "The Function of the Merchant in Specific 
Liverpool Import Trades. 1820-50" (MA Thesis, University ofLiverpool, 1963), 88. 
Figure 7.1 
Brocklebank Shipping Routes Inaugurated, 1800-1914 
Sail: 1800-1901 
1) Whitehaven/Liverpool-West Indies 
2) Whitehaven/Liverpool-South America 
3) Whitehaven/Liverpool-Maritime Canada, Newfoundland 
4) Whitehaven/Liverpool-Calcutta and Dutch East Indies 
Steam: 1900-
1) 1901: Steam replaced sail on Brocklebanks' main routes to Calcutta. 
2) Antwerp-Suez Canal-Singapore-Shanghai-Japan. 1905-1914. 
3) London-Malaya-Singapore--Hong Kong-China ports-Japan. 1906-1911. 
4) Glasgow-Liverpool-India (Anchor-Brocklebank). 1911-1939. 
249 
Note: The firm was also engaged in general coasting and trade to the Baltic in 
summer. India gradually came to predominate, while the others shrank in 
importance. Later outward sailings from Britain normally went direct to 
Calcutta. Other routes included Liverpool/Birkenhead-South Africa-Calcutta, 
Continental Europe-London-Dundee-Liverpool~ and Liverpool/ Birkenhead-
Colombo-Bombay-Karachi. 
Source: Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets: Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank (London, 1994 ), 
16. 
The origins of the Brocklebank firm go back to the middle of the eighteenth century 
or perhaps even to the Reign of Queen Anne. The Reverend Daniel Brocklebank was born 
in 1705 and spent the years 1735-1757 as curate of a small parish church in the village of 
Torpenhow. For twenty- two years Rev. Brocklebank performed the parish duties in place 
of absentee vicars before finally being rewarded in 1757 with the Vicarage of Morland in 
Westmorland. During his tenure at Torpenhow his wife Sarah gave birth to two daughters 
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and two sons. The older of the boys, Ralph, played no direct role in what became the family 
business, following instead in his father's footsteps and assisting in his ministry from 1762 
to 1764. His grandson and namesake, however, went on to play an integral role in the 
Brocklebank shipping interests. The actual foundation ofthe business was left to the younger 
brother, Daniel Jr. 6 
Daniel was born in 1741. Little concrete detail survives ofhis early life, but we know 
that he became an apprentice shipbuilder in Whitehaven and that after he completed his 
indentures he became a builder in his own right. The younger Daniel was married in 1769, 
and it seems his attention was soon focussed on greener pastures. The next year he sailed to 
the American colonies in the hope of establishing himself as a shipbuilder in a locale where 
he believed the competition would be less and the opportunities greater. There is some 
disagreement as to where this yard was located, with one author giving it as New York and 
another saying it was near Sheepscott, in the part of Massachusetts that after 1820 would 
become Maine. Be that as it may, it seems that wherever the first Brocklebank yard was 
established, it produced five vessels in total. Yet by the time Brocklebank completed his 
fifth craft, a brig named Castor, the winds of revolutionary change threatened to ruin the 
young couple's hopes for a quiet life in their new home. 7 
6 
Clement Wakefield Jones, Pioneer Shipowners (2 vols., Liverpool, 193 5-1938), II, 13-14. 
7 
Ibid., II, 16-17; and W. Stewart Rees, "Brocklebanks," Liverpool Nautical Research Society Transactions, ill 
(1946-1947), 30-31. It is Rees who gave the location of Daniel's first yard as Maine. Given that he was a 
longtime member ofBrocklebanks' office staff, and spent years arranging and docketing their archival materials, 
it is likely that Rees (affectionately known as "Willie") is correct. The Castor is described by Jones as the "best" 
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This is not the place to recount the events of the American Revolution. Suffice it to 
say that in April1775 armed revolt erupted in some of Britain's colonies on the American 
seaboard following Parliament's reassertion of its right to tax the colonists without elected 
representation. To modem Americans the choice must seem simple- between loyalty to 
one's country or casting one's lot with a foreign power. In reality, however, the choice was 
more complex, especially since not all colonists defined their allegiance unambiguously. 
Indeed, the Revolution was much like a civil war and, although there are wide variations in 
the estimates, it may be that as many colonists in the end defined their allegiance with 
reference to the King in Britain (Loyalists) as pledged allegiance to the new nation 
(Patriots). 8 While we do not know Brocklebank's precise thoughts on the issue, it is clear 
which side he chose- the King and England. This was quite understandable for a man who 
had only left his native soil five years earlier. Taking command of the Castor, Brocklebank 
gathered a crew of like-minded colonists and prepared to return to the homeland. 9 A 
of the vessels built in America by Brocklebank. It was 220 tons and mounted twenty guns. 
8 
John Adams, the revolutionary leader who became the second president of the United States claimed in old age 
that one-third of the colonists became patriots, one-third Loyalists, and the other third "did not give a damn." 
For a more complete discussion, see John E. Hill, Revolutionary Values for a New Millennium: John Adams, 
Adam Smith, and Social Virtue (Lanham, MD, 2000). 
9 
Jones, Pioneer Shipowners, IT, 15; and Rees, "Brocklebanks," 30. On the subject ofloyalists. see Bernard Bailyn, 
The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992); and G. N.D. Evans 
(ed.), Allegiance in America: The Case of the Loyalists (Reading, MA, 1969). Sources on the American 
Revolution are legion. A concise popular overview is Daniel Marston, The American Revolution 1774-1783 
(New York, 2003). An interesting take on the revolution is Kevin Phillips, The Cousins Wars: Religion, Politics 
& The Triumph of Anglo-America (New York, 1999). Phillips sees the revolution as part of a continuum of 
Anglo-political dissent and conflict stretching back into the English Civil War through the War oflndependence 
that culminated in America's own North-South conflict in 1861-1865. Through such internecine struggles grew 
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contemporary account indicates that there was some haste involved in their departure; 
indeed, Daniel and his crew had managed to load on the Castor: 
... only one barrel of beef and some bread. Provisions could not be purchased 
there [America], he therefore gave his seamen the choice of running for 
Nova Scotia or the Banks ofN ewfoundland, to try whether they could secure 
a sufficiency of fish to support them on their passage to Europe ... They chose 
the latter and in a few hours caught an amazing great quantity [of fish]. They 
had some salt but not enough to preserve the fish they had taken, this 
deficiency they however soon supplied, by scraping up the salt which had 
been laid between the timbers (a custom used for preserving ships) wherever 
they could get it, and by these means ... cured a quantity which served them 
plentifully on the passage ... After twenty days sail, they were in St. George's 
Channel, and on the 1 rh from that, came safe into Whitehaven ... 10 
The Whitehaven to which Daniel Brocklebank returned was thriving due to the 
success of the Lowther family's collieries in the area. In the Tudor period Whitehaven had 
been little more than an insignificant village, but by the 1770s it had been completely 
transformed. Indeed, as early as mid-century the town had already grown to some eleven 
thousand inhabitants. From being home to only a few fishers in earlier centuries, 
contemporary Whitehaven could boast 260 registered vessels of about 30,000 tons burthen. 
Thirty of these bottoms were employed in the foreign trades, with the rest used for the 
carriage of coal." The demand for shipping to carry the area's coal to market made 
modem Anglo-American culture that came to dominate the world from the British Empire to the United States' 
current predominance. 
10 
Cumberland Pacquet, 15 June 1775, as quoted in Rees, "Brocklebanks," 30. 
11 
Jones, Pioneer Shipowners, II, 16. For information on the Lowther family, Cumberland and the coal industry 
in general, see J.V. Beckett, Coal and Tobacco: The Lowthers and the Economic Development of West 
Cumberland, 1660-1760 (Cambridge, 1981); J.D. Marshall andJohnK. Walton, The Lake Counties from 1830 
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Whitehaven a logical place of residence for a man who had been trained as a shipbuilder. 
Not many years into his chosen trade, Daniel had already learned the lesson of comparative 
advantage well. 
But first there was a war to be fought, and Brocklebank's adopted home did not 
escape its effects. In 1777 the expatriate mariner John Paul Jones crossed the Atlantic in the 
twenty-six-gun Ranger in the service of the American rebels. After refitting at Brest, Jones 
landed at Whitehaven on 23 April 1778, intending to destroy the port, its shipping and its 
shipyards. The raid was not apparently motivated by any malice against the town, but simply 
by Jones' familiarity with the port. It was from Whitehaven that he had sailed to Virginia 
at age thirteen. Jones landed with two boat crews, one of which promptly sought out a local 
pub and got drunk. The raid may have been quite serious had not Jones been betrayed by an 
Irish crewman who warned the locals. Ranger's crew accomplished no more than burning 
three vessels, including the collier Thompson, and spiking the guns in a dilapidated fort 
before they were driven off Damage estimates ran from between £250-£1,250. 12 Daniel 
Brocklebank was not one to remain inured to such provocations and the next year was 
to the Mid-Twentieth Century (Manchester, 1981); and B.R. Mitchell, Economic Development of the British 
Coal Industry 1800-1914 (Cambridge, 1984). 
12 
Samuel Eliot Morison, John Paul Jones: A Sailor's Biography (Boston, 1959; reprint, Annapolis, MD, 1989), 
139-142; James C. Bradford, "John Paul Jones and Guerre de Razzia," The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du 
nord, XIII, No. 4 (October 2003), 6; and David Howarth, British Sea Power. How Britain became Sovereign 
of the Seas (London: 2003), 308-310. The main effect of Jones' raid was psychological- English soil had not 
been directly attacked since the Dutch burned Shemess in 1667 and people feared the Royal Navy could not keep 
them safe. 
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granted a Letter of Marque by King George III for the Castor. 13 Brocklebank commanded 
this newly-minted privateer, which was armed with twenty-six guns and carried a crew of 
forty-five. Captain Brocklebank sank an enemy vessel on 9 March 1779 and recaptured a 
London privateer only recently taken by the Americans. 14 
These activities, while of interest, were not Brocklebank's main occupation and 
involved him for only a few years before he again was able to devote all his energies to 
ensuring the success of his shipyard. Still, during the period of hostilities the mariner had 
two vessels built on his behalf The first was the 300-ton Pollux, built in 1780 and 
subsequently renamed Precedent. In 1782 the 342-ton Castor II was constructed at 
Whitehaven to replace the original Castor, which had been wrecked in the West Indies the 
previous year. In 1784 this became the first Brocklebank vessel to be advertized as available 
for charter. It was not long before Brocklebanks' shipping business returned to the old 
haunts where Daniel had some experience. A week after being advertized, Castor II 
13 
National Museums Liverpool (NML ), Merseyside Maritime Museum (MMM), Maritime Archives and Library 
(MAL), B/BROC, Operational, Letter of Marque to Daniel Brocklebank for Privateering against Spain in Ship 
Castor, 1779. 
14 
Jones, Pioneer Shipowners, IT, 17; and Rees, "Brocklebanks," 31. Privateering was a common way for 
governments to supplement their naval forces up to the end of the Napoleonic wars. Letters of Marque gave 
warships that were privately fitted-out the right to attack and capture. or sink. enemy vessels. The loot taken 
and the vessel were granted to the privateer's crew (and owners) as their reward, with a portion also going to 
the Crown. Tradition has it that privateering led Brocklebanks to fly their houseflags from the foremasts, as the 
main was originally needed for the letters-of-marque flags. John Clarkson and Roy Fenton, Ships in Focus: 
Anchor and Brocklebank Lines (Longton, Preston, 1994), 3 5. It does not appear that Daniel Brocklebank made 
any significant gains as a result of his privateering ventures, but in some cases money earned by privateering 
could aid in establishing other businesses. See Lindley S. Butler, Pirates, Privateers, and Rebel Raiders of the 
Carolina Coast (London, 2000). 
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commenced a voyage to North America, while the Precedent was on a run to Florida. The 
company acquired interests in a number of other vessels during this period, making runs to 
the Carolinas for tobacco and to other American ports for timber. From the end of the 
Revolutionary War to the outbreak of hostilities with Republican France, the small fleet 
traded not only to British North America but also to the Baltic, Ireland and the Carribean. 15 
Brocklebank continued to operate his vessels as cargo carriers for a number of years 
following the return of peace, but he was soon back ashore and building vessels in earnest. 
In 1788 a new Brocklebank yard was established in Whitehaven which produced the first of 
twenty-five craft under his supervision- the 155-ton brig Perseverance. The business soon 
became an important industry in Whitehaven, with its vessels growing both in size and 
quantity. A third and fourth Castor were produced at the yard. Brocklebank's oldest son, 
Daniel Jr., became master of the Castor IV when he was only nineteen years-old. To 
supplement this business Brocklebank purchased the Bransty Ropery in 1794 so the firm 
could make rope for their own vessels. 16 
15 
Brocklebank's original Castor was a wartime loss. The privateer was being pursued by another private ship of 
war off Jamaica when a fault in the wood caused her foremast to break. The Castor was then driven onto the 
rocks and completely wrecked. John Frederick Gibson, "The House of Brocklebank (1 )," Sea Breezes, XVII 
(1954), 31. 
16 
Jones, Pioneer Shipowners, II, 17-18; Rees, "Brocklebanks," 31-32; and Gibson, "House of Brocklebank (1 )," 
31-32. This period also encompassed the start of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Ships generally 
sailed in convoy, but a number of Brocklebank bottoms were captured. The 233-ton Nestor was captured by a 
French frigate off Cape St. Vincent- much better known as the scene ofBritish naval success. The small brig 
Ceres was taken by a privateer while coasting between Whitehaven and Hull. This trend continued in the early 
years of the second-generation owners. The 204-ton brig Ariel was taken in the English Channel by a French 
privateer in 1807. 
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Even in these early years, when the firm's focus was more on the shipbuilding yard, 
their trade connections and fleet were already growing. Given his experience in the former 
colonies, the re-opening of the American trades after the ratification of Jay's Treaty in 1794 
was certainly to his advantage. 17 Because shipping in that period was depended entirely on 
the vagaries of wind and tide, few vessels operated on a single route or depended exclusively 
on only one cargo. Brocklebank's vessels generally carried coal and iron outward, returning 
to Whitehaven in the main with West Indian products and timber for the yard. 18 The fleet 
then consisted of the Castor, Scipio, Jupiter, Hero, Jrton, Cyrus, Zebulon and Nestor (see 
Appendix 6A). Brocklebank's tonnage was also engaged by Scotland's Carron Company to 
transport canon to Catherine the Great's forces in St. Petersburg, returning with tar and 
hemp. 19 
17 
Jay's treaty was signed in the context of increasing hostility between Britain and the newly-independent United 
States. The treaty temporarily resolved a number of disputes, guaranteeing that the British would give up control 
of certain western posts retained in contravention of the Treaty of Paris (1783). It also allowed American claims 
for damages resulting from British vessel seizures and permitted a limited American trade with the West Indies. 
On the other hand, Britain did not concede the right of neutral nations to trade freely with the belligerents in their 
war with France. The treaty, concluded between American statesman and Chief Justice John Jay (17 45-1829), 
and Lord Grenville (1759-1834), was generally favourable to the US. Still, opponents perceived it as a betrayal 
offormer ally France, and the document angered the revolutionary French authorities, leading indirectly to the 
Franco-American "Quasi-War" of 1798 to 1800. Magnus Magnusson ( ed.), Chambers Biographical Dictionary 
(Edinburgh, 1990), 627 and 776; and Nathan Miller, Broadsides. The Age of Fighting Sail, 1775-1815 (Edison, 
NJ, 2005), 185-187. On the role of Jay's Treaty set in the context of Anglo-American commercial relations after 
the Revolution see Charles R. Ritcheseon, Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy toward the United States, 
1783-1795 (Dallas, 1969). 
18 
The main imports from the West Indies in Brocklebanks' ships in this period were Jamaican sugar and rum, 
cottons, port and sherry. 
19 
Gibson, "House of Brocklebank (1 )," 34. 
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Considering the company's later success, it is ironic that Daniel never intended to 
become an important shipowner. Most of the craft built at the Whitehaven yard were put up 
for sale or charter even before they were launched. Local merchants and mariners also 
placed a number of orders. If we take the years 1775, 1785 and 1795 as examples, the 
average age of vessels in Daniel's fleet was only three years. Still, by 1795 the business 
owned, at least in part, twelve vessels. The following year all but three were sold, and the 
founder continued disposing of most of his tonnage until he retired in 1800, although he 
continued to hold a few shares in some of the vessels. 20 
Daniel passed away at Whitehaven in March 1801 at the age of sixty, but not before 
he was predeceased by his eldest son. Twenty-five-year-old Daniel Jr. had been commanding 
the 314-ton ship Alfred as part of a convoy to Jamaica in 1798 when he contracted yellow 
fever and died, leaving no descendants. As a result, when Daniel Sr. died the business, until 
then known as Daniel Brocklebank, was left to two of his younger sons, Thomas, aged 
twenty-seven and Jonathan, who was twenty-one. The business then became known as Thos. 
& J no. Brocklebank, a name that endured in shipping for over 180 years (Appendix 6B gives 
particulars of all vessels owned by Thos. & J no. Brocklebank from 180 1 until 1914, the 
latter year marking the end of this study).21 
20 
Ibid; and NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Historical Notes, Brocklebank Fleet. 
21 
Jones, Pioneer Shipowners, II, 18; Rees, "Brocklebanks," 32; and Gibson, "House of Brocklebank (1 )," 34. 
Source: 
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Graph 7.1 
Average Age of Vessels in Brocklebank Fleet, 1805-1905 
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Brocklebank Fleet. 
Thomas and Jonathan took charge of the shipbuilding yard while their cousin, John, 
the son of their uncle, Rev. Ralph Brocklebank, assumed responsibility for the ropery. The 
siblings divided their responsibilities, with Thomas remaining in Whitehaven for the most 
part and shaping general policy while John visited other British ports to supervise the 
loading and unloading of their vessels. According to at least one author, the transfer of 
power was in more than name only: whereas Daniel Sr. had run his concern more from the 
standpoint of a mariner, both brothers were pure businessmen. This new approach would be 
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reflected through the remainder of the firm's existence.22 
When it was profitable to do so, Thomas decided that tonnage should be sold while 
still on the stocks. In 1805, only four years after the brothers had assumed control of the 
firm, the average age of vessels in the fleet was only two years, the lowest in the company's 
existence (see Graph 7.1). When tonnage could not be sold profitably in this way, 
Brocklebanks vessels were employed as traders to pay for themselves until a buyer could be 
found. 23 At the time Thomas and Jonathan took control of the yard, their tonnage was quoted 
at just over £10 per ton, but by 1803 the 264-ton King George was sold at Liverpool for 
£4,000, or about £16 per ton. Under the brothers' guidance the firm quickly expanded, and 
many craft were produced. In fact, from 1807 until the yard closed in 1865, 116 vessels were 
produced, amounting to some 34,388 tons of shipping (see Appendix Seven). In some cases, 
such as the first vessel built after the brothers assumed control of the yard, the General 
Hunter, the firm sold most of the shares but retained a few, in this case 8/64ths. Because of 
the company's dual role as shipowners and merchants (a role that was maintained for most 
of the nineteenth century), many vessels only partially owned by the firm were used to carry 
Brocklebanks cargoes. These were integrated into the Brocklebanks fleet and operated 
22 
Rees, "Brocklebanks," 32-33; and David E. Stillwell, "Brocklebanks: The Final Century," Sea Breezes, LVIII 
(1984), 115. 
23 
In this way the Brocklebanks were very much like builders in British North America in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. The region that specialized most obviously in building vessels on speculation, but operating 
the craft if no buyer could be found, was Prince Edward Island. See Lewis R. Fischer, "The Port of Prince 
Edward Island, 1840-1889: A Preliminary Analysis," in Keith Matthews and Gerald Panting ( eds. ), Ships and 
Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region (St. John's, NL, 1977), 19-40. 
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according to an agreed cost formula that normally took the form of expenses, insurance and 
depreciation, along with a percentage for the vessel owner. Voyage profits would then be 
apportioned according to the number of shares held by each party. As merchants, the 
Brocklebanks fixed cargoes on these terms and arranged homeward freights, the latter 
function being most important for a vessel's substantive owner. Without such arrangements 
captains might have to wait for prolonged periods in foreign ports before finding paying 
cargoes for their return voyage. 24 
Whitehaven had become prosperous in the sugar and rum trades, and Brocklebank's 
own 264- ton ship King George was put on the run to Demerara for sugar after a period 
trading in the Baltic. By 1805 the nucleus of the company's fleet was already in place. 
Although amounting to just 682 tons in aggregate, the Experiment, Beaver, Queen Charlotte 
and Hercules were the forerunners of a large array of successors. By the cessation of 
hostilities with France in 1815 the number of vessels owned, at least in part, by the company 
stood at thirteen, amounting to more than 3,000 tons. In 1820 the firm owned ten vessels 
outright, valued at a total of £38,000. Brocklebanks were also part owners of another six 
24 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Brocklebank Fleet; Vessels Built by T. & J. Brocklebank, 1807 to 1865; and 
Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets: Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank (London, 1994), 18-19 and 32. During the French 
Revolutionary Wars some Brocklebank vessels were armed with cannon, leading to the introduction of a broad 
white stripe around the hull. Even when cannon were not mounted, it was hoped the stripe would lead enemy 
vessels to confuse Brocklebanks craft with Royal Navy warships, or those of the equally well armed East India 
Company. In addition to craft part-owned by Brocklebanks, others which they did not own at all are generally 
counted as part of their fleet, as they were used mainly for Brocklebank trading. The Superior is a good example. 
Built at the Whitehaven yard in 1825, the 240 gross ton brig was sold to the Bouch family. Despite the sale, she 
was frequently employed by Brocklebanks and traded to India and Singapore on their behalf from 1829. It was 
this vessel which made the first Brocklebanks voyage to the Far East. Haws, Brocklebank, 29. 
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vessels, and together this fleet of sixteen craft comprised nearly 4,000 tons of shipping, at 
an average size of257 tons.25 
The Brocklebank yard provided the family with an entry into shipowning and their 
grounding in maritime affairs. In this sense it certainly formed part of their comparative 
advantage (not to mention the fact that they built their own vessels for many years). On the 
other hand, it must be acknowledged that the shipyard was not alway a source of blessings. 
Brocklebanks was a fair employer but, like their competitors, such as Kelsik Wood and Sons 
in Maryport, the yard suffered from labour unrest in the 1820s. According to a contemporary 
account: 
25 
[F]or some time past the workmen in the employ of Messrs. Brocklebank, 
builders, as well as others and even the boys, have exhibited strong 
symptoms of a refractory spirit.. .. It appears that on Tuesday the 18th, [of 
October, 1825] the apprentices seized two men who did not belong to the 
"Union," and mounting them upon poles successively paraded them through 
the streets .... [T]hey were met at the foot of Duke Street, by Mr. [John] 
Brocklebank who endeavoured to prevail upon them to liberate the men, but 
in vain. A scuffle ensued. Mr. Brocklebank pressed in among them and was 
either knocked or thrown down by one of his own apprentices, and he did not 
arise again without soiled apparel and a bloody face. Justly incensed, Mr. 
Brocklebank proceeded to his yard and dismissed every man and boy 
employed in it and shut it up. Several of the apprentices were taken into 
custody but were afterwards liberated on bail. They have since had an 
interview with Mr. Brocklebank and on Monday morning last the Yard was 
Great Britain, Board of Trade (BT) 107, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1820; Gibson, "House ofBrocklebank 
(1)," 34-36 and 50-54; and Stillwell, "Brocklebanks," 129-133. The company also did some coastal trading in 
this period. The Experiment, an eighty-nine-ton topsail schooner, made coasting runs between Chepstow and 
Ireland from about 1804 untill807. The brig Beaver was captained by a cousin, Ralph Brocklebank. To remain 
close to his family Captain Ralph traded mainly in home waters, especially on runs from Liverpool to Drogheda 
and Waterford. Haws, Brocklebank, 19-20. 
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again opened and several, both men and boys, were admitted to work. 26 
John Brocklebank died in 1831 after being thrown from his horse at the relatively 
young age of fifty-one. Management of the yard passed to a cousin, Daniel Bird, and then 
to another relative, Joseph Henry Robinson, following Bird's death in 1845. Despite these 
setbacks, the Brocklebank connection with shipbuilding and Whitehaven was to last more 
than another three decades. In the interim Thomas had moved to Liverpool in 1819, and in 
1820 opened an office there under the name Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank, beginning the close 
connection between Brocklebanks and the Mersey. Nonetheless, the Whitehaven business 
continued to prosper. Ships were still built in Cumberland, registered in Liverpool and sailed 
from the Mersey. The yard produced its first paddle steamer, the Countess of Lonsdale, in 
1827 for the Whitehaven Steam Navigation Company. Ironically, Brocklebanks' shipping 
arm did not itself employ steamers until the 1890s. Nevertheless, this provides proof that 
Brocklebanks' late switch to steam was motivated not by hidebound conservatism but rather 
by what the firm judged to be a realistic assessment of what was needed to service the 
required trade routes. Both brothers were, in fact, shareholders in Whitehaven Steam 
Navigation and supported the use of steam in the coasting trade. Another milestone was 
reached on 15 October 1852 when Brocklebank's yard launched the 852-ton Martaban in 
front of a crowd of5,000 onlookers. In terms of both tonnage and length-to-beam ratio, the 
26 
Gore 's Liverpool Advertiser, 20 October 1825. 
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vessel was the largest produced to that time by any Whitehaven builder. 27 
A portion of the correspondence between the Liverpool office and the Whitehaven 
yard has survived, especially concerning the latter years ofthe latter's operations. The letters 
tell us about a number of important factors relating to the business. It is clear throughout that 
although the shipyard was the more senior of the Brocklebank interests, by mid-nineteenth 
century operations were clearly directed from Liverpool. Indeed, this was likely true much 
earlier, perhaps from the time that Thomas, the elder brother, first relocated to the city.28 
Certainly the Liverpool operation would have predominated after John's death in 1831. It 
seems even to have outlived Thomas' own death in 1845. From this point on Liverpool was 
clearly the hub of the Brocklebank enterprise, a position it held for decades. Most of the 
letters outward to Whitehaven were in fact in the form of directives. While there is certainly 
27 
NML, :MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Vessels Built by T. & J. Brocklebank; Rees, "Brocklebanks," 34-37; Stillwell, 
"Brocklebanks: The Final Century," 115; and Gibson, "House ofBrocklebank," 38. 
28 
The move to Liverpool was referred to in the chapter introduction. Neither of the Brocklebank siblings published 
memoirs, and later writers have been rather vague on why Thomas left Whitehaven for Liverpool. The 
advantages of this seem obvious, however. Already involved in West Indies trading, relocating to one ofBritain' s 
major overseas trading centres was entirely logical for the Brocklebanks. That Liverpool had its own extensive 
links to the West Indies was a plus in itself Certainly the family was much better positioned to exploit the 
Calcutta trade as residents of this world commercial entrep6t, with the many connections this entailed, then they 
were at Whitehaven (the move may likewise have related to the firm's entry into the Newfoundland trade. See 
below). A good statement of the comparative advantage derived from residence in Liverpool is given by Sheila 
Marriner and Francis Hyde. They state that: 
By the first decades of the nineteenth century [Liverpool], with its complexity of merchanting, 
banking, insurance and ship-broking services, had become a magnet for the aspirations of 
many a young man seeking his fortune in the rapidly expanding commercial and shipping 
enterprises on the Mersey ... [T]he Brocklebanks came from Whitehaven, the Ismays from 
Maryport, the Inmans from Silverdale, the Harrison brothers from Garstang and the Holts 
from Rochdale. The list is a formidable one in the history of Britain's mercantile marine ... 
Marriner and Hyde, The Senior: John Samuel Swire, 1825-98. (Liverpool, 1967), 10-11. 
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a collegial air about the letters, no one reading them could doubt who ran the show. 
This is not the only important point, however. A number of the letters indicate 
Brocklebanks' own requirements for tonnage. For all of their long existence, Brocklebanks 
were engaged primarily in middle- or long-distance trades, as opposed to coasting or short-
sea trading. For the trades in which the company was involved, the obvious rig of choice 
would have been ship or barque - in other words, fairly large vessels. On 20 August 1861 
the Liverpool office informed Whitehaven that "a ship of 650 tons is too small for us for any 
purpose and it would be well if you could sell the same you have on hand with out loss."29 
The company might also be included in a list of Liverpool's "conservative" firms for their 
supposed failure to adopt new technology. In the case of at least one piece of innovation, 
Brocklebanks clarify the practical reasons why not all technological developments were 
suitable for specific trades or specific owners. 
In 1863 the Liverpool office wrote that the Whitehaven yard could "in the 600 ton 
ship have patent-reefing topsails but not in the two large ships. In the China trade we may 
be afraid of the cost; in the Calcutta trade with steam aid down channel and up the Hoogly 
topsails are rarely reefed. "30 Later that year the office reiterated its objections to reefing gear. 
"The yards [of the vessel Everest] are disfigured by the reefing apparatus. We will have no 
more of this for experience leads three out of five masters to condemn it. .. [I]t has been found 
29 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Administration, Business Letters, 20 August 1861. 
30 
Ibid., 3 March 1863. 
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a nuisance.'m 
Some of the business relationships engendered by the trades were also reflected in 
the correspondence. In 1863, for example, Brocklebank:s contracted for a cargo of wood to 
be shipped in the vessel Bernice. The material was supplied by the firms of William Jones 
& Son and Duncan Ewing & Company. Two types of wood were contracted - green heart 
and mora- at a cost to Brocklebanks of£8 and £7/5/0 per load (Queen's caliper measure), 
respectively. Interestingly, the risks incurred during the voyage were assumed by the 
suppliers rather than by Brocklebanks. The clause was inserted that the "contract [was] void 
if cargo lost on the homeward voyage. "32 
Of course, Brocklebanks were only one of many builders dependent on a steady and 
reliable supply of wood for their operations, and it appears that a "tit-for-tat" relationship 
existed in which firms helped competitors overcome short-term difficulties in return for their 
good will. On 14 August 1863 the Liverpool office informed Whitehaven that "one from 
31 
Ibid., 13 November 1863. The Everest was ship-rigged, of wooden construction and 571 gross tons. She was 
a speedy craft and clipper hulled. Employed by Brocklebanks in the Hong Kong and Shanghai trades, Everest 
competed with another nineteen vessels in the 1868 "Tea Race," of which she was the only vessel bound for 
Liverpool, all the others having a terminus in London. The ship arrived in Liverpool on 17 October and was 
seventh of the twenty. The vessel sailed for a decade before being stranded and eventually lost on the North 
Danger Reef in the China Sea. Haws, Brack/ebanks, 47. The business correspondence indicates that the 
Liverpool office approved of the vessel's appearance, even when it was compromised by practical concerns. 
They wrote that " ... the Everest entered the [Mersey] river last night about 9 o'clock and the Princes Dock this 
morning. In the Dock we have been able to see her partially. We admire her bow and think it the better of having 
a diminished flange. The after end could only be partially seen. The waterlines are faultless, but could the vessel 
have been narrower across the transome ... there might have been a more sightly view to the eye at the expense 
probably of comfort in the cabins and on the quarter deck." 
32 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Legal, "Contract per Bernice," 23 October 1863. 
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Harland & Wolff applied here today for teak but as we had not heard from you could only 
tell him he might have the logs he marked provided you could spare them. Supposing to part 
with the logs be not injurious to you, we wish Harland to have them .. :m 
The type of relationship alluded to in this letter fits well with the forms of 
information networks and the value of established reputations for integrity discussed by 
Gordon Boyce and Graeme Milne. They further illustrate the importance of such linkages 
in helping to create the comparative advantage possessed by a port's resident marine 
entrepreneurs. Reserving some of its wood stocks for Harland and Wolffs use was a good 
way to ensure the goodwill and co-operation of a competitor. 34 
It was wood, or the shift away from it, that in the end spelled the end of 
Brocklebanks' ninety-year connection with shipbuilding. In the 1860s sail still dominated 
the British registry, especially in the long-distance trades. More and more, however, iron was 
replacing wood as the material of choice for new construction. There would have been no 
comparative disadvantage to the Whitehaven yard - located in Britain - in making the 
33 
NGL, MMM, MAL, BIB ROC, Administration, Business Letters, 14 August 1863. The relationship with Harland 
& Wolff was oflong duration. From 1863, when they first employed iron tonnage, to the outbreak of the Great 
War, Brocklebanks bought almost all their vessels from Harland & Wolff. In the years 1820-1865 all but three 
ofBrocklebanks' vessels were produced at their Whitehaven yard. One of these, the 482-ton ship Mindanao, 
was built by Richard Williamson & Son of Harrington in 1854. The other two were the first pair of iron vessels 
ordered from Harland & Wolff. NML, MMM:, MAL, B/BROC, Brocklebank Fleet, 1775-1945; Vessels Built 
by T. & J. Brocklebank; BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; Jones, Pioneer Shipowners, 
IT, 23; Gibson, "House of Brocklebank (1 )," 50-54; Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets: Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank 
(Uckfield, East Sussex, 1994); and Stillwell, "Brocklebanks," 129-133. 
34 
In this case, with the two businesses based in Liverpool and Belfast, these links also suggest - if they do not 
prove- the efficacy of building networks across a broader geographic area than a single port. 
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switch from wood to iron. This was in contrast to Atlantic Canadian builders of the period, 
whose competitive edge came partly from plentiful regional sources of softwood timber. 
There is some question as to why these producers did not make the switch, but it is clear that 
for Canadian builders transferring to iron would have made little economic sense. The same 
problem does not appear to have been the case for Brocklebank:s in Whitehaven. At this 
same time, however, problems arose with the renewal of their lease, and the firm decided 
to make the best of the situation and transfer their attention even more fully to owning and 
operating tonnage. It is in this capacity that we are most interested in the company and their 
activities. 35 
By 1820, when Brocklebanks established themselves in Liverpool, they were engaged 
in seven distinct trades, taking their vessels to all regions of the globe (see figure 7.2). In the 
years between Daniel Sr.'s death in 1801 and 1820, the name Brocklebanks was already 
becoming well established as a shipping firm. A central feature of the company at this time, 
which would continue for decades, was a fusion of the functions of builder, merchant and 
shipowner. In fact, Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank was noted for many years for operating vessels 
to carry mainly, though not exclusively, their own goods. Their early shipping business was 
based around a number of American and West Indian commodities, especially tobacco and 
to a lesser extent sugar. Most of the early ships built and retained by the firm ran between 
the West Indies, the US and Whitehaven. Being based in Whitehaven at the time, it was a 
35 
Rees, "Brocklebanks," 37. 
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natural decision for the brothers to engage in the tobacco trade since the town, along with 
Bristol and London, was one of only three British ports where the commodity could be 
legally landed. 36 At the same time Brocklebank craft were also trading to Russia, British 
North America, Newfoundland and South America. In fact, the connections with most of 
these locales would be maintained for many years. However, patterns oftrade were changing 
and Brocklebanks, with their usual acumen, changed along with them. 37 
Figure 7.2 
Brocklebank Trades and Vessels Employed, 1820 
For India 
Princess Charlotte 
Perseverance 
London 
For Cape Horn and Chile 
Ariel III 
Crown 
For Brazil and Argentina 
Cossack 
Prince Leopold 
Caroline 
Westmorland 
Duke ofWellington 
For West Indies 
William 
Aimwell 
Dryad 
Balfour 
For Newfoundland 
Mary 
Hercules 
Trading in West Indies 
West Indian 
Coastal 
Mary II 
Source: JohnFrederickGibson,Brocklebanks 1770-1950(2 vols.,Liverpool, 1953),1, 66-67. 
36 
Nancy Eaglesham, Whitehaven and the Tobacco Trade (Whitehaven, 1979). 
37 
Jones, Pioneer Shipowners, IT, 19. 
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By the latter years of the Napoleonic wars costs had begun to rise in the Atlantic 
trades. Mates and carpenters were then paid about £4 and seamen fifty shillings per month, 
which translated into a wage bill for a standard size crew of about £500 for a six-month 
voyage, which was approximately the length of time needed for voyages to the West Indies 
and the United States. Profits from a single such voyage had ranged from £400 to £700 in 
1813. A trip to the Baltic would earn about £250. Three years later, however, a voyage to 
Bahia was likely to earn only £145. For Brocklebanks the margins in these trades were 
always fairly small. Prior to 1813 they seldom earned enough to re-invest in larger vessels 
or to diversify their trades. This changed in 1816 when the firm dispatched the ship-rigged 
Princes Charlotte- specially built for the purpose- to India. Given the importance of this 
trade to the company it must be discussed in some detail. First, however, it would be useful 
to examine at least one of Brocklebanks' other contemporary trades in some detail. 38 
A long-standing Brocklebanks trade was to Newfoundland, the world's tenth largest 
island, and traditionally considered "Britain's oldest colony."39 First reached by Europeans 
in 1497, the seemingly barren island held a rich resource offshore - bountiful fishing 
grounds teeming with Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua). While initial English attempts at 
38 
Gibson, Brocklebanks, I, 56-57 and 60. 
39 
The classic work on Newfoundland's history remains D.W. Prowse, A History of Newfoundland (London, 
1895). A recent overview of the early period of European settlement in Newfoundland is Patrick O'Flaherty, 
Old Newfoundland: A History to 1843 (St. John's, NL, 1999). See also O'Flaherty, Lost Country: the Rise and 
Fall of Newfoundland, 1843-1933 (St. John's, NL, 2005); and Kevin Major, As Near to Heaven by Sea: A 
History of Newfoundland and Labrador (Toronto, 2001 ). 
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commercial settlements failed, a permanent resident population began slowly to take shape; 
by the end ofthe American Revolution there were several thousand "Newfoundlanders." By 
this time, British interest in the cod fishery was well established. 40 
This interest in the Newfoundland fishery may have been one of the factors that led 
to the general expansion ofEnglish shipping. Merchants from ports in Devon, Cornwall and 
Dorset from the early 1600s until the English Civil War fitted out an increasing number of 
fishing vessels for the Newfoundland Banks. According to Ralph Davis, "[t]he experience 
of ocean voyaging to Newfoundland, in which so many seamen were trained, must have 
been invaluable to [Sir Richard] Hawkins and others in Devon who developed larger ideas 
of trade and privateering on the African coast and in the Caribbean.41 Vessels large and 
small transported the precious cargo hauled from the sea to Spain, Portugal and the 
Mediterranean. The importance of the Newfoundland fishery to England was such that 
contemporary Sir William Monson was inspired to write that "[t]rue it is that there is no 
commodity in the world of so great bulk and small value, or that can set so many ships of 
burden to work. As for example: a mean merchant may freight his ship of250 tons with fish 
that will not cost above £1,600, that forty merchants cannot do of richer and better 
40 
On the discovery of Newfoundland by John Cabot, see Peter E. Pope, The Many Landfalls of John Cabot 
(Toronto, 1997). A concise overview of the early European cod fisheries is found in Mark Kurlansky, Cod. A 
Biography of the Fish that Changed the World (Toronto, 1997). 
41 
Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. (London, 
1962), 4. 
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commodities. "42 
Although seldom mentioned in the context of the early Newfoundland trades - at 
least by most Newfoundland historians - the port of Liverpool also had long-standing 
connections to the island. The basis for the early linkage was the salt trade. Salt 
manufacturing was recorded in Liverpool as early as the seventeenth century when Thomas 
Johnson and John Blackburne produced rock salt. Indeed, Liverpool's second wet dock, 
Salthouse, was associated with Blackbume's refinery which opened in 1753. Salt boilers in 
Cheshire were also active in this period, with their product being exported via the River 
Mersey. By 1770 about 48,000 tons of salt were shipped from the Mersey alone. According 
to a seventeenth-century writer, salt was the most important contributor to the early 
development of Liverpool as a port. In addition to its usefulness as ship ballast, salt was an 
essential element in the Newfoundland cod fisheries. In those days before refrigeration cod 
had to be cured with salt for preservation. The salt fish was then sold or bartered for sugar, 
coffee, wine or fruit in the West Indies or the Mediterranean. By the early nineteenth 
century, when companies like Brocklebanks began to take an interest in trade with the 
island, there was already a firm connection with Britain that had persisted for 200 years. As 
Britain's oldest colony, Newfoundland must have seemed a natural place for merchants and 
42 
Ibid., as quoted from M. Oppenheim (ed.), The Naval Works of Sir William Monson (2 vols., London, 1913), 
II, 235. 
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shippers to establish trading relations, and Brocklebanks did not see things differently.43 
As will be recalled, Daniel Brocklebank had fished off Newfoundland after he fled 
revolutionary America, but it was his sons who developed a firm commercial connection to 
the island. The brothers began sending their vessels to Newfoundland about the time of the 
company's move to Liverpool in 1818-1819. We must view this connection in terms of the 
comparative advantages Thomas garnered by moving his headquarters to Liverpool. We 
have noted Liverpool's links to Newfoundland through the export of salt for 
Newfoundland's fisheries. To a merchant/shipowner establishing himself in Liverpool 
during the 1820s the Newfoundland trade, based on a readily available local export, must 
have appeared as a golden opportunity. Conversely, it is reasonable to think that Thomas 
held prior ambitions of trading to Newfoundland. The comparative advantages offered by 
local salt production may itself have provided the initial impetus for the move to Liverpool. 
Thomas might certainly have considered salt as a potential export cargo, although surviving 
evidence indicates that salt was ultimately not the bedrock upon which Brocklebanks built 
up its Newfoundland export trade.44 
In the traditional Newfoundland context salt was, as noted, intimately tied to 
43 
Francis Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey: The Development of a Port 1700-1970 (Newton Abbot, 1971 ), 27-28. 
The best scholarly work on the Newfoundland saltfish trade is Shannon Ryan, Fish Out of Water: The 
Newfoundland Saltfish Trade, 1814-1914 (St. John's, NL, 1986). 
44 
A connection to Newfoundland was also useful as its primary export, cod, fitted in well with the broader patterns 
of the trades in which Brocklebanks were then engaged. Likewise, Liverpool was England's major West Coast 
entrepot for many of the goods, like Manchester wares, that Brocklebanks vessels shipped to Newfoundland (on 
these linkages, see below). 
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commercial fishing. One ofBrocklebank:s' first Newfoundland voyages was not connected 
with the fishery at all, however, nor was the island the initial choice of destination. One of 
their older craft, the three-masted, 302-ton ship Hercules had been refitted at Deptford with 
a lower deck and became the first Brocklebank vessel designed to carry passengers. The 
company intended to send Hercules to Londonderry with 200 wagons of coal. Most would 
be sold there, with the remainder left aboard for ballast. In Londonderry the ship was 
expected to pick up immigrant passengers at a rate of £10 per head to New York. 
Unfortunately for Brockle banks, an Act of 1816 forbad vessels from carrying more than one 
passenger for every five tons. Taking into account deductions, Hercules was only rated for 
the carriage of forty-five people, a number that was insufficient to earn a profit. Using the 
acumen and adaptability that characterised the company during most of their existence, 
Thomas tried a new strategy. He discovered that Newfoundland was excluded from the 
provisions of the act and decided to send his vessel to Newfoundland in place ofNew York. 
This may have seemed a logical move since the colony at the time had just benefited from 
an influx oflrish settlers. Most had come as servants in the fishery. When the decision to go 
to Newfoundland proved unpopular with the passengers, Hercules sailed for New York in 
August as originally intended. 45 
45 
Gibson, Brockle banks, I, 60. See also NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Thomas Brocklebank's Notebook. On the 
evolution of the British Passenger Ship Act, see Helen I. Cowan, British Emigration to British North America: 
The First Hundred Years (Toronto, 1961 ). The impact of these Acts on Newfoundland is discussed in a number 
of essays in John J. Mannion ( ed. ), The Peopling of Newfoundland: Essays in Historical Geography (St. John's, 
NL, 1977). The exemption from the stricter regulations embodied in the various Passenger Ship Acts meant that 
shipowners were free to cram as many emigrants into the holds of vessels as they wished. The corollary of this 
practice, of course, was that Newfoundland became the temporary home to many of Europe's poorest migrants. 
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This minor setback did not end the Brocklebanks' interest in Newfoundland. For one 
thing, there were profits to be made in buying and selling Newfoundland fish. Another 
market was the trade in manufactured goods, grocery wares and fishery implements - often 
transshipped through Liverpool- for Newfoundland's settler population, which was growing 
fairly rapidly in the first half of the nineteenth century. In that period virtually everything 
Newfoundlanders consumed, save fish, had to be imported, a process that required marine 
transport. The British authorities had long encouraged the fishery but had never encouraged 
settlement.46 Nonetheless, colonists did come, making their living at sea just as men had 
done earlier in the migratory fishery. The nature of Newfoundland, along with the attitude 
on the part of the Crown, encouraged a dependence on outside trade goods. Newfoundland 
settlers earned a precarious livelihood from the sale of their single commodity - cod fish. 
This was supplemented by a spring seal fishery and some forestry, but for the most part, 
Newfoundland was built on the humble cod.47 The island's climate and lack of arable land 
did not support large-scale agriculture, and the authorities made no real attempts to develop 
For a discussion of the impact of this on Newfoundland and an analysis of those who eventually saved enough 
to complete their journeys to other parts of North America, see Edward Vincent Chafe, "A New Life on 'Uncle 
Sam's Farm:' Newfoundlanders in Massachusetts, 1846-1859" (MA thesis, Memorial University of 
Newfoundland, 1982). 
46 
Indeed, settlement was actively discouraged by the so-called "Western Charters." See W. Gordon Handcock, 
"English Migration to Newfoundland," in Mannion (ed.), Peopling of Newfoundland, 15-48. 
47 
On the role of sealing in Newfoundland, see Shannon Ryan, The Ice Hunters: A History of Newfoundland 
Sealing to 1914 (St. John's, NL, 1994). Ryan argues that sealing was an important adjunct to the cod fishery, 
not primarily for the animals' pelts or meat but for the oil produced from their blubber, which was important to 
Europeans as a lighting fuel. See also Ryan, "The Industrial Revolution and the Newfoundland Seal Fishery," 
International Journal of Maritime History, IV, No.2 (1992), 1-43. 
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local industry. For this reason Newfoundland was dependent on overseas imports for most 
of its needs, paying for all with the profits from the fishery. This opportunity for importers 
(and the advantages of Liverpool as a base) was not lost on the Brocklebank brothers. 
Although complete inventories no longer exist, notes taken by Thomas in 1827 record the 
great range of goods imported into Newfoundland in the early days of their trade to the 
island. The name of the vessel was not recorded, but it departed in February 1827 carrying 
a wide array of products (Table 7.1).48 
Table 7.1 
Brocklebanks Imports into Newfoundland, February 1827 
Butter, Hamburg Bacon Ale Tea kettles 
Soap Lard Porter Sad irons 
Coffee-foreign cheap Pork Nails Scales & weights 
Tea Pitch tar Iron bolts Fish hooks 
Sage Paints & oil Copper Hooks & thimbles 
Pepper, ginger & spice Cordage Lead shot etc. Iron pots 
Sugar, Bengal or Brazil Twine & line Furniture Cheese 
Brandy Earthenware Glassware Rice-India 
Geneva Wine Bunting Dry mutton & beef 
Whiskey Sherry Dog& guns Hams 
Oatmeal Duck canvas Pump leather Flour 
Source: National Museums Liverpool (NML), Merseyside Maritime Museum 
(MMM), Maritime Archives and Library (MAL), B/BROC, Thomas 
Brocklebank's Note Book, 1827. 
48 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Thomas Brocklebank's Notebook, 1827. 
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Of course, simply importing products into an area without return cargoes was never 
good business, and shippers avoided making trips "in ballast" whenever possible. 49 This was 
also true in the Newfoundland trade, and Brocklebanks developed complex "triangular" 
routes that integrated Newfoundland as a "port" of call. 50 In the early days of the company, 
when the West Indies and South American trades predominated, it was customary for 
Brocklebanks craft to depart Liverpool for Bahia and return to the home port. In the 
Newfoundland trade vessels would sail with mixed cargoes of goods, such as that above, and 
sell these in Newfoundland in return for cargoes offish. 51 The craft would then depart for 
Brazil with its load of cod. Brazil, a largely Catholic nation, depended on fish for those days 
when eating meat was forbidden. Also, it was a good and inexpensive source of nutrition in 
the Portuguese colony. In fact, Brazil remained a major importer of Newfoundland fish for 
many years after the heyday ofBrocklebanks' connection. Brocklebanks' vessels would then 
return from Brazil loaded with local goods and products which would then be re-exported. 
49 
The problem of a disjuncture in demand depending on voyage direction was endemic in North Atlantic trades. 
The best discussion of the problem is C. Knick Harley, "Issues on the Demand for Shipping Services, 1870-1913: 
Derived Demand and Problems of Joint Production," in Lewis R. Fischer and Eric W. Sager (eds.), Merchant 
Shipping and Economic Development in Atlantic Canada (St. John's, NL, 1982), 65-86. 
50 
The description of a "triangular trade" is a simplification of the complexity of many trade routes in the North 
Atlantic during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. See Ronald Findlay, The "Triangular Trade" and 
the Atlantic Economy of the Eighteenth Century: A Simple General-Equilibrium Model (Princeton, 1990). 
51 
In fact, the main outward cargo carried in Brocklebanks bottoms from Liverpool was Manchester goods, 
especially cotton wares, shipped by the company on their own behalf Jones, Pioneer Shipowners, IT, 22. On the 
development of Liverpool as a cotton port, see Nigel Hall, "The Cotton Brokers and the Development of the 
Liverpool Cotton Market, c. 1800 to 1914" (DPhil thesis, Oxford University, 1999); and Hall, "The Emergence 
of the Liverpool Raw Cotton Market, 1800-1850," Northern History, XXXVIli, No. 1 (2001 ), 65-81. 
277 
In fact, the items above included sugar that may have come from Brazil, if not Bengal, and 
which was likely paid for originally with Newfoundland fish. Landward products were also 
traded out of Newfoundland, although in this period these never eclipsed the fishery. Also 
in 1827, the brig Westmorland II, returning from South America, put in at Newfoundland 
for roasting timber used by Brocklebanks in the Whitehaven Yard. This was also a common 
practice for the fleet at the time. 52 
The activities ofBrocklebanks in Newfoundland were not confined simply to export 
and import trades. Indeed, the firm maintained a presence on the island for upwards of four 
decades, Like certain other Liverpool merchants, the company operated their own 
establishment (founded 1830) in Newfoundland's capital, St. John's, with the same name 
as the larger company, Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank. After 1830 cargoes similar to the one in 
Table 7.1 would have been imported directly to Brocklebanks' own shop in St. John's and 
either sold directly from there or wholesaled to merchants in smaller communities. This 
store was noted for selling "tea, hardware, Manchester goods etc:"53 precisely the kinds of 
products noted in the inventory above. The shop operated from at least 1830 until about 
1846. The premises would also have acted as a distribution point for fish going to Brazil or 
for lumber on the return voyage to Liverpool. In 1832 the company dispatched the 
52 
Gibson, Brack/ebanks, I, 88; Haws, Brack/ebanks, 24; and NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Thomas 
Brocklebank's Notebook, 1827. 
53 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Historical Notes. 
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Westmorland, Ariel and Manchester to St. John's. All three craft offloaded their cargoes in 
the port and proceeded on to Bahia with sealskins, fish, oil, and blubber before returning to 
Liverpool. Using this system, Brocklebanks vessels carried paying cargoes on each leg of 
their journey. 54 
The Newfoundland trade cannot have been the easiest to pursue given the treachery 
of the weather off the island's coasts. At times passages could be uneventful, as with the 
1833 voyage of the Bouyant under Captain Ponsonby which departed from Liverpool for St. 
John's and then sailed on to Brazil before returning to Britain, the entire venture taking just 
over seven months. In 183 7, however, during a particularly unsettled winter Brocklebank's 
brig Manchester sailed for Newfoundland, departing on 27 January. During a storm on 12 
February the vessel was struck amidships by a large sea which carried away portions of the 
superstructure. Manchester returned to Liverpool, needing a month for repairs before making 
for St. John's once more. Another vessel, the Swallow, a 141-ton brig, was not as fortunate. 
She sailed two days following the Manchester. Apparently the vessel was crushed by ice 
flows off Newfoundland, and her crew was forced to take to her lifeboat. After attempting 
unsuccessfully to make the shore, their frozen bodies were later found in the ship's boat. 55 
Despite such setbacks, the company's relationship with Newfoundland continued for 
some time and took a number of forms. For example, Brocklebanks were active in 
54 
Gibson, Brocklebanks, I, 82, 106. 
55 
Ibid., I, 106-108. 
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promoting community ventures, and in 183 5 subscribed toward the building of St. Paul's 
Church in Harbour Grace, then the second-largest settlement in the colony. At the same time 
the company maintained business links with other St. John's merchants and had an account 
with Benjamin Bowring and Son. John Brocklebank (not Daniel's son but another member 
of the family) went out to Newfoundland to oversee their interests and became the owner 
of a number of fishing boats on his own account. 56 
The company's trade with Newfoundland suffered a serious blow in 1846 when one 
of its periodic "great fires" swept through the closely packed wooden buildings of St. John's. 
Brocklebanks' premises were destroyed, but unlike many other merchants in the city they 
did not rebuild. Perhaps by this time their interests lay elsewhere, since over the next three 
years only one voyage to Newfoundland was recorded by a Brocklebanks vessel. 
Nonetheless, the firm continued to maintain some links with the island, and in 1852 
56 
Ibid., I, 106; and NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Historical Notes, Notes from Arthur C. Wardle of C.T. 
Bowring & Co. Ltd. It was this John Brocklebank who set up the firm's Newfoundland office in 1830. It is 
perhaps not surprising that Brocklebanks maintained connections in Newfoundland with Bowrings. Although 
thought of inN ewfoundland as essentially a "home-grown" concern, the business, like Brocklebanks, was mainly 
associated with Liverpool. Liverpool itself is not thought of in terms of Newfoundland connections as much as 
is the West Country, but in addition to Brocklebanks' shorter connection, both Bowrings and Job Brothers (also 
ofLiverpool) were active on the island. An in-depth, if now somewhat dated, account of the former firm is David 
Keir, The Bowring Story (London, 1962); Wardle produced his own account of the family and its business, 
" ... primarily intended for members of the Bowring family and their employees ... " Wardle, Benjamin Bowring 
and His Descendants. A Record of Mercantile Achievement (London, 1938), 7. This work gives an incidental 
piece of information about Brockle banks' Newfoundland trade and the links between the Liverpool firms active 
in the colony. It states that on 15 January 1845 Henry Price Bowring arrived at London on a buying trip that 
also took in the Continent. Bowring had taken passage from Newfoundland in Brocklebanks' new 135 ton brig 
Courier II, paying a fare of£ 10 for his passage. Courier was launched from the Whitehaven yard in March 1844, 
replacing the original Courier, sold the following year to William Robinson ofDrogheda. Wardle, Benjamin 
Bowring, 74-75; NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Vessels Built by T. & J. Brocklebank, 1807 to 1865; 
Brocklebank Fleet, 1775-1945; Gibson, "House ofBrocklebank (I ),"50-54; and Stillwell, "Brocklebanks, 129-
133. See also Appendices 6B and Seven. 
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Brocklebanks outfitted three vessels, averaging 115 tons: the Prosperity, Hecla and Creole 
for the seal fishery under the partnership ofBrocklebanks & Anthony. In 1855 the partners 
again sent out three sealers, including the Prosperity, joined this time by the Active and 
Harmony. The latter two craft had been operated in the 1852 hunt by the firm ofR. Alsop 
& Company. There was also a connection with the Brien family of mariners. Prosperity was 
commanded for Brocklebank & Anthony in both years by a member of this clan. Active and 
Harmony were also skippered by Briens, while in the employ of both firms. Still, this 
venture does not appear to have played any major role in Brocklebanks overall business 
strategy; certainly by the 1860s, trade to Newfoundland ended for good. By the 1861 seal 
hunt Brocklebank & Anthony no longer employed any tonnage, although the Liverpool firms 
of Bowring and Job continued to play an active role in sealing, as they would into the 
twentieth century. 57 
In fact, this period was one oftremendous change, not only for the Brocklebanks firm 
but also for shipping in general. One of these developments was the company's increasing 
emphasis on the Pacific, a feature discussed below. Internally, the business was in the midst 
of a transition. John, as we know, died in 1831, followed by Thomas in 1845. Although both 
brothers had been successful in business, they had not prospered as well in family terms. 
~7 
Gibson, "House of Brocklebank," 45; and Prowse, History of Newfoundland, 705-707. A good first-hand 
account of the 1846 fire is included in Wardle's family/business history of the Bowrings. The blaze apparently 
started in the Shuttleworth Street workshop of a cabinet maker named Hamlin and spread rapidly. Aside from 
the Brocklebanks premises, the businesses of J. Rogerson & Son, C.F. Bennett & Co. and the Victoria Hotel, 
not to mention the Bowring Brothers' own establishment, were all burned. The contemporary account estimated 
that upwards of7,000 persons were left homeless by the inferno. Wardle, Benjamin Bowring, 81-83. 
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Both died bachelors and left no direct heirs. With Thomas' death control of the company 
went to his nephew, Thomas Fisher, who took the name Brocklebank under the conditions 
of his uncle's will. Thomas II was thirty-one years old when he took charge of the family 
business, and was the only direct male heir of Captain Daniel. He was joined in the business 
by Ralph Brocklebank, Reverend Ralph's grandson, who became a junior partner. 58 
Although still merchants, the Brocklebanks were also bonafide tramp shipowners. 
Shipowning expanded rapidly, and the number of vessels owned steadily increased from 
1815 to 1845. In the last fifteen years of the period alone the Brocklebanks fleet doubled 
from twenty-one to forty-two, while average tonnage rose from 200 to 250 tons. The 
majority of these vessels were intended for the trades to Brazil, Chile, Peru, Newfoundland 
and the Gulf of Mexico. A small number, usually barque- or ship-rigged and larger than 
those in the former trades, were destined for India and China. 59 Table 7.2 shows the impact 
58 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Brocklebank Family, Licence for Thomas Fisher to Take the Name 
"Brocklebank," 1845; Epitome of the Will of Thomas Brocklebank, 1843; and Gibson, Brockle banks, I, 82. 
Thomas Brocklebank was born in 1814, the only son of Anne, Captain Daniel Brocklebank's daughter, and 
Wilson Fisher ofWhitehaven. Fisher Sr. was, like the Brocklebanks, a West India merchant. Young Thomas had 
a long connection with the family firm, starting out there in 1831, aged only seventeen. Thomas married Anne 
Robinson in 1844, and the couple had four sons and four daughters. Settling in Liverpool after taking charge 
ofBrocklebanks, Thomas Jr. devoted his considerable energy not only to the company but also to politics (he 
was for many years a close supporter of Gladstone), the Church and philanthropy. Ralph Brocklebank was the 
son of"Corbridge John" Brocklebank, himself a son of Rev. Ralph and nephew of Captain Daniel. He was born 
in 1803, two years after his mother, Mary Macdonald, married his father. Ralph started working for 
Brocklebanks in 1826 at Liverpool and in 1836 married Eliza Moon, daughter of the Chairman of the London 
and North Western Railway. Ralph remained with the company for six decades and was also active with the 
Dock Board, the Sailors' Home and the mercantile Marine Service Association. The latter organization also ran 
a Seaman's Orphanage and a Mariners' Home. Ralph Brocklebank continued to work with such charitable 
institutions even after he retired from active service with the firm in 1886. Jones, Pioneer Shipowners, II, 24-28. 
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Gibson, Brockle banks, I, 65,67 and 87-88; BT 107, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; Gibson, "House 
ofBrocklebank (1)," 50-54; Haws, Brocklebank, and Stillwell, "Brocklebanks," 129-133. The total tonnage of 
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of this extra tonnage on Brocklebanks' trades. As can be seen in these six distinct trading 
areas, sailings increased in all except East Asia and Brazil. Total sailings more than doubled 
from fifteen to thirty-two. 
Table 7.2 
B kl b k S T 1830 d 1840 roc e an a1mgs, an 
Destination 1830 Sailings 1840 Sailings 
Calcutta 4 9 
Lima and West Coast S.A.. 2 7 
Brazil 6 6 
St. John's 2 5 
East Asia 1 1 
Bombay 0 4 
Total 15 32 
Source: John Frederick Gibson, Brocklebanks 1770-1950 (2 vols., Liverpool, 1953), I, 88. 
During Thomas' tenure, the company his father founded had been transformed. Over 
his lifetime Thomas had ordered 105 vessels and had become a director of the Bank of 
Liverpool and the Liverpool Fire and Life Insurance Company. When Thomas and Jonathan 
first assumed control, only a single Brocklebanks vessel was in active service. On the day 
of Thomas' death in 1845 a partial fleet deployment ran as follows: At Liverpool were the 
Patriot Queen, Westmorland, Crown, Callao, Tigris, Maypo andRimac Dryad~ in the North 
Atlantic were the Princess Royal, Lanercost, Manchester, Earl Grey, Esk, Jumna and 
the fleet in 1845 stood at 11,730, amounting to forty-five vessels. This was slightly down from the previous year, 
when Gibson says that "Brocklebanks owned 50 ships, the greatest number ever to be under their flag." Gibson, 
"House ofBrocklebank (1)," 45. 
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Jamaica~ the Bonanza and Camana were in the South Atlantic~ Robert Pulsford, Herculean, 
Lord A/thorp and Sir Henry Pottinger were in the Indian Ocean~ Courier and Valparaiso 
were in the Pacific~ London, Aden andPatria were in the China Seas~ Mazeppa was in the 
Baltic; the Globe was at Iquique; the Kestrel at Valparaiso; and the Hindoo at Calcutta.60 
During Thomas Senior's final years the old traditions established in Whitehaven had 
almost gone. The shipyard was now building much larger barques and full-rigged ships. The 
last Brocklebank brigs built for the South American trade were launched in 1842. It seems 
that the trades to Newfoundland and Brazil continued as long as the older and smaller craft 
remained in the fleet but died off as the vessels were sold or retired. Having been at the helm 
for so long, Thomas doubtless disliked the break with tradition, but even greater changes 
were in the wind. On 2 March 1843 Brocklebanks placed an ad for a line of packets to 
Valparaiso, with sailings every three weeks. The service was unable to keep up this pace in 
the pre-steam era and the route did not last. Still, it was Brocklebanks' first attempt at the 
regular sailings that later became a hallmark of the company.61 The first twenty years under 
Thomas and Ralph Brocklebank's leadership were marked by change. The one that was most 
60 
Gibson, "House of Brocklebank (1)," 45. 
61 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Vessels Built by T. & J. Brocklebank; and Gibson, Brocklebanks, I, 110-111. 
Unlike PSNC, Brocklebanks was never a South American specialist firm. Still, as Table 5.2 shows, they did 
maintain interests there for some time. As late as 1898 the firm dispatched their longtime trader Majestic to 
Chile, where it was sold to the government. The vessel departed Barry on 22 July 1898, navigated the Straits 
of Magellan and arrived at Punta Arenas on 10 October. Once there the Majestic was "handed over by the 
captain," and the crew was discharged. Great Britain, BT 100, British Empire Agreements and Accounts of 
Crew, Majestic, July-October 1898. 
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startling and which provided the focus for most of the company's later existence was the 
gravitation toward trade to one particular port - Calcutta. 
Prior to the nineteenth century it was all but impossible for new British firms to 
break into the trade to India. The East India Company had existed since 1600 and held a 
monopoly on British trade for over two hundred years. But when in 1813 this monopoly was 
partly rescinded, new competitors began to cast their gaze toward the jewel in Britain's 
crown62 . As was typical, Brocklebanks was not slow to recognize a new business 
opportunity, and in the autumn of 1815 the Whitehaven yard began to build the Princess 
Charlotte specifically for this trade. Constructed of oak, the vessel was ship-rigged, 514 tons 
net and armed with twenty guns. The carriage of arms tells us something significant about 
the conditions under which subcontinent trade was conducted in those days. The so-called 
"golden age of piracy" may have been a century in the past, but no one had told this to the 
brigands who continued to operate in the Indian Ocean. 63 In fact, it had been normal practice 
for East Indiamen to be heavily manned and gunned and to operate in convoys. The Princess 
Charlotte, however, was designed to make the run on its own. The ship departed Whitehaven 
62 
K. Charlton, "Liverpool and The East India Trade," Northern History, Vll (1972), 54-72. For an overview of 
recent scholarship on the English East India Company, see the essays in H.V. Bowen, Margarette Lincoln and 
Nigel Rigby (eds.), The Worlds of the East India Company (Suffolk. 2002). 
63 
On Indian Ocean piracy during the "golden age," see Graham Harris, Treasure and Intrigue: The Legacy qf 
Captain Kidd (Toronto, 2002); and Charles Grey, Pirates of the Eastern Seas (1618-1723). A Lurid Page of 
History (London, 1933: reprint, Port Washington, NY, 1971 ). The most recent scholarly study of piracy in 
general during this period is Marcus Rediker, Villains of all Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age 
(Boston, 2004) 
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under the command of Captain J. McKean on 18 February 1816 and was accompanied as far 
as Madeira by another pair of vessels registered in the town. 64 
The destination was Calcutta. This city was chosen as a terminus by British shippers 
almost as soon as the East India Company monopoly ended. Prior to the Princess Charlotte's 
journey in 1816 three ships had already cleared for Calcutta, and in the same year twelve 
vessels left the Mersey for this port. The first vessel to make the run, at least from the 
Mersey, was the 512-net-ton Kingsmill under Captain A. Cassels. The voyage, sponsored by 
John Gladstone & Grant, began on 22 May 1814, and the Kingsmill returned to Liverpool 
on 6 September 1815.65 
The principal city ofthe Indian state ofBengal, Calcutta was a natural terminus point 
for British trade. It was known as Fort William by its early shipping community, named after 
fortifications built on the east bank of the Hooghly River. The brown Hooghly was long an 
important artery for Indian trade. Located 120 miles from the sea, Calcutta is linked to 
oceanic trade by the River Ganges~ with the Hooghly being the largest branch of its delta. 
64 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Historical Notes, Liverpool-Calcutta Trade, I; and Gibson, Brockle banks, I, 54-
56. If we recall that some of Brocklebanks' early cargoes of sugar may have originated in Bengal, it is a 
reasonable assumption that the decision to engage in Calcutta trading stemmed from this link. 
65 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Historical Notes, Liverpool-Calcutta Trade, I. Other Liverpool firms engaged 
in the trade included the Croppers, Bensons. Caleb Fletcher & Co .. Tobins, Taylor Potter & Co. and Charles 
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Calcutta is a natural entrep6t. Using the Ganges and its tributaries, small vessels can sail for 
more than 1,000 miles from Calcutta through northwestern India to locales such as Patna, 
Varanasi, Allahabad, Kanpur, Agra and Delhi. Travelling in the opposite direction one 
arrived at the Bay of Bengal where monsoon trade winds formerly provided sail craft with 
a convenient mode of propulsion to the markets of Europe. As Niall Ferguson has noted, 
" ... when Europeans came to trade in India, the Hugli was one of their preferred destinations. 
It was the economic gateway to the continent. "66 Based in the town of Chinsura north of 
Calcutta, the Dutch were established by the early seventeenth century and only later 
superceded by the English. The site did have some drawbacks. On 5 October 1864, the port 
was hit by an intense cyclone that caused severe damage to shipping. More than one craft 
was driven inland by a subsequent tidal wave, a number ofLiverpool vessels among them. 67 
Thomas Brocklebank planned thoroughly for his vessel's first voyage to the port. It 
would stop at Mauritius and take an outward cargo including coal, lead, nails, glass, iron and 
tin plates, of a total value of approximately £3,000. Under McKean's command the vessel 
made its way across the Indian Ocean in the summer of 1816, then headed north to the 
Sunda Straits via Sumatra and Java. By the beginning of August the vessel reached Batavia, 
the main port of Java, then controlled by Britain. With the East India Company still firmly 
in control, McKean decided to ingratiate himself(and Brocklebanks) by offering the ship 
66 
Niall Ferguson, Empire. How Britain Made the Modern World (London, 2003 ), 18-19. 
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NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Historical Notes, Liverpool-Calcutta Trade, 1 and 7. 
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on a limited basis as a transport. This offer was accepted and the Princess Charlotte was 
soon off to Calcutta ferrying company troops. The vessel returned to Batavia in February 
1817. Released from the company's service in September, McKean sailed for Liverpool on 
2 October with Brocklebank's first cargo oflndia goods. These items included cotton, sugar, 
saltpetre, ginger and rice. When sold the cargo brought in more than £10,000 profit. This 
was at the same time, it must be remembered, that West Indies voyages brought in £700 or 
less on average. The new trade started beyond the firm's best expectations, and the vessel 
was soon being readied for another voyage to the subcontinent.68 
With its first voyage to Calcutta an unqualified success, Thomas received the 
backing of other merchants for the second voyage - all were anxious to send their own 
cargoes on the run. At the same time the Whitehaven yard had begun construction of another 
vessel, the Perseverance, specifically for the Calcutta trade. The pattern for Brocklebank 
vessels over the next decades was that new ship-rigged construction would be assigned 
specifically to the Calcutta route; new brigs would be used for voyages to Brazil and 
Argentina; and older tonnage was deployed on the less profitable trades to the West Indies 
and Newfoundland. The decision to use the ship rig on long-distance routes and the brig for 
middle-distance (or sometimes coasting) trades was a natural one. As we have seen in 
68 
Gibson, Brockle banks, I, 54-59. Prior to the vessel's departure Brocklebanks placed the following promotional 
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Chapter Three, the shift appears typical ofLiverpool owners who m~ved increasingly toward 
the larger ship and barque rigs, and eventually away from the brig, as the port shifted 
steadily toward deep-sea commerce. In 1820, the year of Brocklebanks' relocation to 
Liverpool, three vessels were assigned to the Calcutta run. Besides the original Princess 
Charlotte and Perseverance, there was now also the London. As with all the company's 
routes at the time, flexibility was the key to success, and the Crown, originally assigned to 
trading around Cape Hom for Chile, was put on the India run, as was the Balfour, first used 
in the West Indies. In 1820 Brocklebanks' tonnage made ten trips from Liverpool to 
Calcutta, by which time a total of fifty vessels in all had been despatched to Calcutta by 
various owners. At the end of that first decade Brocklebanks' connection to India, and in 
particular to Calcutta, was well established. 69 There was little indication that it would come 
to dominate all other trades, but even in the 1830s the trend was becoming established (see 
Appendices 8A and 8B). Ties to the subcontinent were secure and, as John Gibson wrote, 
"Whitehaven to the West Indies was Replaced by Liverpool to Calcutta."70 
The range of goods carried from Calcutta was broad from the trade's inception. A 
surviving notebook of Thomas Brocklebank, kept ten years after the Princess Charlotte's 
maiden voyage, records a portion of British exports. Items included on one passage to 
Calcutta were iron-bar and sheet, lead, speltre [saltpeter?], copper, quicksilver, earthenware, 
69 
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glass-table, soda water bottles, kettles, Spanish brown, coke, bottles, brimstone, cochineal, 
cutlery, hosiery, and mahogany. 71 
Imports from the subcontinent to Britain were also varied. From the 1840s Calcutta 
was the most important port of call for Brocklebanks vessels, at least in terms of the number 
of voyages (See Appendices 8A and 8B). By the 1880s Brocklebanks' Calcutta trade, 
although somewhat reduced from its peak in the 1860s, was still an important focus of the 
firm's activities. Extracts from the London A Bills of Entry in this decade give some idea 
of the items being imported in the company's tonnage. The ship-rigged Majestic arrived at 
Liverpool on 10 May 1880 under the command of Captain Ellery. While on the Hooghly 
Ellery took on board 100 barrels of jute, 2,491 bags of saltpetre, 1,620 casks of oil and 
11,634 bags wheat for "sundry consignees." Products loaded to order were 1,180 bales of 
jute, 2,000 casks of oil, 2,184 bags ofwheat, 1,000 packets and 8,152 bags of linseed. Four 
years later another ship, the Khyber, under Captain Robinson, arrived at the Mersey from 
Calcutta with 4,175 bags of linseed, 1,073 barrels of sugar and 2,200 bales of jute for 
consignees. Products imported to order included 1,450 casks of oil, 16,644 bags oflinseed, 
662 bags of saltpetre, 8,696 bags of wheat, 700 bags of bone dust, 100 bales of gunny bags 
and 111 packages of tea. 72 
71 
NML, MMJ\.1, MAL, B/BROC, Thomas Brocklebank's Notebook, 1827. 
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Great Britain, Customs, Bills of Entry, 1880 and 1884. These imports appear typical of Brocklebanks vessels, 
with items such as linseed and jute appearing on many manifests. In fact, the latter cargo was important enough 
that the Herculean, constructed by Brocklebanks in 1828 for the Calcutta trade, had special uncluttered holds 
for jute to supply London (later Dundee) sack makers. See Haws, Brocklebank, 31. Other items brought in by 
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Given the nature of business, Brocklebanks was not alone in their pursuit of this 
lucrative trade. We have noted that other firms had begun to send tonnage from the Mersey 
to Calcutta almost as soon as the East India Company monopoly was breached. Along with 
these early traders, many others entered the race after 1830. In 1835 John Bibby & 
Company, in partnership with other firms, sent two vessels to Calcutta. Bibby never 
concentrated on the trade, but sent occasional tonnage to the port for a number of years or 
acted as loading brokers for other establishments. One company, called by Basil Lubbock 
"the great rivals" of Brockle banks in the Indian trade, were the Smiths of Glasgow. Their 
first Calcutta sailing came in 1840 with the 344-ton New Brunswick-built ship 
Constellation. Although this voyage was unsuccessful in terms of profits, Smiths stayed in 
the India trades for decades. Sandbach, Tinne & Co., along with Rankin Gilmour & Co., 
entered the trade in 1841. In fact, quite a few Liverpool owners had entered the trade before 
1850, some sailing regularly while others sent tonnage occasionally. Still, although many 
ships made the voyage each year their tonnage, and thus cargo capacity, remained fairly 
the fleet included peas, castor seeds, tineal, oleaginous seeds, and even bundles of fishing rods. In the early years 
of the steam fleet Brocklebanks' vessels seem to have carried similar goods, although their range was wider on 
some occasions. On 4 February 1890, not long after her commissioning, the S.S. Ameer arrived at Liverpool 
with a cargo that included indigo, jute, twine, gunnies, tumeric, linseed, tea, peas, cotton, wool, charcoal dust 
and hemp. See Bills ofEntry, 1887, 1890 and 1893. Certain Calcutta voyages brought home an especially large 
range of goods. The Historian, operated by Brocklebanks' Calcutta rival Harrisons, docked at Liverpool on 4 
April 1898 under the command of Captain Valiant. Among its import cargo was saltpetre, rice, gunnies, castor 
oil, linseed, jute, hemp, waste silk, cotton, wool, oil, yarn, tea, cigars, lead, indigo, wax, skins, hides, hessian 
cloth, shellac and burlap. The craft also stopped at Colombo, where it picked up tea, cocoanuts and bristle fibre. 
In addition, Historian put in at Port Said, taking on one cask of wine. Bills of Entry, 1898. From the 1890s on, 
Brocklebanks' vessels increasingly used ports other than Liverpool as a terminus. As many of these destinations 
were ports not detailed in the A Bills, knowing the full range ofBrocklebanks' imports in this period is more 
difficult. 
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limited at this time. 73 
As Appendices 8A and 8B show, Brocklebanks sailings to and from Calcutta 
increased in every decade from the 1820s. In absolute terms, sailings declined somewhat 
after 1869, when Appendix Eight ends. In the 1870s and 1880s departures to Calcutta 
dropped to 128 and 111 per decade, respectively. Still, the trade grew for forty years. By 
1840 Brocklebanks craft made eleven departures from the Mersey to Calcutta. Their largest 
vessel then engaged in the trade was the 547-tonPatriot Queen, although the average size 
of vessels in the Brocklebanks' fleet generally was considerably lower (about 240 tons). In 
total, Brocklebanks deployed nine vessels to Calcutta in that year (Table 7.3), with another 
four trading to Bombay. For Brocklebanks' advertised sailings to Bombay and Calcutta see 
Appendices Nine and Ten, respectively. The former port was not a long-term success for the 
company. Trade to Bombay peaked in the 1840s, and in 1856 the last regular Brocklebank 
trader to the port, Jumna, was sold. 74 
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to steam for the Indian trades. Most of their tonnage was constructed by Barclay Curle and Connell and Stephen. 
74 
NML, MMM. MAL, B/BROC. Liverpool-Calcutta Trade. 3: Historical Notes. "Brocklebank Line: Numbers 
of Sailings and Arrivals at Liverpool During Various Decades, & C."; Hollett, Cumberland to Cape Horn, 44; 
Gibson, Brockle banks, I, 124; BT 107, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1840; Gibson, "House of Brocklebank (I)," 
50-54; Haws, Brocklebank; and Stillwell, "Brocklebanks," 129-133. Appendices Nine and Ten not only reveal 
the patterns of the trade but also indicate the caution that must be taken in equating advertised with actual sailing 
dates. The latter seem overly optimistic, at least in the case ofBrocklebanks' sailings. Often several weeks, or 
even a month, might pass between advertised and actual sailings. Appendix Eleven gives the dates when 
Brocklebanks vessels first entered the Calcutta trade. 
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Table 7.3 
B klb kT roc e an onnage m e a cu a ra e, . th C I tt T d 1840 
Vessel Tonnage Rig Master 
London 351 Ship Benn 
Hindoo 266 Barque Mawson 
Patriot King 338 Barque Roddock 
Lord Althrop 233 Brig Jackson 
Jumna 364 Ship McGill 
Earl Grey 242 Brig Bell 
Tigris 422 Ship Robinson 
Patriot Queen 547 Ship Hoodless 
Santon II 
Source: 
345 Barque Huxtable 
D. Hollett, From Cumberland to Cape Horn: The Complete History of the 
Sailing Fleet of Thomas & John Brocklebank of Whitehaven and Liverpool 
-The World's Oldest Shipping Company (Norwich, 1984), 44. 
In the 1850s a number of new competitors entered the Calcutta trade. These included 
Edward Bates in 1854, the Rathbone Brothers in 1856 and Thos. Royden & Sons that same 
year. The Harrison Line also entered the trade in the 1850s. In 1857 the company loaded Jas. 
Browne & Co.'s West Derby in partnership with Greenshields & Co. In 185 8 Harrisons and 
Greenshields again loaded a Browne vessel for Calcutta, and later that year Harrisons sent 
out their own 1,058-ton iron ship Philospher for the trade. In 1859 Harrisons despatched 
Philosopher, along with the 854-ton Geologist. The next year Philosopher was trading to 
Calcutta again, now joined by the 713-tonPeveril of the Peak. Harrisons continued to load 
tonnage for other firms, but by this point their own interest in the trade was rising. By 1860 
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the Calcutta run, although receiving traffic from many shippers, was dominated by seven 
firms. Aside from Brocklebank:s, Harrisons and Cotesworth, there were also lmries, Cowies, 
Tyrers and Hughes. The "big seven" were joined in 1863 by Sir Donald Currie's "Castle 
Packets," the first of which was the 1,160-ton iron ship Stirling Castle.75 
Brockle banks were themselves quite active in the period, and in 1854 ten sailings to 
Calcutta were recorded. In absolute, but not relative, terms this was down from fourteen 
years earlier. By this time the average tonnage ofBrocklebanks' Calcutta fleet had doubled 
to almost 700 tons, a rise that parallelled what was happening with their fleet as a whole and 
British shipping in general (Graph 7.2 illustrates the dramatic rise in the average tonnage of 
Brockle banks vessels, especially from about 1855). The largest Brocklebanks vessel engaged 
in the trade in 1854 was the 1,362-ton ship-rigged Florence Nightingale. By 1865 
Brocklebank sailings to the Hooghly reached eighteen. For almost fifty years the company 
had run wooden ships in the trade, all but one built in their own yard. These vessels were all 
first-rate vessels that were popular with shippers; Brocklebanks' craft had a reputation for 
carrying their cargoes in first-class condition.76 
75 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Liverpool-Calcutta Trade, 6-7. For an overview of Sir Donald Currie's activities, 
particularly in Africa, see Andrew Porter, Victorian Shipping and Imperial Policy. Donald Currie, the Castle 
Line and Southern Africa (Woodbridge, 1986). For some useful observations on the perils of the Calcutta trade, 
see A.C. Staples, "Memoirs of William Prinsep: Calcutta Years, 1817-1842," Indian Economic and Social 
History Review, XXVI, No. 1 (1989), 61-79. 
76 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Liverpool-Calcutta Trade, 8; and BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 
various years. 
Source: 
Graph 7.2 
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NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, "Brocklebank Fleet;" and Great Britain Board 
of Trade (BT) 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
It was on the Calcutta route that Brocklebanks first employed much of the new 
technology that revolutionized shipping in the second half of the nineteenth century. Here, 
as was generally the case, the company was not among the first users, but there were sound 
business reasons behind the lag. We have seen previously that the firm chose not to use 
roller reefing sails for their Calcutta vessels since the device was unnecessary given the use 
of steam tugs on the Hooghly. In 1863 Brocklebanks deployed their first iron-built vessel in 
the Calcutta service. The 1 ,352-tonAlexandra was, like most Brocklebank iron sailing craft, 
built by Harland & Wolff Prior to this year there appeared to be sound arguments against 
the use of iron for vessel construction. As a primary outward cargo from Liverpool was 
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Manchester goods- namely cotton wares- it was important to keep such items dry during 
their passage to India, a distance of over 11 ,500 miles. In the early days of iron many 
shippers believed that such vessels would "sweat" and cause moisture damage to the cargo. 
Although this idea was subsequently found to be erroneous, Brocklebanks' decision to wait 
until the technology was proven was certainly understandable. There were some real 
problems to contend with in deploying such technology. In tropical climates - such as the 
route to Calcutta- fouling was a serious problem for iron hulls. Iron vessels running to the 
Far East frequently made good time on the outward passage, but their return progress was 
often much slower. Also, compass deviation was a concern when using iron. This was not 
serious over short routes but could be fatal on long routes where the vessel was out of sight 
of land for extended periods. Of course, it was on precisely these long-distance trades that 
large iron vessels would be of the most value. In fact, Lloyd's ofLondon itself had originally 
refused to classify iron vessels for insurance purposes. 77 
IfBrocklebanks' decision to convert their fleet to iron was made cautiously, it was 
adopted wholeheartedly as policy following the acquisition of Alexandra. From 1863 to 
77 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Liverpool-Calcutta Trade, 7; Administration, Business Letters, 3 March 1863; 
Ronald Hope, A New History of British Shipping (London, 1990), 273; and Graeme J. Milne, Trade and Traders 
in Mid-Victorian Liverpool. Mercantile Business and the Making of a World Port (Liverpool, 2000), 40-41. 
By the late 1850s shipowners found it most cost-efficient to run vessels which were entirely steam or entirely 
sail powered as opposed to auxiliary-steamers, although as demonstrated in Chapter Four, the auxiliary steamer 
long remained popular with Liverpool investors. Owners concentrating more on sail naturally turned to iron 
hulls, which allowed for maximum size on the longest distance bulk trades. Liverpool came to dominate the 
market in such vessels. We should note that, although Brocklebanks was not exactly an innovator in switching 
to iron, their 1863 purchase of Alexandra closely matched the take-off in iron vessel investment at Liverpool 
generally (see Graph 3.2). 
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1885 the company's gross investment stood at thirteen vessels. Of these only the Bowfell and 
Mahanda, launched at the Whitehaven yard in July of 1864 and April1865, respectively, 
were of wood construction. They were also the last pair of vessels the company built 
themselves, marking the end of an era in more ways than one. In 1885 Brocklebanks turned 
yet another comer, with their first steel vessel Zemindar, 2,053 tons. Like wood before it, 
iron became a thing of the past as far as Brocklebanks' fleet was concerned (at least in terms 
of newly-registered tonnage). Within a few years Brocklebanks would make another, more 
radical, change that they had resisted for years by replacing their traditional sail fleet with 
steamers. 78 
78 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Vessels Built by T. & J. Brocklebank; BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 
various years; Gibson, "House ofBrocklebank (1)," 50-54; Haws, Brocklebank; and Stillwell, "Brocklebanks," 
129-133. 
Chapter 8 
Brocklebanks II - Sail to Steam 
The end of the 1860s was marked by a major development in the Indian trades, and indeed 
in all trades using the route around the Cape of Good Hope. As was the case with iron 
vessels, Brocklebanks did not immediately respond to opportunities by adopting a new 
technology; indeed, they did not to do so for two decades. In 1869 the Suez Canal opened, 
reducing the distance from Britain to India by about a third, from 11 ,500 to approximately 
6,000-8,000 miles1• Prior to this, the lengthy journey to the subcontinent ensured that 
steamers, with their still inefficient engines, could not compete with sail. In the years just 
prior to 1869, however, the use of high pressure marine engines meant an increase in fuel 
economy of up to forty percent.2 At just this time steamers first came into their own over 
middle-distance routes. Officials at Sandbach, Tinne's Demerara office noted something to 
this effect the year Suez opened concerning their own trades. They stated that 
by recent improvements in engines & boilers, especially by what is known 
as the high & low pressure system the consumption of coal has been reduced 
by more than one half since the last attempt at steam to Demerara was made 
& we affix particulars of a steamer recently built which is capable of going 
For a case study of the impact of the opening of the Suez Canal on one long-distance trade route, see Frank 
Broeze, "Distance Tamed: Steam Navigation to Australia and New Zealand from Its Beginnings to the Outbreak 
of The Great War," Journal ofTransport History, New series, X, No. 1 (1989), 1-21. For a discussion of the 
economics of the shift from sail to steam see Chapter Four. Also see C. Knick Harley, "Aspects of the 
Economics ofShipping," In Lewis R. Fischer and Gerald E. Panting ( eds. ). Change and Adaptation in Maritime 
History: The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century (St. John's, NL, 1985), 167-188; and GeraldS. 
Graham, "The Ascendancy of the Sailing Ship 1850-85," Economic History Review. 2nd ser., IX (1956), 74-88. 
2 
J. Forbes Munro, "Suez and the Shipowner: The Response of the MacKinnon Shipping Group to the Opening 
of the Canal, 1869-84," in Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W. Nordvik (eds.), Shipping and Trade, 1750-1950: 
Essays in international Maritime Economic History, 1750-1950 (Pontefract, 1990), 102-103; and Denis 
Griffiths, Steam at Sea: Two Centuries of Steam-Powered Ships (London, 1997). 
to Demerara in 20 days on 220 tons of coals & of carrying (in addition to her 
home voyage coal) between 2000 & 3000 tons of freight... 3 
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The opening of Suez, along with improvements such as those noted above, created 
new opportunities and conundrums for shipowners. Although he believes there was more at 
issue than simply technology, J. Forbes Munro admits that an important business decision 
after 1869 was how soon, if at all, to abandon the use of sailing vessels around the Cape for 
the shorter route via Suez using steam. Not all owners were reticent about the development. 
Almost immediately, the 475-ton steamer Cleator, owned by Alfred Holt, was despatched 
to India by MacDiarmid Greenshields & Co. It was advertised to sail on 15 December and 
was followed only five days later by Stoddart Brothers' 644-ton steamer Waverly. Smith's 
City Line - participants in the Indian trade since 1840 - almost immediately switched to 
steam with the opening of Suez and thereafter built only two more sailing craft. In January 
1870 Brocklebanks' rival Harrisons advertised the new steamer Statesman -large for the 
time at 1,800 tons- for the Indian trade via Suez. Two more Harrisons' steamers left the 
following month, although the Statesman did not actually get underway until March. In 
addition, Harrisons also used the steamers Warrior, Chrysolite, and two chartered bottoms 
on the route. Within a year of the Canal's opening the Harrison steam line to India was 
making regular trips. If this was practical, it raises the question of why Brocklebanks did not 
3 
National Museums Liverpool (NML ), Merseyside Maritime Museum (MMM), Maritime Archives and Library 
(MAL), "Correspondence, Sandbach, Tinne & Co.," 2 December 1869. 
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take a similar step. 4 
The decision was based in part on the way Brocklebanks conducted their business 
-and primarily their continued involvement in the merchanting function. We have seen in 
Chapter Six that many Liverpool shipowners became specialists after mid-century, and the 
number of owners who listed themselves as merchants plummeted dramatically (refer to 
Graph 6.1 ). Again, Brocklebank:s went at their own pace and continued to operate mainly 
as carriers of goods on their own account. It is interesting to note that in 1889, the last year 
4 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Liverpool-Calcutta Trade, 9-1 0; and Munro, "Suez and the Shipowner," 98. The 
tonnages for Warrior and Chrysolite were I ,231 and 702, respectively. The Canal was proposed by the 
Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps in 1852 and digging began six years later. Although not officially opened until 
1869, the first vessel actually passed through it in 1865. By 1885 about seventy-six percent of all Far Eastern 
trade went via the Canal, with the remainder taking the Cape route. In that same period approximately a seventh 
of all British foreign trade made use of Suez. The Canal also strengthened the position of steam versus sail in 
certain Indian trades since the Canal Company's towage requirements, and the associated fees, made sail vessels 
impractical users (some sail vessels did, in fact, use Suez. In 1870, for example, twenty-seven of the 486 transits 
were made by sailing craft). Despite the Canal's problems regarding sail tonnage, by the 1880s steam had not 
developed to the point where it superceded sail in all trades. Still, the Suez Canal greatly reduced voyage lengths 
(and times) to India for steamers while sail tonnage was, for all practical purposes, forced to travel by the 
circuitous Cape route. Decreased voyage times also encouraged a revival of the old idea that India might become 
a viable alternative to the United States as a source of raw cotton. This goal was never fully realized because 
the Indian product was perceived by many buyers as of poorer quality than American cotton and was more 
expensive to ship. Nevertheless, Calcutta, and more especially Bombay, were opened to Liverpool steam 
tonnage, and the Indian cotton trade itself gained momentum as prices rose across the board; the A Bills indicate 
that cotton comprised a portion of many Brocklebanks import cargoes. Until at least 1876 Liverpool exported 
more Indian cotton to the Continent than European nations themselves imported directly from India. Thus, the 
Canal became associated with the development ofLiverpool steam. See D.A. Farnie, East and West of Suez. The 
Suez Canal in History, 1854-1956 (Oxford, 1969), 102and 197; The "Shipping World" Yearbook: A Desk 
Manual in Trade, Commerce and Navigation (London, 1887), 51-52; Francis Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey: 
The Development of a Port 1700-1970 (Newton Abbot, 1971 ), 96; Graeme J. Milne, Trade and Traders in Mid-
Victorian Liverpool. Mercantile Business and the Making of a World Port (Liverpool, 2000), 54; C. Knick 
Harley, "The Shift from Sailing Ships to Steamships, 1850-1890: A Study in Technological change and Its 
Diffusion," in D.N. McCloskey ( ed. ), Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain After 1840 (London, 1979), 223-
224; and J.A. Fairlie, "The Economic Effects of Ship Canals," Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, XI (1898). In the first few months of its operation the Harrison vessel Cordova carried the 
largest load of manufactured cargo to date through the Suez Canal, although this was at first credited to a Hull 
firm. The Times, 17 February 1870, 5, as quoted in Milne, Trade and Traders, 5. 
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of the BT 108 registry series, three of the Brockle banks invested in their first steamer, the 
Cardiganshire, soon renamedAmeer. In entering their occupations on this registry all listed 
themselves as "merchants." They comprised almost half of only seven Liverpool investors 
to register new tonnage as merchants in that year. Steamers like Ameer were, of course, 
expensive (for a cost breakdown ofBrocklebanks' later steam fleet, see Appendix Twelve). 
Any company making the transition from sail needed a good source of capital to invest, 
along with the surety of full holds, to make such costly tonnage a paying proposition. Of 
course, steamers could make many more round trips to a particular destination than could 
sail over any given period of time. Still, this is not of much use if cargoes are not sufficient 
to make a good return on one's investment. Retaining their merchanting role in the first 
years after Suez, finding cargoes would have been less of a problem for Brockle banks, who 
were shipping their own wholesale goods. On one hand, this could be an incentive to invest 
in steam, as a company never had to worry about full holds. The flip side of this is that, in 
Brocklebanks' position, there was no immediate need to move to more expensive tonnage 
when cargoes were assured. This was certainly one reason the company was able to remain 
with a sail fleet longer and more profitably than most of their rivals. As Basil Lubbock put 
it, "Brocklebank[s] could afford to ignore the Suez Canal [and steam] for they were long 
established merchants in the East and their ships were never in the freight market. They 
carried Brocklebank cargoes only. "5 
5 
Basil Lubbock, The Last of the Windjammers (Glasgow, 1975), 121; and Great Britain, Board of Trade (BT) 
108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1889. The best study of the historical economics of the industry is Yrjo 
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The actual composition of these cargoes was also part of the equation. As we have 
seen, they were normally comprised of rather prosaic items- generally not high-value goods 
needing rapid transit or that could justify the additional costs associated with steam. As a 
further example, Brocklebank:s' ship-riggedBactria under Captain Bolderston arrived on the 
Mersey from Calcutta in November 1887. It carried the firm's usual array oflndian imports, 
dominated by 6,963 bags of wheat and 15,527 bags of linseed. Apart from these 
commodities the Bactria also carried bones, bone meal, peas and jute cuttings. Shippers of 
such low-end cargoes were not the ones that most needed to worry about increasing steam 
competition. The firms which may have suffered most were established steam lines relying 
primarily on lucrative government contracts for mail, passengers and freight. Facing new 
competitors that were using more advanced steam vessels, such firms could only remain in 
business by upgrading or replacing their own fleets and/or finding a new comparative 
advantage. 6 
Kaukiainen, Sailing into Twilight: Finnish Shipping in an Age of Transport Revolution, 1860-1914 (Helsinki, 
1991). 
6 
Great Britain, Customs, Bills of Entry, 1887; and Munro, "Suez and the Shipowner," 99. Munro's case study 
is of the Mackinnon shipping group, one of the main beneficiaries of Suez. The Group was already established 
as an adaptable and innovative concern, having switched to steam starting as early as the 1850s. Munro argued 
that their main strength lay in their extensive contacts among the expatriate colonial communities and their 
related involvement in coastal and country trades, which were not so vulnerable to competition because of Suez. 
The Group could easily find local managers and had better access to authorities on the spot than many of their 
rivals. In effect (although Munro does not use my terminology specifically) the Mackinnon group made good 
use of a comparative advantage not open to most competitors. In keeping with Gordon Boyce's and Graeme 
Milne's work, a goodly portion of this advantage was based on information networks and interpersonal 
relationships. Munro, "Suez and the Shipowner," 116-117; Gordon Boyce, Information, Mediation and 
Institutional Development. The Rise of Large-Scale Enterprise in British Shipping, 1870-1919 (Manchester, 
1995); and Milne, Trade and Traders. 
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Brocklebank.s' decision to employ sail longer than many of their competitors was 
also rooted in their main port of call, Calcutta. Appendix Eight shows the increasing 
importance of Calcutta to the company through the 1860s. Although the company's 
concentration on the Hooghly was less marked after the 1870s, Calcutta did remain their 
primary Indian port. Bombay, a principal beneficiary of steam's new competitiveness, was 
only a minor port of call for Brocklebanks after the 1850s. Using the Cape of Good Hope 
route the sea distance from both Bombay and Calcutta to Britain was about 11,500 miles. 
Via Suez the distance to Bombay was reduced to 6,200 miles. The distance reduction to 
Calcutta was less significant - 8,200 miles using the Suez Canal. Since the Canal was 
unsuited to sailing craft, steamers gained a greater advantage over their rivals on the shorter 
route to Bombay. Before Suez officially opened in 1869 little or no steam tonnage entered 
British ports from Bombay. As early as 1870 just over a third of this tonnage was steam. On 
the UK-Bombay route the cost of a round trip voyage was about equal for steamers and 
sailing vessels (travelling by Suez and the Cape, respectively), by 1872. In 1873 a full sixty-
five percent of Bombay's trade to Britain was carried on by steamers. By the early 1890s 
none of the port's seaborne trade was retained by sail. Calcutta was another case altogether. 
Steam tonnage to that port became slightly more cost-effective than sail only in the 1880s, 
the same decade in which Brocklebanks purchased their first steamer. In the early 1870s 
only premium-value goods were the preserve of steamers at Calcutta. As late as the 1890s 
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a quarter of Calcutta vessel entrances in some trades were still made by sailing vessels. 7 
Evidence reported by Lewis Fischer and Gerald Panting indicates that the nature of 
certain Indian ports may have played a role in the retention of sail tonnage in other ways as 
well. Again, this was not the result of hidebound conservatism on the part of owners like 
Brockle banks but a realistic and sensible business choice given the contemporary dynamics 
of the shipping industry. By the last decades of the nineteenth century the Indian trades were 
largely the preserve of steam. Nonetheless, a good deal of sail tonnage continued to call at 
subcontinental ports. Fischer and Panting's analysis suggests that from 1870 to 1900 sailing 
vessels trading to Asia and the Antipodes, especially if they called in Ceylon, might 
frequently stop at Indian ports to "top up" their holds prior to returning to Britain. At the 
beginning of the period such vessels were more likely to fill up with a single commodity, 
usually cotton. Over time grain became the dominant outward cargo, although by 1900 it 
was most common for a sailing tramp to load with a variety of goods including textiles, jute, 
dyes and tea. This is a simplification of Fischer and Panting's data, but it does make the 
point that India remained a viable niche for sail tonnage up to the turn of the twentieth 
century. Indeed, sail was by no means static or moribund for most of this period; in fact, the 
continued development of sail technology offered more promise to many shipowners than 
7 
Harley, "Sailing Ships to Steamships," 223-224 and 226-227. In actuality, the gap between sail and steam costs 
in the 1880s may have been even less than Harley found. Taking the year 1881 as an example, and assuming the 
costs per 1,000 tons of cargo capacity, his results were £2,470 for sail (Cape) and £2,389 for steam (Suez) from 
the UK to Calcutta. This calculation was based on the assumption that the steamer coaled at Port Said, but that 
no port charges were levied. Therefore the steam figure- as Harley noted- contains a "downward bias." In fact, 
in 1873 the steam cost to Calcutta by Suez was still greater than the Cape route by sail, leaving aside the port 
charges; and this was in a year that Suez Canal dues increased by thirty percent. 
304 
did steam. One such advance was in iron construction- a development which, as we have 
seen, Brocklebanks had adopted well before 1889. In certain trades, such as the carriage of 
South American nitrates, large steel sailing vessels continued to be used into the twentieth 
century. 8 Support for the retention of metal sailing vessels comes both from modem writers, 
such as Graeme Milne, and contemporaries. As Milne noted: 
8 
For many sailing-ship owners ... a sudden shift to steam made no rational 
sense, and far from writing these people off as conservative and backward-
looking, we should give them credit for a sound awareness of their business. 
There is ample evidence that technologies and practices can persist over 
considerable periods of time because keeping them remains, overall, less 
expensive than replacing them ... For a port like Liverpool, which was 
expanding its activities in trade with the Far East and Latin America, a 
continued commitment to sail.. .is a sign of sensible business practice, not 
backwardness. The historian needs to measure the dynamism of a trading 
community by its use of the most appropriate technology, not the most 
Milne, Trade and Traders, 23; Lewis R. Fischer and Gerald E. Panting, "Indian Ports and British Intercontinental 
Sailing Ships: The Subcontinent as an Alternative Source of Cargo, 1870-1900," in K.S. Mathew (ed.), 
Mariners, Merchants and Oceans: Studies in Maritime History (New Delhi, 1995), 373 and 376-380. Fischer 
and Panting bring out a number of important themes in this article. One is the growing complexity of the trade. 
It was not simply that cargoes were becoming more varied but that the average sailing tramp stopping in India 
at the tum of the century would put in at more ports on average than its counterpart thirty years earlier. Also, 
the growing importance of grain as a sail cargo questions the traditional wisdom that the opening of Suez 
basically created the market for Indian grains. Since sail, which was excluded from the Canal, filled ever-
increasing portions of their holds with subcontinent grain, the story may be more complex than previously 
thought. On the guano trade, see Jimmy M. Skaggs, The Great Guano Rush: Entrepreneurs and American 
Overseas Expansion (New York, 1994); C. Alexander G. DeSecada, "Arms, Guano, and Shipping: TheW. R. 
Grace Interests in Peru, 1865-1885," Business History Review, LIX, No. 4 (1985), 597-621; W.M. Mathew, 
"Peru And The British Guano Market, 1840-1870," Economic History Review, XXDI, No. 1 (1970), 112-128; 
Lewis R. Fischer, "The Great Mudhole Fleet: The Voyages and Productivity ofthe Sailing Vessels of Saint John, 
1863-1912;" in David Alexander and Rosemary Ommr ( eds. ), Volumes Not Values: Canadian Sailing Ships and 
World Trades (St. John's, NL, 1979), 117-156; Michael Monte66n, "John T. North, the Nitrate King, and 
Chile's Lost Future," Latin American Perspectives, XXX, No. 6 (2003), 69-90; and Robert G. Greenhill and 
Rory Miller, "The Peruvian Government and the Nitrate Trade," Journal of Latin American Studies, V, No. 1 
(1973), 107-131. 
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"advanced. "9 
From a contemporary perspective, the issue was phrased slightly differently although 
in the same tenor: 
... [I]nvestors may reasonably consider new iron sailing vessels the best 
permanent investment they can find, as when business is good they make 
very large profits, and when freights are low they possess the best staying 
power, being capable of management on most economical principles, and 
requiring almost no outlay for repairs during the first 12 years of their 
existence, so that handsome average dividends are obtained over a course of 
years without deduction for repairs, and only a very trifling rate of 
depreciation. 10 
This notwithstanding, shipping agents quickly came to prefer steam to sail for its 
regularity. Although sailing fleets like Brocklebanks could make several voyages per year, 
arrivals and departures were notoriously irregular. The agents preferred to link up cargoes 
with a steam-based shipper who could give their clients fairly exact dates. Cold storage 
facilities and the submarine cable to Bombay also helped increase the advantages of steam, 
as did steam vessels' more and more efficient engines. 11 
In the interim, however, Brocklebanks did make the best use of their resources. As 
Graph 7.2 in the previous chapter clearly illustrates, the company was achieving economies 
9 
Milne, Trade and Traders, 24 and 28. 
10 
Shipping Gazette and Lloyd's Ust Weekly Summary, 4 January 1884, 7, as quoted in Harley, "Sailing Ships to 
Steamships," 226-227. 
II 
On the Indian Ocean cable, see Kenneth McPherson, The Indian Ocean: A History of People and the Sea (Delhi, 
1993); and Jorma Ahvenainen, "The Role of the Telegraph in the 19th Century Revolution of Communications," 
in Michael North (ed.), Kommunikationsrevolutionen. Die neuenMedien des 16. Und 19. Jahrhunderts (Koln, 
1995), 73-80. 
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of scale by operating larger tonnage, and the average tonnage of Brocklebanks' fleet rose 
significantly even before their switch to steam. In the 1820s the fleet's average tonnage per 
annum stood at only 5,315, while by the 1880s this had grown to 20,925 tons. The theory and 
practice behind economies of scale in shipping is that a bigger vessel does not require a 
proportionally larger number of men to operate. Therefore, crew costs will hardly rise while 
the amount of cargo carried on any single voyage can be considerably larger. As an example, 
the 1,302- gross-ton Rajmahal, launched by the Whitehaven yard on 16 April, 185 8, had a 
crew of thirty-three officers and hands. The 3,007-gross-ton Sindia was constructed for 
Brocklebanks by Harland & Wolff in 1887. Although it was almost three times the tonnage 
of the Rajmahal, the vessel carried only three extra crew members. Brocklebanks were 
helped in making this adaptation by the switch to iron vessels, and by 1872 five full-rigged 
iron ships from Harland & Wolff had joined the fleet- Alexandra, Baroda, Candahar, 
Tenasserim II and Chinsura. On average these new craft were 400 tons larger than the old 
wooden vessels. In 1874 the ships made fourteen sailings from Liverpool to Calcutta, plus 
one to Australia and a few to China. The firm maintained a reputation for quality-built ships 
which served them well when they did look to attract outside cargoes. As late as 1885 
Brocklebanks despatched eleven sail vessels to Calcutta, three of the newer craft averaging 
2,000 tons each. Two years on, the four-masted barque Sindia was launched for 
Brocklebanks, along with the similarly rigged Holkar the following year. At 3,000 net tons 
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each, they were among the world's largest sailing vessels. 12 
Referring back to Graph 7.1, however, there is little evidence that Brocklebanks were 
further reducing costs by holding on to older tonnage. In 1885, for example, the average age 
ofthe fleet's vessels was twelve years. This was up somewhat from the decade before, when 
the average age stood at only nine years. The 1885 average was actually lower than 1845, 
1855 and 1865. By 1895, when steamers comprised much of the fleet's tonnage, the average 
vessel age stood at ten years- lower than 1885 but higher than 1875. In terms of gross 
investment, tonnage added to Brocklebanks' fleet in the 1840s, for example, lasted on 
average about 18.3 years. By the 1880s newly-registered tonnage could expect to remain 
with the fleet for a somewhat shorter span, 15.5 years. 13 
In 1900 the company did take another step toward reducing voyage costs by replacing 
12 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Liverpool-Calcutta Trade, 12; Vessels Built by T. & J. Brocklebank; 
Brocklebank Fleet, 1775-1945; BT 1071108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; John Frederick Gibson, 
"The House ofBrocklebank (1 ),"Sea Breezes, XVll (1954), 50-54; Gibson, Brack/ebanks: 1770-1950 (2 vols., 
Liverpool, 1953), I, 147-157; Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets: Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank (Uckfield, East 
Sussex, 1994), 44 and 54; and David E. Stillwell, "Brocklebanks: The Final Century," Sea Breezes, LVIII 
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Calcutta run for some time after the first steamers joined the fleet. For example, the ship-rigged Majestic, built 
in 1875, was a regular trader to Calcutta in the early 1890s. Under J. Nicholson the vessel made the voyage from 
Liverpool at least three times from 1890to 1893. Great Britain, BT 100, British Empire Agreements and 
Accounts of Crew, Majestic, 1891 and 1893. 
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all European deck and engine room seamen with cheaper Indian Lascars. Europeans were 
retained as officers and quartermasters, however. Evidence from the Crew Agreements 
indicates that Brocklebanks were moving in this direction even earlier, employing Lascars 
after the first voyages of the steamers Ameer and Gaekwar. On Boxing Day 1896, for 
example, Gaekwar arrived at Dundee. The vessel had departed Liverpool just over three 
months previously, making calls at Calcutta and Colombo. The agreement notes that sailors 
on this particular voyage were Lascars (likely Indian). Such a manning strategy would have 
been eminently practical for Brocklebanks. British vessels had used foreign and colonial 
seamen at least since the 1600s, but the practice took on new importance after 1850. The 
repeal of the Navigation Acts reduced barriers to foreign and colonial hiring. In addition, the 
introduction of steam made Jack Tar's traditional skills largely redundant. On steamers these 
qualifications were replaced with industrial skills more akin to shore-based industry. Now 
shipowners could readily hire seamen in any port without worrying about specialized 
qualifications. Thus, steam brought with it an influx of non-British mariners. Conventional 
wisdom held that Lascars were better able to cope with stokehold work during tropical 
voyages. In addition, it was practically impossible to replace European seamen and engine 
room personnel at Asian ports. By 1891 over twenty-two percent of seamen on British craft 
were foreigners. From the perspective of cost cutting, Indian seamen were especially 
desirable, being the lowest paid mariners in the shipping industry. Their wages were up to 
a third less than comparable British sailors, and their victualing costs were even lower than 
Arabs or Chinese. Brocklebanks' use of Calcutta as their principal Indian port also made 
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Lascar seamen an attractive choice. As was the case with Bombay, the port had long-
standing ties to coastal shipping and thus a large supply of experienced seamen. Although 
there were reports of corruption in the recruitment process, British firms in the Indian trades 
were by and large pleased with "a system which virtually ran itself at very little cost." 14 
The employment of Lascar seamen and the conversion of the fleet to larger iron 
vessels were only two of a number of changes underway at Brocklebanks from the 1870s. 
By the late-1880s Thomas and Ralph Brocklebank had already changed with the times and 
were basically pure shipowners - despite the tendency still to refer to themselves as 
merchants. This is similar to what Sager and Panting found in Atlantic Canada where many 
shipowners also considered, and referred to, themselves as merchants. The difference in the 
Brockle banks case is that by the late-nineteenth century they were probably functioning less 
as actual merchants than their colonial counterparts; for Brocklebanks, shipowning itselfhad 
become the main focus of their enterprise. 15 From this point on outside cargoes had to be 
found, and the Brocklebank cousins realised the switch to steam was essential. As Francis 
Hyde remarked, " ... the Brocklebanks had already gained experience of the Indian primary 
14 
G. Balachandran, "Recruitment and Control oflndian Seamen: Calcutta, 1880-1935," International Journal of 
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commodity trades through the provision of well-ordered services, but it was the steamship 
which was henceforth to foster the commercial potentialities ofthe trade."16 Following the 
1889 delivery of Ameer, Brocklebank:s soon purchased the steamer Gaekwar. Like 
Brocklebanks' sail tonnage, contemporaries considered these steamers to be some of the best 
of their type in service. With their advent, a new era began for the company. From the 
purchase of Gaekwar though to the Great War Brocklebanks acquired some nineteen vessels, 
amounting to 112,506 tons, all of which were steamers (see Appendix 6B). 17 
Although no longer purchasing sailing vessels, Brocklebanks continued to run old 
wind-driven tonnage for well over a decade after the beginning of their steam fleet. The later 
careers of these vessels harkened back to an earlier era when tramping was more common 
than liner shipping. Once again, the old sail craft became wanderers, searching for cargoes 
wherever they might be had. Brockle banks' sailing vessels could be found in any number 
of European, American and Pacific ports in the fin de siecle era. These new niche trades 
might include carrying bulk cargoes such as coal or salt from British and European ports (or 
case oil from New York) to India. Return voyages would frequently carry jute from Calcutta, 
which was often returned not to Liverpool but Dundee. 18 As tramps, these vessels' ports of 
16 
Hyde, Liverpool, 106. 
17 
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call were truly global. The 1,967 -ton ship Khyber, for example, was mainly employed on the 
old Liverpool-Calcutta run through the 1880s, but this pattern changed thereafter. The vessel 
sailed to Colombo and Cochin in 1892. In 1894 Khyber departed London, making stops in 
ports such as Middlesbrough, Calcutta, New York, Dundee and Madagascar, before arriving 
back at its home port in 1898. Under master H. H. Steele she departed Liverpool again before 
the year was out, loading at the Australian ports of Sydney and Newcastle from June through 
October 1899. During its return voyage Khyber also put in at the South American ports of 
Valparaiso and Iquique, finally ending the voyage at Hamburg. From 1901-1902, 
commanded by Henry Rushery, the ship traversed half the globe, starting at the Irish port of 
Dublin. From there it sailed, as per its crew agreement " ... to New York," then on to Hong 
Kong. Khyber next doubled back, loading at both Astoria and Portland, Oregon, ending its 
voyage at Cardiff in March 1903. Brocklebanks' rigging preference for most of these last 
sailing vessels was the ship (like the Khyber) and the four-masted barque. These were craft 
built especially for their carrying capacity, not for their speed, and they were described as 
"ugly" when in port. The last sailing vessel to be purchased by the Brocklebanks was the 
Holkar. Added to the roster in 1888, it remained part of the Brocklebanks fleet until 1901 
when it was sold to German owners who promptly renamed her Odessa and continued to 
operate her until she was captured by the Royal Navy in 1915. H olkar had made her first run 
to Calcutta in 1888 and toward the end of her tenure was one of the few sailing craft still 
operated by the firm. Ironically, the commander of the boarding party that took her 
immediately recognized the vessel, having worked for Brocklebanks as an apprentice many 
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years previously. 19 
Despite the continuity provided by the remaining sailing vessels, this period was 
generally transitional for the company. Some of the firms in the Calcutta trade by the late-
nineteenth century have already been mentioned, but in addition there were quite a few 
others. Many leading shippers in the trade felt that competition was becoming too severe and 
that this was exacerbated by rising costs. With the advent of the steamer on Indian routes 
after the opening of the Suez Canal, these trends only increased, and ports in the 
subcontinent were clogged with steam tonnage. The Rathbone family who, like the 
Brocklebanks, were long established in the Indian trades, were unable to stave off the worst 
effects of competition and sold their steamers to Harrisons. Action had to be taken. In 
August 1875 the Calcutta Conference was founded by seven of the port's regular lines. 
Based on the port rather than India as a whole, the Calcutta arrangement became the first of 
many deep-sea conferences arranged by British shipping companies. Under the conference 
system freight rates in a particular trade would be fixed at levels that could be supported by 
the commodities involved. In effect, established shippers closed ranks and attempted to 
squeeze out newcomers while ensuring that no harmful "rate wars" broke out among the 
members (the latter ideal was less than effective, as we will see). With some stability in 
long-term freight rates, merchants could plan for the future with a measure of confidence 
since they could estimate costs and revenues with some precision. Moreover, because 
19 
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conference members could regulate the supply of tonnage on offer, the likelihood of 
crippling rate wars was reduced. To ensure loyalty, the Calcutta Conference pioneered 
deferred rebates in 1877. To earn a rebate shippers were required to use conference tonnage 
for all their goods for a set period of time; only when these conditions had been met did the 
client receive the rebate. 20 
Although the system sounds almost foolproof, in fact it was by no means perfect. 
From time to time there was fierce in-fighting among members of the Calcutta Conference, 
a situation exacerbated by the presence of competitors, Brocklebanks prominent among 
them. Hendersons' Anchor Line (a member from the early 1880s) became disenchanted 
20 
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with the conference system. They quit the Calcutta Conference to compete in the freight 
market after rejection of their demands for more sailings and increased outward cargoes. In 
the same era Brocklebanks provided the Conference with its main competition, particularly 
in the carriage ofbulk commodities. The Conference lines had hoped to bring Brocklebanks 
within the fold, but the idea was shelved following Anchor's defection. The result was a 
financially damaging rate war, as both Anchor and Brocklebanks stepped up competition 
with Conference vessels. Brocklebanks began loading tea cargoes at rates well below that 
charged by the Conference, which responded by reducing its own rates for tea carriage. 
Francis Hyde contends that in 1891 Harrisons' earnings dropped from £143,00 to £72,000, 
partly due to increased competition from Brocklebanks. The situation was not stabilized 
until1892 when Brocklebanks joined (and Anchor rejoined) the Calcutta Conference.21 
Over the years a number of other issues divided conference members. In the 1890s, 
for instance, Brocklebanks and Harrisons opposed the adoption of a freer market in tea, 
championed by conference member George Smith of City Line, who did not want to offend 
tea shippers. Adoption of this system might by necessity have extended to goods like salt, 
linseed, jute and gunny cloth - important cargoes for both Brocklebanks and Harrisons -
replacing deferred rebates. The issue remained a source of friction until 1895 when a 
tentative arrangement to retain the deferred rebate was reached. In time a new basis for 
agreement was reached whereby the Indian market was shared among all the Conference 
21 
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members. Still, the Calcutta Conference remained, as Hyde termed it, "a loosely-knit 
structure." Between 1875 and 1900 practically all members of the Conference considered 
breaking away when they felt their particular needs were not being met. Despite such 
problems, the working arrangements reached among Conference members provided some 
measure of stability to Brocklebanks, Harrisons and their main Indian trade rivals, Clan, 
Anchor and City Lines- a workable relationship that lasted until1914.22 
For obvious reasons, conferences tended to work best when their sole members were 
liner operators. Tramp shipowners were unlikely to seek conference membership because 
their goal was to engross whatever cargo happened to be available. This often entailed 
negotiations about rates, something that of course was antithetical to conference members. 
In addition, tramps were often chartered by merchants to carry their own goods, and these 
charterers were not generally interested in collaborating with competitors. Although frowned 
upon today, these practices were common in late nineteenth-century shipping. In theory, 
abuse was prevented because unreasonably high rates would encourage outside competitors, 
such as the tramps. In fact, a Royal Commission of the early twentieth century reported 
favourably on the Calcutta Conference. In their day conferences were considered perfectly 
22 
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legal and were not thought to have exploited shippers.23 
Whether or not Brocklebanks was doing anything underhanded, there were at least 
some contemporaries who thought so. Prior to their entry into the Calcutta Conference, 
Brocklebanks, as an ancillary of their shipping business, acted as agents for the East India 
railway. In this period it was common for the older shipping concerns to act as agents and 
brokers. At least one rival felt he was being squeezed out of the Indian shipping business by 
what he perceived to be unfair business practices by Brockle banks acting in their brokerage 
and agent roles. 24 This rival, David Brown, wrote that: 
23 
... an owner is compelled to charter his vessel for these freights through 
certain brokers [the reference here to Brocklebanks], who, in addition to the 
ordinary brokerage, also bind the ship to special houses in India under a 
consignment commission for homeward freight & c & c .. .In the case 
of.. .guaranteed Indian Railways, it is the fact that the broker receives from 
the railway company 11 per ton for engaging their tonnage ... Ship-owners 
have been sailing their vessels for the past few years in too many cases with 
loss, whilst the ship brokers have been making enormous gains, standing as 
charterers and not as brokers between the merchant and ship-owner .. .In the 
Indian and Australian Berth lines a kind of trades-Union exists, not for the 
benefit of the shipowners, however, as they are bargained with to the last 
shilling, but for the benefit of the brokers, who agree together the amount of 
freight they will give for the vessels they charter ... [I]t does not pay them to 
load a ship for 5 per cent commission ... As near as I can gather, the profits are 
Armstrong, "Conferences," 55-56. For further information on the conference system generally and the 
Commission's findings, see Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers (BPP) 1909, 
XLVII-XLVIII, "Royal Commission on Shipping Rings." If contemporaries viewed shipping conferences with 
equanimity, they showered far less praise on railroads, especially in North America. For examples of restraints 
of trade by US railroads in the late nineteenth century, and the complaints that these engendered among users, 
see Robert J. McFall, Railway Monopoly and Rate Regulation (New York, 1968). 
24 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, David Brown, "Private Correspondence," 12 May 1879. By this period it was 
common for shipping lines such as Brocklebanks to act as agents for their clients. 
generally from 20 to 40 per cent, and I have before me a list of some half-
a- dozen vessels recently loaded on the Indian Berth to Australia, on each of 
which I understand the brokers made from £500 to £1000 and certainly the 
rates paid by the shippers at the time fully bear out these figures - these 
profits, I am quite given to understand, the various brokers place into one 
common fund, and divide up pro-rata at stated periods. 25 
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This brokerage arrangement in itself appears much like an informal conference. 
Whether it was fair or not depended on which side of the fence one sat. An employee of 
Brocklebanks, R. Todd, later commented on this letter to the company's then head, Col. 
Denis Bates. Todd remarked on certain other points made by Brown, saying that Brown had 
apparently tried to load his vessel in Calcutta but that Brocklebanks had sent out their own 
vessel and offered rebates to their regular shippers to have them desert Brown's craft. Other 
charges Brown apparently made against Brocklebanks were that in their role as sole agents 
for the East India Railway they were able to make profits of £300 to £400 on a single vessel 
and still were able to load other cargo to supplement their "ill gotten gains." Bates noted that 
the charge against them was "so colossal it makes one think of Tammany." Todd noted that 
whether it was through the ordinary course of business or directly a result of Brown's 
protests, Brocklebanks lost the railway's sole agency not long after 1879, although they still 
carried much of its cargo as late as 1925. After 1892, the Calcutta Conference perhaps acted 
25 
Ibid. Although Brown was talking more about brokers, the pooling of receipts was not unknown in the 
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as a more formal substitute for such arrangements. 26 
Although change, technological or otherwise, was the principal theme for 
Brocklebanks from the late 1880s on, the actual structure of the company had altered little 
in decades. Thomas, by then Sir Thomas- made a Baronet by his friend Gladstone in 1885 
- along with his cousin Ralph, had been in firm control of the company for forty years. 
Although the business had switched from wood to iron, was making the transition from sail 
to steam, and would soon join the Calcutta Conference, they remained a family concern. In 
1886 Ralph Brocklebank and his son, Ralph Jr., who had also joined the business, retired. 
The elder Brocklebank died on 2 February1892, leaving the considerable sum of £799,644 
in his will. Sir Thomas continued as head of the firm for a number of years after cousin 
Ralph's retirement, but he finally left in 1895. Upon his departure his two sons, Thomas and 
Harold, assumed control under the terms of a detailed "Memorandum Agreement," which 
transferred all shares and assets from father to sons. It is interesting to note that even at this 
late date family members were still referred to as "Merchants and Shipowners," though their 
business was now firmly based on the second function. The two young brothers had been 
active with the firm for a number of years and already controlled one-fifth ofBrocklebanks' 
26 
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assets, estimated at £225,000. Although the first Sir Thomas died in 1906, aged ninety two, 
the traditional family structure of the business continued until 1912, the year after the 
younger Sir Thomas passed away. In 1911 Harold assumed the Chairmanship, while Sir 
Thomas' son Aubrey took over day-to-day management, a job with which he already had 
some familiarity. 27 Indeed, Aubrey was appointed to his first position on the Board of 
Directors at their meeting in July 1898 where it was "resolved unanimously that Mr. James 
D. Maxwell and Mr. Aubrey Brocklebank be, and they are hereby appointed managing 
Directors of [Brocklebanks]."28 In fact, adherence to the family-firm model during this 
period was not the result of any particular reticence on the part of Brocklebanks. Many 
British shipping companies made the change from this organizational structure much later. 
As Gordon Boyce reminds us, 
27 
It was not until salient changes brought a new contracting culture into being 
after World War II that Harrisons ... and many other firms admitted significant 
numbers of professionally trained specialists and restructured their business. 
Before that time, owners continued to secure the talent they needed using 
traditional contracts, and although compelled to share rents with salaried 
men, families determined the basis of division. 29 
During this important period the company underwent structural changes apart from 
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those caused by changes in the people at the helm. With the advent of a steam fleet 
Brockle banks brought in a superintendent engineer, bought new coal bunkers and stores, and 
generally increased the pace of the firm. Closer contact permitted by the telegraph meant 
that decisions once left by necessity to the discretion of a master or supercargo now became 
the purview of management. In the Calcutta trade, conferences failed to weed out all 
competition, especially from foreigners who were usually outside the British conference 
structures. As with all businesses, the goal of Calcutta shippers was to protect their niche to 
ensure survival and profitability. 30 
Partially in response to the growing changes in the industry, many firms at this time 
became limited liability companies. Normally this meant bringing in a number of outsiders 
as shareholders with the advantage of their new ideas and outlooks but with the drawback 
of losing some control over the enterprise. On 28 September 1898 Brocklebanks took this 
step but tailored the change to suit their own interests. Although the firm was parcelled out 
into shareholdings, practically all of these went to family members who were already 
involved with the business; a few residual shares were allotted to company employees. The 
share distribution was as follows: Thomas and Harold Brocklebank 1,247 shares each; and 
Aubrey Brocklebank, J.D. Maxwell (shipowner), J.M. Stamper (secretary), R.R. Woodcock 
(cashier), James Sandilands (freight clerk) and A.B. Hughes (freight clerk), 1 share apiece. 
Shares were valued at £100 each, and the share distribution was renewed, with the same 
30 
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investors and holdings, on 20 March 1900.31 
The new limited-liability company continued to increase its investment in steam 
tonnage, and the steam-powered fleet increased steadily from 1890 through 1905. By 1902 
Brocklebanks owned six steamers. In 1905 four new vessels built by Harland & Wolff were 
added to the fleet which then consisted of the Ameer, Gaekwar, Pindari, Mahratta, 
Marwarri, Bengali, Mahronda, Malakand, Manipur andMatheran. In total, Brocklebanks' 
fleet that year amounted to nine vessels, at 48,372 gross tons, and averaging 5,375 tons per 
vessel. By this date all but the venerable Khyber were steamers. All the steamers by this 
stage had names that reflected the company's long relationship with India in general and 
Calcutta in particular. After the twin-screw Pindari experienced trouble with its starboard 
propellor on an 1894 voyage it was decided to operate the vessel on its port screw alone. The 
steamer made the passage from Calcutta to Britain on the single screw in forty-eight days. 
It was decided from this point on that all new Brocklebank steamers would be of single-
screw construction, as were the four that were added in 1905. The new fleet represented the 
cutting edge oftechnology. The 1905 additions were equipped with powerful steam winches 
and the latest cargo- working gear. The vessels had cellular double bottoms to enable them 
to carry water as ballast, and a few first-class passengers were provided with staterooms 
31 
"NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, "Register of Shareholders & c. Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank Limited," 1898 and 
20 March 1900; Administration, Minutes of Directors' Meeting, 28 September 1898; and Stillwell, 
"Brocklebanks: The Final Century," 116. About forty years later Denis H. Bates stated that "for purely family 
reasons, the business was turned into a private limited company ... under the title Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank, 
Limited," although Bates gave no further insight into this decision. Bates, "Liverpool Shipping Company's 167 
Years ofProgress," The Liverpolitan (September 1937), 29. 
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fitted with electric lighting. 32 
The general tendency in this period, one which developed more sharply over time, 
was toward the concentration on a particular trade. Companies often worked out 
arrangements to this end which amounted to "mini-conferences." For example, if two 
companies had been accustomed to trading to Calcutta and Shanghai, it might be arranged 
for one to concentrate on Calcutta, while the other shifted their business more to Shanghai. 
Brocklebanks had, of course, been quasi-specialists in the Calcutta trade since at least the 
1860s, although they never completely gave up trading to other ports. Ironically, the 
remaining sail fleet in the 1890s, as we have seen, caused Brocklebanks tonnage to range 
more widely in search of cargoes, and the 1905 steam acquisitions had a similar effect. 33 
Because the four craft delivered by Harland & Wolff created a surplus of tonnage in the 
Calcutta trade, the firm decided to redeploy some of their vessels on East Asian routes. 34 
Although Calcutta had long been the primary destination for Brocklebanks shipping, 
32 
Gibson, Brockle banks, IT, 9; Stillwell, "Brocklebanks: The Final Century," 116-117 and 129-133; NML, MMM, 
MAL, B/BROC, Brocklebank Fleet, 1775-1945; Gibson, "House of Brocklebank (I)," 50-54; and Haws, 
Brocklebank. Brocklebanks' late start in the use of steam led them to avoid the transitional auxiliary steamers 
so prevalent on the Liverpool registries for much of the late-nineteenth century, at least for the most part. Most 
ofBrocklebanks' post-1889 tonnage consisted of pure steamers, although the company's first steam vessel, the 
4,127 gross ton Ameer, while up-to-date and employing a triple expansion engine, still carried a full spread of 
sails on its foremast. NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Brocklebank Fleet, 1775-1945; BT 107/108, Liverpool 
Vessel Registries, 1889; and John Clarkson and Roy Fenton, Ships in Focus: Anchor and Brocklebank Lines 
(Longton, Preston, 1994), 37. 
33 
For a discussion of the choice between operating steamers as tramps or liners, see robin Craig, The Ship: Steam 
Tramps and Cargo Liners, 1850-1950 (London, 1980). 
34 
Gibson, Brocklebanks, IT, 9. 
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their interest in East Asia, and especially in Chinese ports, had never ceased, as illustrated 
in Appendix Thirteen. The firm started their East Asian service with the sailing of the 
Superior to Batavia and Singapore on 16 August 1829. By the 1830s about three percent of 
all Brocklebanks' shipping movements were to the Far East. The percentages rose to 
approximately seven and nine, respectively, in the 1850s and 1860s. From 1829 there were 
voyages to at least one Asian port, excluding India, in almost every year. Through the 1840s 
Singapore remained an important destination, along with Brocklebanks' first Chinese port 
of call, Canton. After the 1840s Brockle banks all but discontinued sailings to Batavia, with 
the last voyage being made by the Tigris in December 1863. From the 1840s, Chinese ports 
became the focus of the company's Asian trade outside India, with the ports of Hong Kong 
and Shanghai the primary destinations. 35 
35 
Gore 's Liverpool Advertiser, various years. The story ofBrocklebanks trade to China, like that to India, parallels 
the rising fortunes of Britain and other imperial powers during the nineteenth century. It was noted above that 
Brocklebanks' Chinese sailings at first focused on Canton, but by the late 1840s these shifted decisively toward 
Shanghai and Hong Kong. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Manchus had closed virtually the entire 
country to European trade. At the time Brocklebanks became involved in Chinese trading foreigners could do 
business only through Canton- hence the company's focus on this port. In 1839, however, the British fought 
China in the First Opium War (1839-1841) to protect their trade in the drug, notwithstanding that the carriage 
of opium was illegal in China. Following a British victory, China was forced to sign the Treaty ofNanking in 
1842. Under the treaty five ports, including Shanghai, were opened to British trade. The treaty also ceded Hong 
Kong to Britain, and these two ports quickly became the focus of trading activity by Brocklebanks, among other 
firms. It is significant that the first company sailing to Hong Kong was in 1844, only two years after the treaty 
signing; trade to Shanghai also started before the decade was out. See Christina Jane Baird, "The Liverpool 
China Trade 1834-1880" (PhD thesis, 2 vols., London, 1997); Belchem and Price (eds.), Dictionary of 
Nineteenth-Century History, 27-28, 122 and 625; J.P. Kenyon (ed.). The Wordvworth Dictionary of British 
History (Ware, Hertfordshire, 1996), 176; and Arthur Cotterell, China: A History (London, 1995), 230-233. 
For a view ofthe opium trade from India to China and the connection of such to the world economy see Man-
Houng Lin, "World Recession, Indian Opium, and China's Opium War," in Mathew ( ed. )., Mariners, Merchants 
and Oceans, 385-417. The author links a contemporary world recession and China's problems regarding the 
outflow of sliver to pay for opium imports. During an upturn in the trade cycle the impact may have been less 
severe because China could have made good its losses in bullion by exporting more tea and silk. Moreover, the 
recession encouraged the traffic in opium. The convergence of factors meant that China's money supply fell 
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With the addition of their new tonnage in 1905 Brocklebank:s started a service from 
Antwerp to Singapore, Shanghai, Kobe and Yokohama. With the addition of these latter 
ports Brocklebanks moved to conquer a new trade - that to Japan. One of the steamers 
placed on this service was the Gaekwar. During the 1890s the 4,220-ton vessel was 
employed on the traditional Calcutta run while also stopping at Colombo, Bombay and Port 
Said. Starting in 1906 Gaekwar was redirected to East Asia. Starting from Dundee in March 
with Peter Rice in command, she was at Antwerp from the 5th to the 14th of that month. The 
steamer returned to London around the twentieth, and a month later was in Cochine, China. 
At the beginning of May Gaekwar called at Singapore, before arriving at Shanghai, where 
it remained for five days. On 19 May the vessel departed for Japan. Rice and his crew spent 
from 23 May to 13 June in the country, calling at the ports of Shimonoseki, Kobe and 
Yokohama. A little over two weeks later Gaekwar docked at the colony of Hong Kong, and 
by mid-July it put in at the familiar port of Calcutta. After a voyage of almost seven months 
Captain Rice brought his vessel back to Britain - this time to Hull - on 25 September. 36 
behind demand, giving an economic impetus to the Opium War. For a useful discussion of early European and 
Asian trade linkages, not to mention Asia's own regional trade networks, see G.B. Souza, "Convergence before 
Divergence: Global Maritime Economic History and Material Culture," International Journal of Maritime 
History, xvn, No. 2 (December 2005), forthcoming. Using alum and sappanwood as his study commodities 
Souza demonstrates, among other findings, that trade - both regional and global - went far beyond the usual 
"luxury" goods and precious metals normally studied in relation to Asian commodity exchange. The Liverpool 
company most synonymous with East Asian trading was Holts' Blue Funnel Line (Ocean Steam Ship Company), 
which inaugurated a steam service to Shanghai and other Asian ports in 1865. See Duncan Haws, Merchant 
Fleets: Blue Funnel Line (Burwash, East Sussex, 1984); Francis Hyde with J. R. Harris, Blue Funnel. A History 
of Alfred Holt and Company of Liverpool from 1865 to 1914 (Liverpool, 1956); and Malcolm Falkus, The Blue 
Funnel Legend. A History of the Ocean Steam Ship Company, 1865-197 3 (London, 1990). 
36 
BT 100, Gaekwar, various years. The 1906 voyage was typical ofGaekwar's passages at this time. From 1908-
1909, for instance, the vessel sailed from Middlesborough, calling at Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Kobe 
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One ofBrocklebanks' rivals in the Chinese and Japanese trades was London's Shire 
Line, owned by Jenkins & Co. With the inauguration oftheir Japanese service Brocklebanks 
immediately bought half the shares in the Shire Line, a deal that included a payment for the 
company's good will. The Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, owned by Owen Philips, 
became a partner in this venture in 1907, with shares being divided up one-third each. When 
Jenkins later left the shipping business, Brockle banks and Royal Mail became equal partners 
in the trade. In the period 1905-1911 (the year Gaekwar was sold) Brocklebanks steamers 
made regular voyages to Japan- in addition to their traditional trading area in India- via 
the Suez Canal. 37 
Despite the changes Brocklebanks underwent during this period there was very little 
substantive change in the way the company did business. Apart from the Board of Directors, 
the firm, then operating ten vessels, still employed only thirteen office staff, of whom four 
were apprentices. Captain W. Ray was Marine Superintendent, with Walter Grieve as 
Superintendent Engineer~ J. Stamper handled the duties of Manager and Secretary, while 
and Colombo. See BT 100, Gaekwar, 1908-1909. 
37 
Gore 's Liverpool Advertiser, various years; and Gibson, Brockle banks, II, 9-10. On Royal Mail's involvement, 
see Martin J. Daunton, Royal Mail: The Post Office since 1840 (London, 1985); Edwin Green and Michael 
Moss,A Business o.fNational Importance. The Royal Mail Shipping Group 1902-193 7 (London, 1 982); Richard 
Storey, "The Royal Mail Stearn Packet Company Crisis: A Footnote," Journal of Transport History, VII, No. 
2 (1986), 93-96; Peter N. Davies, "Business Success and the Role of Chance: The Extraordinary Philipps 
Brothers," Business History, XXIII, No.2 (1981), 208-232; Davies and A.M. Bourn, "Lord Kylsant and the 
Royal Mail," Business History; XIV, No. 2 (1972), 103-123; Robert G. Greenhill, "The Royal Mail Stearn 
Packet Company and the Development ofStearnship Links with Latin America, 1875-1900," Maritime History, 
III, No. 1 (1973), 67-91; and Greenhill, "The State under Pressure: The West Indian Mail Contract 1905," 
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A.B. Hughes was Outward Freight Manager. Frederick Gibson's account ofBrocklebanks 
history describes an office life that was becoming outmoded at the turn of the twentieth 
century - and one which seems especially quaint today. 38 
There was an unhurried simplicity about the office life in those days [circa 
1905]. Aubrey and Harold Brocklebank would drive in from the country by 
car; or, perhaps, arrive by coach from another part of Liverpool. Their small 
offices were on the ground floor. Upstairs, the gas-lit rooms were heated by 
a coal fire in which the apprentices would roast chestnuts when no one was 
looking. It was the end of the Victorian belief that progress was bound to 
continue. 39 
On the surface, the timing of Brocklebanks' strategic changes often makes them 
appear dilatory. At this point, however, the company was about to embark on the most 
striking restructuring in their long history. None of the entrepreneurial transitions since 
Daniel Brocklebank handed control to Thomas and Jonathan involved more than one 
generation of the family passing the torch to the next. Not even the second-generation name 
change or the 1898 transfer to a limited company had altered the actual structure of the firm. 
By 1911 Brocklebanks' position was different, and both Harold and Sir Aubrey (now the 
third Baronet) were considering selling. This transfer is mentioned in practically all 
company histories, but there is little explanation. It appears both Brocklebanks felt that the 
firm could no longer remain competitive against increasingly large conglomerates. As 
38 
Gibson, Brocklebanks, IT, 11. 
39 
Ibid. 
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Gibson vaguely worded it, "shipowning was becoming complicated and specialized. "40 
Gordon Boyce's work on British shipping may help put the Brocklebank situation 
into a wider context. According to Boyce, the decade from 190 1 to 1910 was a period of 
transition in British shipping. One of the main elements of this transformation, alluded to 
by most commentators on Brocklebanks, was the tendency toward increasing size. 
Businesses now began to look beyond traditional family structures to build new business 
networks. These expansions generally took the form of consolidations, the absorption of 
smaller rivals and the building of inter-company linkages. Prior to 1900 the older patterns 
appeared to function quite satisfactorily, but circumstances soon altered. The main impetus 
for change came not from Britain, which still clung to the family business model, nor even 
from a shipping industry insider. The greatest challenge to British control of the shipping 
industry, and the springboard for change in its business model, came from J.P. Morgan.41 
Morgan is remembered in popular lore as one of the greatest American financiers and 
railroad tycoons. It was perhaps natural that a man of his ambition would try to extend his 
influence over transportation beyond America's shores. In 1900 Morgan's influence in 
financial circles was at its peak. His banking concerns were valued at more than 
$160,000,000; his railroad interests controlled almost 30,000 miles of track in the 
40 
Ibid.; Gibson, "House of Brocklebank (2)," 113; and Clarkson and Fenton, Anchor and Brocklebank, 35. 
41 
Boyce, Information, Mediation and Institutional Development, 121; and Adam W. Kirkaldy, British Shipping. 
Its History, Organization and Importance (London, 1914), 172. 
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continental United States~ and his influence was felt throughout most branches of American 
industry. His ideas regarding shipping were comparatively simple, though they would have 
been impossible for most people. Morgan proposed to absorb all the world's major shipping 
companies and combine them to provide an integrated service with his railways. In other 
words, he proposed to stretch his "railroad terminals across the Atlantic. '"'2 
After acquiring the two largest American shipping companies, Morgan switched his 
attention to Britain. He acquired the Leyland Line's forty vessels in April 1901 for 
$12,000,000. This was an important gain because Leyland was then the world's largest 
transatlantic freighter company. Later that same year White Star Line and their eight liners, 
at the time more profitable than Cunard's passenger business, became part of the Morgan 
group for $40,000,000 in cash and stocks. This purchase was followed soon by the 
acquisition of the Dominion Line for a "mere" $4,500,000. In just over a year the Morgan 
group gained control of one hundred vessels, amounting to a fifth of all tonnage in the trans-
Atlantic cargo trades, and a third of the lucrative Atlantic passenger service.43 
The European press opinion railed against the "Morganization" of the Atlantic, but 
42 
Melvin Maddocks, et al. The Great Liners (Alexandria, VA, 1982), 98. John Pierpont Morgan was born in 
Hartford Connecticut in 1837, the son ofBritish banker Junius Morgan. His career in business started when he 
became his father's agent in the United States. Maintaining ties with both London and Paris, his financial house 
Drexel & Morgan stood at the top of the profession by the 1870s. Following the failure of his rival Jay Cooke 
in 1873, Morgan had little American competition. As an investment banker he promoted vertical integration in 
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New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art. He died in Rome in 1913. Belchem and Price (eds.), Dictionary of 
Nineteenth-Century History, 390-391. 
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Maddocks, et al, Great Liners, 98; and Kirkaldy, British Shipping, 172. 
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in business circles profit margins often spoke louder than patriotism. At the beginning of 
1902 the two largest German lines, Hamburg-Amerika (HAP AG) and Norddeutscher (North 
German) Lloyd, although refusing to sell, did agree to a ten-year affiliation with Morgan's 
group to avoid undue competition. With this agreement in hand, Morgan formed a holding 
company for the fleet, naming it the International Mercantile Marine Company (IMM), 
capitalized at $170,000,000. This figure, however, was arrived at by estimating future stock 
values, which at best was a rather risky move. At the time events seemed to be moving so 
much in Morgan's favour that the gamble seemed likely to pay off.44 
It was at this point that IMM suffered their first reversal. Cunard, one ofthe British 
Empire's premier liner companies, and certainly the safest, was the next target of Morgan's 
aspirations. He proposed to the company's directors that he buy their shares at more than 
eighty percent above market value. The deal was certainly attractive, but this time patriotism 
outweighed profit. Since the two major German lines had not been swallowed up, many in 
Britain feared that the German government would be able to coopt a fleet of nine fast liners 
that might be converted into auxiliary cruisers in time of war. Erstwhile British tonnage 
currently owned by Cunard - seventeen craft in all - would be unavailable for such 
conversion if Morgan's plan came to fruition. National ideals were also at stake. Britain 
44 
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Thomas R. Navin and Marian V. Sears, "A Study in Merger: Formation of the International Mercantile Marine 
Company," Business History Review, XXVIII, No. 4 (1954), 291-328. 
330 
might eventually be left behind both the Germans and Americans in terms of their 
mercantile fleets - an unacceptable notion for a country (and the centre of an Empire) that 
proudly "ruled the waves." Cunard's Chairman played on these fears and pressured 
Parliament into granting £2,600,000 to build two new super-liners, an annual subsidy of 
£150,000 to maintain the leviathans and another £68,000 in mail subsidies. This was an 
extraordinary payout given that Parliament had always been notoriously parsimonious in 
granting subsidies beyond mail contracts to national shipping companies. In the past firms 
either made it or not on their own account. That the government was willing to take this step 
is an indication of how serious the challenge from IMM (and Germany) was taken. It also 
gives some indication as to what smaller owners like Brocklebanks must have been thinking 
at the time. If a company like Cunard could only survive with massive government aid, what 
chance did a smaller family firm have under such market conditions?45 
45 
Preston, Lusitania, 60; and Maddocks, eta/., Great Liners, 99. The two liners built by Cunard using the subsidy 
were the famous Mauritania and Lusitania. As it turned out, Morgan's attempt to monopolize Atlantic trade 
was abortive. Following Cunard's stand, the much larger French Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, with 
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British Shipping (London, 1990), 272. 
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Table 8.1 
Profit and Loss Summary, Thos. & Jon. Brocklebank, 1898-1910 
Period (6 mos. To Dec.) Profits(£) Loss(£) 
1898 29,392/15/11 
1899 51,032/11108 
1900 91,963/16/05 
1901 31,927/16/01 
1902 147/10/11 
1903 1,956/01108 
1904 2,378/00/01 
1905 3,877/08/02 
1906 30,676/06/00 
1907 30,415/12/02 
1908 2,822/04/02 
1909 3,697/09/01 
1910 28,516/08/09 
Profit/Loss, as above £236,858/07/ll £71,945/13/02 
Note: 
Source: 
"Profit" and "Loss" are before providing for depreciation and interest. 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, "Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank Limited. 
Summary showing receipts and disbursements of the company from its 
formation down to the 31st December 1910" (Liverpool, n.d.). 
These circumstances certainly provide some explanation of Harold's and Sir 
Aubrey's willingness to sell, although it sheds no light on internal factors that may have 
mattered. Brocklebanks fleet historian Duncan Haws contends that the family wished to 
maintain their concentration on India. To that end Brocklebanks sold its interest in the Shire 
Line to the other major investors, Royal Mail. Although the four Brocklebanks vessels 
332 
involved were not part of the deal, two were immediately sold, while Royal Mail chartered 
the other pair until replacements could be found. According to Haws, this move left 
" ... Harold and Aubrey Brocklebank in the minor league of Liverpool shipowners and 
inclined to quit the business rather than rebuild their fleet. "46 This explanation seems quite 
plausible given the expansionist climate in the industry just prior to World War I, but there 
must surely have been more to the story. Haws' interpretation of this deal does not 
correspond with John Frederick Gibson's time frame (detailed below). According to Gibson, 
whose research entailed direct contact with some of the principals involved, the sale of 
Brocklebanks' Shire Line shares did not occur until after the Brocklebanks had sold their 
business. The Shire deal thus could not have played any role in Harold and Sir Aubrey's 
decision to sell. 47 
In any case, most business people would think twice about selling a going concern 
to the first buyer to come along unless they were simply tired of running the show. As Haws 
indicates, the Brocklebanks may indeed have wished to quit shipping entirely, but in the end 
both Sir Aubrey and Harold maintained close connections with the firm. The real reasons 
behind considering the sale may lie elsewhere, in the freight rate and profitability cycles of 
the day. There is some primary evidence of this among the Brocklebank papers, and some 
46 
Haws, Brocklebank, 10. 
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Gibson, Brack/ebanks, II, 12-13. 
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relevant figures are given in Table 8.1.48 
The first year represented in Table 8.1 is 1898, the last of peace prior to the outbreak 
of hostilities in South Africa.49 There was a healthy profit of £29,392/15/11 in that year, 
although this does not take into account interest or depreciation on the fleet. During the first 
two years of the Boer War profits rose markedly, peaking in 1900. There was a fall in 1901, 
but profits remained above the 1898 level. In 1902, with the conclusion of the war, 
Brocklebanks receipts plummeted dramatically to only £147/10/11. The company's main 
area of operations was not in Africa, so the decline was at best only an indirect result of the 
end of the Boer War, although we do know that freight rates plummeted at the end of the 
conflict, largely because of an oversupply of tonnage. In the first two full years of peace 
( 1903-1904) the company suffered losses, which led the Board of Directors in 1904 to 
recommend that no dividends be paid (although at least one employee received a salary 
increase). There was a small recovery in 1905, but profits rebounded only to just over ten 
percent of what they had been in 1901. By 1907, following another year of losses, 
Brocklebanks issued 3,500 debentures at £100 each to ease the company's financial plight. 
Whether or not this pattern of losses was determined principally by the Boer War is 
debatable; but what is clear is that the period from 1902 to 1909 was a troubled one for the 
48 
For a contemporary assessment of the trend toward fleet consolidation see Kirkaldy, British Shipping, 171-173. 
49 
It should be noted, however, that the campaign against Mahdist forces in the Sudan was ongoing for most of 
1898, so it cannot properly be called a peacetime year- perhaps few could during the Empire period. 
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firm. This is not surprising since, as Derek Aldcroft notes, Britain's shipping industry was 
generally in a depressed state from 190 1 to 1911, although the worst was over by 1909. 
Coupled with the machinations of the IMM, this state of affairs certainly could have given 
the Brocklebank family pause to think about the future of their company. 50 
In 1910 profits finally returned to the 1898 level when the company grossed 
£28,516/8/9. After 1911 the shipping cycle rebounded, and the almost offhand way in which 
Brocklebanks changed hands may have been more calculated than most authors 
acknowledge. With the company showing a profit once more and things looking up in the 
industry (relatively speaking), shipping was again at a premium. As they had always done, 
the Brocklebank family made the most of their situation, even when this involved handing 
over effective control of their business to others. 51 
Tradition has it that the ownership change was effected after a chance remark by 
members of the Bates family. The Bates shipping business was founded in 1839 by Edward 
50 
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Bates (later Sir Edward). Seven years previously he went to India in the employ of his 
brother Joseph, a merchant working under licence to the East India Company. Edward Bates 
& Co. was at first run out of Bombay, but in 1848 Sir Edward returned to Liverpool where 
he opened an office as merchant and shipowner in 1854. During the American Civil War 
Bates made a sizeable profit by shipping Indian cotton, amassing a personal worth of about 
£200,000. 52 During the 1860s Bates bought large numbers of second-hand sailing vessels. 
Obtained "on the cheap," Bates' fleet spread potential risks across many low-cost vessels 
rather than a few expensive bottoms. Sir Edward even purchased old steamers, discarded 
their engines and put the hulls to work as iron sailing vessels. Much ofhis capital investment 
was paid for by revenue from government contracts during the Abyssinian campaign of 
1868. Over the next two years Sir Edward bought no fewer than twenty-three used vessels. 
Coincidently, the company's first ship-rigged vessel had been the 351-ton London. It was 
built in 1812 at the Brocklebanks yard and served in their fleet for thirty-five years. A Bates' 
52 
The American Civil War (1861-1865) was a watershed in US history. Fought largely over the issues of slavery 
and states' rights, it ended with the abolition of the old system of bondage under which Southern plantation 
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popular overview of the naval aspects of the Civil War, see Gerald Simons, eta/., The Blockade: Runners and 
Raiders (Morristown, NJ, 1983). See also Neil Ashcroft, "British Trade with the Confederacy and the 
Effectiveness ofUnion Maritime Strategy during the Civil War," International Journal of Maritime History, X, 
No. 2 (December 1998), 155-176; and Thomas Boaz, Guns for Cotton: England Arms the Confederacy 
(Shippensburg, PA, 1996). 
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service to Calcutta was inaugurated with the barque Simoon. For all this, Bates was only 
grudgingly respected by the Liverpool shipowning community and certainly was not liked. 
He played the game his way with little of the give and take that could endear a businessman 
to his fellow owners. When, for example, cotton merchants Nicol, Duckworth & Company 
ran into trouble with creditors, most accepted a repayment deal. Bates had other ideas. 
Although he was owed far less than the other major creditors- about £6,000- Sir Edward 
was willing to bankrupt the company unless he was paid in full. Given such proclivities, 
Bates would have been unlikely to receive help from his peers had his own business run into 
trouble. As it transpired he never needed such assistance. In later years Sir Edward retired 
from commerce to concentrate on a political career based on a Hampshire country seat. By 
1911 another generation had taken the reins of power and the founder's three grandsons, Sir 
Percy, Frederick, and Denis Bates, ran the family firm. 53 
About this time many larger shippers, perhaps taking their cue from Morgan, were 
systematically buying up as many smaller companies as could be had. The Bates family also 
hoped to expand but was finding it difficult to acquire any of the small lines, as larger groups 
always beat them to the punch. The brothers said as much to Sir Aubrey Brocklebank; when 
he offered to sell his tonnage, the deal was made. Again, this transaction was almost 
certainly not as offhanded as most authors make it appear. For Brocklebanks (though 
probably not for all shipowners), 1911 would have been a prime year, both in terms of the 
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market cycle and the previous year's profits. Had the family sold out only two years 
previously the company would certainly have looked less appealing to a potential buyer, at 
least in terms of its short-term profitability. At a Board of Directors' meeting on 28 June 
1911 most of the shares in Brocklebanks were transferred to the Bates brothers. Harold 
Brocklebank still held 349 shares, but Sir Aubrey and Thomas Geoffrey Brocklebank 
retained only a single share each. Sir Percy Bates became the largest Brocklebank 
shareholder with 700 shares; Frederick Bates gained 160 shares, Denis the same amount, 
while another family member, Sydney Eggers Bates was granted 230 shares. From this 
meeting the Bates family became the company's controlling influence, although 
Brocklebanks would retain their separate corporate identity for more than seventy years. 54 
Later that same month the Board of Directors held an extraordinary general meeting 
to decide on the formal structure of the Board given the changes in shareholdings. Harold 
and Aubrey Brocklebank returned to the Board, joined by Sir Aubrey's brother, John Jasper 
Brocklebank, D.S.O. The Brocklebank directorate was rounded out by Sir Percy, Denis and 
J.A. Bates. At the next Directors' meeting Sir Aubrey formally relinquished his role as 
Managing Director with the move forming part of the deal with the Bates family. Harold 
Brocklebank, on a motion from Sir Percy and seconded by Sir Aubrey, became that year's 
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Chairman of the "new" Brocklebanks. The firm's new management, perhaps more in tune 
with contemporary realities in the shipping world, began making changes to operations 
almost immediately. 55 There has been some suggestion that Harold Brocklebank, despite the 
Bates' influence, played a major role in effecting change in this era. It appears that Gibson 
was under this impression when planning his monograph, but Denis Bates strongly disputed 
this. In a letter to Gibson forty years after the event, Sir Denis (as he then was) stated that: 
it is incorrect to say that Harold Brocklebank carried into effect 
developments he had in mind. He was quite a figurehead. As a matter of fact 
the Brocklebank family wished to get out [of the business] entirely but it was 
we 3 brothers who persuaded Aubrey Brocklebank to stay on and to take on 
to the board Geoffrey Brocklebank, son of Harold Brocklebank. 56 
This was many years after the event and, people being people, it is not implausible 
that Sir Denis may have overstated his family's role. In fairness to Sir Denis, it is quite 
correct that the changes to come did not happen until the Bates family took control of the 
Board, so there was likely something to his claim. Whoever actually carried out the 
conversion, routes were immediately reorganized and rejuvenated. Bates' 8, 121-ton steamer 
lrak was put into service on the Calcutta run on an experimental basis under the name 
Mandasor. This was an important move, mainly due to the size of the vessel. She became 
the largest craft trading to Calcutta and at 501 feet, her length was such that the Hooghly 
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dock system had to be enlarged to accommodate such vessels. 57 
The next question on the minds of the new Board was Brocklebanks' East Asian 
service. The Brocklebank family was usually astute in timing operational or capital changes, 
but this is an instance where they were certainly too far behind the times. The Shire Line 
vessels were all showing their age. As a direct result of this deficiency shippers began to 
abandon Brockle banks in favour of more up-to- date rivals. Their partners, the Royal Mail 
Group, were asked to either sell out entirely to Brocklebanks or to buy the service for itself. 
Royal Mail decided on the latter, effectively ending Brocklebanks' participation in Far East 
trading. Had it not been for this, it is likely that the trade would have been developed 
alongside the Calcutta route. The Ameer, Gaekwar and Pindari were sold, and the Marwarri 
and Bengali were both withdrawn from East Asia after being given back their original 
names. Counting the Maiden, newly launched in 1912, Brockle banks' fleet stood at twelve 
vessels at a combined gross tonnage of 80,178, averaging 6,681 tons per vessel; four of these 
vessels had been transferred that same year from the Anchor Line. 58 
Brocklebanks had acquired these four craft as part of a deal in which they purchased 
Anchor Line's Calcutta Conference rights. For the vessels and their good will Anchor 
received £134,000 and also agreed to buy about £100,000 in Brocklebank nominal shares. 
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Anchor Line had been founded by the Henderson brothers and entered the Calcutta trade 
with sailings from both Liverpool and Glasgow in May, 1882. Their first vessel in the trade 
was the 5,080- gross-ton Belgravia, followed by the 3,387-ton Roumania, the 2,715-ton 
Elysia and the 3, 147-ton California. These were also joined by a number of other craft. The 
deal sounds fairly straightforward but was in fact complicated, as survtvmg pnmary 
evidence indicates. 59 
All the ordinary shares in the Anchor Line at this point were held by Cunard, and it 
was this arrangement, along with the presence of the Bates brothers, that eventually led to 
Brocklebanks coming under the umbrella of Cunard. Sir Percy Bates was not only an owner 
and Director ofBrocklebanks but also was on the Cunard Board. When Harold Brocklebank 
retired in 1913, Sir Aubrey became chairman and A.C.F. Henderson, Anchor Line's 
Managing Director,joined the Brocklebanks Board. Sir Alfred Booth and Lord Royden, joint 
Directors of Cunard and Anchor, likewise became Brocklebanks Board members. At this 
point, however, there were still no formal ties between Brocklebanks and Cunard which 
shared an interest in the trade to Calcutta. 60 
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While complex in itself, such details of the merger do not give a sense of the 
manoeuvring behind the scenes to complete the deal. Fortunately, Sir Percy Bates' notebook 
from the period survives, along with some correspondence pertaining to the Anchor-
Brocklebank fusion. These details have been ignored by most authors, but they serve as a 
window into the Edwardian shipping business that should not be ignored. By this stage the 
emphasis had shifted somewhat, with a number of long-term players in the Calcutta trades 
coming together for mutual benefit. This was perhaps a natural outgrowth of the process 
started by the Calcutta Conference and continued through the influence of J.P. Morgan. As 
part of the merger the parties agreed that a proportion of Brocklebanks' stock would be 
transferred to the Anchor Line Directors. There was initial disagreement on what the 
proportions of such would be. Booth, not yet a Brocklebank Board member, first wanted 
Anchor to acquire half the shares in Brocklebanks, an idea Sir Percy was not inclined to 
consider. The amount set for the share purchases was intended, at least in Sir Percy's mind, 
to represent a minority holding in the company, so applying the price to an equal or majority 
holding in Brocklebanks was "absurd."61 This situation might lead to Anchor's gaining 
absolute control over Brocklebanks, an outcome that Bates felt would only be acceptable if 
his family and the Brocklebanks were ready to retire from the shipping business - which 
they were not. As Bates pointed out to Booth, the idea of Anchor holding half the 
Brocklebanks' shares had not been part of the original deal, a point on which Booth 
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apparently agreed. He did not insist on an equal split, instead suggesting that the share split 
ultimately be three-fifths for Brocklebank:s and two-fifths for Anchor. In justifying why 
Brocklebanks deserved the lion's share of the new Calcutta business, Sir Percy paid tribute 
to the way the company had managed the trade in the past. 62 
If it came to an abstract discussion as to whether A[ nchor] orB[ rocklebanks] 
had the better title to control the Calcutta business, I should say there were 
little doubt of the answer. B with smaller opportunities has made the most of 
them and proved what can be done even working on a confined scale. A has 
shown how not to do it and neglected the proper treatment of larger 
opportunities. A no doubt has a right to do what it likes with its own but it 
cannot expect B to be very anxious to allow A to do the same with B's 
property ... A does not realize the risk of immediate loss incurred by B to be 
compensated by development of A's potentialities.63 
Once the deal was completed the four former Anchor Line vessels, Anchoria, Me ida, 
Assyria and Bavaria (5,429; 5,437; 6,370 and 4,711 tons, respectively), became part of the 
Brocklebanks fleet. With increased sailings the new Anchor-Brocklebank Line to Calcutta 
proved a great success with shippers. The company soon became the Hooghly' s most 
important source of tonnage. In the years after 1912 the companies maintained a joint office 
in Liverpool's Royal Liver Building - something envisioned by Sir Percy Bates during 
negotiations. Nonetheless, Thos. & Jno. Brocklebanks' constitution remained unchanged. 
By the end of the year the new Board of Directors, including Booth and Lord Royden, was 
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in place. The company had by this time engaged the services of a number of agents to 
represent them in various UK ports. The Anchor Line acted as Manchester and Glasgow 
agents, while W.O. Taylor performed these duties at Dundee. Brocklebank:s' London agents 
were also Anchor Line, along with Alexander Howden. For the Calcutta trade Brocklebanks' 
agents were Graham & Co., which had acted in this role for some time, along with Turner 
Morrison & Co. The latter was an especially useful ally since they had previously been the 
main charterer for homeward tramp tonnage in competition with the Calcutta Conference. 
By making the firm an agent, their role as competitor was negated. Additionally, 
Brocklebanks arranged to enter the charter market and cover Calcutta freights with Messrs. 
F. Gardiner of Glasgow, mainly noted as tramp owners. Once again, a former rival was 
coopted. By August 1914 Brocklebanks faced the future with confidence. Given that the firm 
had almost seventy years left in business (despite the upheavals of the twentieth century), 
such confidence was not altogether misplaced. 64 
Although a myriad of political and economic forces were at work during their long 
existence, a good deal of the credit for Brocklebanks' success must be given to those who 
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directed their affairs, from the Brocklebanks, through the Bates family and finally Cunard. 
From their inception its seems that Brocklebanks was built on the twin pillars of 
comparative advantage and the ability to adapt to change. Starting out in Whitehaven 
shipbuilding, Daniel Brocklebank was willing to gamble on making his fortune in a new 
land. When events outside his control threatened to crush this dream Captain Daniel 
returned to the place he knew best and started anew. The professional approach taken by his 
sons, especially the eldest Thomas, led the company toward shipowning at a time when 
vessel ownership as a profession was scarcely spoken of Perhaps sensing the limited 
opportunities available in Cumberland, in 1820 Brocklebanks relocated south to Liverpool. 
This move was natural, given that Liverpool was one of the main foci of British shipping 
activity in the nineteenth century - not to mention the fact that Cumberland essentially 
formed part of the port's regional hinterland. 
Through the family's next generation Brocklebanks grew into a substantial 
shipowning concern whose development in some ways parallelled that of the "typical" 
Liverpool shipowner, although with some unique features. As merchant owners the 
Brocklebanks had started out with close connections to the West Indian trades, but as the 
century wore on they gravitated increasingly toward longer -distance trades, in particular that 
to Calcutta. In broad terms, this mirrored developments on Merseyside generally, as 
Liverpool became known as a deep-sea port (though still with substantial coastal trade). 
The firm underwent a number of significant changes over the course of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The new focus on longer-distance trades, like 
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Calcutta and the Far East, meant an increase in the average size of Brocklebanks' vessels, 
along with a shift away from brig and schooner rigs towards ships and barques. This 
development likewise parallelled what was occurring on Merseyside generally, as well as 
in some of the ports of Atlantic Canada. As in Merseyside, and in about the same period, 
Brocklebanks' gross investment switched over completely to metal construction (although 
this innovation was not embraced in any significant way in Atlantic Canada). Along with the 
change to metal construction Brocklebanks abandoned its own shipbuilding enterprise, 
which until1865 had supplied nearly all the firm's tonnage requirements. 65 
Although Brocklebanks were willing to innovate when the time was right, such 
changes were always carried out at their own pace. Despite making the switch to iron (and 
then steel) construction techniques basically on a par with Liverpool generally, the company 
was somewhat slower than the average investor when converting to steam. When they did 
finally begin investing in steamers, however, the innovation was embraced with enthusiasm, 
and no new sail tonnage was purchased after 1888. Brocklebanks' long use of sail may be 
traced back to their retention of the merchanting function, eliminating the need to find 
cargoes for their vessels. Indeed, the Brocklebanks were among the last Liverpool 
shipowners to refer to themselves as merchants on the Board of Trade registries. Retaining 
this element of their business allowed Brocklebanks to capitalize on a traditional 
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comparative advantage, while their eventual conversion to steam reflects a commercial 
flexibility that appears to have served them well. 66 
Much the same can be said about the company's organization. For many years 
Brocklebanks resisted the trend toward limited liability. Even when they did make the 
change a family structure was retained by parcelling out nearly all of the firm's shares 
among members of the Brocklebank family. By the early twentieth century, however, 
Brocklebanks appeared unprepared, or unwilling, to resist the tide of amalgamations 
sweeping the industry. That the firm remained viable is suggested by the retention of their 
separate corporate identity, first under the Bates family and then Cunard, long after 1914. 
The continued involvement of the Brocklebank family in company affairs further indicates 
a faith in their old family firm that also lasted beyond the crisis of the Great War. Although 
their livery eventually disappeared from the deep-sea trade routes in the 1980s, their history 
of over two centuries is a testament to the long-term viability of Brocklebanks' business 
strategies. Willing to innovate when conditions seemed appropriate (as in the switch to iron), 
the firm was equally capable of taking a conservative path to retain traditional comparative 
advantages (including the purchasing of their own yard's wooden tonnage through to 1865, 
and the long maintenance of a sail fleet and merchanting). Able to adapt when the need 
arose, Brockle banks also mirrored, to a degree, some of the conservatism- based on realistic 
assessments of their industry- that has been noted about Liverpool shipowners generally. 
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By managing this balancing act, Brocklebanks remained an industry success story 
for generations. Equally successful as a Liverpool shipowning concern, although quite a 
contrast to Brocklebanks (and also to the "typical" nineteenth century Liverpool investor) 
was the Pacific Stearn Navigation Company or PSNC, the subject of the next two chapters. 
Chapter 9 
Pacific Steam Navigation Company- The Wheelwright Years 
One ofLiverpool' s most technologically innovative companies in the nineteenth century was 
Pacific Steam Navigation or PSNC. Founded on the South American trading experiences and 
maritime background of an American entrepreneur, PSNC was one of the earliest Liverpool 
companies to make extensive use of steam technology. Its innovative nature is highlighted 
by the fact that, despite its founders' confidence, the company struggled for more than a 
decade after its inception. Although providing essentially a coastal service, the long 
distances covered by PSNC vessels- 2,168 nautical miles between the ports ofTalcahuano, 
Chile and Guayaquil in modem Ecuador, for example- were nothing if not daring in an age 
when steam was still something of a novelty. PSNC was likewise one of the first Liverpool 
shipowning firms to adopt the corporate structure, with a board of directors, that would 
become a familiar business model later in the nineteenth century. In time PSNC would go 
on to pioneer its own forms of coastal steamers, while investing in infrastructure in their 
primary sphere of operations, South America. Pacific Steam was willing to work with 
railway companies and other shipping firms, such as Royal Mail, to maintain efficient 
services. Finally, they were able to move beyond their familiar routes to locales such as 
Australia and the western seaboard of the United States. Thus, for much of its history to 
1914 PSNC was noted for its innovative nature (or adaptability). In many respects this very 
trait also served as PSNC's main comparative advantage. 1 
For full details ofPSNC's fleet see Appendix Fourteen. 
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This was not so in the case of many firms. Brocklebank:s' example might give the 
appearance that their cautious approach was the key to success for a Liverpool-based (or 
indeed British) shipowner. The move away from the family business model toward a 
corporate structure, along with technological and route changes, were eventually necessary 
in adapting to the times, but it was obviously best to wait until such developments were well 
proven before committing to change. Until that point the best motto was that "if it is not 
broken, do not fix it." Brockle banks seem to prove this adage in the Liverpool context. 
While this may be true to a point, there is more to the story. We have noted, for example, 
that it was largely their unusual retention of the merchant role that allowed Brockle banks 
to prosper while seemingly ignoring technological advances for many years. For those other 
investors who chose early on to specialize as owners, and also possibly to act as agents, such 
a solution was impractical. Harrisons, themselves as much agents as owners, took the steam 
route earlier than Brocklebanks and that they were successful in the same Calcutta trades 
that Brocklebanks handled with sailing vessels until the 1890s. 
Brocklebanks was a long-term success by most measures, but their model was not 
the recipe for all firms, even within the same trade. Once we move into other geographic 
areas and entirely new trades, the situation was even less analogous. The term shipowner 
may indicate the commonality of owning tonnage, but beyond that their activities could be 
very different. Certain shipowners like PSNC took another path, building their comparative 
advantage through the adoption of cutting-edge technology and by embracing new ways of 
doing business. This model was about as different a route to the top of the same industry 
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from that taken by Brocklebanks as can be found. Such was the case regarding their chosen 
trades, but even more so when referring to their particular business strategies. 
Having alluded to the differences between PSNC and Brocklebanks, it must be 
confessed that the germination of both companies was in one respect very similar - both 
sprang largely from the energy and ambition of a single man. In the Brocklebanks example 
this was Captain Daniel Brocklebank. The inspiration for Pacific Steam Navigation was 
William Wheelwright. Wheelwright, like J.P. Morgan, was an American ofBritish ancestry, 
his forebears hailing from Lincolnshire. He was born at Newburyport, Massachusetts, on 16 
March 1798,just three years before Thomas and Jonathan Brocklebank assumed control of 
their father's shipbuilding yard and fleet. William was the eldest son of master mariner 
Ebenezer Wheelwright and Ann Coombs. In 1794 Ebenezer and a brother founded the 
merchanting firm of A & E. Wheelwright and like the Brocklebanks was involved in West 
Indian trading. Wheelwright biographer Roland Duncan describes the family as "sizeable 
shipowners." Ebenezer seems to have been a natural entrepreneur; apart from the trading 
house, he also founded the Newburyport Woolen Manufactory. In some respects the father 
may have set the pattern for the son's later career in South America and Liverpool. Young 
William's maternal grandfather was certainly a further influence, as he was a successful 
shipmaster and importer. William's surroundings may also have given him a comparative 
advantage (or at least the inclination) to pursue his later career as a shipowner. Newburyport 
was in those days a prosperous port whose merchant houses conducted trade with Mexico, 
the West Indies and South America. Despite such strong maritime commercial ties (or 
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perhaps because of them), however, young William was not immediately marked for a life 
at sea, and his first recorded job was that of a printer in his home town. Despite this, and 
despite the good liberal education that he received, at least until age sixteen, Wheelwright 
was not content with spending his days setting type. He soon left the printing business and 
went to sea as cabin boy in a family-owned vessel. The youthful mariner was apprenticed 
in New Orleans' sailing brigs, experiencing shipwreck and fever before achieving his first 
command after only three years at sea, and aged only nineteen. Family connections certainly 
played a role in this early promotion as the vessel was his father's 111-ton schooner, Ames, 
on a voyage to Rio de Janeiro. Still, Ebenezer must have had a good degree of confidence 
in his young son's abilities to entrust such a voyage to him. The journey was not without 
incident, however. Returning home, Wheelwright was attacked in his sleep by a crewman. 
The reasons behind the attack are lost, but fortunately for the later history of the PSNC, and 
William himself, it failed. 2 
In 1823, at the age of twenty-five, Wheelwright was given command of the barque 
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Rising Empire ofNewburyport, owned by William Bartlett, later William's grandfather-in-
law, and then Newburyport's second-largest shipowner. On 22 June the vessel loaded a 
cargo of tobacco, sugar and rum at Havana, touching at Montevideo en route to Buenos 
Aires. This voyage was not a success, however, as the vessel was stranded and wrecked on 
the Ortiz Banks in the River Plate trying to enter Ensenada. One man died in the mishap and 
the crew took to the lifeboats, rowing a full twenty-four hours to reach land where they were 
forced to walk to Buenos Aires. Wheelwright was without money and to return home signed 
on as supercargo on a brig heading to Valparaiso, Chile. From this point on, Wheelwright's 
attention was never fully diverted from South America's west coast. Applying to the 
American government for the posting, he was appointed US Consul at Guayaquil, Ecuador. 
His merchanting venture a success, Wheelwright returned to America in 1828 and the 
following year married Bartlett's granddaughter Anna. The couple's honeymoon was spent 
in sailing back to Guayaquil, first travelling by sea to Panama, then overland on pack mules 
and finally by sea again. The newlyweds were met with bad news on their arrival because 
Wheelwright's business had collapsed, leaving him with debts of$100,000? 
Undaunted, Wheelwright moved to Valparaiso and for several years used the sixty-
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ton schooner Forth of July to trade along the west coast; this service eventually grew into 
a small fleet of sailing packets. During his tenure in Valparaiso Wheelwright engaged in a 
variety of enterprises, building a lighthouse, gas and waterworks, and a brickworks. He went 
prospecting, not for gold, but for coal, saltpetre, lime and borax. At the same time 
Wheelwright began to realize the potential value of a steam service to western South 
America. 4 Before discussing the role of steam here, we will first take a look at Britain's (and 
Liverpool's) historic trade connections with South America and Chile, as it was the 
particular needs of Chile (and western South America in the wider sense) from which 
William Wheelwright's plans sprang. 
Although Wheelwright did not realize it at the time, the eventual success of his 
venture would be founded just as much on the linkages between Britain and South America 
as on his own energy and foresight. England had long traded with South America, either 
officially through Spain and Portugal or by smuggling. Despite, or perhaps because of this 
traditional link, South America provides one of the few examples of a continent outside 
Europe where nineteenth-century Britain did not establish any real measure of direct control. 
Following the collapse of the Spanish-American empire between 1810-1824, established 
traders and Iberian goods were often displaced by those ofBritain, the world's first industrial 
nation. P.J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins feel that profitable commercial relations were freely 
sought, both by the British and by new republics like Chile, Brazil and Argentina. After an 
4 
Wardle, Steam Conquers the Pacific, 14-15; Wardle, "West Coast (1)," 106-107; and "Origin ofthe Pacific 
Steam Navigation Co.," 15. 
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abortive and unauthorised attempt to annex the River Plate estuary by Sir Home Popham, 
official British policy was henceforth to avoid military and political intervention in favour 
of economic relations that would promote prosperity and the emergence of friendly, liberal 
nations. 5 
In terms of promulgating liberal ideals, the British were less than successful. British 
trade also developed slowly. Although Britain became the continent's largest trading partner 
by mid-century, the volume of trade with South America was still rather small. It was only 
after 1850 that rising European demand created substantial markets for Latin American raw 
materials and agricultural produce. Sales of European goods to South America were 
encouraged by Britain's espousal of free trade in the 1840s which, Cain and Hopkins 
contend, encouraged investment in low-cost transport and credit provision. Likewise, falling 
prices for manufactured goods made British products better able to compete with South 
American handicrafts. Finally (here being the juncture where men like Wheelwright proved 
crucial), regular steam services and falling freight rates encouraged the establishment of 
specialized merchant houses in South America. According to D.C.M. Platt, foreign 
investment, accompanied by large-scale immigration, firmly ensconced the continent within 
5 
P.J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914 (London, 1993), 276-
280; William W. Kaufman, British Policy and the Independence ofLatinAmerica, 1804-1828 (New Haven, CT, 
1951), 23-33; and D.C.M. Platt, Latin America and British Trade 1806-1914 (London, 1972), 306. Initially 
much of the onus for maintaining trade relationships was left to the entrepreneurs themselves, a situation 
common to most British overseas commercial enterprise of the period. In short, HM's Government gave little 
assistance to its foreign traders in normal circumstances, other than their good will. Lance E. Davis and Robert 
A Rutten back, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire. The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860-1912 
(Cambridge, 1986), 263-265; and Platt, Latin America, 163. 
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the transatlantic economy. Nations like Chile, Brazil and Argentina developed export 
economies based on products such as minerals, cereals, beef and coffee, manufactured goods 
like textiles becoming their main imports. 6 
From 1865 to the eve of World War I British trade to Latin America tripled. Indeed, 
the region's share of British trade from 1850 to 1914 was greater than that of any locale 
within the empire (except India), and it was a primary recipient of British overseas 
investment capital. In the 1860s and 1870s Britain, being the world leader in industries like 
iron, steel and railways, was the best placed nation to benefit from rising South American 
demands for such commodities. By this era the policy of peaceful commerce with South 
America was paying dividends. This is not say that the British had things all their own way, 
however. From the 1880s on competition from nations such as the US, Germany and France 
increased. British governments reacted by increased diplomatic support for national firms, 
while these companies increased their investment in South American utilities, exporting and 
manufacturing, while extending their range ofbanking services. Although by 1914 Britain's 
share of imports into the three largest South American economies - Brazil, Argentina and 
Chile- had fallen from mid-nineteenth century highs, she still dominated these nation's 
6 
Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 280-284; B.R. Mitchell, with Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British 
Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1962), 321-323; and Platt, Latin America, 306. On the British merchant houses 
see Robert Greenhill, "Merchants and the Latin American Trades: An Introduction," in D.C.M. Platt (ed.), 
Business Imperialism 1840-1930. An Inquiry Based on British Experience in Latin America (Oxford, 
1977), 159-197. Greenhill (196) says that" ... the [South American] republics were initially very reliant on British 
[merchant] houses, which could offer solid advantages such as credit facilities, contacts abroad, knowledge, and 
expertise ... The latent power of British merchants in Latin America was enormous." Still, market forces like the 
presence of competitors and the possibility of government intervention, Greenhill contends, may have limited 
the scope for the British merchant to abuse his comparative advantages. 
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export trades. Also, as Cain and Hopkins note, Britain maintained a premier role in finance 
and the provision of capital. Likewise, British shipping remained the primacy carrier of 
South American goods. 7 
Liverpool played its own long-established role in Britain's trade with Latin America. 
The port's commerce with South America grew out of the metropole's eighteenth-century 
trade with the West Indies. The South Atlantic was the fourth oldest of Liverpool's trade 
routes, with the earliest reference to connections dating from 1641. The first detailed 
account of a Liverpool voyage to the West Indies concerns the Antelope in 1666. The 
traditional cargo brought back from the West Indies was sugar, a trade largely developed by 
the Moore and Norris families. Sugar was not the only regional commodity. A triangular 
trade developed soon after 1700 in which cotton and manufactured goods were shipped from 
Liverpool to Africa. Slaves would then be taken to the West Indies and South America to 
work on the plantations in return for cargoes of sugar, cotton and rum. 8 By the nineteenth 
century many voyages in sailing vessels were made to ports like Parahiba, usually returning 
with Brazilian cotton. With the discovery of the South Shetland Islands, whaling and sealing 
7 
Platt, Latin America, 306-308; Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 282-287; and Davis and Huttenback, 
Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire, 47-50. On British banking services, public utilities and railroads in Latin 
America see Platt ( ed. ), Business Imperialism, 17-52; 77-118 and 395-428. William Wheelwright was involved 
in the creation of public utilities, like the Valparaiso waterworks, on both the west coast and in Argentina. 
8 
See Stephen D. Behrendt, "Markets, Transaction Cycles, and Profits: Merchant Decision Making in the British 
Slave Trade," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, L VIll, No. 1 (2001 ), 171-204.; Behrendt, "The Annual 
Volume and Regional Distribution of the British Slave Trade, 1780-1807," Journal of African History, 
XXXVlli, No.2 (1997), 187-211; and Herbert S. Klein, "The English Slave Trade to Jamaica, 1782-1808," 
Economic History Review, XXXI, No. 1 (1978), 25-45. 
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formed another link between Liverpool and South America. Early in the 1700s a profitable 
trade to South America had been in contraband Lancashire cottons. To guard legitimate 
merchant interests in the area a West India Association was formed in 1807.9 
For the entire eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Liverpool's trade to the West 
Indies and South America was conducted using small vessels, normally owned by one 
investor or by a small group acting as joint owners. An example of such craft was the Mary 
Bibby, a Liverpool-built vessel of299 register tons, which was said to be a fast vessel with 
"spacious and elegant" passenger accommodations. As with all sail tonnage these small 
vessels were limited by the tides and weather, and they could not sail regularly or on a fixed 
schedule. This notwithstanding, Liverpool's commerce with South America and the West 
Indies expanded so rapidly in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars that shippers demanded a 
more regular service. This would come about, especially due to William Wheelwright's 
early experiences in South America. As George Chandler has written, "[i]t is one of 
Liverpool's [and Wheelwright's] greatest achievements at sea that the first regular steamship 
service on the west coast of South America was inaugurated by the Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company. "10 One of the primary beneficiaries of this service was the nation of Chile, and 
9 
Francis Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey: The Development of a Port 1700-1970 (Newton Abbot, 1971 ), 108-
1 09; George Chandler, Liverpool Shipping: A Short History (London, 1960), 13 7 -139; and Paul G.E. Clemens, 
"The Rise of Liverpool, 1665-1750," Economic History Review, XXIX, No. 2 (1976), 211-224. 
10 
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and the Caribbean," Business History, XVIII, No. 1 (1976), 85-97. Strangely, the pioneering efforts of 
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358 
early links between it and Liverpool were provided by the commission houses that extended 
capital and credit to British enterprises there. 11 
Their base of operations is one of the longest and narrowest nations on earth. Chile 
runs for more than 2,650 miles ( 4,265 kilometres) north to south but averages only 110 miles 
( 177 kilometres) east to west. Still, the country is about the size of France in terms of square 
miles. Separated from its northern neighbour, Peru, by the Atacama desert, Chile is likewise 
cut off from Argentina and Bolivia to the east by the Andes Mountains. The region suffers 
from an extreme range of weather caused by wind, storms and ocean currents. Since the 
sixteenth century more than 100 earthquakes have been recorded, often accompanied by 
tidal waves. In August 1906, for instance, PSNC' s steamer Orissa was berthed at Valparaiso 
during one such quake and used to accommodate refugees. Rapidly melting snow in the 
Andes often triggers flash floods, and fishers must always be alert for treacherous storm 
systems and currents. Strong winds blow year-round, and locales such as Chiloe Island are 
almost always shrouded in mist. Valparaiso- Wheelwright's early base of operations- has 
steamer service until the founding of the Booth Line in 1865. A full quarter century behind Wheelwright's 
venture, there were actually many parallels between the two. The Booth vessels were not initially successful, 
either in terms of profit or performance, and the line ran at a loss. With help from the Royal Bank ofLiverpool, 
along with the Holt and Rathbone families, Booth's steamers kept running. By 1881, with the advent of new 
marine technology, the company, now limited under the name Booth Steamship Co. Ltd., gradually became 
profitable. By 1886 their main trades were in the homeward carriage of rubber and outward transport of 
emigrants from Lisbon. Like PSNC, Booth was forced to adapt to new trade patterns in the 1890s and the focus 
shifted to cargoes of heavy engineering equipment along with other capital goods. Hyde, Liverpool, 109-110. 
On the Booth Line, see Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets: Lamport & Holt and Booth (Uckfield, 1998}; and P.M. 
Heaton, Booth Line (Pontypool, 1987}. 
II 
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more than once been devastated by natural disasters like earthquakes. 12 
Despite such hazards Chile has long attracted the attention of foreign capital. Like 
much of South America, colonial Chile had a tradition of trade - sometimes contraband -
with foreign nations. Gaining final independence from Spain in 1818, the new Chilean 
Republic had already decreed a free trade policy, although it reserved the right to tax 
commerce to raise revenue and protect vital national industries. In fact, the oligarchy which 
emerged with Chilean independence depended on the revenues of international trade. With 
a Chilean elite predisposed toward foreign commerce, Britain, as the world's foremost 
industrial power, possessed the comparative advantages needed to become Chile's most 
important trading partner. By the 1850s Britain was the largest exporter and importer of 
goods out of and into Chile, its shipping carried most Chilean goods, and British banks 
provided a significant source of finance. Chile offered Britons ample supplies of minerals 
like copper, the mining and refining of which had a long tradition in Britain (especially 
12 
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Cornwall). From 1826 on British entrepreneurs were firmly established in Chile's mining 
region, the Norte Chico or Lesser North. In keeping with the theme of comparative 
advantages, especially those conferred by knowledge and contacts, John Mayo says of these 
entrepreneurs that, "building on the knowledge and relationships clandestinely acquired 
from the era of contraband trade, Britons were well placed to enter business with and in the 
new republic."13 
Still, few Britons resided in Chile - less than 2,000 around 1850 - but of their 
number 708lived in the city ofValparaiso. With the growth in foreign commerce Valparaiso 
became an important West coast entrepot for the trade ofBolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Chile 
itself Aside from a transient population of seamen, the most common British occupational 
group at Valparaiso were merchants, 230 in all. So pervasive was the influence of this tiny 
community, and their homeland, that in 1885 an American visitor declared the city little 
more than an English colony. Apart from those living at Valparaiso, the most common place 
of residence for Britons in Chile was in the northern mining districts where Coquimbo 
emerged as a small but important mineral port. Mayo concludes that the presence of British 
nationals in Chile was based firmly on trade and the provision of services. In the case of the 
northern mining districts he feels that British merchant capital and its agents were useful in 
getting Chilean production onto the world market, and that their knowledge and skills helped 
13 
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to integrate Chile into the international economy. Mutual ties of respect allied to potentially 
profitable trade would mark Anglo-Chilean relations until the end of the nineteenth 
century. 14 
Trade and profits are always important to entrepreneurs, but it was geography, 
climate and resources that first set William Wheelwright to thinking about steam on the 
Chilean coast. Having operated sailing vessels there, Wheelwright was well aware of the 
difficulties in using this form of propulsion in the waters off western South America. Yet 
there was a great need for some form of transport, either on land or by sea. The former was 
impractical for long distances due to the terrain- the Andean barrier combined with a 
paucity of potential north-south corridors. Most important, however, was the north-south 
connection, and this demand could be met by sea. Sailing vessels were simply too inefficient 
to provide any sort of regularity. The Pacific Ocean often lived up to its name, with many 
periods of deadly calm or light southerly breezes, both of which made voyages propelled by 
sail highly uncertain, even more so as mariners also had to contend with the Humbolt 
current. Or to put it another way, although smooth seas are ideal for steamers, they are 
anathema to sail. Storm systems, when they did occur, also increased the danger of running 
14 
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wind-driven vessels along the coast. 15 The advantages of steam were summed up most 
clearly by the company's own Prospectus of 1838: 
No part of the world is better calculated for Steam Navigation than the 
shores of the Pacific ... [Sail] voyages, which usually occupy a period of20 or 
25 days, may be accomplished by steam in 40 or 50 hours ... The distance 
from Valparaiso to Panama is about 2,500 miles [ 4, 023 kilometres]; and the 
countries bordering on that line of coast contain a population of upwards of 
four million of inhabitants. The communication by land, which is everywhere 
extremely difficult and expensive, in some places is nearly impracticable; 
and the existing intercourse between the large cities and towns of these 
extensive countries is greatly impeded by these circumstances, on the one 
hand, and by the uncertainty of voyages by sailing vessels on the other. 
Notwithstanding these obstacles, the intercourse has of late years 
considerably increased; the number of persons travelling along the coast 
amounting to no less than 8,850 annually ... The facilities that steam will 
afford must necessarily increase this communication and give a new impulse 
to the commerce of the whole of the Pacific States; developing more rapidly 
than their natural resources, and giving them a commercial stability and 
importance far beyond that which they now enjoy. 16 
William Wheelwright was certainly a forward thinker, but it still seems improbable 
that a merchant shipowner in this period would consider inaugurating a regular steam service 
for what would be a fairly long-distance trade. As noted in Chapter Four, steam was just 
coming into its own, and Wheelwright's countrymen had largely dropped out of the steam 
race following the voyage of the Savannah. When he began floating his proposals for a 
15 
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steam service in 1833, Brunei's Great Western had not been built, and Samuel Cunard had 
yet to establish his transatlantic steamer service, a venture mocked by professor Dionysius 
Lardner for being as likely as going to the moon. Still, there were solid foundations to 
Wheelwright's vision. By this period steam was already established on short-sea routes and, 
despite the distances involved, his service as first conceived was essentially coastal. As a boy 
Wheelwright had seen Robert Fulton's experiments with steam propulsion on the Hudson 
River, and perhaps this remained an inspiration for him. 17 
In the Chilean context, Wheelwright undoubtably did have predecessors to whom he 
could look for inspiration, although not in terms of final results. There had already been 
several ventures in steam navigation on the west coast of South America, all of which were 
failures (one rather spectacular). In 1820 the American Daniel Greenhill was given 
permission to operate a steamer along the coast for a period of fifteen years, but nothing 
came of the proposal. In May 1822 the Rising Star, an auxiliary steamer ordered by Lord 
Thomas Cochrane, arrived at Valparaiso from London, becoming the first steamer to enter 
the Pacific. The steamer's early voyages appear to have suffered some mechanical problems 
and it finally returned to England when the Chilean government could not afford to complete 
the purchase. Two other steamers were shipped to Chile in parts the next year but were never 
17 
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assembled. In 1825 the Pacific's second steamer came into service. The small Telica was 
owned by a Spaniard of Russian heritage named Mitrovitch. This entrepreneur encountered 
a problem that would dog the PSNC in their early years: a lack of fuel for his engines. Owing 
to this difficulty, the venture was proved abortive. Standing on the deck of his little steamer 
in Guayaquil Harbour Mitrovitch, taken either by a fit of anger or despair, fired a pistol at 
a gunpowder barrel. The resulting explosion blew the Telica, Mitrovitch and all but one of 
his crew to atoms. 18 
Mitrovitch's idea may have inspired Wheelwright, but its outcome certainly did not 
deter him. He spent a number of years investigating possible fuel sources on the Pacific 
coast and making arrangements with the governments of Chile, Peru and Bolivia. 19 In June 
of 1835 Wheelwright met with the Chilean statesman Diego Portales at the residence of 
Joseph Waddington, an English merchant in Valparaiso.20 Portales was impressed with the 
18 
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idea for a steam service, as was President Jose Joaquin Prieto Vial. On 25 August 1835 the 
Chilean Republic granted Wheelwright a ten-year monopoly over foreign navigation at 
Chilean ports and on the nation's rivers. Exceptions could be granted to Chilean-registered 
tonnage, and the government retained the right to determine where along the coast bases of 
operation could be set up. All this was conditional on Wheelwright's putting into service two 
300-ton steamers within two years- fortunately for him, this clause was eventually waived. 
The monopoly concession, Prieto Vial allowed, was "simply a privilege that has always been 
conceded to inventors or to introducers of machinery which increases the speed of 
operations whilst diminishing the costs. "21 A year later, the Peruvian government granted 
Wheelwright a similar licence, and Bolivia followed shortly thereafter2 (For the full text of 
importance. Robert Greenhill says of British merchants in Latin America that: 
21 
" ... it was undeniable that [they] provided basic and valuable services which were of assistance 
to Latin America's long-term development. They were not redundant middlemen who 
contributed nothing. They moved primary goods from producers to manufacturers and 
consumers ... Their links with overseas markets, their efficiency and expertise, were crucial 
when a large portion of output was exported ... The reputation of British merchants was 
such ... that small firms and buyers could not get credit unless a well-known British house 
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the Chilean, Peruvian and Bolivian decrees, see Document 1, following the Appendices). 
Although Wheelwright could not have hoped for more official co-operation, raising 
capital was another matter. On 18 June 1836 the British Consul General convened a meeting 
of Peruvian merchants. These men were interested in Wheelwright's steam concept and 
formed a committee to review his ideas. In November the Consul General chaired a second 
meeting at Santiago, Chile, which urged the formation of a company to raise the needed 
funds to purchase steamers. Unfortunately, there were few investors with the requisite 
capital in the region, so Wheelwright decided to look elsewhere for financial backing. He 
first travelled to the United States, where he tried to attract investors in New York. With 
little American interest in steam at the time, it is not surprising that Wheelwright came away 
empty-handed. Again, the entrepreneur was undeterred and headed off to Britain to test the 
waters. There his most influential support came from the Hon. Peter Campbell Scarlett, 
whom Wheelwright had met during his years in South America. Scarlett was the second son 
of Lord Abinger, who had served as secretary to the British Legation at Rio de Janeiro in 
1834. Like Wheelwright, the younger Scarlett was enthused about the prospects of steam in 
western South America, having written a treatise in favour of a Panamanian isthmus railway 
to connect Atlantic and Pacific feeder ports. 23 Scarlett took the idea to his father who, 
unusually for the period, was both a peer and an early capitalist. With their backing and that 
23 
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of the elder Scarlett brother, an MP, the company issued a prospectus in November 1838 
following a preliminary meeting at 5 St. Mildred's Court, London, in September. A share 
capital of £250,000 was agreed upon, to be allotted in 5,000 shares of £50 each; 1,000 shares 
were reserved for South American investors. An office was opened at 5 Barge Yard, 
Bucklesbury, and Peter Cambell Scarlett was named as one of the Directors. The new 
company's first Chairman was George Brown, who was also a founder-director of the Royal 
Mail Steam Packet Company, a fact that gave the two concerns an immediate connection. 
William Wheelwright was appointed PSNC's resident director at Valparaiso.24 
Although there was some doubt about the government's willingness to grant a Royal 
Charter, to keep the process moving ahead agents were hired to sell shares in Paris and 
Hamburg, while Wheelwright lobbied potential shareholders in Liverpool. Unfortunately, 
however, many potential investors were unwilling to commit themselves without a Charter. 
Initially only £5,000 was raised, and this came exclusively from the Directors. Nonetheless, 
a number of shareholders signed up over the next two years. While the original Directors 
were mainly Londoners, most of the new shareholders were from Liverpool. Ironically, 
considering these troubles, regrets were later expressed in the press that more shares had not 
been set aside for merchants and other interested parties in South America. Such potential 
24 
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investors, drawing on their local experience, were thought to be well placed to appreciate 
the benefits of steam linkages in the region. In any event, the process of gaining the Charter 
took a full eighteen months. However, thanks to the efforts of the elder Scarlett brother in 
Parliament, the application was eventually successful, and the Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company was officially inaugurated. Initially, the company flag was supposed to have 
included the white star of Chile, but this was replaced with a crown once the Royal Charter 
was granted in January 1840.25 
The awarding of the charter was by no means a foregone conclusion. Legislation 
passed in 1825, 1834 and 1837 made it easier to obtain a Royal Charter and become a 
limited-liability company, but not all applications were successful. Between 183 7 and 1854 
the Board of Trade received 164 applications for Royal Charters, ninety-three of which were 
approved. Many of the successful applications were from non-profit organizations, with 
25 
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mines and shipping companies comprising the bulk of approvals in the corporate sector. 
Registering an limited-liability company was fairly inexpensive, but obtaining a Royal 
Charter was not. The application originally cost about £402, a large sum for the day. Also, 
rivals could exert pressure to have a charter denied. This was exactly what happened to the 
London, Liverpool & North American Screw Steamship Company, which was registered as 
a limited-liability concern in 1852. Their charter application was opposed by Cunard, which 
had just inaugurated a trans-Atlantic steam cargo service. SouthLiverpool'sMP, W. Brown, 
who had an interest in the Collins line, protested granting the charter in the Commons. 
Although ostensibly a rival of Cunard's, Collins was actually in collusion with the firm, so 
Brown's stance was understandable. Despite such potential hurdles, Pacific Steam 
Navigation became one of the first shipowning companies with Liverpool ties to obtain a 
Royal Charter.26 
The manner of the company's formation itself marked a great difference from most 
contemporary Merseyside shipping companies, including Brocklebanks. Table 5.1 has 
already shown us that, except for the partnership model, there were no other forms of 
company organizations owning new Liverpool tonnage in 1820. Indeed, it was only after 
1870 that other company forms, especially the limited-liability type, began to appear with 
26 
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any frequency as owners on the Liverpool register. In fact, by 1889 their share of new 
registries was about thirty percent in numeric terms, still far from a majority, although they 
did hold almost half of all tonnage newly-registered that year (see Appendix Four). In fact, 
the individual investor remained the primary buyer of shares throughout the period. In the 
case of Brockle banks, the company waited until the late 1890s to make even a tentative 
foray toward going public. This makes the PSNC all the more remarkable as a limited-
liability company officially organized by 1840.27 
The company prospectus provides quite a bit of information about the aims of the 
enterprise and is instructive on a number of issues, including some misconceptions that 
would later plague the venture. The document gave credit to Wheelwright as the inspiration 
behind PSNC, although it did not go so far as to call him the founder. The monopoly granted 
by the South American governments was mentioned, along with a reference to certain other 
"necessary immunities and privileges." Financially, there appears to have been little direct 
input from either the Chilean, Peruvian or Bolivian governments, but the document 
specifically mentioned an exemption from port dues for the duration of the PSNC monopoly 
- a significant concession. The time limit to place two steamers in service had already 
passed, but the respective governments maintained their confidence in Wheelwright and 
granted an extension, which was also mentioned in the prospectus. In fact, the directors' first 
report in 1843 went so far as to mention " ... their sense of obligation ... not only for the 
27 
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renewal thus granted, but for the uniform good faith [the governments of Chile and Peru] 
have shown in the observance of these privileges. "28 
Perhaps the most significant feature of the prospectus was the implied linkage of 
worldwide British trade by steam. As the government was already planning to establish a 
line of steam packets between England and the West Indies, it was noted that the network 
could be taken even further were this service linked in turn to the PSNC routes along the 
west coast of South America. By 1840, in fact, the British government offered a small 
subsidy for transporting the mails monthly between Valparaiso and Panama. This service 
then linked to Europe through the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, which ran from 
Southampton to the Isthmus and from there overland to the Pacific. At least one nineteenth-
century source credited this mail subsidy with the actual foundation of the PSNC, and 
George Brown's presence as Chairman was advantageous as wel1.29 The Directors' 
ambitions went beyond even this service, however, since the prospectus noted that the 
28 
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journey to Lima, Peru, which then took about four months, could be reduced to less than one 
month via the Isthmus route. In an observation which turned out to be prophetic in the long 
run, the Board also noted "that a communication between England and Australia, by this 
[Isthmus] route, might be accomplished in about sixtyfive [sic] or seventy days; in place of 
four months, which it now occupies. "30 
Though they were unforseen at the time, two later problem areas were alluded to 
immediately following this discussion of routes. The report mentioned the abundance of 
good quality coal in Chile, especially in the area known as Talcahuano. This, it was asserted, 
could be obtained at very reasonable rates. Likewise, other coal deposits had been found at 
San Lorenzo in Callao Bay and in the Gulf of Guayaquil. 31 If this proved insufficient, extra 
coal could always be imported from England or Australia at moderate cost. Although steam 
engines were still known for their voracious consumption of coal, the Directors gave the 
impression that this limitation could be overcome easily. The next few years would prove 
just how wrong that assessment was. 32 
30 
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The second miscalculation made by the Board, and perhaps by Wheelwright himself, 
was the amount of capital required. As we have seen, PSNC's share allocations divided the 
company into 5,000 shares at £50 each, for a total working capital of £250,000.33 The 
prospectus reported that "less than one-half this amount will be sufficient to carry into full 
effect the operations of the company. "34 This assertion provides evidence that PSNC, despite 
the mention of potential routes to Australia, was not seriously considering moving into such 
trades in the foreseeable future. Although the southern continent figured in the company's 
later operations, it seems likely that it was only mentioned at this point as a way of attracting 
the notice- and perhaps a mail subsidy- of the government. Writing in 1903, John Kennedy 
expressed the opinion that "it was not the intention of the company to trade elsewhere than 
along the Pacific Coast, and for this purpose a capital of a quarter of a million pounds was 
thought to be sufficient. "35 As with the Chilean coal situation, events would prove the 
Board's assessment optimistic at best, especially given the failure to meet even this capital 
Williamson, complained that his Liverpool partners were sending too many products, thinking they could be sold 
just as cotton or flour were in their home port. PSNC, with their initial concentration on passengers, mails and 
specie, largely avoided this trap. This is not to say, of course, that the company did not also carry general 
cargoes. See Graeme J. Milne, Trade and Traders in Mid-Victorian Liverpool: Mercantile Business and the 
Making of a World Port (Liverpool, 2000), 59; and Robert G. Greenhill, "Latin America's Export Trades and 
British Shipping, 1850-1914," in David Alexander and Rosemary Ommer ( eds. ), Volumes not Values: Canadian 
Sailing Ships and World Trades (St. John's, NL, 1979), 249. 
33 
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requirement. 
In the interim, Wheelwright and the Directors had not been idle. As early as 1838 
plans were underway for the construction of a pair of steamers to inaugurate the service. 
Since PSNC was constrained in terms of buying power, and since two engines had already 
been ordered from Miller, Ravenhill and Company of London at a cost of £17,400, the 
Directors agreed to assume liability for costs in the event the company failed. The Liverpool 
shareholders had agreed with a suggestion from Wheelwright that two 700-ton vessels would 
be ordered from Thomas Wilson in Liverpool. Aside from the novelty of steam, the vessels 
were to be constructed of iron- another example of Wheelwright's foresight. Intended for 
launch six months after the signing of the contract, the craft were to cost £9,000 apiece. The 
first rift between Wheelwright and the London Directors arose over this contract. Because 
of the delay over obtaining the Royal Charter, the Board cancelled the order while 
Wheelwright was away. Although further negotiations were undertaken, Wilson refused to 
have anything more to do with the company. Wheelwright had been convinced that iron 
construction would be cheaper in the long run because the vessels would not require as much 
maintenance. The Board disagreed and contracted with Curling, Young and Company of 
Poplar, London, to build the steamers out of wood. The vessels cost £17/5/0 per ton, which 
made them more expensive than Wilson's proposed craft. The 700-ton steamers were due 
to launch within a year of the contract signing. In 1843, when the Board reflected on the 
issue, it judged only that "both the vessels and engines have proved, in every respect, 
efficient, and calculated for the service in which they are engaged;" an opinion supposedly 
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shared by "many naval men of high rank." The Directors made no mention of the steamers 
Wheelwright had tried to purchase or the dispute over them. 36 
Whether or not the decision regarding the steamers was correct, the Board soon made 
what was certainly a misstep. In early 1840, contrary to the advice ofLloyd's surveyor, the 
Directors bought the wooden sailing vessel Elizabeth, intending it to carry coal out to the 
Pacific coast to supply the company's own steamer operations. Just prior to sailing the crew 
refused to embark, alleging that the Elizabeth was unseaworthy and were backed in their 
assertions by Lloyd's surveyor George Bailey. Wheelwright, accompanied by Captain 
George Peacock, RN, the company's first steamship commander, inspected the vessel 
personally and agreed that it was unfit for service. Both vessel and cargo were sold, the 
former hopefully for scrap. Another wooden craft, the barque Portsea, was then bought as 
a replacement and loaded with 500 tons of Welsh coal. Misfortune continued to plague the 
venture, and Portsea caught fire off Cape Horn, only being saved by its quick-thinking 
captain who dumped the burning coals overboard and doused water on the remainder. Even 
upon arrival problems ensued as Peacock realized the coal was of poor quality. This 
incident, following on the heels of the steamer dispute, led the Directors to become 
dissatisfied with Wheelwright, who for his part had also lost confidence in them. For the 
36 
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time being, however, the company's affairs proceeded apace. 37 
On 18 April of that same year the first PSNC steamer, Peru, was launched, with the 
Chile following three days later (the latter being christened by Mrs. Peter Campbell 
Scarlett). The vessels were both equipped with side-lever engines of approximately ninety 
horsepower each. Captain Peacock was personally charged by Peter Campbell Scarlett with 
taking the craft to South America's Pacific coast to begin operations. Peacock had taken an 
avid interest in the vessels' construction from the beginning. With cabin room for 150 
passengers and able to carry 300 tons of freight, the vessels were among the most efficient 
steamers of their day, perhaps vindicating the Board's decision. Chile departed from 
Falmouth under a Captain Glover, who had been appointed by Peacock, on 10 June. Peru, 
37 
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with Peacock himself in charge, left on 10 July 1840 and called at Plymouth to board some 
late passengers and to collect the mails. Both sailings were several months behind schedule. 
Indeed, The Times ran their sailing announcement as early as 21 May (a final embarkation 
notice followed on 18 June). The two vessels linked up at Point Famine in the Straits of 
Magellan and travelled into Valparaiso Bay in tandem on 16 October. Although their 
departure was not the media event that the launching of Cunard's Britannia had been, it 
nonetheless marked a milestone in shipping, for when they arrived in Chile steam 
transportation was permanently established on the Pacific coast of South America. Aside 
from being a leader in technology and corporate organization, in their first year as a 
chartered company PSNC broke new ground in terms of the routes they served- it was a 
whole new field for British commercial enterprise. 38 
As with most trend-setting endeavours, the PSNC encountered a great many hurdles 
before any positive returns appeared. As Arthur Wardle so succinctly described it, "troubles 
in great variety befell the Pacific Steam Navigation Company in those early years ... "39 One 
of the most informative documents surviving from the company's formative period is the 
Board ofDirectors' first report. Published in 1843, it summarizes events during the PSNC's 
first three years in operation and previous efforts to launch the company. The document 
38 
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reads much like an apologia, with the Directors at great pains to reassure investors while at 
the same time absolving themselves from responsibility for the many setbacks plaguing their 
efforts. In fact, the opening paragraph of the report explicitly stated that part of the Board's 
objective in the report was to chronicle the various problems which had led them to delay 
presenting their initial statement. 40 
The steamers having been dispatched to South America, the Directors acknowledged 
that their arrival was delayed due to problems at Rio de Janeiro and elsewhere, beyond the 
date originally set under the agreements with Chile, Peru and Bolivia. The Directors 
admitted, however, that the patience of these governments gave PSNC some room to 
manoeuver. Although the steamers left in the summer of 1840, they did not begin operations 
until November. The service ran until January, but the runs were soon curtailed by 
Mitrovitch' s old nemesis - lack of fuel. The ramifications of this problem were serious 
enough that we will return to a discussion of it shortly. Although probably their most serious 
problem, the scarcity of coal was not the only difficulty besetting PSNC. The steamers were 
out of commission for three months, only returning to service in April1841. Even then there 
was less than two months of uninterrupted service. On 31 May the Chile struck a reef while 
entering Valparaiso harbour. The vessel was heavily damaged and was out of service for six 
months while repairs were effected (Had it not been for Captain Peacock's skills in 
engineering and salvage, the accident would likely have sunk the fledgling company). 
40 
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Although insurance covered the cost of the repairs, the loss of the vessel's services so soon 
into their operations was a serious setback for the company. In the interim PSNC employees 
in the region purchased a schooner to keep the runs between Callao and Panama in service. 
Given the disadvantages of sail on this coast, the solution was nothing more than a stop-gap 
measure. The report allowed that due to the accident "the Company suffered a large loss." 
Translated into financial terms, out of a subscribed capital of £94,000, £72,000 was already 
spent.41 
Even faced with such difficulties the company was determined to forge ahead. 
Wherever the need existed PSNC tried to expand their services. After appeals from the 
governments of Peru and Ecuador, it was decided to include Guayaquil, Ecuador's main 
port, as a port of call. In return the Ecuadorian government gave Pacific Steam Navigation 
a monopoly similar to what Peru and Chile had already granted. In keeping with the 
company's run of bad luck, this service was also unprofitable with only two vessels in 
service, and it was decided to confine operations to the region south of Callao for the 
interim. Later in the report the Directors proposed the addition of a third steamer to the fleet. 
On one hand, this vessel would act as insurance against the kind of accident that befell the 
Chile. With the third steamer available there would presumably be at least two fit for service 
41 
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at all times. When all three were available a monthly service to Guayaquil could also be 
operated, along with occasional freight and passenger voyages going to Panama. The 
proposed vessel was estimated to cost £20,000, which would necessitate an additional issue 
of shares. Still, the Directors felt that the third craft would be no real expense, since there 
was, in their view, sufficient demand to warrant expansion. 42 
In terms of actual profitability, the company was still on very shaky ground in 1843. 
The Board's balance sheet and profit-and-loss account for the period ending 31 June 1842 
presented a fairly bleak picture.43 By then it was clear that the sum raised thus far was 
insufficient to cover the expenses PSNC had incurred in setting up the line. The Directors 
were forced to secure a loan of £20,000 to cover the shortfall. In addition, of the alleged 
capital that had initially been raised from the sale of shares, more than £6,000 was still owed 
by investors in Britain and South America. The Board of Directors regretfully informed 
shareholders that to date Pacific Steam faced a loss of £13,695/8/10. This situation 
notwithstanding, the Directors still believed that the company's financial future was 
promising. There were some hopeful signs. A good deal of the loss to 1843 was due to initial 
start-up costs which would not recur and accidents, such as that to the Chile. In fact, the 
losses under these headings amounted to a full £15,000; had they not occurred the company 
would have shown a small profit. To reassure investors the Board presented the annual 
42 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Directors' Report, 18 August 1843, 5-6 and 11. 
43 
For full particulars of the profit-and-loss account, see Document 3. 
381 
expenses that it believed would appear in future. 44 These totalled £29,852, a figure that it 
somehow managed to claim was "not an estimate." Yet since the report presented 
contingency figures for the cost of several different kinds of coal, it is clear that this is 
precisely what it was. 
The Board also attempted to convey an air of cautious optimism and fiscal prudence, 
but it is hard to accept that it would have convinced many investors. It was "confident" that 
operating expenses could be reduced, especially concerning the cost of coal. At the time of 
the report the company was paying 27 /6d. per ton for coal, but the Directors were convinced 
that the price could be reduced to 20/-d. once local sources of coal came into general use. 
Unfortunately, they provided no hard evidence that this was likely to be the case. Steamer 
receipts were also the cause for guarded optimism. On the route from Callao to Talcahuano 
the two steamers had earned an average of £43,125. Taking this into account, the net profit 
for PSNC and their shareholders would stand at about £13,273- a return of 14.5 percent on 
paid-up capital. The vessels were already noted for their punctuality, a factor many shippers 
would come to appreciate in steam services. The good will of the various South American 
governments involved was also encouraging. The Directors ended their first report on a 
cautiously optimistic note. 45 Wheelwright was likewise moved to claim in 1843 that "I have 
44 
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established steam navigation m the Pacific in a secure and effective manner. "46 
Unbeknownst to either Wheelwright or the company Directors, problems still lay ahead. 
Shortly after the first Directors' report appeared, William Wheelwright returned from 
an extended stay in South America. He had travelled there by sailing vessel and, as on his 
honeymoon, worked his way southward by mule to prepare the way for the newly arrived 
steamers. Wheelwright's work on PSNC's behalf was ill rewarded, however. He returned 
to the United Kingdom, having worked out many difficulties faced by the company on the 
spot, only to discover that the Directors had fired him for "bad management." Most 
commentators have not dealt at length with the reasons behind this decision, but the 
motivation ofthe Directors can surely be traced to Wheelwright's independent line regarding 
the purchase of the Elizabeth and his wish to invest in iron rather than wooden steamers. In 
short, he was not sufficiently tractable for the London-dominated Board. 47 
Wheelwright promptly trumped the Board, however, turning the Directors' own 
tactics against them. Appealing to shareholders in Liverpool, and reminding them of the 
Board's own failings in these matters, he succeeded in having the Directors themselves-
46 
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minus George Brown- removed from the company. A new Board was instituted, this time 
composed mainly of prominent merchants and businessmen from Liverpool itself. It is from 
this period that PSNC can be considered a full-fledged Liverpool company, as its 
headquarters was subsequently also moved to the city. Unlike the previous Board, the new 
Directors showed great confidence in Wheelwright's abilities. His powers were extended to 
cover not only Chile but also Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Panama.48 
Armed now with the full support of his new Directors, Wheelwright was granted a 
contract by the British government to provide regular mails between Valparaiso and 
Panama. With this in hand the new Directors acted on a suggestion by their predecessors and 
invested in additional tonnage. The iron paddle-wheeler Ecuador was built by Tod and 
McGregor of Glasgow to serve the ports of Callao, Guayaquil and Panama. The 323-ton 
vessel was launched in October of 1845. Two months later the Board made Wheelwright 
Joint Managing Director for the company, and Alexander Hutchinson was named Pacific 
Coast Manager. Following the PSNC's year-end Board meeting, Wheelwright returned to 
South America to try to fix a number of the issues that were dogging the firm- the fuel issue 
48 
Wardle, "West Coast (1)," 109; "Origin of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company," 16; and Haws, PSNC, 14-
15. According to Graeme Milne, Trade and Traders, 164, the choice ofDirectors for a publicly-traded company 
had two main functions. First, from the internal perspective of the firm it "ensured that all elements in the 
proposed trading network- often already operating informally- were tied into the business structure from the 
outset." Second, the reputations of the individuals involved was often important in creating trust among potential 
buyers of stock. As Milne wrote, "[ d]irectors were chosen to give the firm an air of solidity and competence. 
Not only would leading shipowners be present, but usually a local banker or two, and sometimes agents with 
experience of operating at the other end of the proposed route." Many individual PSNC Directors over the years 
were closely tied to other major shipping enterprises or were members of Liverpool's leading shipowning 
families (see Chapter Ten). 
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foremost among them. In Wheelwright's absence William Just, of the Aberdeen & London 
Steam Ship Company, had already been appointed Second Joint Managing Director of 
Generally speaking, Wheelwright's object was "to reform the management of the 
company's affairs in the Pacific." Unlike the previous Board, the new Directors assured 
Wheelwright that they were "satisfied of [his] fitness for the task" and gave him "full 
discretionary power" to carry any proposed changes into effect. 50 Their main concerns came 
under a number ofheadings, and Wheelwright was charged with setting them right or at least 
proposing longer-term solutions. 
Although not listed first, the coal supply was among the most important difficulties 
facing PSNC. In fact, the company's 1836 agreements with the governments of Peru and 
Bolivia, though not that with Chile, specifically mentioned coaling issues, providing an 
exemption from tonnage dues for any PSNC vessel importing coal exclusively. An early 
estimate of the company's progress (or lack thereof) in this era set total losses at about four-
fifths of all paid up capital. These losses were largely attributed to the lack of fuel on the 
coast. It will be remembered that the London Directors were quite sanguine about the 
49 
Duncan, "Chile and Peru," 270-271; Wardle, "West Coast (1)," 109; NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, 
Administration, Directors' Report, 18 August 1843, 11; December 1845; and Haws, PSNC, 15. William Just 
served as Managing Director from 1843 untill875 and was responsible for reorganizing the company's services 
on South America's west coast in 1856, having visited the area to prepare for the changes. He died in 1895, aged 
eighty-three, still serving on the Board of Directors. Kennedy, History of Steam Navigation, 60. 
50 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Business Letters, 14 January 1846. 
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fuelling prospect in their first report. Indeed, they seem to have had a genuine faith that any 
problems in this regard could be quickly overcome. Even twenty years on, however, a 
contemporary commentator noted that much of the coal needed by the PSNC in South 
America was still exported from the United Kingdom. 51 Principally shipped out of Cardiff, 
the coal was supplied principally by the Crown Company's patent fuel and Nixon's steam 
navigation coal. Although it was true that coal could be had in Chile, there were a number 
of problems associated with this supply. One coastal deposit at Lota, although plentiful and 
of a reasonable quality, was unsuited for use on its own except in specially-designed engines. 
On a more positive note, this coal did serve fairly well when mixed with Welsh coals. For 
the Directors the main hurdles were suitable storage depots and an economical supply. They 
proposed to Wheelwright that each of their Chilean coaling stations should have 
accommodation for at least 3,000-4,000 tons of coal and that quays and stages should be 
built to ensure efficient discharging and loading of the fuel. The company had previously 
been dependent on older vessels converted into coal hulks, a solution that was not only 
expensive but also provided limited storage. 52 
Upon his return to Liverpool in 1847 Wheelwright prepared a report for the Directors 
51 
John Will ox, The Steam Fleet of Liverpool: A Series of Historic, Statistical, and Descriptive Sketches, Tracing 
their Origin, and Showing the Progress and Present Condition of the Leading Branches (Liverpool, 1865), 64. 
See also British Library, Additional Manuscripts, "Copy of the Licence of the Government of the North and 
South Peruvian States to Mr. W. Wheelwright"; and Wardle, Steam Conquers the Pacific, 186-187. 
52 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Business Letters, 1845," 2-3; "Origin of the Pacific Steam 
Navigation Company," 3-4; and "Trade of South America," 68. 
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in which he pointed out a number of problems that he encountered concerning coaling on 
the South American coast. The main difficulty, as he saw it, was not the necessity to procure 
coal from Britain or a lack of accommodation. Rather, it was the problems associated with 
the region's own geography and climate. Except in the case of its coaling depots at Payta and 
Coquimbo, the PSNC' s supplies oflocal coal had to be procured at "open ports, exposed to 
the rolling sea. "53 This prevented the vessels from laying alongside piers or hulks, except in 
very calm weather. In Wheelwright's opinion this in itself accounted for the great expenses 
to which the company had been subjected. Also, on arriving at Valparaiso Wheelwright 
found that the company's three deposit sites in the area were all vulnerable to fire and 
looters. In response, a new facility was built which could accommodate about 3,000 tons of 
coal, while the older deposits, by then almost played out, were abandoned. Coaling at 
Valparaiso was expensive in any event, about two American dollars per ton by 
Wheelwright's calculations. This could possibly be reduced ifPSNC was to use their own 
launches to transship coal, and if the firm made extra efforts to load when the weather was 
most conducive to discharge from colliers into steamers. 54 
Wheelwright had more suggestions and proposed solutions about other specific 
coaling sites. At Callao the PSNC maintained three hulks, the Portsea (mentioned earlier), 
53 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Business Letters, 9 August 1847. 
54 
Ibid. 
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Cecilia and Jasper, which collectively could hold about 2,000 tons of coal. 55 Wheelwright 
ordered that all should be overhauled and a new barge built. With this increased capacity 
PSNC would be better equipped to handle occasions when both steamers had to be refuelled 
at once. Wheelwright viewed the company's Payta deposit as vital to operations unless new 
deposits were found at Panama. Yet this potential coal source was also problematic. 
Wheelwright believed that at both Callao and Payta the cost of landing and embarking coal 
was less than at Panama. On the other hand, more freight appears to have been loaded at 
Panama, or at least there was a longer delay in waiting for full complements to be placed on 
board. For this reason, Wheelwright believed, coaling there might still be feasible. With the 
longer stop over, it made sense for the company to use the down time to coal their vessels. 
In the final analysis Wheelwright concluded that the company's arrangements, along with 
the improvements he effected on the spot, were about the best that could be expected. He 
stated that "with ... our improved arrangements in Payta, 4 hours is quite sufficient to coal, 
and that time will always be regular so that on reviewing the whole system, I do not see in 
what way I can suggest an improvement. "56 
55 
Portsea (name also given as Porta) and Cecilia were originally barque-rigged sailing vessels. Portsea was built 
in 1808 for the London-Calcutta trade. Cecilia was used on the Clyde-Australia run by Alexander & Company 
from 1815; she was lost in 1847, the same year as Wheelwright's report to the Directors, and was replaced with 
the Queen of the Ocean. PSNC fleet historian Duncan Haws was unable to find any substantive information on 
the .Jasper. Wardle, "West Coast (1)," 109; and Haws, PSNC, 95. 
56 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Business letters, 9 August 1847. Eventually regional coal 
supplies, especially from Talcahuano, Chile, did aid PSNC. Both Wheelwright and Peacock surveyed the coast, 
finding Talcahuano to be the most suitable area for the company's coaling needs. Wheelwright contracted for 
the resource, starting a new Chilean industry when a mine was opened with its own pier and railway in early 
1841. By the end of the year the mine had produced 4,000 tons of coal, keeping steam operations going until 
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As with many steamship ventures in this period, coal consumption was a drag on the 
efficiency of the vessels. Indeed, the question of technology- an undercurrent of this entire 
work- was central to company planning at this stage and remained so for most ofPSNC' s 
subsequent history. 57 Pacific Steam was certainly onto a good idea, but they would have to 
wait on the engineers and further improvements in the marine steam engine for the service 
to reach its full potential. Looking at the matter from the perspective of the 1840s, it was a 
close thing as to whether this would be possible before the company's finances dragged 
suitable stocks of British bituminous coal were collected. As of mid-1843 PSNC had spent £2,194/3/8 in 
developing the mine. By 1844 British shippers discovered a lucrative return cargo in the form of guano (bird 
manure used as fertilizer), and were arriving in western South America with coal cargoes that doubled as ballast. 
Thereafter Chilean coal production declined. NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Directors" Reports, 
18 August 1843, 12; Duncan, "Chilean Coal and British Steamers," 276-279; Duncan, "Captain George 
Peacock," 22; and Duncan, "Chile and Peru," 256. Refer also to Wheelwright, Mr. Wheelwright's Report, 18-
21. 
57 
The development of marine steam technology and the economics of such is covered in some detail in Chapter 
Four. This question was pervasive in seaward industry for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Some companies, like Brocklebanks, were able to sidestep the issue for many years simply by the nature of their 
trades and company structure. Pioneers like PSNC and Isambard Kingdom Brunei took great risks when 
choosing the route of innovation. In Brunei's case the ideas were simply too advanced, and his steam leviathan 
Great Eastern was a commercial failure, unlike his previous ventures, Great Britain and Great Western. In many 
instances developments had to wait for, and feed off, one another. Steamers were dependant on advances in 
engines, which in tum relied on progress in metal hull technology and propellers. Overall, the steam shipping 
industry was constrained, like a convoy, to the pace of its slowest element. Milne, Trade and Traders, 23. On 
Brunei, see Alan Buck, The Little Giant. A Life of IK. Brune/ (Newton Abbot, 1986); and Howarth, British Sea 
Power, 368-370, 373-378, 381, 396. The issue was not confined to commercial ventures. With the complete 
conversion of the major navies to steam in the mid-nineteenth century the whole concept of maritime warfare 
changed. Prior to this point the Royal Navy and others could range over the globe propelled by wind alone. 
Britain and its empire had to be on guard at all places and in all times. With the advent of steam and the 
limitations imposed by coal consumption, the entire strategic outlook changed. As Marc Milner commented, 
"[g]iven the limited range of steam-fired ships, the general lack of foreign bases, and the preponderance of the 
British fleet, no coal-fired raider -let alone a battle fleet- could expect to survive long outside its home waters." 
Marc Milner, Canada's Navy: The First Century (Toronto, 1999), 10. See also Andrew Lambert, Battleships 
in Transition: the Creation of the Steam Battlejleet, 1815-1860 (London, 1985). 
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them under - an opinion expressed by others previously. 58 If the company failed, Pacific 
South America would be left to await another man of vision like Wheelwright before 
another permanent service of this type came into being. For the moment Wheelwright 
understood that the company was at the mercy ofBritish coal prices; the quantity and quality 
of the fuel found locally; and the uncertainties of South America's weather patterns. 
The Directors also asked Wheelwright to look into other areas of the trade that 
related to technology. These included the mail service, services to minor ports and the 
condition of the steamers themselves. On the first issue, the Board was most concerned that 
mails were delivered punctually and regularly on all occasions. The minor ports at which 
PSNC steamers called were also an issue, as the Directors thought it better to discontinue 
service to such harbours unless local merchants were more forthcoming in providing 
profitable amounts of goods for carriage. 59 
Regarding the mails, Wheelwright replied that the service had been running with as 
much "order and regularity" as possible under the circumstances. Customers in general 
appeared pleased with Pacific Steam's service, and all ports had been receiving their mail. 
58 
The author of a 1923 article in the Mersey Dock Board Staff Guild's periodical commented: "Had I been alive 
at the time [circa 1845], and a diviner of horoscopes, I might, or might not, have foretold the measure of good 
fortune which the gods had in store for [the PSNC]." "Origin of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company," 16. 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Business Letters, 14 January 1846, 2. Another matter that recurs 
in this correspondence is that of issuing precise instructions to masters. The object of these regulations was to 
ensure maintenance of the company's primary attractions for shippers and passengers- speed and regularity. 
PSNC issued such orders for many years in the form of handbooks, not just to masters, but also to engineers and 
other personnel. A number are preserved in the Maritime Archives and Library at the Merseyside Maritime 
Museum. See NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, "PSNC, Instructions for Masters," various years. 
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There was some delay in Panama, but this was beyond company control since it was caused 
by waiting for the connecting service from Britain. It was in addressing these concerns about 
the mails that Wheelwright was led into technical matters. Southerly winds, blowing up from 
the Antarctic, still caused service delays, which were a cause for complaint among certain 
Chilean patrons. The scheduled arrival date at Valparaiso was the twenty-eighth of each 
month, but occasionally this was off by as much as eight days, creating problems for the city 
mails. In Wheelwright's opinion, new developments would soon remedy this difficulty. Both 
the Peru and Chile were to undergo refits, which were to include the installation of new 
tubular boilers. The increased power would allow PSNC greater punctuality and would 
satisfy both the governments and the public.60 
The question of the minor ports was also bound up in technological concerns. 
Wheelwright did not see the need to eliminate these ports from the company's schedule, but 
he did feel that visits to such places must be limited strictly to no more than two hours. 
Collectively, PSNC earned US $1,800 per call from these ports, and he pointed out that on 
the northward passage little time was lost by putting in to them. On the southbound leg, 
owing to the strong southerly winds Callao could be made late each evening, but this would 
mean putting on full steam, thus sacrificing profits to increased coal consumption. The 
60 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration Business Letters, 9 August 1847. The mails were a natural source 
of concern for PSNC. Robert Greenhill, "Latin America's Export Trades and British Shipping," 248, asserts that 
privately arranged government mail contracts gavePSNC (and Royal Mail) a virtual monopoly ofsteamshipping 
in their sphere of operations. This discouraged competition, constrained the amount of tonnage available to 
shippers and kept rates up. 
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steamer could not be berthed at night in any case, and more time would be lost the following 
morning. Again, the introduction of the new engines could surmount the problem. 
Wheelwright noted that "with powerful steamers we should save at least three days on the 
round voyage, as compared to the time occupied at present."61 
Despite such continued problems Wheelwright, ever the optimist, predicted good 
things for the future, including an annual gross revenue from a bi-monthly service of 
$341,152. This optimism is perhaps understandable given his own self-interest concerning 
the PSNC's fate. With the advantage of hindsight, it is easier to share Wheelwright's faith 
in his creation and in the continued value of steam to South American transport. He prefaced 
his 1847 report to the Board of Directors in the following terms: 
61 
... the interest of the company, its security and prosperity, will be ... promoted 
[by a bi-monthly steam service], the welfare and convenience of the 
public ... with increased facilities will contribute to our revenue, which will 
be fully sustained when all the arrangements have been carried into effect ... 
[L ]ast year's traffic shows an excess per voyage as compared to the previous 
year- the result in part of greater regularity, the reduction in the number of 
voyages - but mainly from the extension to Panama and the consequent 
transfer of Atlantic passenger traffic from Cape Hom by our steamers, to the 
Isthmus- added to the natural increase of receipts from a line of coast 1 ,500 
miles in extent, and intimately connected by commercial interchange with 
Peru and Chile. 62 
Whether PSNC would "make it" in the long run was still debatable, but the confident 
NML, MMM, MAL, BIPSNC, Administration Business Letters, 9 August 1847,7. See also Greenhill, "Shipping 
1850-1914," 123. 
62 
NML, MMM, MAL, BIPSNC, Administration Business Letters, 9 August 1847, 2. 
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Liverpool Directors, as well as William Just and Wheelwright himself, took a proactive 
approach to the service, ensuring that they remained a cutting-edge enterprise. At this point 
PSNC's trio of vessels could hardly be called a proper fleet, and they were far from being 
a major player among Liverpool shipowners. But this would change rapidly. The year 184 7 
was something of a turning point for the fledgling company, for this was the year in which 
investors earned their first dividend, even if it were only two and a half percent. By the time 
Wheelwright reported back to the Board, another steamer, the iron-paddle wheeler New 
Granada, had already been completed by Smith and Rodgers of Govan. 63 The 773-ton 
Bolivia was added in 1849, steaming out to Valparaiso in October. The Ecuador meanwhile 
had not met expectations and was sold. It was at this point that the Directors decided to 
embark on what became a hallmark of PSNC in the nineteenth century - investment in a 
large increment in tonnage. When the government mail contract was extended in 1850, the 
Board invested £140,000 to acquire four new steamers, Lima, Santiago, Quito and Bogota. 
As with many ofPSNC's vessels, all these were built on the Clyde and powered by 400-
horsepower engines. To date PSNC had escaped any serious misfortune to their vessels, 
apart from the episode in which Chile struck a reef. In 1852, however, the venerable Peru 
was stranded and became a loss, and in May the Chile was sold. Another intended addition 
to the fleet was the small steamer La Perlita. But this ill-fated craft was destined to never 
63 
Kennedy, History of Steam Navigation, 60; and Wardle, Steam Conquers the Pacific, 74. Many of PSNC's 
vessels were named after the nations they served. New Grenada reflected this trend. Built in 1846, it was given 
the contemporary name for the Republic of Columbia. Haws, PSNC, 30. 
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see South America. It departed the Mersey under the command of Captain Maughan, but 
vanished without a trace while en route. The little steamer Osprey, intended for a Callao, 
Pisco and Huacho service, suffered the same fate in 1853.64 
In the main, however, these were good years for the company. For most of the two 
decades after 1847 profits climbed steadily. By September 1850 the Directors were able to 
announce a dividend of ten percent, four times the level achieved just three years earlier. 
Besides the standards of service which Wheelwright and the company Directors imposed, 
a good deal of the credit for the turnaround must lie with PSNC's continued innovation and 
adaptability. In late 1853 the company invested in their first screw steamer, the 573-ton 
Valdivia, constructed by Caird and Company- it was the only PSNC screw vessel ever built 
of wood. Despite the acquisition of Valdivia, PSNC continued purchasing paddle-wheelers 
for some time thereafter. In 1860 PSNC made their first foray into steel construction with 
the small, 132-ton passenger tender Morro. Yet the most important technological adoption 
in this period was neither the screw propellor nor the introduction of steel vessels. We have 
noted in detail the problems associated with fuel consumption in this early period, and the 
64 
Duncan, "Chile and Peru," 273; Wardle, "West Coast (1)," 109-110. See also Gore's Liverpool Advertiser, 25 
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Registries, various years; Wardle, "The West Coast Route (2)," 206; Haws, PSNC; and Lloyd's Register of 
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most important transition was the introduction of the compound reciprocating engine.65 
The point has been made more than once in this study that steam only became 
practical on longer routes as engine efficiency increased and fuel costs dropped. Once this 
process was complete steamers could not only outperform sail in terms of regularity of 
service but could also operate economically on the longest routes. Innovations in marine 
steam technology were almost continuous throughout the later nineteenth century, although 
most developments were in themselves marginal. The exception to this, in terms of its 
immediate impact, was the perfection of the reciprocating engine. John Elder (1824-1869), 
in partnership with Charles Randolph, took out the first patent for a compound marine 
engine in 1853. The engine operated by having the pistons of the high- and low- pressure 
cylinders move in opposite directions, with diametrically opposed cranks. The first vessel 
to employ this technology was the screw steamer Brandon in 1854. The importance of this 
development to shipping in general and to PSNC in particular was that it dramatically 
reduced the rate of coal consumption on vessels using the engines. With the introduction of 
the compound engine, long-distance operations by steamers were for the first time a 
practical alternative to sail. 66 
65 
Wardle, Steam Conquers the Pacific, 87; Wardle, "West Coast (1)," 110; Kennedy, History of Steam 
Navigation, 60; and Haws, PSNC', 1 S and 32. 
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For the fuel-hungry craft of Pacific Steam's fleet, this innovation could not have 
come too soon. In 1856, only three years after Elder was awarded his patent, PSNC ordered 
the Inca and Valparaiso, 290 and 1,060 tons, respectively. Ordered directly from John Elder 
and Company, the pair of iron paddle steamers marked one of the first times that the new 
engines were employed by an oceanic steamer company. This was more than fourteen years 
before other owners (excepting Alfred Holt) began regularly employing the technology. 
PSNC was once again on the leading edge of technology. This decision paid dividends, and 
it is was no coincidence that this was the same period in which PSNC achieved their first 
great upturn in commercial viability.67 
engine was Liverpool's Alfred Holt. In 1862 Holt produced his own version of the Randolph Elder engine, and 
three years later fitted these to the 2,300 ton vessels Agamemnon and Ajax. With their pioneering voyages to 
Shanghai, Holt inaugurated his Ocean Steam Ship Company (Blue Funnel Line) and regular steam navigation 
between Europe and East Asia. The vessels were built by Scott & Company of Greenock at a cost of £156,000. 
Their Holt-designed engines consumed an average of twenty tons of coal per day on the maiden voyage, running 
at about ten knots. The vessels' designed steam pressure stood at sixty-nine lbs, in contrast to the mere ten lbs 
common in most steamers of the day. A sister ship, Achilles, followed in 1866. Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets: 
Blue Funnel Line (Burwash, East Sussex, 1984), 15-16 and 41-42; Francis Hyde with J. R. Harris. Blue Funnel. 
A History of Alfred Holt and Company of Liverpool from 1865 to 1914 (Liverpool, 1956), 19; Malcolm Falkus, 
The Blue Funnel Legend. A History ofthe Ocean Steam Ship Company, 1865-1973 (London, 1990), 1; and 
Hope, British Shipping, 300-301. 
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and Haws, PSNC, 32. The company's application of new technology was not without risks. On 16 October 1876 
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BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; Arthur C. Wardle, 
"The West Coast Route (2 ), "Sea Breezes, XXIII (September 19 56), 200-206; 
Wardle, Steam Conquers the Pacific. A Record of Maritime 
Achievement,(London: 1940), 189-194; NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, 
Administration, Pacific Steam Navigation Company Handbook, various 
years. 
Perhaps the most astonishing statistic relating to PSNC during their first three 
decades of operation was their growth. Starting with only the original two craft in 1840, by 
1877 the company had acquired eighty-seven vessels in total. Some of the company's vessel 
orders rank among the most ambitious in the history of Liverpool shipowning. In 1870, for 
example, PSNC ordered five new steamers at a total tonnage of25,019, costing £630,044. 
At the time this was the largest building order placed by a single company in one year. More 
was to follow. The next year thirteen new vessels of a combined 39,780 tons, joined PSNC' s 
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fleet, costing the firm £1,174,401. Graph 9.1, above, graphically illustrates the effect these 
early 1870s purchases had on the company's size. In 1865, after twenty five years in 
operation the PSNC still ran just under 18,000 aggregate tons, although this was about three 
times the level of a decade earlier. By 1875 the company had again expanded almost six-
fold, with well over 100,000 gross tons of shipping, making them among the largest 
steamship companies on Earth. This astonishing growth was made possible by the increased 
efficiency of the service from the 1850s on, not to mention a widening of the firm's interests 
in South America. 68 
By the 1860s PSNC was actively working toward the expansion of their routes, and 
this factor necessitated an enlarged fleet. Whether the massive addition of tonnage would 
be too much for the needs of the region remained to be seen. The four steamers acquired in 
1852 for the mail contract were employed on a bi-monthly run from Valparaiso to Panama. 
In 1865 the company sought, and was granted (on 15 June), an extension oftheir operating 
charter. Under the supplementary charter PSNC could now operate not only on the west 
coast but also to the River Plate, including the Falklands.69 Even more importantly, the 
company was authorized to operate tonnage to "such other ports or places in North and 
68 
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South America and other foreign ports" as the company thought necessary. 70 This clause was 
important because it greatly expanded the area in which the PSNC was authorized to trade. 
Two years later a supplementary charter enlarged Pacific Steam's potential sphere of 
operations even further. According to the supplement, company vessels were now free to 
pursue lawful trade "along the shores ofN orth and South America, in the Pacific Ocean; and 
likewise from or between those shores and the coasts of China and New Holland 
[Australia] ... and also from or between the ports of .. Central America, and Mexico, in the 
Atlantic Ocean .. .'m (For the full text of this charter see Document Four). 
Up to the mid-1860s PSNC had run an exclusively South American service, with 
their vessels acting essentially as coasters on the continent's long western shoreline.72 
Passengers arriving from Europe did so first on other lines' vessels and then crossed over 
the Isthmus via the Panama Railway. After clashing with the railway over its refusal to give 
PSNC the same reduced through rates granted to cargoes heading to American ports, the 
company determined to inaugurate a direct steamer service from Europe to the Pacific coast 
of South America. This idea was also on the minds of the Chilean authorities, who wished 
to see the whole service overseen by a single company. A PSNC shareholder meeting in 
70 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Pacific Steam Navigation Company, Supplemental Charter No. 1, 1865, 1; and 
"Humble Petition of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company," 2. 
71 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Pacific Steam Navigation Company, Supplementary Charter No. 2, 1868, 1; and 
"Humble Petition of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company," 2. 
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This was exclusive of colliers making runs back and forth to Britain and Europe. 
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December 1867 proposed a Liverpool-Valparaiso service via the Straits ofMagellan and an 
increase in company capital to £2,000,000 in order to keep pace. The new Royal Charter was 
granted on 3 December 1867 to accommodate this expanded itinerary and increased 
capitalization. The service commenced on 13 May 1868 when the paddler Pacific departed 
Valparaiso for St. Nazaire and Liverpool. The passage took forty-three days with the vessel 
carrying a full cargo and £65,000 in specie. By July she departed the Mersey on the return 
leg of the voyage. In March of the following year the 2,800-ton Magellan steamed out of 
Liverpool to inaugurate a regular monthly service to Valparaiso. This vessel and its sisters, 
Patagonia, Araucania and Cordillera, were all equipped for the carriage of 145 first, 75 
second and 300 third-class passengers, along with 2,500 tons of cargo. With the addition of 
these four vessels and a reduction in freight rates, PSNC's passenger and cargo traffic grew 
beyond anything Wheelwright and the early investors had envisioned. Sailings from 
Liverpool soon stood at three per month, and the company had to charter tonnage to keep 
up with demand. In January 1873 a weekly mail service was inaugurated between Liverpool 
and Callao, and in one year the company's steamers covered over 1,000,000 miles (a total 
of forty-five round trips). Likewise, services to continental - especially French- ports 
produced such quantities of cargo that the number of company steamers was often 
inadequate. So as not to incur the displeasure of shippers or provide competitors with an 
opening, PSNC purchased a fair amount of second-hand tonnage just to keep pace. This was 
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in addition to the huge orders for new tonnage. 73 
In retrospect we may wonder at the wisdom of such capital expansion. A business 
owner is always taking a risk in expanding operations, and this may apply especially to the 
volatile business of shipping. Fleets could be expanded rapidly, but contraction was a much 
greater problem. Freight rates tended to fall over time, but it was not easy to dispose of 
surplus tonnage in times of economic downturn. To argue that PSNC maintained their long-
term viability through sensible management cannot be dismissed lightly. On the other hand, 
was the growth in Pacific Steam's fleet reckless from a contemporary standpoint? On the 
surface, the answer might appear to be "yes." Freights, for instance, declined by almost two-
thirds in the last third of the nineteenth century. This trend can only be seen clearly with 
hindsight, so PSNC' s Directors cannot have been expected to take it into account at the time. 
At the same time it must be acknowledged that freight rates may decline due to increased 
efficiency, entailing lowered costs, and not simply as a result of an economic downturn. In 
such cases the company's Board was certainly not behaving irresponsibly when adding new 
tonnage to its fleet. 
Even without the efficiency argument, there still appear to be sound reasons for 
periodic expansion- the company's Board was actually, and logically, following the pattern 
73 
Wardle, "West Coast (1)," 111-112; NML, MMM, MAL, "Humble Petition of the Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company," 2; Pacific Steam Navigation Company, Supplemental Charter No. 2, 2; Kennedy, History of Steam 
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of economic events as they unfolded. If we refer back to Graph 9.1, it can be seen that the 
greatest expansion in the PSNC fleet occurred in the period from about 1865-1875, and in 
this same period (15 July 1873) another Royal Charter authorized the company to increase 
their capital to £4,000,000. C. Knick Harley's work on freight rates- based on the classic 
calculations oflsserlis and North- indicates that for the first five years ofthe period at least, 
freights, in sharp decline in the early 1860s, were on the rise. There was then another general 
rate decline, but by 1870-1871, when PSNC undertook their greatest expansion, freights 
were on the rise again. From about the mid-1870s to the mid-1880s freight rates again 
entered into a prolonged, sometimes precipitous decline, and Pacific Steam Navigation's 
tonnage also contracted, although it still remained well above 1865 levels. The next tonnage 
expansion occurred over the period 1885-1895. For the first half of this period freight rates 
were again rising, even if they never equalled their pre-1875 highs. In retrospect, it must be 
concluded that the growth patterns depicted in Graph 9.1 were not simply based on foolish 
speculation or ignorance but were firmly rooted in then-current economic conditions in 
shipping. Pacific Steam's Directors, if not gifted with prescience, were certainly practical 
realists in terms of their fleet. 74 
74 
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The growth ofPSNC's fleet and trade also meant that larger accommodations were 
needed at head office. The office was moved to Castle Street around 1870 and then, only a 
year later, to James Street. In time the decision was made, in accordance with an 
arrangement with the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, to relocate PSNC's loading and 
discharging berths across the Mersey to Birkenhead, where new offices and workshops were 
also added. From this point cargo from Liverpool would be received at Duke's Dock and 
forwarded to Birkenhead, while inward cargoes would be landed at Morpeth Dock on the 
Wirral side of the Mersey. Consignees could then arrange to have them transferred to Duke's 
Dock if they so wished. Along with their ever-expanding fleet, this relocation garnered 
PSNC the nickname "The Birkenhead Navy." The move to Birkenhead marked but one 
change in circumstances. The 1870s and beyond saw Pacific Steam dealing with many 
vicissitudes, not all of them positive. How well the company weathered these storms 
IT, 519-544. Another good, and concise, discussion of freights is found in Cottrell, "Steamship on the Mersey," 
144. There are few in-depth examinations of freight rates for particular trades. Harley has produced one for 
Britain's coal export trade in the nineteenth century. He found that coal freights, although having a pattern 
somewhat their own, loosely followed the trends he found for overall rates in the period. There was a peak 
around 1860, with a general decline until about the turn of the twentieth century. As with freights generally, this 
was followed by a trough lasting about a decade and peaking again just after 1910. C. Knick Harley, "Coal 
Exports and British Shipping, 1850-1913," Explorations in Economic History, XXVI (1989), 311-338. 
According to Harley, freight rates are determined in the short term by more by demand than by supply. Over the 
long term, of course, rates are set by the conjuncture of supply and demand. The overall decline in rates in the 
nineteenth century can be attributed to a number of factors such as the decline in ship prices, especially for 
steamers; improved coal consumption; reduced crew sizes; and the weight of vessels as determined by 
construction materials (steel weighed less per unit than did iron). There were also variations in rates depending 
on the particular trade. In total, however, the trend was clearly toward falling rates. Perhaps the one simple rule 
about freights was that they were seldom determined by any one factor acting in isolation. See Harley, 
"Economics," 172 and 181-182. 
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remained to be seen .. 75 
75 
The Times, 18 November 1870, 2; and Wardle, Steam Conquers the Pacific, 116. The title Birkenhead Navy 
was still used in the mid-twentieth century, although by then PSNC again operated berths at Liverpool 
Chapter 10 
Pacific Steam Navigation Company II- New Horizons 
By the early 1870s PSNC was arguably the world's largest shipping company, and it 
appeared that the problems oftheir early years were well behind them. 1 The years 1873-1874 
were something of a watershed for the line, though, and in very few positive ways. 
Nonetheless, PSNC continued to demonstrate the adaptability that also served as one of its 
great comparative advantages. Its Orient Line service built upon their partners' own 
experience in the Australian trades, while closer ties with the Royal Mail Steam Packet 
Company provided a great capital boost to the firm in the immediate pre-war years. In 
addition, the company continued to employ cutting-edge technologies on its vessels until the 
eve of the Great War (and indeed well beyond). 
In its early years William Wheelwright dominated PSNC operations. Although it was 
a publicly traded company with a Board and shareholders, Wheelwright's relations with both 
groups were such that he was able to influence the direction ofPSNC's affairs to a great 
extent. Wheelwright retired from active management in 1852 and gave up his post as 
consulting resident director in South America three years later, but he still travelled 
extensively to promote the company's interests. In 1873 Wheelwright arrived in London, 
where he intended to settle, from the west coast of South America, but he died in the British 
capital on 26 September. Leaving behind a wife and daughter, he made one final ocean 
Duncan Haws, PSNC, 17, makes the claim that when their coastal fleet was included PSNC was indeed the 
world's largest steamship firm. 
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voyage for burial in his native community ofNewburyport.2 
Wheelwright had been much admired in South America, not only for opening up the 
coast but also for other commercial and philanthropic ventures as well. He and the PSNC 
were known for their support of local school construction and for maintenance of clergy in 
the region. Wheelwright personally introduced gas and brick making; discovered the first 
coal deposits; and started the first railway; these activities and more earned him the title 
"benefactor of Chile." Pacific Steam Navigation also contributed to local infrastructure. 
Owning the islet of Morro in Panama Bay from 1859, the company built a gridiron there to 
haul up vessels for cleaning and repairs of hulls and engines; the facility became known as 
the "North Station." By 1865 PSNC was also promoting construction of an iron floating 
dock in the region. As an adjunct to such activity large workshops were put in place and a 
local workforce hired. Local hiring also applied to the company's steamer personnel. Crew 
Agreements for vessels such as the Quito IV indicate that the majority of crew members on 
PSNC' s South American coastal service were native-born. On one voyage to Valparaiso and 
other ports late in the century, for example, sixty of seventy-three crew were South 
American nationals. On another run at the tum of the twentieth century the crew comprised 
ninety-one South Americans and twenty-nine others. This was not pure altruism on the 
company's part, however, as it made sense to recruit locally, and non-Europeans worked for 
2 
The Times, 27 September 1873, 1; Arthur C. Wardle, Steam Conquers the Pacific. A Record of Maritime 
Achievement 1840-1940 (London, 1940), 120-122; Wardle, "The West Coast Route (1)," Sea Breezes, New 
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lower pay. Contemporary social standards also applied. Europeans filled deck officer 
positions, as well as being engineers, head cooks, baggage masters, head barkeepers, and the 
like. Locals were normally found in more menial jobs, such as assistant cooks, ABs, ordinary 
seamen, servants, saloon workers, firemen and trimmers. Even with such distinctions, 
residents of this sometimes impoverished region fondly remembered the contribution of 
Wheelwright and his company. In February 1877 a statue of him was raised in Valparaiso 
at a ceremony attended by 5,000 people. A special "Hymn to Wheelwright" had been written 
for the occasion by a Professor Yanfranco. It was struck up by a band following the firing 
of a salute to PSNC' s innovative founder. By this time, however, his brainchild had run into 
new difficulties. Wheelwright's death seemed to herald turbulent times ahead for the 
company.3 
Before detailing these problems, however, something should be said concerning the 
3 
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Empire Agreements and Accounts of Crew, Quito, various years. The gridiron was a clever, if! ow tech, solution 
to some of the traditional problems associated with ship repair. Previous to its invention, vessels needing work 
were heeled onto their sides at a beach, and repairs were effected at low tide. This process was inefficient for 
several reasons. First, cargoes had to be oftloaded to relieve stress on the hull. Secondly, the hull had to be made 
watertight before every high tide. Finally, the craftsmen had to wait until the next low tide to resume work, 
which could in any event only be carried out on one side at a time. The gridiron. or tidal grid. alleviated the 
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it did allow for simultaneous work on both sides of the vessel, along with minor repairs and inspections. Eileen 
Reid Marcil, The Charley-Man: A History of Wooden Shipbuilding at Quebec, 1763-1893 (Montreal, 1995), 
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Steam's chairman was traditionally appointed as Liverpool's Honorary Chilean Consul regardless of whether 
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make up ofPSNC' s Board ofDirectors. As we have seen Wheelwright withdrew from active 
involvement in the company more than two decades before he died. Even before this date 
much of the company's decision-making was in the Directors' hands, and this must have 
been even more so after 1852. In fact, the personalities making up the board would have 
exerted a great influence on PSNC's operations and indeed, these men provide further 
evidence of the comparative advantage theme running throughout the thesis. We have noted 
that an important element of comparative advantage consisted of a person's information 
networks, along with the esteem in which they were held as a member of the port's business 
community (in effect, their trustworthiness). Some of the names associated with Pacific 
Steam's Directorate read like a who's who of Liverpool shipowning, and there can be no 
doubt that the extensive experience, interests and contacts these individuals brought to the 
table played a major role in PSNC's success through to the Great War. 
George Brown, the company's first Chair from 1840-1844, was a founding Director 
of the Royal Mail Group. Brown's positive influence on the company was not simply 
engendered by the vital connection he brought with Royal Mail~ at the very outset of their 
services it was Chairman Brown who presided over an elegant dinner at the West India Dock 
Tavern which included potential investors whom The Times described as " ... many of the 
merchants ... connected with the steam navigation of the empire."4 It says something of 
Brown's importance to the company that he was the sole retention from the original BOD 
4 
The Times, 9 July 1840. 
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after Wheelwright successfully persuaded the shareholders to inaugurate a new Board. This 
was despite the fact that Brown was one of the signatories to a letter of 7 October 1843, 
dismissing (or attempting to dismiss) Wheel wright. 5 
Brown was but the first of many influential shipowners to serve on PSNC's Board. 
Another was Edward Percy Bates (Chair 1898-1899), whose family's connection with 
Brocklebanks, Anchor Line and Cunard was detailed in Chapter Eight. The Rankin family, 
whose firm Rankin Gilmour & Company and its branch houses had longstanding ties to the 
Canadian timber trade, were also represented on the PSNC Board for many years. Robert 
Rankin (Chair 1890-1897), was succeeded on the board in 1898 by younger brother John, 
who served until1910. As a PSNC Director, John Rankin is especially useful in illustrating 
the many connections which such persons brought to the Board. Rankin served on the 
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board from 1900-1912~ was a director and chair of the Royal 
Insurance Company~ served as a member of the Liverpool and London Steamship Protection 
Association~ was a member of Lloyd's Register of Shipping (Liverpool), along with his 
many philanthropic interests. Elder Dempster co-founder Alexander Elder also served on the 
PSNC Board, while his sibling John had a long association with Pacific Steam through his 
engineering firm, founded with partner Charles Randolph. A Director himself, John Elder 
was honoured when a PSNC vessel was christened the John Elder following the engineer's 
death in 1869. In the pages to follow we will frequently refer to decisions made by the BOD 
5 
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and we should always bear in mind the contribution men such as the Elders, Rankins, 
George Brown and Percy Bates made to the company over the years. By the 1870s, following 
Wheelwright's death, the Directors faced many new challenges. That these were eventually 
overcome is a testament not only to the experience they brought to the table but (like many 
other successful shipowners) their ability to adapt in changing times.6 
In fact, it was not the loss of the founder alone that created setbacks for PSNC, but 
rather a combination of a number of factors, some of which they could not control. PSNC's 
£4,000,000 capital increase in 1873 had been intended to cover the new tonnage being added 
to the fleet, but the full amount was never subscribed. In the first half of the year PSNC' s 
receipts continued in the black but fell off considerably thereafter. The weekly Liverpool-
Callao service was at the core of their troubles. The charters arranged to maintain the service 
had been made at unfavourable rates simply to keep up scheduled sailings or to stay ahead 
of competition. This was combined with a trade downturn on both the east and west coasts 
of South America. In terms of gross revenue PSNC seemed to be doing well, with their 
Straits Line showing a working profit of £195,097/10/2. Similarly, the West Coast Lines 
6 
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John's, NL, 2000), 20; and Jeremy, David J. ( ed. ). Dictionary of Business Biography: A Dictionary of Business 
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Aside from those detailed above, other prominent Liverpool shipowners to sit on the BOD included Arthur W. 
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returned £110,542/4/5. However, once fleet and property depreciation, plus the expenses of 
laid-up steamers were taken into account, profits were pared down to only £17,327/7/0. In 
addition, the exchange rate on Peruvian currency was depressed, forcing PSNC to make a 
good portion of their remittances in produce rather than currency. As a final blow the 
company had lost £37,908/6/1 on the sale of the vessels Puna and Corcovado. In the end net 
losses for the calendar year 1874 stood at £53,066/0/10. Combined with losses from the 
second half of 1873 the total stood at about £70,000.7 
The depressed state of trade mentioned in the Directors' report for 1875 was severe 
enough that PSNC cut their weekly sailings in half with the approval of the Post Office. 
With this new schedule eleven of the company's steamers were now surplus and had to be 
laid-up at a cost of about £6,000 annually per vessel. Inca and San Carlos were sold in 1874, 
while the paddlers Talca and Peruano were converted into coastal coal hulks. Two newer 
steamers, the Puna and Corcovado, were also sold to the Royal Mail Steam Packet 
Company, which renamed them the Para and Don. At this point the large tonnage 
acquisitions of recent years must have seemed an unmitigated failure and a gross over-
extension of the firm's resources. South American and indeed world trade hit a nadir about 
1877 and another crisis apparently was looming for PSNC. 8 
7 
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One of the primary concerns facing the company was fierce and increasing 
competition from a number of new rivals. In fact PSNC's tonnage expansion was, as noted, 
partly spurred by the fear of giving competitors an opening. This returns to the idea that once 
a shipowner had found a successful comparative advantage it had to be protected from 
incursions. Many firms, both British and European, had been casting glances toward the 
South American trades that PSNC had inaugurated. In the early 1870s White Star Line began 
a competing service when their vessel Republic sailed for Valparaiso and Callao on 5 
October 1872. This turned out to be a double blow for PSNC as their own newly-built 
Tacora was lost off Cape Santa Maria, near Montevideo, on its maiden voyage trying to 
outpace the Republic. Along with White Star, both the Ryde Line and France's Compagnie 
General Transatlantique were operating to South America. Ryde Line's service ran between 
Antwerp, Montevideo, Buenos Aires and Valparaiso, employing four vessels which operated 
under a Belgian Government contract; nonetheless, the service folded after only a few runs. 
Another French competitor was the Compagnie Maritime du Pacific (CMP) which started 
rate wars with PSNC in 1881. Further competition came from Harrisons, Brocklebanks' 
Calcutta trades rival. This firm's South American trade need not have competed with PSNC 
at all since it was primarily centred on the Brazilian port of Pernambuco. However, 
Harrisons were also involved in Carribean trades, with their vessels travelling to Barbados 
and north to Mexico for hides, ores and grain, returning with railway equipment and 
How Developed and Conducted by the Pacific Steam Navigation Company," American-European News Letter, 
II (May-June, 1895), 68-69. 
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machinery. Their routes also took them south where cargoes could be sent to Pacific coast 
ports across the Panamanian Isthmus. This branch of the trade placed Harrisons in direct 
competition with PSNC. By the early twentieth century two more British firms, the Gulf 
Line, owned by the Greenock Shipping Company, and Lamport & Holt, were also active on 
the coasts as rivals to Pacific Steam Navigation. 9 
In the east coast trades a commercial rivalry also developed between the British firms 
and some new German interlopers. Although only recent entrants to the South American 
trades, the Germans nonetheless subjected east coast lines like Harrisons to severe 
competition. Although the east coast was not the principal arena ofPSNC's activities, they 
were still one of the main participants when the British lines came to an understanding with 
their rivals. The step was seen as necessary, since competition was becoming especially 
harmful in years of low demand. With the amount of tonnage on the coast outpacing trade, 
freight rates (and profits) fell, making some form of working agreement a necessity. The 
answer arrived at was the same as in the case of Brocklebanks and Harrisons in Calcutta -
a conference system. In 1896 the four main British firms, Lamport & Holt, Royal Mail, 
PSNC and Harrisons, reached agreement on freight rates and shipping capacity with their 
German competitors, Hamburg-Amerika, Norddeutscher Lloyd andHamburg-Sud-Amerika. 
9 
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This marked the beginning of the Central Brazilian Conference under which a secret list of 
freight rates was agreed, combined with a deferred rebate often percent; the arrangements 
were administered by a paid secretariat. By 1913, in fact, most of the important shipping 
lines operating in the region were either conference members or at least adhered to their 
rules. This system was beneficial for the shipowners involved but likely hindered local 
traders, kept freight rates inflated, and may even have damaged local economies. 10 As 
Francis Hyde describes the process, "this trade, like so many others at this time, emerged 
from a stage of unregulated growth and had now become subjected (at least in the 
relationship of shipping space to cargo) to systematic control. " 11 
Nonetheless, this area never replaced the west coast in importance for PSNC. Indeed, 
on the west coast from the 1870s the company's greatest rival was an amalgam of two 
Chilean coasting firms, the Compania Sud Americana de Vapores ( CSA V), founded 1872. 
In CSAV's early years its presence encouraged rate-cutting, a situation that greatly eroded 
PSNC's revenues. In this era CSAV and Lloyd-Brasileiro were the only domestic lines of 
10 
Hyde, Liverpool, Ill; Robert G. Greenhill, "Latin America's Export Trades and British Shipping, 1850-1914," 
in David Alexander and Rosemary Ommer (eds.), Volumes not Values: Canadian Sailing Ships and World 
Trades (St. John's, NL, 1979), 260-261; and Greenhill, "Bureaucmts, Businessmen and Bananas: The Colonial 
Office and Shipping Services in the West Indies, 1895-1925," in Lewis R. Fischer (ed.), From Wheel House to 
Counting House: Essays in Man'time Business History in Honour of Professor Peter Neville Davies (St. John's, 
NL, 1992), 77. See also, Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers (BPP), Report of the Royal 
Commission on Shipping Rings, (1909), XL VIII, Q 19092; and Adam W. Kirkaldy, British Shipping. Its 
History, Organization and Importance, (London: 1914), 174-202. This impact statement on the effects of 
conferences seems to contradict findings of the pre-war Commission. Then again, the Commission's focus would 
appear to have been on the impact to British shippers, not local traders and economies. Another ofPSNC's 
German competitors was the Kosmos Company, which began seeking berths in 1874. 
II 
Hyde, Liverpool, 111. 
414 
any importance running tonnage to Europe and North America. In fact, CSA V still operates 
in South America today, using their original livery of red funnels with black tops. 12 
Wheelwright himself had predicted such competition a quarter century earlier. The 
company's initial entry into the trades had been based on monopoly agreements with the 
governments of Chile, Peru and Bolivia. All were of limited duration, however, and the 
countries were always free to promote indigenous shipping. By 1847 the monopoly 
agreements were only three years away from expiry, and Wheelwright was concerned as to 
how PSNC would maintain their position. He was certainly correct to believe that "every 
Government wishes to see their local commerce conducted under their own flag. Peru and 
Chile will hold out every inducement to speculators ... " 13 In fact, the Chilean government did 
grant CSA V generous subsidies and favoured them with government contracts. In 
Wheelwright's opinion it was only by keeping up a full and efficient schedule of sailings that 
PSNC could keep ahead of rivals while freeing themselves from dependance on government 
monopolies. Fears of government favouritism of national carriers were fully realized during 
the interwar years in the twentieth century. In 1922 Chile passed a cabotage law under which 
preference was given to local shippers at the expense of foreign operators like PSNC. It was 
12 
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a process Wheelwright would have well understood. 14 
Thirty years after Wheelwright wrote these opinions the tide of fortune appeared to 
be running against PSNC, but their affairs shifted in a new direction with an offer from 
London-based Anderson, Anderson and Company, along with F. Green & Co. These firms 
were looking to start a steam service to Australia to carry both mails and passengers. Both 
companies enjoyed a tremendous comparative advantage since in their role as brokers they 
were already intimately acquainted with Australian trade, possessing first-rate local 
knowledge and connections. They approached PSNC in hopes of chartering at least one, if 
not more, of their vessels for this run. After negotiations Pacific Steam agreed to the venture, 
which involved the loading of four steamers to Australia from London, an earnings 
agreement, and an option to purchase should the enterprise be profitable. It was intended 
from the start that, unlike rival P&O, the new venture would not limit itself to high-end 
trading but would handle a broad spectrum of traffic. On 28 June 1877 the first-PSNC 
chartered steamer, Lusitania, departed Britain, arriving in Melbourne after a forty- day 
passage - ten days better than the previous record time. Three other PSNC vessels, 
Chimborazo, Cuzco and Garonne, soon followed, inaugurating a monthly service that grew 
14 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Business Letters, 14 January 1846. 5: Haws. PSNC, 17: and 
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into the Orient Line. The service quickly became a success and Anderson, Anderson & 
Company exercised their option to buy the four steamers, which retained their original 
names. 15 
Australia has been mentioned as a destination of trade in Chapter Three, but it would 
be worthwhile briefly to recount the contemporary maritime situation of a continent that 
played a major part in PSNC operations for over two decades. The island continent lay about 
12,428 miles (2 0,000 kilometres) away from Britain, and well into the nineteenth century 
it was cut off from most of the world except by sea. By the 1870s the isolation was slightly 
less complete as the submarine cable had reached Darwin in 1869. Except for information, 
however, everything, including people, needed to be imported, and the products of 
Australia's growing economy all came and went by sea until the 1930s. Shipping tonnage 
arriving in the colonies stood at 1,000,000 tons in 1850, a figure which rose to 14,200,000 
by 1890. P&O inaugurated the first regular overseas service to Australia in 1852. Steamers 
soon followed, spurred on by the more efficient engines of the period and the opening of 
Suez. Still, the Australian trade was one of the more unusual in the Liverpool context. The 
port had a large outward trade with the colony by mid-century - more geared toward 
emigrants than goods. On the other hand, there was little direct inward traffic as most 
1~ 
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vessels returned by way of places such as India, where return cargoes were easier to find. 
Another destination of choice for return shipping was South America. Thus, extension of 
PSNC trade to the Antipodes was a natural progression, with the company once again 
building on their comparative advantages. 16 
The inauguration of the Orient Line's service, along with that ofP&O, spurred the 
city of Melbourne to a striking period of growth in the 1880s. 17 In a larger sense the Orient 
Line and a number of their rivals, including the Aberdeen Line, placed Australia and New 
Zealand at the forefront of a growing trade in meat and dairy products to Great Britain. This 
development- like the company's own existence - was made possible by new technology 
and largely ended the paucity of outward cargoes from Australia. Although the Orient Line 
continued to operate primarily for passenger traffic PSNC, with their usual adaptability to 
new trends, inaugurated a service direct from Liverpool to the River Plate in 1880. Its 
steamers on this route, Magellan, Araucania, Cordillera and Patagonia, were all soon fitted 
with meat freezers. 18 
16 
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The Pacific Steam Navigation Co. 
Incorporated by Royal Charter 1840 .... 
MAIL and PASSENGER SERVICES 
LONDON and AUSTRALIA (in Orient-Pacific Line), calling at Plymouth, Gibralter, 
Marseilles, Naples, Port Said, Suez, Colombo, Fremantle, Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney. 
LIVERPOOL and BRAZIL, RIVER PLATE and VALPARAISO, calling at La Pallice 
(Rochele), Corunna, Carril, Vigo, Leixoes (Oporto), Lisbon, St. Vincent (Cape de Verdes), 
Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, Monte Video (for Buenos Ayres), Stanley (Falkland 
Islands), Punta Arenas (Straits of Magellan), Coronel and Talcahuano. 
VALPARAISO and SAN FRANCISCO (California), calling at all the principal ports of 
Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Central America and Mexico; also from Valparaiso to 
Port Montt, calling at intermediate ports. 
CARGO SERVICE 
From GLASGOW and LIVERPOOL. - Fast cargo steamers are regularly despatched 
from Glasgow and Liverpool, delivering cargo direct at Rio de Janeiro. Punta Arenas (Straits 
of Magellan), Corral, Talcahuano, Valparaiso, and at all the principal ports of Chile and 
Peru. 
Source: NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Pacific Steam Navigation Company, 
advertisement, c. 1900. 
Despite the positive aspects of their role, British companies such as the Orient Line 
were often resented for their power in Australia. By 1895 practically all of the Australian 
import trade was controlled by a few shipping conferences, often with similar memberships. 
In 1912 Orient, along with P&O, was able to delay an Australian Navigation Act for nine 
Mail Group built twelve steamers specifically for the trade in the years 1903-1914. Two of their "A" class vessels 
alone, Avon and Asturias, cost the company £500,000. In 1914 the company established Royal Mail Steam 
Packet Meat Transports with a capital of £1,000,000. In the 1890s Australia and New Zealand exported almost 
twice the amount of lamb and mutton as the River Plate region. Up to the tum of the century the area 
concentrated more on livestock shipping, and its meat was considered inferior to the Antipodean product. Robert 
Greenhill, "Shipping and the Refrigerated Meat Trade from the River Plate, 1900-1930," International Journal 
of Maritime History, N (June 1992), 69 and 73. 
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years that would have reserved the country's coastal trade to national carriers. In the interim, 
companies such as the Orient Line and their partners PSNC continued to reap the fruits from 
a new trade frontier. In these early years, in fact, this branch of trade was the most promising 
portion of Pacific Steam's business. 19 
For the first three years ofPSNC's connection with Australia they remained simply 
a chartering company for Anderson, Anderson and Company. In 1880 the arrangement was 
changed and the Europe-Australia service became a joint venture for Pacific Steam and the 
Orient Line, with the sailings being conducted under the name of the latter. In addition, the 
frequency of sailings was doubled from monthly to bi-weekly. The first voyage under this 
arrangement was made by PSNC's John Elder; built by Elder's company and named to 
honour PSNC's association with the late builder and engineer. The original four Australian 
service steamers were also assigned to the bi-weekly run, along with the newly-built 5,386-
ton Orient. By this stage PSNC's reach went far beyond the west coast of South America, 
and their livery could be seen over three-quarters of the globe (the ad above gives 
contemporary details on the full scope of PSNC' s services in the period; for a complete 
listing of routes from the company's inception on, see Appendix Fifteen). 20 In 1881 the 
company Directors summed up the new Australian service in their report on the pervious 
19 
Broeze, Island Nation, 93-97; Broeze, "Distance Tamed," 15; and NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, 
Administration, Directors' Report, 3 May 1886. 
20 
"Trade of South America," 69; and Wardle, "West Coast (1)," 114. 
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year's business, noting that they had "decided to continue running five of the company's 
steamers in the Orient Line to Australia, thus maintaining, in conjunction with the Orient 
Company, a fortnightly service as heretofore. "21 The arrangement remained much the same 
until the 1890s when Australia was hit by an economic depression, followed by severe 
drought. Indeed, Australian shipping did not begin to recover until the second half of the 
decade. The Orient Line's revenues suffered, resulting in greater co-operation with PSNC. 
The line's name was changed to Orient Pacific, and PSNC placed their most luxurious 
passenger steamers on the route.22 This was reflected in the way PSNC promoted their 
Australian vessels. A sailing of the 600-hp, 4,0 14-ton So rata from London in 1880 noted that 
"[ t ]his magnificent vessel has all the latest improvements for the comfort of passengers and 
is well known as one of the finest and fastest vessels in the Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company's fleet. 23 
PSNC was simply continuing a tradition of offering a superior travelling experience 
to their clients. As in the case of Sorata, the vessels were noted for their good sea qualities 
and for being quite fast. The 6,077-ton Orizaba, built in 1886, for example, was equipped 
with 1 ,200-hp engines. The Australian liners could carry around 200 cabin plus 500 third-
21 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Directors' Report, 6 May 1881. 
22 
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class, or steerage, passengers. The needs of upper-class travellers of the period were also 
taken into account. Special rates were charged for servants making a voyage with their 
employers. A second-class rate was charged for males, who were berthed in second-class 
cabins, and a two-thirds first-class rate for female servants, who travelled in the Ladies' 
Saloon. Before the end of the century all PSNC passenger vessels carried a house surgeon, 
stewardesses and other personnel for the convenience of passengers. The fare served on 
board the liners, at least to cabin passengers, was described as being "as good as that of any 
first class hotel. "24 
Source: 
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Such comforts went hand in hand with safety. In its early days (and beyond) the 
company built its reputation on the modem, first-rate service provided. As an innovator, 
however, PSNC had to contend with losses. As Graph 10.1 demonstrates, PSNC's vessels 
losses declined markedly from the 1870s on, and from this period increased safety was 
almost as important a comparative advantage for PSNC as were their state of the art vessels. 
George Chandler suggests that an important reason for the increased safety ofPSNC vessels 
during this period was an increase in size. In his opinion, this led not only to a need for fewer 
ships but also to safer ones. PSNC's largest bottom at the time was 9,239 tons, as compared 
to 4,671 tons in the era prior to 1877. Graph 10.2 illustrates the average size of the fleet's 
vessels from the years 1865 through 1905. Certainly the trend toward size is there, although 
there was a fall off from 1875 to 1885. A partial explanation may be found in the period's 
freight rates. Knick Harley's data show a marked decline in freights from about the mid-
1870s to the mid-1880s (Adam Kirkaldy' s freight series showed that mean outward freights 
from Britain were in decline until 1885, but that inward freights did not recover until about 
1888). Combined with competitor incursions in the 1870s, plus the decline in world trade, 
lower freights may well have contributed to the company's retrenchment in terms of vessel 
size. Thereafter, the average tonnage ofPSNC vessels rose at a fairly steady rate, at least in 
terms of the sampled years. The real difference came at the tum of the century, when 
average vessel tonnage stood at 3,651 compared to 2,762 in 1895. Likewise, although 
Chandler is probably correct to see increased size as a contributory factor in fleet safety, 
there appears little correlation to a contracting fleet in terms of actual numbers. In the years 
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1875, 1885 and 1895 the number of vessels operated by PSNC varied only between forty-
eight and fifty. The greater change came, once again, after the tum of the century- by 1905 
there were only thirty-seven vessels in the fleet, although aggregate tonnage was down just 
slightly from what it had been ten years earlier. 25 
Source: 
25 
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Through to the end of the century PSNC's Australian trade was one of the bright 
lights of their overall operations. On the other hand, the Directors never forgot the 
company's roots and connections with South America. Nor did they give up on efforts to 
develop service in their oldest region of trade. Yet their reports reveal a series of difficulties 
that hindered profitability. These problems serve once again as a reminder that companies 
such as PSNC cannot be viewed in isolation from their surroundings, as macroeconomic and 
geopolitical events have a constant and direct impact on operations and profitability. The 
dangers of western South America were apparent from the outset. PSNC' s original steamer 
Chile was armed with a pair of two-pounder cannon for protection (although the small guns 
were probably better suited to firing salutes), and in 1852 Lima was fired upon by 
Guayaquil's shore batteries while attempting to land the mails.26 
In 1879, only two years after the start of Pacific Steam's association with the Orient 
Line, the three nations which included most of their western South American ports of call 
went to war. The casus belli was nitrate production in the Atacama desert, a region disputed 
by Chile and Bolivia, and more specifically the presence of Chilean entrepreneurs in the area 
(not to mention severe economic problems in both countries, and Peru, which the region's 
resources might go a long way toward solving). The Bolivian Government had attempted to 
tax the Chilean-owned Antofagasta Nitrate and Railway Company but, meeting resistance, 
cancelled the firm's concession. Chile then occupied the Antofagasta region, declaring war 
26 
Haws, PSNC, 29 and 31. 
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on Peru on 5 April 1879. The latter nation was accused by Chile of egging the Bolivians on 
to secure more nitrate concessions for itself. This was not to mention the fact that Peru and 
Bolivia had actually formed an official defensive alliance in 1873. Bolivian armed forces 
played no real role in the conflict, known to history as The War of the Pacific. The main 
actions of the war were naval, involving the vessels of Peru and Chile. The Chilean Navy's 
victory opened the way to its capture of Lima in 1881. The war dragged on as a guerilla 
conflict until 1883 when a treaty was signed between Peru and Chile. For Chile the war 
marked its most successful international military foray. Its conquests brought the world's 
(then) only source of nitrates under Chilean control, and the country enjoyed a veritable 
monopoly over the product for the next forty years. Bolivia was the conflict's major loser, 
with all its Pacific coast territory ceded to Chile. 27 
27 
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This bitter conflict had a direct and negative impact on PSNC as well. As one might 
expect, local management tended to take sides in the conflict, although the company's 
official policy was strict neutrality. The economic and infrastructure side-effects were bad 
enough in themselves, and their was some direct impact on the fleet. Amazonas, first built 
in 1874 and acquired by PSNC in 1877, was purchased by Chilean government decree for 
use as a troopship during the hostilities. The Directors commented on the war's effects in 
their 1880 report: 
The prolongation of the war [of the Pacific] on the West Coast, and the 
blockade during nine months of Callao and neighbouring ports, which 
occasioned the removal of the company's head-quarters first to Ancon and 
afterwards to Chimbote, resulted in a serious stoppage of traffic and great 
extra expense in working the service. 28 
Nonetheless, the company's fortunes were once again on the upswing, and PSNC's 
employed as troopships, respectively designated Transports No. 91, 12 and 18. The latter carried Lord 
Kitchener, Sir John French and Sir Ian Hamilton home from Cape Town after the end of hostilities. PSNC took 
delivery of the Potosi II in 1900, but it was soon sold to the Russians, who used it during the Russo-Japanese 
War as the Kazan. One of the company's small coasters, Taboga, was impounded by Colombia to use as a 
warship and only returned after intervention by the Royal Navy. Haws, PSNC, 35-36, 48, 56-57, 60 and 62; 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Directors' Report, 3 May 1886; and Greenhill, "Latin America's 
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XCV, 151-411. 
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revenue for 1880 stood at £130,439/0/4. The company was able to pay a dividend of £2 per 
share to their investors, with £12,269/0/4 remaining to be carried over. Despite the surplus 
tonnage remaining from the 1870s buying sprees, the company continued to invest in new 
tonnage. From 1887 until the end of their connection to the Australian service in 1905, 
Pacific Steam actually added another fifty-nine vessels to their already sizeable fleet. To 
make room for the new additions, older, surplus tonnage was sold off or converted into coal 
hulks, especially the now outdated paddle-wheelers. Five of these latter craft, the Pacific, 
Peru, Bogota, Callao and Panama, joined PSNC' s large fleet of coal hulks along the South 
American coast. The Chile and Payta were bought by the Chilean government in November 
of 1880.29 
The following year another four screw steamers were completed for PSNC by Laird 
Brothers of Birkenhead, adding another 8,331 tons to the fleet. Scott and Company of 
Greenock contributed Osorno and Morro III, while John Elder and Company completed the 
2,309-ton iron screw vessel Chiloe in December. The Santiago and Supe, older craft dating 
from 1871 and 1867, respectively, were sold, with two more craft, Quito and Truxillo 
hulked. After the 1881 additions to their fleet Pacific Steam entered what was, for the 
expansion-minded company, a quiet period with no new tonnage added for three years. In 
1885-about when Harley and Kirkaldy noted a rise in freights, although the latter's findings 
applied to outward freights only - acquisitions resumed when the company acquired the 
29 
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steel-hulled screw steamer Manavi from R. Napier and Sons of Glasgow. A year later the 
6,077- and 6,057-ton sister ships Orizaba and Oroya II were built for PSNC by the Barrow 
Shipbuilding Company. These craft had accommodations for 692 passengers in first through 
third class and were capable of the impressive speed of 16.5 knots. Intended for the 
Australian service, the vessels also introduced a call at Italy's port of Brindisi. Mail was 
landed there, then transported overland to London by railroad, shortening the usual Bay of 
Biscay service by six days. PSNC's South American service likewise began landing mail at 
Milford Haven, shaving a day offLondon mails compared to a Liverpool terminus. At about 
the same time the Santiago, built 1872, was sold, and the Supe of 1867 withdrawn from 
service. 30 The additions to the fleet, along with the sales and retirements, represent a clear 
and consistent policy by PSNC, followed throughout much of the company's history. The 
goal was always to maintain the most speedy, comfortable and modem service possible to 
maintain customer loyalty against rivals such as the CSA V. For the most part these policies 
were successful, and new tonnage was added throughout the 1880s and 1890s. This was not 
only for technological reasons, however. The fleet's routes were by this time so extensive 
that the maintenance of first-class tonnage in sufficient numbers was practically essential. 
The British Empire Crew Agreements give some idea of these routes. In 1890-1891, 
30 
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for example, Santiago IV, under Horatio Hooker of Cornwall, was engaged on the South 
American west coast run. His crew was comprised almost equally oflocals and others. The 
latter group included a number of nationalities, such as Britons, Swedes, Norwegians, 
Germans, French, Jamaicans, Spaniards and Dutch. For the six-month period starting in 
December 1890, Hooker cruised between the ports of Valparaiso, Guayaquil, Callao and 
Panama. In most cases the vessel stayed in port for three days or less, although it was at 
Callao from 31 May to 9 June 1891. This voyage pattern was typical of the vessel's 
movements over the next decade or so. As late as 1905 Santiago IV made a journey to the 
same ports of call under Charles Depei. 31 
Despite such busy schedules, the company's fortunes continued to fluctuate. The 
worst effects of technological shortcomings in the 1840s were long past, and the company 
had put the serious downturn of the mid-1870s behind it. Nonetheless, matters outside the 
Directors' hands were still a cause for concern. Their 1885 and 1890 reports give an 
indication of some of the tribulations that an international steam company like PSNC faced 
as the nineteenth century drew to a close. In the first of these reports the Board mentioned 
a year-long depression in the South American business. This commercial downturn was 
coupled with what was termed "frequent disturbances in Peru. "32 In the 1890 report the 
Directors noted that competition on the Straits and West Coast Lines likewise troubled the 
31 
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company, as did a rise in the price of coal. For the first time the Australian service appeared 
in the report as a source of discontent, noted by the Directors as "serious labour strikes at 
home and in Australia. "33 
Although this strike occupied only one briefline in the Board ofDirector' s report for 
the year, it was a central event in Australian labour history. The 1890 maritime strike was 
then the largest union action taken up to that time in Australia. In 1889 both Australian 
unions and the colony's middle-class had supported London's Great Dock Strike, although 
no support was forthcoming from Britain or Australia's own middle classes when their port 
workers walked off the job in 1890. The first union to go was the Mercantile Marine 
Officer's Association, after their claims for salary increases were rejected by shipowners. 
They were soon followed by sailors, dockworkers, coalminers and shearers - the latter two 
groups having trade union links with maritime labourers. 50,000 men were soon off the job. 
Colonial trade and finance, so dependant on seaborne linkages, appeared likely to collapse. 
Even as the walk-out started, however, shipowners such as the Orient Line and P & 0 allied 
themselves with merchants, bankers and officialdom to bring down the Unions. Non-union 
labour was forcibly imported under the protection of constables supplied by the governments 
of Victoria and New South Wales, both on the quays and at coal mines such as at 
Wollongong. By October the strikes were effectively broken, although sporadic flare-ups 
continued until1893. At a time of recession, maritime employers still possessed sufficient 
33 
Ibid, 16 May 1891. The Chilean revolution of 1891 also created problems, as both the government and rebels 
believed PSNC was loading arms and war materials. 
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power to crush the strongest combinations of workers, much to the detriment of the latter. 34 
Troubles such as the Australian strike occasioned serious downturns in profitability. 
In 1880 PSNC's Pacific Manager had been forced to mothball a large number of steamers 
intended for the company's west coast lines. PSNC had wide-ranging interests, so a large 
fleet was a necessity. The price of such a large, modem fleet- as any shipowner knew- had 
to be paid whenever the market for tonnage was at a nadir and vessels had to be laid-up, as 
in 1880, or even sold at a loss. However, Pacific Steam were not lavish in the tonnage they 
ran, and in practice only those vessels associated with the competitive passenger trades were 
equipped with the most modem conveniences and were of the newest build. As Table 10.1, 
below, demonstrates, the average age of vessels in PSNC's fleet from 1885 through to the 
early twentieth century stood at over ten years, comparable to, if not older in aggregate, than 
Brocklebanks' fleet over the same period. From 1865 to 1895 the average age of the PSNC 
fleet almost trebled, although this fell significantly by 1905. The Directors learned their 
lesson from the oversupply of new tonnage bought in the 1870s. Older tonnage from this 
point on was often simply retained and brought up to date by refits. In 1890, for example, 
the Aracania and Patagonia, both 1869 vintage vessels, were fitted with new triple-
expansion engines and boilers. Nonetheless, numbers of new, cutting-edge vessels were 
frequently added to the fleet so that passengers on prestige routes could always expect the 
34 
Broeze, Island Nation, 206-207. 
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finest in service. 35 
Year 
1865 
1875 
1885 
1895 
1905 
Note: 
Source: 
Table 10.1 
PSNC~ A veraf!e Af!e of Vessels~ 1865-1905 (Selected Year~ 
Average Age of Vessels 
6 
8 
11 
15 
10 
Average age ofvesse1s rounded to the nearest whole number. 
BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; NML, MMM, MAL, 
B/PSNC, Pacific Steam Navigation Company Handbooks, various years; 
Arthur C. Wardle, Steam Conquers the Pacific. A Record of Maritime 
Achievement 1840-1940(London, 1940), 189-194; and Wardle, "West Coast 
Route (2)," 200-206. 
Once vessels became too outdated for such work they were transferred to other 
services, usually more cargo-oriented, and were finally sold or hulked. In 1900, for example, 
South American trade was again down, and PSNC' s Directors decided to sell the newly-built 
5,300-gross-ton Potosi and to substantially alter the 5,896-gross-ton Galicia for use as a 
general cargo vessel. In actuality, it was the cargo side ofPSNC's operations that came to 
dominate in the closing years of the nineteenth century. Until about 1890 economic wisdom 
had it that passengers were more important than freight carriage. By this date, however, 
35 
BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; Arthur C. Wardle, "The West Coast Route (2)," Sea 
Breezes, New series, XXXlli (September 1956)," 180 and 200-206; and NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, 
Administration, Directors' Report, 16 May 1891. 
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cargo shipping had grown exponentially and replaced passengers as the most important end 
of the shipping business, except perhaps on the Europe-New York route. In South America 
specifically, national prosperity was growing. Individual buying power rose, initiating a take 
off in Liverpool's export trade to the region. Return cargoes to Britain were also on the rise, 
and it was in this climate that PSNC ordered their earliest vessels specifically for cargo, with 
Magellan II the first to enter service in 1893.36 
The goods transported from South America (and European ports en route) to Britain 
by PSNC tonnage over the years were quite varied. In July 1893 Araucania arrived at 
Liverpool under Captain Fletcher carrying a mixed manifest, a portion of which had been 
sold at Le Havre. The cargo included wool, sacks of metal, cotton, copper ingots, silver ore, 
rubber, lead ore, sugar, honey, ox tail, horns and antimony. On 8 August 1898 Oropesa 
docked at Liverpool with a cargo that included a number of the same items, such as cotton 
and wool, along with cottonseed, olives, Peruvian bark, skins, tin, potash, old brass, borax, 
gum, spermaceti, clover, oranges, orange plants, maize, tulipwood, apples, grapes, lemons, 
milk, lentils, tomatoes, onions and cheese. The imports were variously loaded at Valparaiso, 
Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Lisbon and Corrufia.37 
36 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Directors' Reports, 3 May 1886; 16 May 1891; 190 I; and Haws, 
PSNC, 19. The company was at least partially on the right track, and a small dividend was paid to shareholders 
in both 1885 and 1890. The returns on PSNC shares were £1117/6 in 1885 and ten shillings in 1890. Still, this 
represented a clear downward trend, starting from the £2 dividend realized in 1880. Although PSNC continued 
adding modern vessels to their passenger fleet, overall vessel numbers, through sales, conversions and hulking, 
remained fairly static in this period. 
37 
Great Britain, Customs, Bills of Entry, Araucania, 1893; and Oropesa, 1898. 
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By this time PSNC's safety record was much improved from their early years of 
operation (see Graph 10.1 above), and the Directors' reports for 1885 and 1890 both make 
the statement that "there has been no serious disaster to any of the steamers during the 
year. "38 Ironically, the year 1889 was marked by a spectacular misfortune, one of several that 
plagued the company in the fin de siecle period. The steamer Cotopaxi was involved in a 
collision with the German-registered Olympia under stormy conditions in the Straits of 
Magellan. The crew under Captain Hayes managed to beach their stricken vessel only to 
discover a twelve-by-six-foot hole and other smaller punctures the next day. Cotopaxi's 
crew, assisted by her passengers, shifted cargo to turn the craft on an angle so its hull could 
be repaired. Fortunately, among the cargo were a large number of boiler plates, and some 
of the passengers were boiler makers. They and the PSNC engineers were able to use this 
material to repair the damage, and the vessel resumed its course on 11 April. Only two days 
later, however, another misfortune struck. The ill-starred vessel, travelling at thirteen knots, 
hit a rock in the Messier Channel, sinking in under ten minutes. The passengers and crew 
were more fortunate than the Cotopaxi. All 202 souls aboard got safely away in lifeboats, 
38 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Directors Reports, 3 May 1886; and 16 May 1891. Safety was 
not simply a concern for individual companies. As the nineteenth century progressed British governments 
generally took an increased interest in safety at sea, a preoccupation that was represented by numerous pieces 
oflegislation and Royal Commissions; this attitude was presaged by the earlier efforts of voluntary organizations. 
See David M.Williams, "State Regulation of Merchant Shipping 1839-1914: The Bulk Carrying Trades," In 
Sarah Palmer and Glyndwr Williams ( eds. ), Charted and Uncharted Waters (London, 1981 ), 55-80; Williams, 
"Mid-Victorian Attitudes to Seamen and Maritime Reform: the Society for Improving the Condition ofMerchant 
Seamen, 1867," International Journal of Maritime History (June 1991) XXX, No. 1, 1 01-126; and J.H. Wilde, 
"The Creation of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade," in David M. Williams, (ed.), The World Of 
Shipping. Aldershot, 1997, 19-32. 
435 
landing on Wellington Island. After two days they rowed to the mainland and were rescued 
by the Setos, a German steamer. 39 
Several other losses followed within a few years. In 1895, for example, two vessels 
were involved in mishaps. The Oroya stranded in the Bay of Naples on 4 March, and the 
Britannia stranded in Rio de Janeiro harbour on 5 September. The Oroya was subsequently 
repaired and resumed sailings on the Australian mail run by 1 November. Britannia was not 
as fortunate and was eventually sold where she lay. The pair of incidents created a 
considerable strain on PSNC' s underwriting account for the year. The next few years were 
more tranquil for PSNC, at least in terms of misfortunes to their vessels. But in 1901 disaster 
struck again. The company's new 1,018-ton collier Talca was wrecked on 12 July on 
Puchoco Point while carrying a full cargo. A German steamer, the 818-gross-ton Rupanco, 
was purchased as a replacement. The vessel was only six years old, but PSNC adhered to 
their usual policy ofkeeping tonnage modernized and had her re-engined by Glasgow's Ross 
and Duncan. On 2 June of the following year tragedy struck once again when the Arequipa 
sank in a storm off Valparaiso. The passengers and crew were not as lucky as those of the 
Cotopaxi, and the incident resulted in considerable loss of life. 40 
In 1905 PSNC suffered another wreck which, although not as tragic as that of the 
39 
Wardle, Steam Conquers the Pacific, 143-14145; Wardle, "West Coast Route (1)," 119; and Chandler, 
Liverpool Shipping, 145. 
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NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Directors' Reports, 1895; Wardle, "West Coast (2)," 180; and 
Chandler, Liverpool Shipping, 145. 
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Arequipa, was to have important spin-offs for the company. The Orizaba formed part of 
Pacific Steam's mail fleet to Australia. On 17 February, bound for Fremantle, the vessel 
grounded on the Australian coast. Unrepairable, it was sold as scrap for the sum of £3,750. 
Not long thereafter PSNC sold their interest in the Australian service to Royal Mail Steam 
Packet Company along with the vessels Ortona, Oroya, Orotava and Oruba. With their sale, 
a quarter century's association with the Antipodes ended. PSNC then re-oriented their focus 
more toward routes to the Americas. Strangely, there is little indication as to why PSNC 
pulled out of the Australian service at this particular time, either from primary or secondary 
materials. The Directors noted only that "as from the P1 January, 1906, the Company 
terminated its agreement with the Orient Co., and transferred its interests, including the four 
steamers running in the Australian Mail Service, to the Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. "41 
Using these vessels Royal Mail founded the Orient-Royal Mail Line in 1905, giving 
their tonnage distinctive buff-yellow funnels. Just four years later, however, Royal Mail also 
withdrew from the Australian trades. Oroya was sold for scrap, Orotava and Oruba were 
transferred to the West Indies, and Ortona was converted into the cruise liner Arcadian. 
Although the PSNC Directors' 1906 statement on the subject provides no direct evidence 
as to why the service was ended, it is interesting to note that this was the same period in 
which Brocklebanks experienced difficulties during the post-Boer War slump. In fact, A W. 
Kirkaldy and Knick Harley present evidence that freights were then at about the mid-point 
41 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Directors' Report, 1905; Wardle, "West Coast (2)," 180; and 
Chandler, Liverpool Shipping, 145. 
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of a downturn in their cycle which began around 1900 and which was not reversed until 
1910. It is likely that PSNC was simply regrouping during a period of industry downturn and 
making full use of the comparative advantages they had as the oldest established British 
steam shipping company in South America. 42 
Despite this retrenchment, the quarter -century between 1885 and 1910 was generally 
one of growth and change for Pacific Steam. As always, the Board of Directors chose to 
approach industry challenges in a proactive manner. Tonnage acquisitions and fleet 
reorganization continued apace until about 1909. At the same time as Araucania and 
Patagonia were being refitted (1890), the old steamer Santa Rosa was sold, while the 
Columbia was converted into a coal hulk. Gourlay Brothers ofDundee delivered a new steel 
tug and water boat, Assistance, for use in the Valparaiso service in 1891. In 1893 the steel 
screw vessel Magellan, of 3,590 gross tons, was delivered by Harland & Wolff. This was the 
first Belfast-built craft to enter into PSNC service, starting a connection with the 
shipbuilders that lasted well into the twentieth century. The yard also produced three sister 
ships to Magellan that year, adding another 10,780 gross tons to the PSNC fleet. Harland & 
42 
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Wolff also produced a number of the "0" class vessels - destined to be sold to Royal Mail 
- over the next three years. Caird & Company delivered a pair of twin-screw steamers, the 
Chile and Peru, in 1896 for use in the West Coast Service. C.S. Swan & Hunter Ltd. were 
contracted for a cargo steamer. This vessel, the 4,568-gross-ton Covocado maintained 
PSNC's commitment to cutting-edge technology. She was the fleet's largest cargo vessel. 
The craft was fitted with triple-expansion engines and seven watertight bulkheads. She was 
capable of making almost thirteen knots, fast for a cargo vessel of the day. The small forty-
nine-ton tender Perlita, built at Birkenhead, rounded out the company's building programme 
for the year.43 Nonetheless, PSNC's fleet updates were by no means finished, and a number 
of new craft were acquired while older tonnage was sold, modernized or hulked around the 
turn of the century. A constant renewal of the fleet was one ofPSNC' s distinctive hallmarks 
in this era (Appendix Sixteen details some of the changes to PSNC's fleet in the years from 
1897-1909~ see also Appendix Fourteen for more particulars on individual vessels). 
At the same time the fleet was undergoing these changes, the company was making 
other operational shifts. By 1900 PSNC West Coast sailings were extended northward to 
43 
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ports in Mexico and to the United States through San Francisco. Agreement was also 
reached with the Panama Rail Road Company for a through service across the Isthmus of 
Panama. In 1904 head office also made changes, and the Mersey loading berth was moved 
from Birkenhead to Liverpool's Alexandria Dock. In consequence, PSNC's Birkenhead 
works, in use since 1870, and their depot at Duke's Dock, Liverpool, were shut down. The 
Birkenhead works represented one PSNC's many innovations, as the firm was a pioneer in 
carrying through their own ship works and repairs - a policy which applied to their South 
American coastal stations at Morro and Callao. In the latter cases self sufficiency was 
essential since that part of the coast previously lacked its own infrastructure. 44 
The greatest change to PSNC's structure came in 1910 and practically mirrored 
developments at Brocklebank:s about that time. Chapter Eight discussed the influence of J. 
P. Morgan on the shipping business at the tum of the century, especially the trend toward 
size and amalgamations. Pacific Steam Navigation was not immune from this development; 
as a publicly traded company it seems only natural that the composition of ownership should 
change over time. Since George Brown was made their first Chairman in 183 8, the company 
maintained close ties with the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company to which they later sold 
their Orient Line interests. Almost from the start PSNC had run through traffic in 
conjunction with Royal Mail, first by the Panama mule track and later using the Panama 
Railroad. The two firms were also founder members of the Brazilian Conference of 1896. 
44 
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Construction of the Panama Canal was well under way at this stage, and the effect it might 
have on operations was a concern for PSNC in particular. Accordingly, in 1910 Royal Mail 
took over Pacific Steam's proprietary holdings, although the two companies remained 
separate entities and PSNC' s Chairman, Liverpool shipowner Thomas Rome, retained his 
position. Perhaps the greatest symbolic changes accompanying the takeover were the 
replacement of PSNC's traditional black livery with Royal Mail's buff yellow and the 
transfer of control from Liverpool to London.45 
The reasons behind the merger may be as simple as the belief that the larger a 
company was in the emerging marketplace the better placed they were to survive. The 
Directors said that "the closer association of this Company with the Royal Mail Steam 
Packet Company will tend to give both Companies a stronger position in the trade with 
South America." Earlier, then-company chair Arthur W. Bibby asserted before a Royal 
Commission that the company had faced problems along the west coast and that PSNC had 
taken losses on chartered shipping. The additional capital available from a merger with 
Royal Mail could only have been welcome under the circumstances, especially with the 
uncertainty about the Panama Canal's impact on traffic. 46 
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Nonetheless, the merger may not have been entirely a friendly proposition. Following 
a management change in 1903 Royal Mail displayed a more aggressive business strategy 
toward their old ally PSNC. According to Robert Greenhill, PSNC was only acquired by 
Royal Mail after it advertized a direct line to the River Plate which would have competed 
with Royal Mail's services. Royal Mail were at their strongest on South America's east coast 
and the Caribbean (where they challenged Germany's Hamburg-Amerika Line). The former 
region, including Brazil and Argentina, was outstripping the west coast economically. In 
1910 a rail connection linked Argentina and Chile overland, and Royal Mail benefited from 
a loss of trade by PSNC, whose fleet was contracting. Although PSNC was unquestionably 
an innovator in terms of technology and had led the way for Liverpool's publicly traded 
shipowning companies, over-concentration of trade was certainly their greatest weakness. 
Their routes had expanded many times, but the company continued their concentration on 
their first regional niche - the west coast of South America. This concentration was even 
more marked once PSNC sold their stake in Orient Pacific. After 1876, PSNC rival 
Harrisons had expanded their South American and Carribean operations to the point that a 
trade downturn in one area could be made good in the other, giving the firm extra security. 
The same could not be said ofPacific Steam in 1910. With the merger that same year, Royal 
Mail brought a number of innovative operating methods to PSNC, including the raising of 
infrastructure capital through debentures (Although the company had actually been 
permitted by Royal Charter to issue debentures and debenture stock since 1902). The 
number of shareholders was reduced, and the group's finances were controlled by a small, 
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but influential, Board. Certainly, information from the Directors' reports indicates that the 
immediate post-merger years were a good period for PSNC. After writing off depreciation 
on the fleet, profits in 1910 and 1913, for example, stood at £108,806/12/0 and £114,309/4/8, 
respectively.47 
Much impetus for the merger of Pacific Steam and Royal Mail came from one 
particular individual. Owen Cosby Philipps K.C.M.G., better known by his later title, Lord 
Kylsant, was born at Warminster in 1863. After an apprenticeship with Dent and Company, 
a shipowninglbroking firm at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, he moved to Glasgow and founded 
Philipps, Philipps and Company and the King Line in 1887. By 1897 he had also formed the 
London Maritime Investment Company and the next year became Chair of London and 
Thameshaven Oil Wharves Limited. It was in the twentieth century that Philipps made his 
greatest - some would say most infamous - marks on the shipping world. Royal Mail had 
been a chartered company and, like PSNC themselves, had no direct links to Liverpool's 
shipowning dynasties (although, as we have seen, members of these families had served as 
47 
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PSNC Directors and Chairs). This factor rendered Royal Mail vulnerable to a contest for 
control starting in 1902. In January 1903 Philipps had become a company Director and then 
their Chairman within three months. He was very much in tune with the merger trend in 
Edwardian shipping and in this respect was not unlike Morgan himself. Soon after the death 
of Alfred Jones in 1909 Philipps, alongwithLordPirrie, bought Elder Dempster, which was 
re-created as Elder Dempster and Company Limited the following year. This was at about 
the same time that Royal Mail and PSNC merged. Philipps was one of the leading 
inspirations behind this move as, in addition to his control of the Royal Mail Group, he was 
also a substantial shareholder in PSNC. For Phillips the official cementing of the 
relationship was merely the natural outcome of his expansionist view of the industry. After 
1920 Royal Mail, along with six other liner groups, controlled almost half of all Britain's 
merchant tonnage. 48 
In building terms the years 1909-1913 were fairly static by PSNC standards. 
Following the addition of Or coma in 1908 the only new member of the fleet for five years 
was a small tug ordered in 1910 and delivered in 1911. The last year of peace saw an 
increase in activity by the company, starting with their 1913 purchase of the 15,620-ton 
steamer Andes- their first triple-screw vessel and the first PSNC bottom to exceed 15,000 
48 
Davies, The Trade Makers, 131-135; Davies, "Business Success and the Role of Chance: The Extraordinary 
Philipps Brothers," Business History, XXIII, No.2 (July 1981), 209, 214 and 216-217; Greenhill, "Shipping 
1850-1914," 135-136; and NML, MMM. MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Directors' Reports, 16 May 1911. 
In 1911 and 1913 the Royal Mail Group was further enlarged by the acquisition of Lamport & Holt and H & 
W Nelson, respectively. 
444 
tons- built and engined by Harland & Wolff In 1914 a sister ship Orduna (15,507 gross 
tons) joined the fleet, and two steam launches were purchased. One, the Cuervo, was for 
Valparaiso and the second, Gironde, was for La Rochelle-Pallice. A cargo boat to be named 
Lobos was also contracted. Like Andes this craft was significant in a technological sense 
because it was to be propelled by diesel engines. PSNC had also purchased the freehold of 
their long-time Valparaiso premises and was building a new office at Callao. With the 
upcoming opening of the Panama Canal, the Directors also decided to enlarge the Straits 
Mail Line service from Callao to Panama. As with many of their competitors, PSNC in 1914 
was looking forward to continued peacetime operations and success. For all of these 
companies, however, events overtook them in ways most could not have imagined. 
Nonetheless, their progressive approach to the business of shipowning had served the Board 
and investors ofPSNC well and would continue to do so for another seventy years.49 
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Chapter 11 
Conclusion 
Although this thesis has dealt with a number of themes relative to shipowning, one of its 
primary foci has been on choices, especially those relating to the process by which a 
business finds its niche or comparative advantage. The examples ofBrocklebanks and PSNC 
suggest that this is a thread that unifies the history of Liverpool's nineteenth-century 
shipowners (and possibly all shipowners). Chapters Five and Six discussed certain traits 
possessed by the "average" investor in Liverpool tonnage. Of course, profiling average 
investors gives us no more than general characteristics, since all owners were to some degree 
unique and all developed particular strategies to compete. 1 The goal, naturally enough, was 
stay in business and, if possible, to make money. Measured by the yardstick of longevity, 
firms like Brocklebanks, PSNC, Harrisons and Sandbach, Tinne were no mere speculative 
ventures- all were committed to certain trades and behaved accordingly over the long-term. 
Still, it does not necessarily follow that success is ensured regardless of the strategy a 
shipowner employed; indeed, Graeme Milne's work contains numerous examples of 
Naturally, these strategies were seldom unique to any one investor. They might be better thought of in terms of 
knowing the best response for a particular set of circumstances. For example, many firms, like Brocklebanks, 
that engaged mainly in mid-to-long distance trades, would have seen the efficacy of investing in large vessels, 
usually rigged as either ships or barques. As we saw in Chapters Seven and Eight, however, the particular 
circumstances of their trades sometimes led Brocklebanks to put their own interpretation on exactly what was 
needed for day-to-day operations. We may recall that patent-reefing topsails were rejected for a pair of the firm's 
larger vessels because they were judged too expensive for the China trade, and Calcutta's Hoogly River already 
had steam tugs in 1863, thus rendering the devices unnecessary. See National Museums Liverpool (NML), 
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Liverpool shipping investors who made the attempt and failed. 2 Nonetheless, finding, or 
having, a comparative advantage in one or a number of trades, and sticking to a well 
thought-out plan, was certainly a reasonable way to decrease the riskiness that was (and is) 
inherent in shipowning. However, sticking doggedly to one approach was not a panacea, and 
firms that were in existence for several generations were bound to encounter shifting 
conditions, not only from economic but also from technological, geopolitical and social 
standpoints. Perhaps the best that any owner could do to maximize his chances of achieving 
success was not only to find and exploit a particular specialization but also to display a 
certain "elasticity" of thought in his approach. In short, the message seems to be to find what 
you are good at and to know how to stick with it. But equally the lesson is to be sufficiently 
flexible to know when to shift emphasis in response to evolving trends. 
Change was perhaps the most obvious characteristic of the period that stretched from 
1820 to 1914. Although change was hardly a new phenomenon, it is clear that the pace of 
change increased exponentially in the hundred years after the conclusion of the Napoleonic 
wars. Staking out one's territory and mastering it remained a key component of shipowning. 
Added to this, however, the investor's ability to adapt to change was likely more of an asset 
2 
Again, my argument concerning comparative advantage and the ability to make informed choices parallels Milne, 
especially on the latter point. Milne states that "people make choices in response to change, and those choices 
in tum drive further change ... [M]any Liverpool traders were conscious of the hard choices facing them, and of 
the fact there would be losers as well as winners." Graeme J. Milne, Trade and Traders in Mid-Victorian 
Liverpool: Mercantile Business and the Making of a World Port (Liverpool, 2000), 1-2. Again, the Oliver case 
is Milne's most striking example of business failure (see Milne, Trade and Traders, 156-160). 
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in the business than ever before. 3 The Liverpool investor was not static over time, and there 
were a number of significant shifts in the decades after 1820. 
Graeme Milne acknowledges the meshing of these two trends, noting that "Liverpool 
offers useful examples of shipping firms that expanded their tonnage very rapidly in mid-
century; even these, however, often retained the management structures of small private 
firms. "4 One could make the case that firms choosing this strategy were simply reactionary 
in refusing to change. Nonetheless, assuming that such companies could afford their tonnage 
expansions, it is reasonable to assume that they were making a profit. This certainly appears 
to have been the case for Harrisons from 1885-1914. Brocklebanks' record at about the same 
period (Table 8.1) was more checkered, but they did manage at least a moderate profit in a 
majority of these years. Given this, it is not unreasonable to allow that their existing 
"corporate" structures had worked to that point and could be considered a comparative 
advantage rather than a weakness. Such considerations were by no means lacking, even 
while the shipping industry became more specialized. Experienced companies tended to 
operate within trades they knew and where they could establish reputations for "risk-
avoidance and creditworthiness." Once a player stepped out of his specialty area those in the 
3 
Graeme Milne, "Information, Reputation and Collaboration in Mercantile Business: Evidence from Mid-
Victorian Liverpool," International Journal of Maritime History, XIV, No. 1 (June 2002), 3-4. 
4 
Ibid, 3. 
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know, such as bank managers, quickly ran up a red flag, signalling the firm's imprudence. 5 
Apart from this tendency to stick within one's specialty area, another important 
characteristic of the typical investor was stable in the seven decades after 1820: the domicile 
of Liverpool's vessel shareholders. The Board of Trade 107 and 108 series provides 
information on the residence of every investor and makes it clear that throughout the period 
the port's investors mainly lived within the city itself. A decade-by-decade survey (Appendix 
Five) indicates that the percentage of investors resident in Liverpool never fell below sixty 
percent of all investors in new vessels at the port, and this peaked at just over seventy 
percent in the 1840s and 1850s. Apart from the 1870s, when the share of non-English (most 
notably northern Welsh) investors peaked -largely at the expense ofLiverpudlians- the 
actual numbers were quite stable, ranging from about sixty-eight to seventy-one percent of 
all investors in the port. 6 Again excepting the 1870s, the majority of the remaining investors 
always came from other English counties. In most decades, as might be expected, the bulk 
were from Lancashire, outside of Liverpool itself, or from the adjacent county of Cheshire. 
Indeed, in most decades, including the 1870s, investors from the two counties generally 
comprised over ten percent of all investors. Likewise, a fair number of investors were 
domiciled in Cumberland, just north of Lancashire, with the county most prominent in the 
5 
Ibid, 3-4. 
6 
Great Britain, Board of Trade (BT) 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. These figures refer to 
the actual number of individuals who held at least one vessel share in a sample year, not to the actual number 
of shares held or the tonnage this represented. 
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1820s, 1830s and again in the 1860s. These numbers are hardly surprising. It is natural that 
investors in a seaward industry would, in the first instance, be drawn from regions where 
such activities were prevalent and second, that they were most likely to invest in local areas 
where their own interpersonal networks and knowledge of community affairs might mean 
the crucial difference between success and failure. Indicative of this was the fact that no 
other English counties, even in the Northeast, contributed really significant numbers of 
investors to Liverpool's shipping. Those British regions that did have some real presence on 
the Liverpool registry, in terms of investor numbers, were mainly eastern Ireland (primarily 
Belfast and Dublin), southwestern Scotland and north Wales- all located within the general 
confines ofLiverpool' s coastal trade sphere. The only other "significant" source of investors, 
although its contribution never topped three percent, was British North America, an 
important timber trading partner for Liverpool. Even in this region it appears that many 
"Canadian/Newfoundland" investors may have actually been expatriate Liverpudlians like 
the Gilmours, Jobs and Bowrings. This was an important indicator ofthe role of comparative 
advantage at work in the business - first and foremost, people chose to invest in an area 
where their knowledge of local conditions was likely to come in handy. 7 
Excluding the geographical residence ofLiverpool investors, the BT 1071108 owner 
7 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. Milne's work is some of the best available at exploring 
these relationships, particularly for the mid-Victorian period. His look at business failures also makes it clear that 
having a finger on the pulse of local business affairs did not always guarantee success. As we have seen, the 
Atlantic Canada Shipping Project's findings demonstrate that local shipping investment was a characteristic 
British North America shared with Liverpool. 
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data indicate a number of trends, although these tended to vary over time. As part of the 
emerging nineteenth-century global economy, many industries and occupations were 
becoming more complex, and the generalists who had dominated businesses like shipowning 
became much more rare, replaced by specialists who would focus on the one industry or 
even a particular trade. In time the individual shipowner holding most of a vessel's shares 
would also fall by the wayside. It was not that these professional owners had dropped out 
of the industry but that by the late nineteenth century they were more prone to operate as part 
of an organized corporate structure in whose name vessels shares were held. In the long 
history of trade and economics there have been a number of"revolutions," starting with the 
agricultural and moving through the industrial and scientific revolutions. Much less has been 
written about the "professional revolution." Yet in industries such as shipping (as with most 
others), professionalization was a central tenet of change in the Victorian era. 
As the static nature of residence patterns reflected the trend toward finding and 
building upon a comparative advantage, so did the professionalization and specialization of 
shipowning mirror the need for adaptability. Concurrently, this trend was often associated 
with maintaining ties to established comparative advantages. Within a generation or two 
families such as the Brocklebanks could remake themselves from shipbuilder/merchants to 
shipowners without immediately sacrificing their old pursuits. Indeed, Brocklebanks were 
able to combine their old merchanting function (and shipbuilding until the 1860s) with 
large-scale shipowning until very late in the nineteenth century. Likewise, pioneers such as 
William Wheelwright could over three decades successfully establish a shipping service that 
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at its inception appeared impractical, if not impossible, to contemporaries. PSNC derived 
much of its inspiration and guidance from established shipowning elites in Liverpool, thus 
maintaining a continuity with the port's traditional way of conducting business. 
The industrial and economic transformations discussed above made this fusion of 
the old and the new a necessity in nineteenth-century Britain. In many ways the industrial 
and economic rebirth of the nation in general- and its shipping industry in particular- from 
the late eighteenth century onward was quite remarkable. In 1820 Britain was less than two 
decades removed from Trafalgar. Nonetheless, experiments with steam were already being 
carried out, although few visionaries could see that imminent changes were poised to 
revolutionize shipping and trade. These shifts would also catch the investor in their net, and 
the practice of investing in a few vessel shares as an income supplement, or the tendency to 
own tonnage simply as a complement to merchanting, largely fell by the wayside within a 
half century. Those, like Brocklebanks, that had found a place in seaward industry well 
before the change and were successful in making the transition did so by adapting to the new 
realities ofthe age. In the case ofBrocklebanks, the change was gradual, but some investors, 
like R. P. Houston, became de facto professional investors within a few years. Even in such 
cases, however, comparative advantages were seldom lost. Houston, we remember, had a 
technologically advanced fleet, often designed with input from the former engineer himself 
His expertise in this area was used to even greater advantage by investing in new 
technologies, like meat refrigeration units. 
Starting out as a marine engineer, Houston had some prior connection to Liverpool's 
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maritime community. This was true of many, but by no means all, investors before mid-
century. Ironically, the decades prior to the onset of specialization were marked by a 
plethora of occupations among Liverpool's shipping investors. In 1850, for example, persons 
without any clear connection to the seaward industries made up almost a quarter of all 
investors in new vessels. In 1870 such persons still accounted for about a fifth of investors. 
On the other hand, the percentage of total tonnage owned by these persons tended to be 
much less significant- a gap that widened from 1850 to 1870.8 Despite such persons' lack 
of obvious ties to the shipping industry, the need to find a comparative advantage still 
existed, even if seaward linkages were less visible in some cases than in others. Looking at 
the Board of Trade Registries we can see that everyone from the gentleman to the spinster 
could be found among investors in new tonnage. Today, practically anyone with the spare 
capital might invest in stocks, bonds, securities, or even riskier affairs, such as currency 
speculation. Liverpool's Georgian residents were little different, but in an age where few 
commercial ventures carried with them limited liability, investing in shipping was one of the 
few "safe" options. Shareholders might lose their capital, to be sure, but they did not risk 
their other assets. In effect, persons with a range of ties to maritime trade (sometimes few 
at all) sought an additional economic place for themselves in an era devoid of the benefits 
8 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1850 and 1870. See also Appendix Four. 
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of social welfare and retirement schemes. 9 
Persons with seaward connections, such as sailmakers, shipwrights, ship chandlers 
and riggers, were naturally to be found among the port's investors. 10 Certainly, marine 
tradesmen of many stripes were to be found among the port's investor community as late as 
1889. Referring to Appendix Four, we note that marine tradespeople generally made up 
around five percent or more of total investors in newly-registered Liverpool vessels, by 
occupational groupings, from 1830 through 1889, although they tended to own a smaller 
proportion of the actual tonnage registered. There are at least two possible reasons for their 
presence on the Liverpool registry. First, as Simon Ville notes, maritime tradesmen "resorted 
to related investment in vessels to extend their business patronage." 11 They would frequently 
invest in small coasters, generally older craft, so investment costs were minimized and 
9 
It is a strange prospect for modem investors to contemplate losing all their material goods to pay off the debts 
of an insolvent company in which they owned only a few shares. This is not to mention the prospect of 
confinement in a debtor's prison, like the infamous Marshal sea, which only closed in 1842. This argument for 
shipping investment is made by Simon Ville, as noted in Chapter Five. This factor also meshes well with the idea 
of pursuing a comparative advantage. Since the ownership of vessel shares were one of the few limited holdings 
open to investors in the early nineteenth century, this created an immediate advantage for anyone with money 
to invest in shipowning. Contemporary shipowning by its very nature created a niche for persons who in today's 
market might gravitate toward other forms of investment. 
10 
For current purposes, "marine tradesmen" does not simply include maritime craftspeople like those listed above 
but also certain trades related more to the port generally, including pilots and stevedores. 
II 
Simon P. Ville, "The Growth of Specialization in English Shipowning, 1750-1850," Economic History Review, 
2nd series, XL VI (1993), 706. 
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frequent visits to the home port created opportunities for additional employment. 12 Second, 
local residents had a certain information network based on their ties to the city that could 
only be enhanced through the creation of additional connections to the port's activities. A 
Liverpool-based sailmaker, for example, had the dual advantage ofbeing physically near the 
port's seaward activity as well as the information networks that accompanying it. 
In short, our sailmaker by living and working on Merseyside in a maritime industry 
was well placed to hear of vessel shares being offered for sale. 13 In addition, either he or his 
clients would be in the know on the quality of the vessel and how much of a "bargain" the 
proffered shares might have represented. Likewise, because the people involved in such 
dealings would be personally known to the sailmaker - either as friends, acquaintances or 
customers- the worth oftheir personal reputations and integrity could also come into play. 14 
On the other hand, a gentleman investor from another county was much more likely to be 
taking a shot in the dark, so to speak, if he chose to buy shares in Liverpool tonnage. This 
would also presume that the said gentleman would even have heard of the sale before local 
investors had already bought up the shares. Indeed, it is unlikely that the best deals, offered 
12 
Ibid. Sarah Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping, 1820-50," Maritime History, ll (1972), 58, also noted this 
factor as a possible motivation for investing but found evidence that it was not especially important by the 1830s. 
On the other hand, some marine tradesmen became investors simply because they were granted a share or shares 
in payment for work. This was also common for master mariners. 
13 
Or, as Palmer puts it, "often, no doubt, the shareholdings by these people as with others in 'maritime' 
occupations, were simply the result of personal contacts within the port." Palmer, "Investors in London 
Shipping," 58,. 
14 
This type of argument lies at the core of Gordon Boyce's work. 
455 
by the most reputable sellers, would have made it past the well-connected investors resident 
in Liverpool. What the typical outside investor was likely to get was probably far from the 
pick of any port's registered tonnage, unless he too had connections in that particular locale. 
Graeme Milne has commented on the comparative advantage this information network gave 
to Liverpool's business and trading community in a larger sense, and his observations could 
be specifically applied to the investor community. He feels that: 
it is reasonable to assume that some of the most valuable information to be 
had in dealing with ... uncertainties was acquired through the personal and 
associational contacts available to traders, whether in daily meetings ... or 
through membership in regional or commodity trade organizations. 
Liverpool's business culture relied on a complex web of information, rumour 
and gossip. Larger firms with branches in a number of ports devoted a 
notable proportion of their correspondence to assessments of the reliability 
and good standing of local firms with whom business was being 
contemplated. 15 
Such information networks were no doubt of crucial importance for maritime 
tradesmen who chose to invest in Liverpool's shipping. In terms of tonnage owned and the 
actual number of investors, however, the marine craftsmen were dwarfed in the pre-
specialist era by the merchants. (Even in an exceptional year like 1870, for instance, marine 
tradesmen accounted for only 5.7 percent of gross tonnage investment). Merchants 
comprised the single most important group of investors in the period up to, and slightly 
beyond, mid-century. The career of the owner-company starting out as essentially a 
merchant house while turning its attention increasingly toward owning is best reflected by 
15 
Milne, "Information, Reputation and Collaboration," 10. 
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Brocklebank:s. Such firms and individuals need not have been directly concerned with 
nautical trades (although Brocklebanks were through their shipyard), but owning tonnage 
was nonetheless an important component of their business. In the years prior to road and rail 
traffic, moving commodities by sea was the only feasible solution for transporting large 
quantities of goods. Even today seaborne transport, where it can be employed, remains the 
best option for transporting very large quantities ofbulky, low-value goods. The ownership 
of tonnage to transport one's own goods also related to information networks in this era, at 
least in Eric Sager and Gerald Panting's opinion. Making a profit on trading required a good 
deal of knowledge about commodities, markets and the reliability of distant agents. Perhaps 
the most important of this latter group to a merchant was the supercargo, who acted as the 
merchant's main agent overseas. In conditions where the merchant could not readily direct 
the course of affairs personally, owning tonnage oneself made sense and allowed flexibility 
in the rapid buying and selling of cargoes according to local market conditions. Thus, in the 
Georgian through mid-Victorian eras, it was logical that the main tonnage investors in ports 
like Liverpool came from the merchant community. 16 In this respect the situation was little 
changed from a century before. As Ralph Davis noted, "in the eighteenth century there was 
no such thing as the shipping firm; a ship was managed - as a minor part of his general 
16 
BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1870. See Eric W. Sager, with Gerald E. Panting, Maritime Capital: The 
Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada 1820-1914 (Montreal, 1990), 85. The connection between merchanting 
and vessel ownership was especially strong in the timber trade - a tendency that continued after merchant 
ownership in many trades had given way to the trend toward increased specialization. 
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activity - by one of the merchants who owned a share in it. " 17 At mid-century Liverpool 
merchants made up about half of all investors and accounted for two-thirds of the port's 
newly-registered tonnage. 18 Above and beyond any other investors of the time, they had the 
most to gain by controlling the mode of transport, thus creating a natural comparative 
advantage for themselves in tonnage ownership. 
Merchant predominance did not survive long after the middle of the century, 
however. After 1850 fewer merchants owned shares~ they were replaced increasingly by the 
specialist shipowner. Although they seem affected most dramatically in terms of numbers, 
merchants were not the only occupational group to fall by the wayside as investors in 
shipping. Indeed, from the 1870s there was a definite decline in all types of non-specialist 
investors. Ownership of shares was no longer the purview of the non-professional or the 
speculator~ instead, it had become the provenance of the few who chose to make it the centre 
of their affairs. By 1889 professional shipowners accounted for almost half of all investors 
in new tonnage at Liverpool. 19 If we return to Simon Ville's work for a moment we can infer 
17 
Ralph Davis, "Maritime History: Progress and Problems," in Sheila Marriner ( ed. ), Business and Businessmen 
(Liverpool, 1978), 171. 
18 
BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1850. Even by 1870 merchants still accounted for a quarter of all investors 
in new vessels at Liverpool, including companies, though their share of tonnage was then less than twenty 
percent. (Appendix Four). 
19 
BT 108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1889. This figure does not include companies, which comprised almost 
a third of all investors in new Liverpool vessels by 1889. In terms of the actual tons of shipping registered, 
professional shipowners and companies accounted for over eighty percent of all gross investment that year. 
Company numbers include firms that specialized in commodities such as coal, for example, rather than those that 
acted specifically as shipowners. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of company owners in this era were 
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a number of cogent reasons for this substantive change. Specialization grew in the wake of 
the industrial revolution when the exponential growth of British overseas trade encouraged 
the emergence of shipowning as a separate livelihood, affording ancillary services like 
brokerage the opportunity to develop into life-long careers. In broad terms, "the shipping 
industry had become large enough for many processes to be "sufficiently important to be 
turned over to specialists. "20 
Naturally, the change did not occur at the same pace for all owners. Sandbach, Tinne, 
for example, appear to have never made the shift fully from commodity producers/merchants 
to shipowners and actually moved away from shipowning by the late nineteenth century. If 
we refer again to Appendix Six, it will be noted that Sandbach, Tinne actually purchased 
their last vessels in 1882, with the rump of their fleet sold off by 1902. Likewise, 
Brocklebanks were quite late in abandoning merchanting, while PSNC was conceived as a 
shipowningventure from the outset. Again, however, all these firms found a particular trade, 
or trades, in which to specialize and continued their involvement by successful adaptation 
to change over time. 
essentially shipping lines. This also included companies like Harrisons, whose parent firm was officially a 
brokerage house. See Graph I A 
20 
Ville, "Growth of Specialization," 712. See also G. J. Stigler, "The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent 
of the Market," Journal of Political Economy, XXXTI (1984), 185-193. Ville argues that an early manifestation 
of the rise of the shipowner was the decline in "small, fractional investor[s]." As certain managers began the 
process of fleet consolidation, the proportion of single-owner vessels in Liverpool rose from twenty-five to 
thirty-six percent in Liverpool between 1786 and 1835. This factor should not be discounted, but in terms of new 
registrations at the port, the real change came after 1860. Another stimulus to the growth of specialization, 
discussed in Chapter Five, was the need for wartime transport. 
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We might take this line of reasoning a step further and argue that the conference 
system- of which most major Liverpool liner companies were a part at one point or other 
-was itself an extension of this survival strategy. What we can observe through this process 
is a number of firms making use of a similar comparative advantage in the industry by what 
would be deemed, in biological terms, "parallel evolution." Good examples of this are 
Brocklebanks and Harrisons, who both gravitated toward trade with the subcontinent. 
Without taking the biological analogy too far, we can say that such rivals then banded 
together for mutual protection by keeping out new rivals. By the time firms like 
Brockle banks, Harrisons and their competitors came together in a conference (and theirs was 
the pioneer, if we discount the Collins-Cunard arrangement) these players usually were too 
well established for one to oust the other without risking disaster. The Calcutta Conference's 
own rate war exemplified this; eventually the players were forced to re-establish a modus 
vivendi to preserve their own interests. In the end the best one could do was to attempt to 
limit competition among members while negating the effect of outsiders. As R.P. Houston's 
story illustrates, this formula was no guarantor of success. Nonetheless, the conference 
system did provide, at least in theory, a sound way of allowing companies to maintain and 
build upon their comparative advantages in a certain trade, while itself constituting an 
adaptive mechanism to deal with changing conditions.21 
It was in reality these two factors - comparative advantage supplemented by 
21 
The reader will recall that PSNC was also involved with conference arrangements after having started out under 
a form of monopoly, protected even from national carriers. 
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adaptability - that provided a major connecting thread between the business strategies of 
seemingly disparate firms such as Brocklebanks and PSNC. I do not argue here that these 
were the only points of convergence in the survival strategies of such firms. Milne and 
Boyce would no doubt point out similarities in their use of information networks and 
established reputations to facilitate operations. Yet even these formed part of businesses' 
comparative advantages and reflected numerous instances of adaptation to changing 
conditions. 
Although based for much of their careers on Merseyside, Brocklebanks and PSNC 
appeared, on the surface, to have had little in common. Brocklebanks began life as a small 
shipbuilding concern, run until191 0 by successive generations ofthe same family. From this 
beginning it evolved into a merchanting and shipowning company which was still not 
publicly traded until1898- and even then only on a very limited scale. Brockle banks started 
out in the West Indian trades before gravitating, under the pressure of falling revenue, to 
Calcutta and other East Asian ports. After decades of experience in operating a large fleet, 
Brocklebanks first relegated its building arm to a secondary role before abandoning it 
entirely in the 1860s rather than making the capital investment necessary to switch to metal 
production. As the trend toward specialization in British shipping gathered steam, 
Brocklebanks' own comparative advantage gradually evolved from one marine trade to 
another; maintaining both threatened to disperse the finn's focus and no longer made sense. 
Unlike Brocklebanks' own gradual evolution, Pacific Steam Navigation Company's 
role as a provider of shipping services was planned from its inception. Nonetheless, its 
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foundation was also built on comparative advantages - in this case those accrued through 
William Wheelwright's background in Newburyport, his South American trading career and 
the contacts he had made. Certainly Wheelwright was forward thinking in his choice of a 
limited company structure, complete with a Board ofDirectors, long before this became the 
norm in British business. Wheelwright first attempted to base his operations in the United 
States, thus drawing on his background and contacts there. On being rebuffed he eventually 
settled on Liverpool as a major nexus of world trade and shipping. The Directors (and many 
shareholders), with their experience in Liverpool's shipping and general business circles, 
created a natural web of information on which PSNC could draw. Such contacts led to the 
company's close working relationship with Royal Mail and the eventual merger of the two 
under an umbrella group. 
For both Brockle banks and PSNC a defining element of their comparative advantage, 
and an indicator of their adaptability, was their fleets. This was true of many shipowners.22 
Vessels were their primary capital investment and in a sense defined the owner's role in the 
transport industry. The type of vessel an owner chose to operate was itself frequently defined 
by the trades in which he participated, especially as the nineteenth century progressed. In the 
beginning, Thos. & Jno. Brocklebanks' fleet was comprised largely of small wooden craft 
of a variety of rigs, mainly brigs but also schooners, ships and the occasional barque. Up to 
1850, in keeping with the times, individual vessels never exceeded 700 tons. Vessel size was 
22 
See especially Chapters Three and Four. 
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a way for the company to maximize efficiency by matching supply with the demands of what 
were, in that era, largely middle-distance trades with places like Newfoundland, the West 
Indies and eastern South America. Once the benefits of metal construction had been 
established and their shipyard was jettisoned, Brocklebanks in the 1860s abandoned wood 
as a construction material. Now focussed more on trading to Calcutta and China, the 
company's vessels routinely exceeded 1,000 tons after 1860, with average tonnages 
increasing sharply from that point on (Graph 7.2). This was part of the more general trend 
toward larger tonnage in British shipping. It nonetheless reflected Brocklebanks' own move 
away from middle and into longer-distance routes. This was particularly so by the time they 
became involved with Australia. The company's comparative advantage had gradually 
shifted from the western to the eastern hemisphere, and the firm adapted to keep pace. The 
same was true of their eventual switch to steam. Although this transition was late in coming, 
Brocklebanks' long retention of their merchanting function lessened the need to convert 
earlier to the new technology. Moreover, Calcutta was one of the last ports (outside the 
Antipodes) in which sail remained competitive. Finally, from the standpoint of capital 
outlay, it made sense not to make the switch too early. Naturally, this particular option was 
not seen as the best course of action by all companies in the trade, and Harrisons largely 
converted to steamers from 1860 on. 
Like Brocklebanks, PSNC geared its fleet toward its particular comparative 
advantage - trading with western South America. Besides drawing on his own experience 
in the region, William Wheelwright was fortunate (and canny) enough to have created a new 
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comparative advantage for his fledgling company. By its very nature PSNC was essentially 
a steam operation from 1840 on, and the company continued to be innovative concerning 
its fleet. After its troubles with coaling in the 1840s and 1850s, the adoption ofthe Randolph 
Elder engine created the first great upsurge in the firm's fortunes. This was a lesson its 
Board of Directors never forgot, and PSNC remained on the cutting edge of technology. 
Indeed, innovation actually became its comparative advantage, allowing the company to 
remain in operation alongside national carriers such as CSA V. Like Brocklebanks, Pacific 
Steam Navigation Company's vessels grew in average size over time and were a product of 
much the same processes: the general increase in British vessel size and the company's own 
expanding routes and interests over the course of the nineteenth century. From simply 
connecting western South American ports like Guayaquil and Valparaiso, PSNC eventually 
expanded into routes serving the western seaboard of the United States, eastern South 
America and continental European ports. In design terms PSNC's vessels- on its older 
routes - were often marked by their own particular superstructure, likely a product of 
carrying cabin passengers on what was essentially a coasting voyage, if an extremely long 
one. Like the Houston line, they PSNC was an innovator in terms of vessel design, as 
witnessed by the early introduction of features such as electric lighting in passenger liners. 23 
23 
For example, the 2,160-gross-ton Mendoza, built in 1879 by Robert Napier & Sons, Glasgow, was the first 
British vessel fitted with a Gramme generator to produce electricity, although the device had been given trials 
in HMSMinotaur. Mendoza was employed on PSNC's Valparaiso-Callao until it was converted into a hulk in 
1904. Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets: The Pacific Steam Navigation Company (Burwash, East Sussex, 1984), 
53. 
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These traits certainly differed from Brocklebanks on the surface, but they reflect a similar 
propensity to focus upon a comparative advantage and display a willingness to adapt when 
and where needed. 
One could certainly argue that in the end such strategies availed Liverpool's 
traditional shipowners little. All of the old names- Brocklebanks, PSNC, Harrisons, Elder 
Dempster and their colleagues -have disappeared from world shipping lanes. In a broader 
sense, we might also say the same of Great Britain's entire merchant marine, for it is not 
only in a naval context that Britannia no longer "rules the waves." Still, to draw such 
conclusions is to miss the point. Prior to the container and computer revolutions of the late 
twentieth century, the shipping industry underwent the greatest change it had ever known 
in the decades after 1850. Many companies did indeed fall by the wayside, but some (even 
if the tides of fortune eventually caught them) played the game successfully for a long time. 
As of 1914 both Brocklebanks and PSNC still plied their traditional blue ocean routes. 
While it is true that both were by this time integrated into larger shipping groups, like that 
of Lord Kylsant, this should not be taken as indicative of some kind of failure. In fact, the 
mergers related more to the prevailing trend toward horizontal integration than to any 
mismanagement on the part of the Brocklebank family or PSNC's Edwardian Board of 
Directors. On the contrary, the move toward integration should more properly be seen as an 
astute business decision that allowed firms to compete against giant conglomerations like 
Morgan's International Mercantile Marine. Facilitated by the web of business connections 
discussed by Graeme Milne and Gordon Boyce, this trend was essentially a successful 
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adaptation to changing economic conditions. Using their business experience, the 
Brocklebanks and PSNC's Directors were able to create new comparative advantages for 
their firms without being subsumed within the larger entities of which they became a part. 
That both companies survived in some form for another seven decades that spanned two 
world wars, the Depression and countless international business shifts is a testament to their 
acumen. Many other Liverpool shipowning firms likewise made it through such vicissitudes 
only to be lost in the late twentieth century. They were not failures, although all have now 
passed into history. I have made the point previously that no strategy could ensure long-term 
success. Nonetheless, these shipping companies, by exploiting their various comparative 
advantages while also being flexible, positioned Liverpool at the forefront of mercantile 
commerce for more than two centuries. Perhaps that is their greatest legacy. 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Tonnage Measurement Problems 
The issue of tonnage is always a thorny one when performing calculations on the size of the British merchant 
marine over time. The term tonnage originated at a very early period and related to the English trade in Bordeaux 
wine. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries some of the longest voyages made by English mariners were to 
the Bay of Biscay for this product. At the time "tonnage" had no relation to a ton in weight, it simply referred to 
a form of wine barrel known as a "tun." Tunnage just meant the numbers of wine barrels a merchant vessel could 
carry. In its more modem usage, tonnage generally referred to a measure of the cubic feet of a vessel below deck 
divided by 100. Net tonnage was the registered tonnage of a vessel minus space that, at least in theory, could not 
be used for cargo, such as crew accommodations and engines. In the first years of steam this deduction might be 
considerable. In the early paddle-wheelers the cumbersome machinery and drive shafts could take up a large share 
of the interior space below decks. G.M. Walton and C.J. French put the tonnage discrepancy at fifty-nine and 
thirty-four percent, respectively. In the latter years of the BT 108 series the gross tonnage was noted alongside 
the registered tonnage for sail as well as steam craft. Tonnage measurement for naval vessels was another matter 
entirely, representing physical displacement of water, not carrying capacity. Simon Ville has produced an article 
that examines the more modem meaning of tonnage, albeit only for the period to 1830. Nevertheless, his 
observations on the problems of tonnage measurements hold true for the remainder of the nineteenth century as 
well. Prior to 1786, discrepancies between measured and registered tonnage were quite marked, with the former 
often exceeding the latter by fifty percent for the same craft. Things improved somewhat during the ensuing years, 
but registered tonnage was still apt to be measured inaccurately and inconsistently. As Ville points out, the noted 
marine insurance company, Lloyds, would be considered a likely source of accurate tonnage measurements, but 
in this era at least this was not the case. Ville sampled a number of vessels registered in the years 1786-1830 and 
found that the gap between a vessel's registered tonnage and its "Lloyds tonnage" was often fairly wide. For 
example, the vessel Cornwall registered at 368 tons was only recorded as being 320 tons by Lloyds. Another craft, 
the Lord Rodney, measured at 397 tons by register, came in at 344 tons according to Lloyds. In some cases, such 
as that of the Polly, Lloyds tonnage came in at thirty-three tons above the registered tonnage. 
One characteristic of the nineteenth century was change and revision in tonnage measurements, as 
British (and other) authorities attempted to devise more accurate ways of measuring the carrying capacity of its 
merchant marine. In the three decades following 1820, tonnage on the registries was usually written in without 
any specific designation about how it was calculated, although this was likely considered gross tonnage, as this 
was then measured. David Alexander was of the opinion that pre-1854 numbers represented "net burthen" and 
that the 1854 measurement changeover inflated later schooner and barque tonnage registries in the port of 
Yarmouth, Nova Scotia by ten and five percent, respectively. To reflect the changes made the year before, in 1855 
the registry forms were altered from the old unspecified method of reporting to noting registered tons as the 
measure (in the case of steamers, gross tonnage still appeared).Unfortunately for the researcher, this changeover 
in 1855 did not occur until part of the way through the year, resulting in a mix of tonnages. There had also been 
a changeover in measurement standards in 1833. This is less problematic in this study since 1833 was not 
included as one of the sampled years. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the shift. 
Sources: David Howarth, British Seapower: How Britain Became Sovereign of the Seas (London, 
2003), 41-42; Simon Ville, "The Problem of Tonnage Measurement in the English Shipping 
Industry, 1780-1830," International Journal of Maritime History, I (1989), 80-81; David 
Alexander, "The Port of Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, 1840-1889," in Keith Matthews and Gerald 
Panting (eds.), Ships and Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region (St. John's, NL, 83; John 
McCusker, "The Tonnage of Ships Engaged in the British Colonial Trade During the 
Eighteenth Century," Research in Economic History, VI (1981); G.M. Walton, "Colonial 
Tonnage Measurements: A Comment," Journal of Economic History, XXVII (1967), 392-397; 
and C.J. French, "Eighteenth Century Tonnage Measurements," Journal of Economic History, 
XXXIII (1973), 433-443. 
Source: 
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West England; NE=North East England; SW=South West England; SE=South East England; 
SC=Scotland; IR=Ireland; WS=Wales; CN=Canada (British North America, including 
Newfoundland); PR=Prizes; US= United States; OT=Other points of origin. Figures for each 
decade are taken from the Board of Trade registry series sample years. (i.e. those years ending 
in "zero" and "five," with 1826 substituted for 1825, plus 1889). Due to its status as a 
transitional decade regarding tonnage, the 1850s sample years are omitted. All figures are 
from sample years only. Totals (for vessel numbers and tonnage) may not equal 100 percent 
due to rounding. 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
468 
Appendix 3: Quantities of Timber Imported into Great Britain, 1870-1910 
Year Country of Origin Loads Imported Value(£) 
1870 Canada 402,490 1,612,498 
1870 Sweden 239,092 579,336 
1870 Russia 179,763 400,609 
1870 Norway 151,438 314,450 
1880 Canada 1,479,625 3,380,935 
1880 Sweden 1,517,388 3,536,419 
1880 Russia 1,395,090 3,285,032 
1880 Norway 747,679 1,566,426 
1890 Canada 1,362,777 3,780,360 
1890 Sweden 1,889,396 3,382,146 
1890 Russia 1,516,446 2,916,794 
1890 Norway 742,616 1,413,562 
1900 Canada 1,799,422 4,941,736 
1900 Sweden 2,407,358 4,900,354 
1900 Russia 2,317,892 (illegible) 
1900 Norway 839,874 1,934,211 
1910 Canada 1,130,665 3,435,962 
1910 Sweden 1,233,894 3,269,525 
1910 Russia 3,159,474 7,982,433 
1910 Norway 359,327 1,164,839 
Note: Figures include "fir" and all timber listed as "unenumerated," whether, hewn, sawn, split, planned, or 
dressed. Sweden's 1890 wood products value excludes hewn wood products which were of lesser 
importance than sawn or split wood. Unfortunately, the value of hewn wood is illegible in the 
Parliamentary Papers. "Russia" includes wood exported from the Russian-occupied portions ofF inland. 
Although Norway was not a country until 1905, its exports to the UK were entered separately than 
those from Sweden. The Swedish figures include an unspecified amount of wood transshipped from 
other sources in the Baltic. 
Source: Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers (BPP), Trade and Navigation Accounts, 
LXIT,part2, 1871;LXXVll,1881;LXXXII,1890-1;LXXVI, 1901;andLXXIX,1911. 
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Appendix 4: Investors in Liverpool-Registered Vessels by Occupational Group, 1830-1889 (New 
registrations only. Select years) 
1830 1850 1870 1889 
Shipowners:% ofTotallnvestors 4.2 8.1 24.9 45.9 
Shipowners: o/o of Tonnage Owned 5.2 7.2 32.1 35.8 
Merchants:% ofTotallnvestors 60.0 48.1 24.4 8.0 
Merchants:% of Tonnage Owned 62 . .9 67.2 18.7 3.7 
Companies:% ofTotallnvestors 0.0 0.4 7.7 30.8 
Companies:% of Tonnage Owned 0.0 0.1 30.1 48.7 
Mariners:% ofTotallnvestors 13.2 11.4 6.5 1.5 
Mariners:% of Tonnage Owned 10.2 7.2 1.8 0.1 
Marine Tradesmen:% of Total Investors 4.7 5.8 10.2 6.0 
Marine Tradesmen:% of Tonnage Owned 4.1 4.1 5.7 0.6 
Shipbrokers:% ofTotallnvestors 1.4 2.0 7.0 0.0 
Shipbrokers:% of Tonnage Owned 0.9 1.3 5.8 0.0 
Engineers:% ofTotallnvestors 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 
Engineers:% of Tonnage Owned 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 
Others/not stated/illegible: %of Total Investors 16.5 24.0 18.8 7.8 
Others/not stated/illegible: % of Tonnage Owned 16.7 12.7 5.6 11.1 
Notes: For 1870 and 1889, tonnage used was register; for 1830 and 1850, the tonnage measurement 
in the Registries was unspecified. "Marine Tradesmen" includes shipbuilders, shipwrights, 
pilots, rope makers, ship chandlers, blockmakers, riggers, master riggers, ship carpenters, sail 
makers, watermen and stevedores. Aside from those whose occupations were not stated or 
illegible in the registries "Others" includes (but is not limited to) gentlemen, esquires, yeomen, 
manufacturers, painters, butchers, brewers, blacksmiths, book keepers, cotton brokers, inn 
keepers, widows, spinsters, labourers, Clergy, solicitors, surgeons and medical doctors. Totals 
include only tonnage newly registered in Liverpool for that year. If a vessel had multiple 
owners, the tonnage ascribed to each occupational group was calculated as Tonnage x 
shares/64. 
Source: BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, 1820, 1850, 1870 and 1889. 
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Appendix 5: Shareholders in Liverpool Vessels by Place of Residence (New registrations only) 
1820s 1830s 1840s 1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 
Liverpool 69.5% 69.0% 71.9% 71.7% 69.2% 61.8% 68.7% 
Lancashire 6.6% 4.6% 5.6% 6.2% 6.0% 4.5% 4.4% 
Cheshire 4.0% 3.6% 4.7% 4.0% 6.3% 6.9% 11.6% 
Cumberland 3.5% 6.9% 2.1% 2.0% 5.0% 1.5% 0.5% 
83.6% 84.1% 84.3% 83.9% 86.5% 74.7% 85.2% 
Westmorland 0.7% 1.6% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
Northumberland 0.7% 0.2% 0.5% 0.1% 0.6% 0.7% 0.3% 
Durham 0.2% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 
Yorkshire 0.9% 1.1% 0.8% 1.1% 0.5% 0.5% 0.0% 
2.5% 3.4% 1.7% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4% 0.3% 
Other English 2.2% 4.1% 4.8% 5.9% 3.4% 3.0% 2.3% 
Scotland 0.7% 1.5% 4.0% 1.7% 1.5% 2.5% 2.6% 
Wales 0.4% 2.6% 1.9% 1.1% 3.6% 14.1% 6.7% 
Ireland 1.3% 0.8% 1.8% 3.6% 2.0% 3.2% 1.8% 
4.6% 9.0% 12.5% 12.3% 10.5% 22.8% 13.4% 
Canada/NL 2.2% 1.6% 1.1% 2.1% 1.2% 0.5% 0.8% 
Other/Unknown 5.9% 1.8% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.0% 
8.1% 3.4% 1.5% 2.5% 1.7% 1.0% 0.8% 
Notes: Columns may not equal 100% due to rounding. "NL" refers to Newfoundland. 
"Other/Unknown" refers to overseas registrations, minus Canada, plus all cases where a 
residence was not stated or was illegible in the registries. Decadal totals are taken from Board 
of Trade registry series sample years (those ending in "zero" and "five," with 1826 substituted 
for 1825, plus 1889). 
Source: BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
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Appendix 6A: Daniel Brocklebank Fleet, 1775-1800 
Name Acquired Built Rig Tons Notes 
Castor 1775 w.brig 220 Wrecked off Jamaica, 1781 
Precedent 1780 w.s. 301 Wrecked offlreland, 1791 
Castor II 1782 w.s. 343 Sold, 1789 
Cyprns 1786 w.brig 166 Sold, 1797 
Zebulon 1787 w.brig 187 Sold, 1795 
Dolphin 1788 w.brig 75 Sold, 1796 
Perseverance 1788 w.brig 155 
Hero 1788 w.brig 174 Sold 1796 
Mackerel 1790 w.c. 12 Broken up, 1794 
Castor III 1790 w.brig 197 Sold, 1790 
Rock/iff 1790 w.brig 127 
Hope 1791 1788 w.brig 151 Sold, 1791 
Castor IV 1791 w.brig 247 Wrecked, 1794 
Ann 1791 w.brig 65 Sold, 1791 
Nestor 1792 w.s. 233 Captured by the French, 1795 
Grampus 1792 w.brig 87 Sold, 1792 
Irton 1793 w.snow 201 Sold, 1794 
Jupiter 1793 w.s. 207 Sold, 1796 
MaryAnn 1794 w.brig 155 Sold, 1794 
Dispatch 1794 w.brig 102 Sold, 1796 
Jane 1795 w.brig 124 Sold, 1796 
Jane and Sarah 1795 w.snow 158 Sold, 1795 
Cavereene 1796 w.brig 127 
Carrier 1796 w.brig 127 Sold, 1797 
Alert 1796 w.brig 85 Sold, 1798 
Alfred 1796 w.s. 314 Sold, 1798 
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Scipio 1797 w.brig 242 Sold, 1799 
Duncan 1798 w.s. 239 Sold, 1799 
Earl of Lonsdale 1798 w.c. 61 Sold, 1798 
Ceres 
Montgomery 
Ariel 
Active 
Cumberland 
Note: 
Source: 
1798 w.brig 93 Captured by the French, 1799 
1799 w.s. 190 Sold, 1799 
1800 w.s. 238 Sold, 1801 
1800 w.brig 134 Sold, 1805 
1800 w.s. 340 Sold, 1800 
In many cases Daniel Brocklebank's tonnage came from his own shipyard, so the build date 
normally represents a vessel's date of acquisition as part ofhis fleet unless otherwise specified. 
See also Appendix 7. Under rig, "c" denotes cutter. 
National Museums Liverpool (NML), Merseyside Maritime Museum (MMM), Maritime 
Archives Liverpool (MAL), Thomas and John Brocklebank (B/BROC), Brocklebank Fleet, 
1775-1945; and John Frederick Gibson, "The House ofBrocklebank (1 ),"Sea Breezes, XVll 
(January-June 1954), 50-51. 
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Appendix 6B: Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank Fleet, 1801-1914 
Name Acquired Built Rig Tons Notes 
General Hunter 1801 w.s. 217b. Last Brocklebank shares sold, 1811 
Matty 1801 w.brig 163b. Sold, 1801 
Dryad 1801 1801 w.s. 256b. Sold, 21 November 1805. 
Experiment 1802 w. sch. 89b. Sold to Baker & Co., Liverpool, 1807 
King George 1803 w.s. 264b. Sold to Rodie & Co., 1804 
Volunteer 1803 w.s. 353b. Sold, 1803 
Queen Charlotte 1804 w.brig 211b. Sold, 1812 
Beaver 1804 w.brig 81b. Sold, 1809 
Hercules 1805 w.s. 301b. Sunk by collision at sea Nov, 1825 
Swallow 1806 w.brig 114b. Owned by Capt. Wilson Fisher, 1809 
Brown 1807 w.brig 220b. Sold, 1807 
Ariel II 1807 w.brig 204b. Captured by the French, 1809 
Dryad !I 1808 w.brig 220b. Wrecked off Newfoundland, August 
1810 
Maranham 1809 w.brig 154b. Sold, 1810 
Balfour 1809 w.brig 310b. Sold, 1849 
Caroline 1810 1810 w.s. 237b. Wrecked, Atlin Shoal, Maranham, 
1826 
Nimble 1810 w.brig 139b. Sold to a Mr. Thompson, 1816 
Watson 1810 w.brig 162b. Sold, 1810 
Bransty 1811 w.brig 104b. Wrecked, Ireland, 1819 
London 1812 w.s. 351b. Sold to Edward Bates & Son, 184 7 
Mary 1812 w.brig 208b. Sold, 1814 
William 1812 w.brig 237b. Sold, 1812 
Cossack 1813 w.brig 172b. Wrecked, 19 March 1824 
Westmorland 1813 1813 w.brig 168b. Seized & sold, Copenhagen, 1813 
Margaret and 1813 w.brig 89b. Sold, 1813 
Frances 
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Aimwell 1813 w.brig 257b. W reeked in West Indies, 183 9 
Tobago 1813 w.brig 268b. Sold to Mr. Hopper, London, 1818 
Westmorland II 1814 w.brig 195b. Sold to Owen & Co., Portmadoc, 
1857 
Duke of 1814 w.brig 139b. Sold, 1814 
Wellington 
New Triton 1814 w.sl. 55 b. Sold, 1814 
Jamaica 1815 w.brig 215b. Wrecked, I January 1854 
Princess 1815 w.s. 514g. Crushed in ice, 14 June 1856 
Charlotte 
Antigua Packet 1815 w.s. 272 Sold, 1815 
Mary// 1816 1781 w.brig 144b. Lost, River Mersey, 25 November 
1825 
Prince Leopold 1816 w.brig 1llg. Sold, 1839 
Shammon 1816 w.brig 161 Sold, 1816 
Dryad III 1816 w.brig 23lg. Abandoned in the Atlantic, 1830 
Constellation 1817 w.brig 187g. Wrecked near Halifax, 1819 
Doris 1818 w.brig 133 Sold, 1819 
Santon 1819 w.brig 170 Sold, 1819 
Perseverance II 1819 w.s. 513g. Wrecked near Madras, 28 March 1829 
West Indian 1819 w.sl. 44b. Wrecked in the West Indies, 1839 
Candidate 1820 w.brig 225g. W reeked in River Plate, 13 June 1823 
Ariel III 1820 w.brig 154g. Sold to T. Rigby, Liverpool, 1845 
Crown 1821 w.b. 297 Sold, Hatton & Co., Liverpool, 1849 
Globe 1822 w.brig 212g. Lost at Bahia, 1835 
Swallow II 1822 w.brig 14lg. Lost offNewfoundland, January 1837 
Telegraph 1823 w.sch. 111 Wrecked Havana, 1825 
Andes 1823 w.brig 216g. Wrecked offNetherlands, 1852 
Whitehaven 1824 w.brig 214g. Sold to Simms & Co., Whitehaven, 
1834 
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Branstyll 1824 w.sch. 130g. Wrecked on Yucatan Peninsula, 1830 
Manchester 1824 w.brig 163g. Sold to Armstrong ofWorkington, 
1852 
A.ffleck 1825 w.brig 237g. Sold to J. Fell, 1825 
Grecian 1825 w.brig 235g. Wrecked, River Mersey, 1831 
Superior 1825 w.brig 240g. Owned by Gunson & Co., 1835 
Gazelle 1826 w.brig 241g. Sold, 1826 
Courier 1826 w.sch. 142g. Sold to Capt. Curry, London, 1845 
Meteor 1826 w.b. 240g. Wrecked, 1856 
Lady Shaw 1827 w.brig 181g. Sold, 1827 
Stewart 
Countess of 1827 w.stm. 241g. Broken up, 1854 
Lonsdale 
Oberon 1827 w.brig 150g. LostaboutFebruary, 1846 
Herculean 1828 w.b. 317g. Sold to J. Mondel, Liverpool, 1853 
Gleaner 1828 w.sl. 50 g. Blown ashore in gale, February, 1835 
Irt 1828 w.b. 215g. Sold, 1849 
Dash 1828 w.sch. 86g. Sold to Martin, et al, Liverpool, 1845 
Buoyant 1828 w.sch. 130g. Sold, 1838 
Esk 1828 w.b. 217g. Sold for Australian trade, 1855 
Maypo 1829 w.b. 173r. Sold to Tasker & Co., Liverpool, 
1838 
Mite 1830 w.sl. 54r. Posted missing, 1833 
Avoca 1830 w.b. 256r. Brocklebank shares sold by 1837 
Bonanza 1830 w.sch. 176r. Sold to J. Mondel, Liverpool, 1855 
Tampico 1830 w.brig 129r. Sold, 1839 
Hindoo 1831 w.b. 266r. Sold to T. Carter, Liverpool, 1864 
Mackerel!! 1831 w.c. 23r. Sold to J. A Ross, Isle of Skye, 1850 
Mazeppa 1831 w.brig 134r. Sold, Tasker, Fairie & Co., LP., 1847 
Branstyll/ 1832 w.sch. 99r. Sold to J. Wood, Whitehaven, 1847 
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Patriot King 1832 w.b. 338r. Sold for scrap, 17 April 1868 
Lord A/thorp 1832 w.brig 233r. Missing, 1859 
Mary Gordon 1833 w.sl. 55r. Abandoned, waterlogged, 1840 
Jumna 1833 W.S. 364r. Sold, Tay Whale Fishing Co., 1856 
Rimae 1834 w.brig 214r. Sold to Nuttall & Co., Liverpool, 
1864 
Ear/Grey 1834 w.brig 242r. Sold to Capt. Potts, 1860 
!tuna 1834 w.brig 221r. Sold, 1834 
Earl of Lonsdale 1834 w.stm. 183r. Broken up, 1855 
Tigris 1836 w.s. 422r. Aground & sold, March, 1865 
Globe II 1836 w.brig 252r. Sold, Lowden, Edgar & Co., 1861 
Dryad IV 1837 w.brig 251r. Sold, Lowden, Edgar & Co., 1860 
Fairie 1837 w.sch. 80r. Missing at sea, December, 1883 
Mite II 1837 w.sm. 61r. Too small. Sold, 1839 
Patriot Queen 1838 w.s. 547r. Sold to Low & Co., Liverpool, 1880 
Horsburgh 1838 w.b. 320r. Wrecked at Valparaiso, 1855 
Susanna 1838 w.sch. 65r. Sold, 1838 
Santoni! 1839 w.b. 345r. Driven ashore & wrecked, January, 
1843 
Aden 1839 w.b. 339r. Sold to J. Cochran, Liverpool, 1868 
Swallow Ill 1839 w.brig 236r. Disappeared, January, 1839 
Kestrel 1840 w.brig 231r. Sold, Gregory & Co., Whitehaven, 
1863 
Industry 1840 w.sch. 63r. Sold, 1840 
Princess Royal 1841 w.s. 579r. Sold toT. Cookson, Liverpool, 1871 
Valparaiso 1841 w.b. 317r. Sold, A. Sutherland, Valparaiso, 1869 
Callao 1842 w.brig 170r. Sold to Hodgson, Whitehaven, 1860 
Lanercost 1842 w.b. 318r. Sold to E. Eaton, Workington, 1869 
Patna 1842 w.b. 362r. Sold, Roger & Henry Jefferson, 1868 
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Camana 1842 w.brig 185r. Sold to Hodgson, Whitehaven, 1846 
Robert Pulsjord 1844 w.s. 593r. Sold at Valparaiso, 1869 
Rowland Hill 1844 w.sch. 64r. Sold, 1844 
Courier II 1844 w.brig 135r. Sold, Wm. Robinson, Drogheda, 1856 
Sir Henry 1845 w.b. 334r. Wrecked, Carmarthen Bay, 30 
Pottinger December 1859 
Crisis 1847 w.s. 426r. Wrecked on Arklow Bank, Ireland, 
1862 
Thomas 1847 w.s. 629r. Wrecked, Rosario Reef, Jamaica, 1878 
Brocklebank 
Harold 1849 w.s. 666r. Sold to French owners, 1869 
Petchelee 1850 w.b. 393r. Sold toW. Killey & Co., LP, 1871 
Arachne 1851 w.s. 654r. Abandoned at sea, 12 November 1866 
Marta ban 1852 w.s. 852r. Sold, 1873 
Aracan 1854 w.s. 864r. Sank after collision, 4 March 187 4 
Mindanao 1854 w.s. 482g. Sold, 1874 
Florence 1855 w.s. 1,362g. Sold, G. Cairns & Co., Liverpool, 
Nightingale 1869 
Cormorin 1855 w.s. 803g. Sold toP. Sutherland, Liverpool, 1875 
Herculean II 1865 w.s. 531r. Wrecked, Gaspar Strait, 30 Nov. 1860 
Eskett 1857 w.brig 123 Sold, 1857 
Rajmahal 1858 w.s. 1,302g. Sold, Capt H. Williams, 1883 
Sumatra 1858 w.s. 773r. Sold to J. Karron, Isle ofMan, 1858 
Juanpore 1859 w.b. 460g. Sold toT. Davies, London, 1874 
Veronica 1860 w.b. 332r. Sold, Orient Line, London, 1873 
Maiden Queen 1860 1860 W.S. 814g. Sold to E. Burchard, Rostock, 1874 
Cam bay 1861 w.s. 1,061g. Sold, 0. L. Sorensen, Kragero, 1884 
Tenasserim 1861 w.s. 1,002g. Wrecked 26 December 1865 
Burdwan 1862 w.s. 803g. Wrecked, China Sea, 16 August 1885 
Ariel V 1862 w.brig 130g. Sold, 1862 
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Everest 1863 w.s. 571g. Stranded & lost in China Sea, August 
1873 
Alexandra 1863 1863 i.s. 1,352g. Sold, Trinder Anderson & Co., 1887 
Baroda 1864 1864 l.S. 1,364g. Sunk by collision in Mersey, 1887 
Bow fell 1864 w.s. 1,002g. Wrecked, Java Sea, May 1886 
Mahanda 1865 w.s. 1,003g. Sold, 1883 
Candahar 1866 1866 l.S. 1,418g. Sold to S. Goldberg, Swansea, 1890 
Tenasserim II 1866 1866 i.s. 1,419g. Lost, Table Bay, Cape Town, May 
1902 
Chinsura 1868 1868 i.s. 1,336g. Sold to Hughes & Co., Liverpool, 
1883 
Belfast 1874 1874 i.s. 1,957g. Sold, Shaw, Savill & Albion, 1900 
Majestic 1875 1875 l.S. 1,974g. Sold to Government of Chile, 1899 
Khyber 1880 1880 l.S. 2,026g. Total loss, 1905 
Bolan 1882 1882 i.s. 2,058g. Lost off Cape of Good Hope, July 
1889 
Bactria 1885 1885 l.S. 2,170g. Sold, D. & J. Sproat & Co., LP, 1898 
Zemindar 1885 1885 st.s. 2,053g. Sold, 1900 
Talookar 1885 1885 st.s. 2,053g. Sunk by collision, 13 December 1890 
Sindia 1887 1887 st. b. 3,007g. Sold, Anglo-American Oil Co., 1900 
Holkar 1888 1888 st. b. 3,009g. Sold to D. H. Watjen, Bremen, 1901 
Ameer 1889 1889 st.stm. 4,127g. Sold, Japan, 1911 
Gaekwar 1890 1889 st.stm. 4,220g. Sold toN. Fredriksen, Sandefjord, 
1911 
Talavera 1890 1890 st.stm. 3,196g. Chartered to Dominion Line, 1892 
Barrosa 1890 1890 st.stm. 3,185g. Reverted to African S.S. Co., 1891 
Pindari 1891 1891 st.stm. 5,713g. Sold to Japanese buyers, 1911 
Mahratta 1892 1891 st.stm. 5,679g. Wrecked, Goodwin Sands, April, 1909 
Marwarri 1900 1900 st.stm. 5,659g. Sold foreign, 1920 
Bengali 1901 1900 st.stm. 5,665g. Torpedoed by UC 34, January, 1918 
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Mahronda 1905 1905 st.stm. 7,630g. Sold, 1923 
Malakand 1905 1905 st.stm. 7,653g. Torpedoed by U 84, 20 April1917 
Manipur 1906 1906 st.stm. 7,654g. Acquired by Admiralty, 1915 
Matheran 1906 1906 st.stm. 7,654g. Hit mines and sunk, January, 1917 
Mandasor 1911 1902 st.stm. 8,117g. Sold to Hamburg-Amerika Line, 1912 
Maidan 1912 st.stm. 8,205g. Wrecked, Red Sea, 1923 
Anchoria 1912 st.stm. 5,430g. Trans. from Anchor Line. Sold, 193 5 
Media 1912 st.stm. 5,437g. Trans. from Anchor Line. Sold, 193 5 
Assyria 1912 st.stm 6,370g. Trans. from Anchor Line; torpedoed, 
1917 
Bavaria 1912 st.stm. 4,711g. Trans. from Anchor Line. Sold, 1914 
A. B. Hughes 1913 st.stm. 147g. Steam barge. Sold, 1932 
Malakuta 1914 st.stm. 7,205g. Sold, 1935 
Mahan ada 1914 st.stm. 7,196g. Bombed & sunk, 1941 
Notes: See Appendices 7, 8, 9 and 10. Under tonnage, "b" indicates tons burthen. Under rig, "sl" denotes 
sloop. Quite a few vessels acquired after Brocklebanks' shipyard closed in 1865 were built especially 
for them by Harland & Wolff. Countess of Lonsdale and Earl of Lonsdale were built for the 
Whitehaven Steam Navigation Company, controlled by Brocklebanks. Talavera and Barossa were 
originally laid down for Brocklebanks but purchased by Alfred Jones for the African Steam Ship Co. 
As part of the deal, Brocklebank chartered both until replacements could be built. 
Source: NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Brocklebank Fleet, 1775-1945; BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel 
Registries, various years; John Frederick Gibson, "The House ofBrocklebank (1)," Sea Breezes, XVll 
(January-June 1954), 50-54; Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets: Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank (Uckfield, 
East Sussex, 1994); and David E. Stillwell, "Brocklebanks: The Final Century," Sea Breezes, L VIIT 
(February 1984), 129-133. 
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Appendix 7: Vessels Built by Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank, 1807-1865 
Name of Vessel Tonnage Date Launched 
Brown 220 1807 
Ariel 204 1807 
Dryad 220 3 October 1808 
Maranham 150 1809 
Balfour 310 17 October 1809 
Caroline 237 27 February 1810 
Nimble 142 23 March 1810 
Watson 160 31 August 1810 
Bransty 104 1811 
London 351 14 January 1812 
Mary 208 1812 
William 238 1812 
Cossack 172 4 February 1813 
Mary and Francis 100 1 May 1813 
Tobago 268 4March 1813 
Aimwell 257 21 August 1813 
Westmoreland 195 4 March 1814 
Duke Wellington 140 19May 1814 
Jamaica 215 11 February 1815 
Princess Charlotte 515 6 September 1815 
Antigua Packet 272 1 November 1815 
Prince Leopold 112 27 April 1816 
Shannon 162 24 June 1816 
Dryad 231 27 June 1817 
Constellation 187 June 1817 
Doris 133 20 June 1818 
Santon 170 13 July 1819 
Perserverance 512 September 1819 
West Indian 44 9 November 1819 
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Candidate 225 26 June 1820 
Ariel 156 9 November 1820 
Crown 297 15 August 1821 
Globe 212 20 August 1822 
Swallow 142 1822 
Telegraph 114 9 September 1828 
Andes 215 21 October 1823 
Bolivar 208 3 May 1824 
Manchester 160 1824 
Bransty 130 1824 
Ajlick 237 18 February 1825 
Grecian 235 22 February 1825 
Superior 240 12 December 1825 
Gazelle 242 11 March 1826 
Courier 142 24 July 1826 
Helvellyn 142 15 September 1826 
Lady Shaw Stewart 181 16 February 1827 
Countess of Lonsdale s.s. 150 12 June 1827 
Oberon 150 1827 
Herculean 317 29 March 1828 
G/eanor 40 30 March 1828 
Irt 217 28 May 1828 
Dash 86 18 June 1828 
Buoyant 130 1828 
Esk 217 27 October 1828 
Maypo 173 17 June 1829 
Mite 54 30 January 1830 
Avoca 256 29 January 1830 
Bonanza 176 27March 1830 
Tampico 129 1830 
Hindoo 226 13 January 1831 
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Arab 23 July 1831 
Mazeppa 134 6 August 1831 
Bransty 99 February 1832 
Patriot King 338 31 March 1832 
Lord Althrop 233 June 1832 
Mary Gordon 55 23 March 1833 
Jumna 364 22 April 1833 
Rimae 214 26 March 1834 
Ear/Grey 242 22 July 1834 
/tuna 221 1834 
Earl Lonsdale s.s. 239 1834 
Tigris 422 19 January 1836 
Globe 252 26 April 1836 
Dryad 251 12 January 1837 
Fairie 80 4 March 1837 
Mite 60 1 July 1837 
Patriot Queen 547 24 January 1838 
Horsburgh 320 3 September 1838 
Susannah 56 2 October 1838 
Santon 346 19 February 1839 
Aden 313 26 June 1839 
Swallow 237 26 July 1839 
Kestrel 241 14 April 1840 
Industry 69 2 October 1840 
Princess Royal 579 8 March 1841 
Valparaiso 295 19June 1841 
Lanercost 318 29 January 1842 
Callao 170 1842 
Patna 379 21 October 1843 
Camana 185 9 November 1843 
Robert Pulsford 593 4 April1844 
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Courier 142 6 March 1844 
Rowland Hill 80 16 May 1844 
Sir Hy. Pottinger 334 19 August 1845 
Thomas Brocklebank 547 29 February 1847 
Crisis 395 1847 
Harold 666 23 June 1849 
Petchelee 393 15 July 1850 
Arachne 654 30 August 1851 
Marta ban 852 15 October 1852 
Aracan 788 14 April1854 
Comorin 803 July 1855 
Herculean 531 15 June 1856 
Eskett 123 May 1857 
Rajmahal 1,302 16 April 1858 
Sumatra 773 7 October 1858 
Juan pore 459 15 May 1859 
Veronica 332 16 January 1860 
Cam bay 1,000 25 February 1861 
Tenasserim 1,002 10 August 1861 
Burdwan 803 28 August 1862 
Ariel 130 1862 
Everest 571 14 October 1863 
Bow fell 1,002 20 July 1864 
Mahanda 1,003 26 April 1865 
Source: NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Vessels Built by T. & J. Brocklebank, 1807 to 1865. 
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Appendix 8: Brocklebank Line: Number of Sailings and Arrivals at Liverpool, 1820-1869 
A Fi L' rom 1verpoo to un ermentwne ·ports. I d d 
Port 1820-9 1830-9 1840-9 1850-9 1860-9 
Bombay 2 14 26 12 -
Singapore and Batavia 1 - 1 4 12 
Calcutta 19 54 92 122 166 
Alexandria 2 1 - - -
Valparaiso 27 23 52 32 3 
Maranh am 16 5 1 - -
Canada and Newfoundland 15 41 33 - -
China - - 2 11 8 
Hong Kong - - 13 21 20 
Total Departures 168 338 380 333 209 
B. Arrivals at Liverpool from various ports 
Bombay 2 10 29 12 -
Singapore and Batavia - - - 1 13 
Calcutta 17 53 100 118 172 
Alexandria 2 2 - - -
Valparaiso 4 10 10 6 3 
Maranh am 18 4 1 - -
Canada and Newfoundland 10 10 4 1 -
China 
Hong Kong 
Total Arrivals 
Notes: 
Source: 
- - 3 12 16 
- - 3 2 4 
uo 232 308 299 263 
China includes Shanghai but excludes Canton; the latter was in fact the earliest Chinese port 
called on by Brocklebank vessels and at least eight voyages departed Liverpool for Canton 
prior to 1840. As can be seen from the fact that departures generally outnumber arrivals, the 
source for the above is likely incomplete, but does give an indication of the relative 
importance of each port or region as a destination for Brocklebanks shipping. See Gore 's 
Liverpool Advertiser, Various issues. 
NGL, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Historical Notes, "Brocklebank Line: Numbers ofSailings and 
Arrivals at Liverpool During Various Decades & C." 
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,ppen 1x : roc e an atmgs 0 om ay, -A d" 9 B kl b ks S T t B b 1833 1855 
Vessel Name Advertized Sailing Date Actual Sailing/Clearance Date (If 
known) 
Princess Charlotte May 1833 Sailed 11 July 1833 
Balfour March I834 Sailed 13 April1834 
Princess Charlotte May 1834 Sailed 28 June I834 
Crown December I834 Sailed I January 1835 
Princess Charlotte May 1835 Sailed 31 May 1835 
Princess Charlotte Aprili836 Sailed 31 May 1836 
Princess Charlotte April1837 Sailed 26 May 1837 
Balfour October 1837 
Herculean Aprili838 Cleared I9 May I838 
Balfour May I838 Sailed I6 June I838 
Princess Charlotte June 1838 Sailed I August I838 
Crown February 1839 Sailed I7 March 1839 
Princess Charlotte April1839 Sailed 18 May 1839 
Herculean April1839 Sailed 30 June 1839 
Balfour July 1839 Sailed 2 September 1839 
Crown January 1840 Sailed 4 February 1840 
Herculean April1840 Sailed 6 June 1840 
Princess Charlotte June I840 Sailed 13 July 1840 
Crown December 1840 Sailed 19 January 1841 
Balfour January 1841 Sailed 9 March 1841 
Herculean March 1841 Cleared 19 April 1841 
Princess Charlotte June I841 Cleared 3I July I84I 
Crown October 184I Sailed 16 November I841 
Herculean January 1842 Sailed 6 February 1842 
Princess Charlotte August 1842 Sailed 1 November 1842 
Crown November 1842 Sailed 6 December 1842 
Herculean March 1843 Sailed 30 April 1843 
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Crown October 1843 Sailed 16 November 1843 
Princess Charlotte November 1843 20 December 1843 
Herculean January 1844 Sailed 6 February 1844 
Balfour August 1844 Sailed 19 November 1844 
Herculean May 1845 
Balfour October 1845 
Crown November 1845 
Herculean March 1845 
Balfour October 1846 
Herculean January 1847 
Crown July 1847 
Herculean December 1847 
Crown April1848 
Herculean October 1848 
Herculean August 1850 
Herculean - Sailed 22 October 1851 
Herculean - Sailed 3 October 1852 
Patriot King - Sailed 17 January 1853 
Jumna - Sailed 17 January 1853 
Patriot King - Sailed 3 November 1853 
Jumna - Sailed 3 November 1853 
Crisis - Sailed 12 March 1854 
Aracan - Sailed 20 July 1854 
Patriot King - Sailed 12 August 1854 
Jumna - Sailed 27 September 1854 
Jumna - Sailed 5 September 1855 
Note: As these were advertised sailings, they do not represent voyages undertaken entirely carrying the 
company's own goods, which would not have been advertised. 
Source: NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Historical Notes. 
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Appendix 10: Brocklebanks Sailings to Calcutta, 1820-1890 
Vessel Name Advertised Sailing Actual sailing/Clearance Date (If 
Date Known) 
Perseverance - Sailed 12 January 1820 
Crown February 1830 Sailed 26 March 1830 
Princess Charlotte March 1830 Sailed 12 July 1830 
Herculean July 1830 Sailed 2 September 1830 
Jrt September 1830 
Tigris January 1840 Sailed 9 January 1840 
Santon January 1840 Sailed 14 February 1840 
Patriot King March 1840 Sailed 30 March 1840 
Patriot Queen April1840 Sailed 26 May 1840 
London June 1840 Sailed 19 July 1840 
Ear/Grey July 1840 Sailed 23 August 1840 
Hindoo September 1840 Sailed 2 October 1840 
Jumna October 1840 Sailed 19 November 1840 
Tigris November 1840 Sailed 19 November 1840 
Santon December 1840 Sailed I 0 December 1840 
Patriot Queen January 1850 
Thomas Brocklebank January 1850 
Robert Pulsford February 1850 
Jumna March 1850 
Harold May 1850 
Petchelee (new vessel) July 1850 
Tigris August 1850 
Patriot King September 1850 
Princess Royal October 1850 
Patriot Queen November 1850 
Sir Henry Pottinger December 1850 
Princess Royal January 1860 
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Patriot Queen January 1860 
Robert Pulsford January 1860 
Florence Nightingale February 1860 
Rajmahal March 1860 
Aracan April1860 
Arachne May 1860 
Thomas Brocklebank May 1860 
Princess Royal August 1860 
Sumatra August 1860 
Comorin September 1860 
Robert Pulsford November 1860 
Patriot Queen December 1860 
Florence Nightingale December 1860 
Comorin - Sailed 10 January 1870 
Alexandra - Sailed 16 February 1870 
Tenasserim - Sailed February 1870 
Sumatra - Sailed 17 March 1870 
Baroda - Sailed 16 May 1870 
Mahanda - Sailed 4 June 1870 
Cam bay - Sailed 2 July 1870 
Mara tan - Sailed 2 July 1870 
Candabar - Sailed 4 August 1870 
Rajmahal - Sailed 24 September 1870 
Bow fell - Sailed 24 September 1870 
Chinsura - Sailed 10 November 1870 
Alexandra - Sailed 21 November 1870 
Tenasserim - Sailed 24 December 1870 
Sumatra - Sailed 24 December 1870 
Tenasserim - Sailed 2 January 1880 
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Alexandra - Sailed 2 March 1880 
Rajmahal - Sailed 15 March 1880 
Cam bay - Sailed 8 April 1880 
Majestic - Sailed 22 June 1880 
Baroda (from London) - Sailed 5 July 1880 
Candahar - Sailed 24 July 1880 
Khyber (new vessel) - Sailed 6 October 1880 
Belfast - Sailed 19 October 1880 
Tenasserim - Sailed 18 November 1880 
Talookdar - Sailed 13 January 1890 
Ho/kar - Sailed 28 January 1890 
S.S.Ameer - Sailed 16 February 1890 
S.S. Gaekwar - Sailed 3 April 1890 
Majestic - Sailed 8 April 1890 
S.S.Ameer - Sailed 2 June 1890 
S.S. Plassey - Sailed 19 July 1890 
S.S. Gaekwar - Sailed 16 August 1890 
Belfast - Sailed 21 August 1890 
Zemindar - Sailed 28 August 1890 
Bactria - Sailed 17 September 1890 
S.S.Ameer - Sailed 30 September 1890 
Sindia - Sailed 1 November 1890 
S.S. Plassey - Sailed 10 November 1890 
S.S. Sabraon - Sailed 29 November 1890 
S.S. Gaekwar - Sailed 31 December 1890 
Note: Plassey, Sa baron and Assaye were chartered steamers. 
Source: NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, historical notes. 
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Appendix 11: Date Brocklebanks Vessels first Entered the Calcutta Trade 
Vessel Name Tonnage Rig Date of First Calcutta 
Sailing 
Princess Charlotte 514 Ship 19 February 1816 
Perseverance 513 Ship 12 January 1820 
London 351 Brig 8 April1823 
Crown 297 Barque 9 November 1825 
Herculean 317 Barque 13 May 1826 
Irt 217 Barque 10 November 1829 
Hindoo 267 Barque 26 March 1831 
Patriot King 338 Barque 10May 1832 
Lord Althrop 233 Brig 22 September 1832 
Jumna 360 Ship 21 June 1833 
Tigris 422 Ship 1 May 1836 
Ear/Grey 242 Brig 19 October 1837 
Patriot Queen 547 Ship 24 March 1838 
Santon 340 Barque 2 April1839 
Princess Royal 584 Ship 4 May 1841 
Robert Pulsford 593 Ship 11 August 1845 
Sir Henry Pottinger 324 Barque 2 October 1845 
Thomas Brocklebank 630 Ship 13 May 1847 
Crisis 426 Ship 15 February 1848 
Harold 666 Ship 19 August 1849 
Petchelee 393 Ship 16 August 1850 
Arachne 654 Ship 8 November 1851 
Marta ban 652 Ship 17 January 1853 
Florence Nightingale 1,362 Ship 17 August 1855 
Comorin 803 Ship 8 October 1855 
Aracan 788 Ship 20 April 1856 
Rajmahal 1,300 Ship 2 July 1858 
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Sumatra 773 Ship 4 January 1859 
Cam bay 1,000 Ship 9 May 1861 
Tenesserim 1,419 Ship 4 November 1861 
Burdwan 803 Ship 19 November 1862 
Alexandra 1,350 Ship 17 August 1863 
Baroda 1,366 Ship 6August 1864 
Bow fell 1,001 Ship 14 October 1864 
Mahanda 1,003 Ship 8 July 1865 
Tenasserim 1,419 Ship 22 November 1866 
Candahar 1,416 Ship 6May 1867 
Chinsura 1,336 Ship 21 May 1868 
Majestic 1,875 Ship 26 July 1875 
Belfast 1,957 Ship 14 June 1877 
Khyber 2,026 Ship 6 October 1880 
Bolan 2,056 Ship 4 October 1882 
Ta/ookdar 2,120 Ship 21 August 1885 
Kemindar 2,120 Ship 27 August 1885 
Bactria 2,170 Ship 6 November 1885 
Sindia 3,067 Ship 1 February 1888 
Holkar 3,073 Ship 8 June 1888 
Ameer 4,014 Steamer 27 October 1889 
Gaekwar 4,202 Steamer 3 April1890 
Pindari 5,674 Steamer 6 January 1892 
Mahratta 5,729 Steamer 20 February 1892 
Marwarri (from Barry) 5,729 Steamer 11 March 1900 
Bengali (from Barry) 5,720 Steamer 6 March 1901 
Mahronda 7,629 Steamer 19 August 1905 
Malakand 7,653 Steamer 9March 1906 
Manipur 7,654 Steamer 7 April1906 
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Mathe ran 7,653 Steamer 2 June 1906 
Mandaser 8,121 Steamer 24 July 1911 
Maid an 8,205 Steamer 24 April1912 
Assyria 6,370 Steamer 20July1912 
Media 5,437 Steamer 8 August 1912 
Anchoria 5,429 Steamer 4 September 1912 
Bavaria 4,711 Steamer 16 September 1912 
Note: Assyria, Media, Anchoria and Bavaria were formerly Anchor Line tonnage. Column "Date of First 
Calcutta Sailing" indicates the actual day each vessel departed on its maiden voyage to Calcutta. 
Source: NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, historical notes. 
Cost of 
Marwarri 
Bengali 
Mahronda 
Malakand 
Manipur 
Matheran 
Maidan 
Assyria 
Anchoria 
Bavaria 
Media 
Source: 
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Appendix 12: Purchase Price of Selected Brocklebanks Steamers, 1898-1912 
Deadweight Tons Date Cost(£) 
8,030 November 1898 88,991/14/05 
8,005 February 1900 102,5 56/18/07 
11,955 August 1904 78,972/01/04 
11,955 August 1904 76,815/04/08 
11,955 August 1904 75,905/12/03 
11,955 August 1904 76,136/09/02 
12,366 October 1910 95,500/00/00 
9,625 - 36,369/17/09 
8,575 20 August 1912 73,527/13/09 
7,625 - 18,227/18/07 
8,575 19 July 1912 74,542/11/10 
NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Brocklebanks, Building Prices, Ship Values, Undated typed 
letter. 
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A ppen d' 13 B kl b ks S T IX : roc e an a1mgs to E A ' 1829 1906 ast s1a, 
-
Vessel Sailing Date Destination( s) 
Superior 16 August 1829 Batavia, Singapore 
Hero 15 September 1830 Batavia, Singapore 
Grecian 12 February 1832 Batavia, Singapore 
Perserverance 12 October 1833 Batavia, Singapore, Manilla 
Jumna 13 May 1834 Canton 
Esk 3 April1835 Batavia, Singapore 
lrt 6 August 183 5 Linton (Canton) 
Jumna 25 May 1836 Canton 
Ear/Grey 23 July 1836 Batavia, Singapore, Linton 
Patriot King 16 September 1836 Batavia 
Lord A/thorp 9 July 1837 Singapore, Manilla 
Tigris 21 July 1837 Canton 
Bonanza 24 December 1837 Canton 
Tigris 26 July 1838 Canton 
Dryad 25 August 1838 Singapore 
Aden (new vessel) 13 August 1839 Canton 
Aden 26 October 1840 Singapore 
Aden 23 March 1842 Singapore 
Dryad 20 November 1842 Singapore 
Patna (new vessel) 12 January 1843 China 
Aden 7 February 1843 China 
Dryad 9 January 1844 Singapore 
Patna 31 March 1844 Hong Kong 
Aden 25 April 1844 Hong Kong 
Robert Pulsjord (new 20 June 1844 Hong Kong 
vessel) 
Dryad January 1845 Singapore 
Patna January 1845 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
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Aden May 1845 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Lord Althrop July 1845 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Patna February 1846 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Patriot King October 1846 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Lanercost January 184 7 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Patna March 1847 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Aden June 1847 Whampoa 
Ear/Grey August 1847 Singapore 
Lanercost December 184 7 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Patna February 1848 Canton 
Aden December 1848 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Patna February 1849 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Crisis February 1849 Shanghai 
Aden December 1849 Hong Kong, Canton 
Sir Henry Pottinger January 1850 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Crisis April1850 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Patna January 1851 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Crisis March 1851 Shanghai 
Patna December 1851 China 
Patna 10February 1852 China 
Aden 18 March 1852 Hong Kong 
Crisis 31 March 1852 China 
Sir Henry Pottinger 19 January 1853 China 
Patna 13 February 1853 Hong Kong 
Aden 17 March 1853 China 
Crisis 12 April1853 China 
Patna 1 February 1854 Singapore 
Aden 21 March 1854 China 
Sir Henry Pottinger 31 March 1854 Singapore 
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Patna 10 January 1855 Hong Kong 
Aden 25 February 1855 Shanghai 
Aracan 4May 1855 Shanghai 
Crisis 6 June 1855 Hong Kong 
Patna 8 December 1855 Hong Kong 
Aden 18 March 1856 Hong Kong 
Crisis 15 May 1856 Shanghai 
Herculean (new vessel) 5 August 1856 Hong Kong 
Patna 27 December 1856 Hong Kong 
Aden 10 April 1857 Hong Kong 
Crisis 9 July 1857 Hong Kong 
Herculean 29 August 1857 Hong Kong (from London) 
Aden February 1858 Hong Kong 
Crisis May 1858 Hong Kong 
Herculean July 1858 Hong Kong 
Aden February 1859 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Patna April1859 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Juanpore (new clipper May 1859 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
ship) 
Crisis July 1859 Batavia, Singapore 
Veronica (new clipper February 1860 Hong Kong 
barque) 
Aden May 1860 Batavia, Singapore 
Crisis August 1860 Singapore 
Petche/ee September 1860 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Tigris November 1860 Singapore 
Maiden Queen (new ship) January 1861 Hong Kong 
Crisis December 1861 Singapore 
Tigris January 1862 Singapore 
Patna February 1862 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
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Patriot King July 1862 Manilla 
Veronica October 1862 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Patna January 1863 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Tigris January 1863 Singapore 
Juan pore May 1863 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Everest (new clipper ship) November 1863 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Tigris December 1863 Batavia, Singapore 
Patna February 1864 Shanghai 
Veronica February 1864 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Juanpore April1864 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Everest January 1865 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Veronica February 1865 Hong Kong, Whampoa 
Tigris February 1865 Manilla 
Patna March 1865 Shanghai 
Juan pore 30May 1865 Shanghai (from London) 
Petchchelee 9 June 1865 Shanghai 
Everest 24 January 1866 Hong Kong 
Veronica 7March 1866 Hong Kong 
Patriot King 9March 1866 Singapore 
Juan pore 26 April 1866 Shanghai 
Patna 15 May 1866 Hong Kong 
Petchelee 26 August 1866 Singapore 
Patriot Queen 20 November 1866 Singapore 
Maiden Queen 28 November 1866 Shanghai 
Burdwan 22 January 1867 Foochow 
Everest 26 January 1867 Hong Kong 
Veronica 21 March 1867 Hong Kong 
Patna May 1867 Foochow (from London) 
Petchelee 25 June 1867 Hong Kong 
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Patriot Queen 29 November 1867 Singapore 
Everest 8 December 1867 Hong Kong 
Burdwan 28 December 1867 Shanghai 
Maiden Queen 15 February 1868 Hong Kong 
Juan pore 29 March 1868 Shanghai 
Robert Pulsjord 16 April 1868 Manila 
Veronica 2May 1868 Hong Kong 
Petchelee 6 August 1868 Singapore 
Everest 14 November 1868 Shanghai 
Burdwan December 1868 Shanghai 
Juan pore 18 February 1869 Shanghai 
Veronica 6 April1869 Hong Kong 
Everest 14 November 1869 Hong Kong 
Burdwan 23 December 1869 Shanghai 
Maiden Queen 29 January 1870 Hong Kong 
Veronica 15 February 1870 Hong Kong 
Juanpore 18 February 1870 Shanghai 
Aracan 21 April1870 Shanghai 
Petchelee 9 June 1870 Singapore 
Maiden Queen 2 March 1871 Anger 
Aracan 3 March 1871 Singapore 
Veronica 30 March 1871 Shanghai 
Everest 1 April1871 Singapore 
Burdwan 7 May 1871 Hong Kong 
Sumatra 3 November 1871 Anger 
Aracan 18 February 1872 Shanghai 
Everest February 1872 Hong Kong 
Maiden Queen 23 February 1872 Hong Kong 
Burdwan 22 March 1872 Hong Kong 
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Veronica 10 April 1872 Hong Kong 
Aracan 13 May 1872 Shanghai 
Maiden Queen 13 February 1873 Hong Kong 
Burdwan 24 February 1873 Shanghai 
Everest 25 February 1873 Hong Kong 
Aracan 1 7 March 1873 Anger 
Sumatra 16 May 1873 Anger (from London) 
Aracan 4March 1874 Hong Kong (from London) 
Burdwan 13 November 1876 Anger 
Burdwan 13 September 1877 Anger (from London) 
Burdwan 15 March 1879 Anger (from Cardiff) 
Bow fell 26 April 1879 Anger (from Cardiff) 
Burdwan 11 January 1880 Anger 
Mahanda 8 March 1880 Anger 
Bow fell 24 March 1880 Anger (via Cardiff) 
Burdwan 10 November 1880 Manilla (via Cardiff) 
Cam bay 21 January 1881 Anger 
Mahanda 12 February 1881 Anger (via Cardiff) 
Bow fell 19 March 1881 Anger (via Cardiff) 
Burdwan 5 December 1881 Singapore (via Cardiff) 
Mahanda 27 April 1882 Anger (via Cardiff) 
Bow fell 10 May 1882 Anger (via Cardiff) 
Chinsura 4 October 1882 Anger (via Cardiff) 
Cam bay 30 October 1882 Anger (via Cardiff) 
Burdwan 28 November 1882 Anger (via Cardiff) 
Bow fell 15 May 1883 Anger (via Cardiff) 
Burdwan 7 February 1884 Manilla (via Cardiff) 
Bow fell 23 July 1884 Anger 
Burdwan 23 April 1885 Anger 
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Zemindar 30 July 1887 Singapore (from Barry) 
S.S. Marwarri 9 October 1905 Singapore, Shanghai, Kobe, Yokohama (from 
Antwerp) 
S.S. Bengali 3 January 1905 Cochin, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, 
Kobe, Yokohama (from Antwerp and London) 
S.S.Ameer 15 February 1906 Cochin, Colombo, Singapore, Shanghai, Kobe, 
Yokohama (from Antwerp and London) 
S.S. Gaekwar 22 March 1906 Cochin, Colombo, Singapore, Shanghai, Hong 
Kong, Kobe, Yokohama (from London) 
Notes: Sometimes only the month was given for sailing date; the actual sailing time was often weeks later. The 
information above is for advertised sailings only. Voyages on Brocklebanks' own account- and thus 
not advertised - are excluded. The steamer service was continued on a regular basis until sold to the 
Royal Mail Line in 1911. 
Source: NML, MMM, MAL, B/BROC, Historical Notes. 
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Appendix 14: Pacific Steam Navigation Company Fleet, 1840-1914 
Name Acquired Built Rig Tons Notes 
Chile 1840 1840 w.stm. 682g. Sold, 1852 
Peru 1840 1840 w.stm. 690g. Lost, 1852 
Ecuador 1845 1845 i.stm. 323g. Sold, 1851 
New Granada 1846 1846 i.stm. 649g. Disposed of, 1851 
Bolivia 1849 1849 i.stm. 773g. Hulked, 1870. Scuttled, 1879 
Santiago 1851 1851 i.stm. 961g. Sold, 1857 
Lima 1851 1851 i.stm. 1,461g. Lost, date unknown 
Quito 1852 1851 i.stm. 1,461g. Wrecked near Huasco, I 0 July 
1853 
Bogota 1852 1851 i.stm. 1,46lg. Hulked after grounding, 1871 
La Perlita 1853 1853 i.stm. 140g. Lost en route for coast 
Osprey 1852 1853 i.stm. 109g. Lost on way out to coast 
Valdivia 1853 1853 w.stm. 573g. Stranded near Valparaiso, Dec 
1857 
Panama 1856 1856 i.stm. 270g. Lost on way to coast, 1856 
Inca 1856 1856 c.stm. 290g. Sold, 1876 
Valparaiso 1856 1856 c.stm. 1,060g. Lost on Layerto Island, 1871 
Cloda 1857 1857 i.stm. 699g. Lost offHuacho 25 January 1865 
Prince of Wales 1858 1854 i.stm. 700g. Wrecked 17 March 1859 
Callao 1858 1858 i.stm. 1,062g. Hulked, 1880 
Anne 1859 1854 i.stm. 344g. Sold, 1864 
San Carlos 1860 1860 i.stm. 652g. Sold, 1874 
Guayaquil 1860 1860 i.stm. 66lg. Dismantled about 1870 
Morro 1860 1860 st.stm. 132g. Disposed of, 1881 
Peruano 1860 1860 w.stm. 639g. Hulked, 1874 
Peru II I86I I86I i.stm. I,307g. Lost near Layerto, II July 1863 
Ta/ca 1862 1862 i.stm. 708g. Hulked 1874. Later scuttled 
Chile II 1863 1863 i.stm. 1,672g. Sold, Chilean govt., about 1870 
Quito !I 1863 1863 i.stm. 1,388g. Sold, 1864 
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Ecuador II 1863 ? i.stm. 500g. Lost, 1870 
Payta 1864 1864 i.stm. 1,344g. Sold, Chilean govt., 1878 
Pacific 1865 1865 i.stm. 1,631g. Hulked about 1870 
Santiago!! 1865 1865 i.stm. 1,619g. Wrecked Straits of Magellan, 
1869 
Limena 1865 1865 i.stm. 1,622g. Hulked at Callao, 1880 
Favorita 1865 1865 w.stm. 837g. Burned 1871, Callao Bay 
Panama II 1866 1866 i.stm. 1,642g. Hulked about 1870 
Colon 1861 1867 i.stm. 1,995g. Sold at Valparaiso, 1872 
A rica 1867 1867 i.stm. 740g. Lost off Peru, 13 January 1869 
Quito!!! 1867 1867 i.stm. 743g. Hulked about 1882 
Supe 1867 1867 i.stm. 298g. Sold about 1882 
Atlas 1867 1867 i.stm. 56 g. Tug.~ounded,abandoned, 1890 
Caldera 1868 1868 i.stm. 1,741g. Sold to Laird's, Birkenhead, 1876 
Magellan 1868 1869 i.stm. 2,856g. Broken up on Thames, 1893 
Patagonia 1869 1869 i.stm. 2,866g. Lost, Chilean coast, 1894 
Araucania 1869 1869 i.stm 2,877g. Sold for £5,500, 1897 
Cordillera 1869 1869 i.stm. 2,860g. Lost, Straits ofMagellan, about 
1884 
John Elder 1869 1870 i.stm. 4,151g. Lost, off Chile, 16 January 1877 
Atacama 1870 1870 i.stm. 1,821g. Lost, 1877 
Coquimbo 1870 1870 i.stm. 1,821g. Hulked, 1901 
Valdivia II 1870 1870 i.stm. 1,861g. Wrecked offHuacho, 1884 
Arequipa 1870 1870 i.stm. 1,065g. Hulked, 1883 
Huacho 1870 1870 i.stm. 329g. Sold, Ecuadorian Government, 
1882 
Chimborazo 1871 1871 i.stm. 3,847g. Sold, 1895. 
Cuzco 1871 1871 i.stm. 3,84Sg. Broken up, Preston, March 1905 
Garonne 1871 1871 i.stm. 3,871g. Sold, Nov 1897 for £11,000 
Lusitania 1871 1871 i.stm. 3,825g. Wrecked, Cape Race, June 1901 
Eton 1871 1871 i.stm. 1,853g. Wrecked off Ventura Pt., 1877 
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Santiago III 1871 1871 i.stm. 1,451g. Sold about 1882 
!qui que 1871 1871 i.stm. 323g. Lost, 1877 
Taboguilla 1871 1871 i.stm. 154g. Out of fleet, 1893 
Aconcagua 1872 1872 i.stm. 4,105g. Sold, 1895 
So rata 1872 1872 i.stm. 4,014g. Scrapped, 1895 
Corcovado 1872 1872 i.stm. 3,805g. Sold to Royal Mail, 1875 
Santa Rosa 1872 1872 i.stm. 1,817g. Sold, 1890 
Rimae 1872 1872 i.stm. 1,805g. Sold to Valparaiso SS Co., 1877 
Ito 1872 1872 i.stm. 1,794g. Hulked, 1882 
Truxillo 1872 1872 i.stm. 1,449g. Hulked about 1882 
Tacora 1872 1872 i.stm. 3,525g. Wrecked near Montevideo, 1872 
Baja 1872 1872 i.stm. 74g. Tug at Callao. Final fate unknown 
Iberia 1873 1873 i.stm. 4,671g. Sold to Italy, 1903 (£13,500) 
Potosi 1873 1873 i.stm. 4,218g. Sold, June, 1897 
Cotopaxi 1873 1873 i.stm. 4,022g. Wrecked, Straits of Magellan, 
1889 
Britannia 1873 1873 i.stm. 4,129g. Sold after grounding, 1895 
11/imani 1873 1873 i.stm. 4,022g. Stranded, July, 1879 
Galicia 1873 1873 i.stm. 3,829g. Sold, 1898 for £9,250 
Puna 1873 1873 i.stm. 3,805g. Sold to Royal Mail, 1875 
Valparaiso II 1873 1873 w.stm. 3,575g. Lost, 28 February 1887 
Ayacucho 1873 1873 i.stm. 1,916g. Hulked, 1897 
Colombia 1873 1873 i.stm. 1,823g. Sold, 1890 
Lima II 1873 1873 i.stm. 1,803g. Lost on Chilean coast, 1909 
Oroya 1873 1873 i.stm. 1,577g. Final fate unknown 
!slay 1873 1873 i.stm. 1,577g. Later hulked 
Tacna 1873 1873 i.stm. 612g. Capsized, March, 1874 
Liguria 1874 1874 i.stm. 4,666g. Sold, F. Bruzzo for scrap, 1903 
Bolivia II 1874 1874 i.stm. 1,925g. Hulked, 1895 
Lobo 1874 1874 i.stm. 106g. Water tender Callao. Fate 
unknown 
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Amazonas 1877 1874 i.stm. 2,019g. Sold, 1881 to C.S.A V. 
Lontue 1877 1877 i.stm. 1,648g. Later Hulked 
Casma 1878 1878 st.stm. 592g. Sold, Costa Rican Govt., 1899 
Chala 1879 1879 st.stm. 598g. Hulked, 1897 
Arauco 1879 1879 i.stm. 801g. Sold, 1899 
Puchoco 1879 1879 i.stm. 801g. Later became Sidora 
Mendoza 1879 1879 st.stm. 2,160g. Hulked, 1904 
Pizarro 1879 1879 st.stm. 2,160g. Hulked, 1907 
Punoll 1881 1881 st.stm. 2,398g. Hulked, 1904 
Serena 1881 1881 st.stm. 2,394g. Hulked, 1903 
Arica II 1881 1881 st.stm. 1,771g. Later hulked, Bay of Panama 
Ecuador III 1881 1881 st.stm. 1,768g. Stranded, December, 1905 
Osomo 1881 1881 st.stm. 532g. Sold to Nicaragua, 1899 
Morro II 1881 1881 st.stm. 170g. Tender at Panama. Sold, 1902 
Chiloe 1881 1882 i.stm. 2,309g. Lost, 1892 
Manavi 1885 1885 st.stm. 1,041g. Later Panamanian flag 
Oroyall 1886 1886 st.stm. 6,057g. Sold to Royal Mail, 1905 
Orizaba 1886 1886 st.stm. 6,077g. Wrecked, 17 February 1905 
Quito IV 1888 1888 st.stm. 1,089g. Sold to Chile, 1915 
Orotava 1889 1889 st.stm. 5,857g. Sold to Royal Mail, 1905 
Oruba 1889 1889 st.stm. 5,852g. Sold to Royal Mail, 1905 
Santiago IV 1889 1889 st.stm. 2,952g. Lost near Corral, 18 June 1907 
Arequipa!! 1889 1889 st.stm. 2,953g. Lost, Valparaiso, 2 June 1903 
Assistance 1891 1891 st.stm. 214g. Tug. Sold, 1926, Chilean Govt. 
Magellan II 1893 1893 st.stm. 3,590g. Torpedoed, July 1918 
Inca II 1893 1893 st.stm. 3,593g. Sold to Chile, 1923 
Sarmiento 1893 1893 st.stm. 3,603g. Sold, 1910 
Antisana 1893 1893 st.stm. 3,584g. Sold to France, 1911 
Orellana 1893 1893 st.stm. 4,821g. Sold in 1905 
Oreana 1893 1893 st.stm. 4,803g. Sold in 1905 
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Orissa 1895 1895 st.stm. 5,317g. Torpedoed, 25 June 1918 
Oropesa 1895 1895 st.stm. 5,303g. Transferred to French Navy, 1915 
Chiriqui 1896 1896 st.stm. 643g. Sank after explosion, 1910 
Chile Ill 1896 1896 st.stm. 3,225g. Sold to Chile, 1923 
Peru Ill 1896 1896 st.stm. 3,225g. Sold, 1923 
Perlita 1896 1896 st.stm. 49g. Tender, Valparaiso. Fate unknown 
Sorata II 1897 1897 st.stm. 4,568g. Sold to German breakers, 1921 
Oravia 1897 1897 st.stm. 5,321g. Wrecked on Falklands, Nov., 
1912 
Taboga 1898 1898 st.stm. 649g. Sold, 1909 
Ortona 1899 1899 st.stm. 7,945g. Sold to Royal Mail, 1905 
Colombia II 1899 1899 st.stm. 3,335g. Lost offLobos de Tierra, August 
1907 
Guatemala 1899 1899 st.stm. 3,227g. Sold to Chile, 1923 
Talcall 1900 1900 st.stm. 1,018g. Lost, Puchoco Pt., 12 July 1901 
Potosi II 1900 1900 st.stm. 5,300g. Sold to Russia, 1900 (£120,000) 
Galicia II 1901 1901 st.stm. 5,896g. Mined offTeignmouth, May, 
1917 
Peri co 1901 1901 st.stm. 268g. Out of service, 1924 
Panama III 1902 1902 st.stm. 5,981g. Became hosp. Ship Maine, 1920 
Victoria 1902 1902 st.stm. 5,967g. Sold to Dutch breakers, 1923 
Mexico 1902 1902 st.stm. 5,549g. Torpedoed, 23 March 1917 
California 1902 1902 st.stm. 5,547g. Sunk by U-Boat, October 1917 
Rupanco 1895 1902 st.stm. 818g. Sank offValparaiso, 14 October 
1914 
Galli to 1902 1902 st.stm. 130g. Tug. Scrapped, 1931 
Orita 1903 1903 st.stm. 9,239g. Laid up, 1927. Scrapped, 1931 
Gaelic (Callao II) 1885 1905 i.stm. 4,207g. Scrapped 1907 
Potosi III 1905 1905 st.stm. 4,375g. Became Georgios M. In 1925 
Bogota!/ 1906 1906 st.stm. 4,603g. Sunk by U-Boat, November 1916 
Duendes 1906 1906 st.stm. 4,452g. Became Greek Zachariosa 1927 
Esmeraldas 1906 1906 st.stm. 4,491g. Sunk by Moewe, 10 March 1917 
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Flamenco 1906 1906 st.stm. 4,540g. Sunk by Moewe, 2 February 1916 
Ortega 1906 1906 st.stm. 7,970g. Broken up at Briton Ferry, 1927 
Oriana 1906 1906 st.stm. 8,066g. Broken up, 1927 
Oronsa 1906 1906 st.stm. 7,970g. Torpedoed, 28 April 1918 
Huanchaco 1907 1907 st.stm. 4,524g. Sold, 1925 
Junin 1907 1907 st.stm. 4,536g. Sold, 1925 
Kenuta 1907 1907 st.stm. 5,025g. Sold, 1926 
Lima III 1907 1907 st.stm. 4,946g. Wrecked, February 1910 
Qui/Iota 1907 1907 st.stm. 3,674g. Became Chile in 1923 
Quilpue 1907 1907 st.stm. 3,669g. Became Gascoyne in 1922 
Explorer 1873 1907 i.stm. 2,066g. Ex-Crocus. Hulked 
Orcoma 1908 1908 st.stm. 11,546g Sold for scrap in 1933 
Poderoso 1911 1911 st.stm. 285g. Sold to Chile 
Andes 1913 1913 st.stm. 15,620g Later Royal Mail Atlantis 
Calbuco 1913 1913 st.stm. 55 g. Tug. Sold, 1925 
Orduna 1914 1914 st.stm. 15,507g Broken up at Dalmuir in 1951 
Note: See Appendices 4, 5 and SA. Fleet list excludes vessels originally purchased as coal hulks. 
Source: NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Directors' Reports, various years; Pacific Steam 
Navigation Company Handbook, various years; "Pacific Steam Navigation Cos. Steamers on West 
Coast," n.d.; BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years; Arthur C. Wardle, "The West 
Coast Route (2)," Sea Breezes, XXII (September 1956), 206; Wardle, Steam Conquers the Pacific. 
A Record of Maritime Achievement 1840-1940 (London: 1940), 189-195; Duncan Haws, Merchant 
Fleets: The Pacific Steam Navigation Company (Burwash, East Sussex, 1986); and Lloyd's Register 
of British and Foreign Shipping (London, various years). 
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Appendix 15: PSNC Routes, 1840-1970 (Also Orient Line Routes, pre-1905) 
Years Ports of Call 
1843-1923 Valparaiso; Coastal Ports (South America); Callao 
1846-1923 Valparaiso; Callao; Guayaquil; Panama 
1848-1923 Valparaiso; South Chilean Ports (Terminal, Puerto Montt) 
1868-19?? Liverpool; Bordeaux; Lisbon; Cape Verde; Rio de Janeiro; Monte Video; Punta Arenas; 
Valparaiso (from 1870); Arica; Mollendo; Callao 
1877 London; Plymouth; via the Cape of Good Hope (no call); Melbourne; Sydney; Adelaide; 
Suez Canal; London 
1877-1879 Liverpool; Bordeaux; Buenos Aires 
1878 Calls at Capetown introduced 
1881 Outward sailings to Australia were alternatively via Suez and Cape of Good Hope 
1883 Cape voyages discontinued and route became London; Gibraltar; Port Said; Suez; 
Colombo; Albany; Adelaide; Melbourne; Sydney 
1890 Naples added as a port of call 
1904-1920 Liverpool; La Pallice; Corunna; Vigo; Lisbon; Recife; Salvador; Rio de Janeiro; Monte 
Video; Buenos Aires; Port Stanley; Punta Arenas; Coronel; Talcahuano; Valparaiso 
1914-1945 Cristobal; Panama Canal; Champerico 
1920-1930 New York; Panama Canal; Callao; Valparaiso 
1920-1931 New York; Guayaqquil 
1920-1959 Liverpool; Bermuda; Bahamas; Havana; Jamaica; Panama Canal; West Coast of South 
America ports; Valparaiso 
1920-1937 Montevideo; Port Stanley 
1955-1970 Bermuda; Caribbean ports; Panama 
1956-1963 (Reina Del Mar) Liverpool; La Pallice; Santander; Corunna (1961 Vigo ); Bermuda; 
Nassau; Havana; Kingston; La Guaria; Curacao; Cartagena; Panama Canal; La Libertad; 
Callao; Arica; Antofagasta; Valparaiso 
1963- Cargo services to Caribbean and South American Ports 
Note: The years 1877, 1878, 1881, 1883 and 1890 are Orient Line routes. 
Source: Haws, Pacific Steam Navigation Company, 25; and The Ship List, http://www.theshiplist.com 
(compiled by Ted Finch). 
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Appendix 16: PSNC Fleet Additions, Sales and Losses, 1897-1909 
Vessel Actions 
So rata Built, 1897 by Swan and Hunter 
Oravia Built, 1897, Harland & Wolff 
Taboga Built, 1898 by Wigham Richardson and Company. Sold, 1909 
Ortona Built, 1899 by Barrow Shipyards. Sold, 1905 
Colombia Built, 1899 by Caird and Company, Greenock 
Guatemala Do. 
Potosi Sold, 1900 
Galicia Refitted for general cargo trade, 1900 
Peri co Built & engineered by J. Jones & Sons, Birkenhead, 1900 
Talca Delivered, 1900 and wrecked 1901 
Chica Delivered, 1900 
Coqumibo Hulked, 1900 
Rupanco Bought from Ferdinand Prehn, Kiel, Germany, 1901 
Panama Built, 1902 by Fairfield Co., Ltd, Glasgow 
Victoria Do. 
Mexico Built, 1902 by Caird & Company, Glasgow 
California Do. 
Galito Tug, built 1902 by J. Shearer and Son, Ltd., Glasgow 
Orita Completed March, 1903, Harland & Wolff, Belfast 
Arequipa Lost 2 June 1903 
Orizaba Wrecked and sold 1905 
Oroya Sold, Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, 1905 
Orotava Do. 
Oruba Do. 
Potosi Built, 1905 by W. Pickersgill and Son, Sunderland. Engines G. Clark Ltd. 
Bogota Built, 1906 by Sir James Laing and Son Ltd., Sunderland. Engines G. 
Clark Ltd. 
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Duendes Do. 
Esmeraldas Do. 
Flamenco Do. 
Ortega Completed June 1906, Harland & Wolff, Belfast 
Oriana Completed June 1906, Barclay, Curle and Co., Ltd., Glasgow 
Oronsa Built 1906, Harland & Wolff, Belfast 
Gaelic Bought from Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., 1906. Renamed Callao 
Huanchaco Built & engined, W. Beardmore and Co., Ltd., Glasgow, 1907 
Junin Do. 
Quil/ota Do. 
Quilpue Do. 
Ken uta Built by John Brown and Co., Ltd., Glasgow, 1907 
Lima Do. 
Explorer Bought from Charente Steamship Co., Ltd., 1907. Formerly Crocus. 
Hulked 
Orcoma Built & engined by W. Beardmore & Co., Ltd., Glasgow, 1908 
Source: Arthur C. Wardle, "The West Coast Route (1)," Sea Breezes, XXII (July-December 1956), 121; 
Wardle, "The West Coast Route (2)," Sea Breezes, XXIII (September 1956), 180-182; NML, MMM, 
MAL, B/PSNC, Sixtieth Report of the Directors, year 1900, 1901, I; and Sixty-Fifth Report of the 
Directors, Year 1905, 1906, I. 
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Document l: Texts ofthe Decrees of Chile, Peru and Bolivia in Favour ofPSNC 
Department of War and Marine [Chile] 
WHEREAS the National Congress has discussed and agreed upon the following project of a law: 
Art. 1. An exclusive privilege, for the term often years is granted to Mr. William Wheelwright, or his legal 
representatives for the establishment of steam navigation in our ports and rivers open to the coasting 
trade, with the exemptions and privileges granted, or that henceforward may be granted, to national 
merchant vessels. 
Art. 2. To secure this privilege, the undertaking must be commenced within the term of two years from the 
date, hereof, at least by two steam vessels, of three hundred tons each. 
Art. 3. If within the period named in the preceding article, the loss of one or both vessels be satisfactorily 
proved, the Government is authorized to grant a further term, not however exceeding two years. 
Art. 4. The term of privilege shall commence from the day on which the aforesaid vessels shall arrive at any 
of our ports. 
Art. 5. If, after four years, from the date of this grant, steam navigation shall not have been established in one 
or more rivers, the privilege, with respect to these, shall cease. 
Art. 6. The respective office shall issue the necessary orders for the immediate despatch of these vessels, in 
order that by suffering no delay in their departure, the regularity of their voyages may not be 
interrupted; without prejudice, however, to the public revenue. 
Art. 7. The Government will determine the points of our coast at which the projector may form his depots for 
provisions, materials and everything necessary for the navigation of the said steam vessels. 
WHEREFORE, etc. 
(Signed) 9'tJWiiS0 
(Signed) $085lii $@.cltiifJW36US:JIIDil.G;m'f0 
Decree of the Government ofPeru, Granting to Mr. William Wheelwright, or His Representatives an Exclusive 
Privilege, for Ten Years, to navigate the Coasts and Ports Thereof with Vessels Propelled by Steam or any other 
Mechanical Power. 
The proposal of Mr. William Wheelwright having been considered, it is acceded to on the following 
conditions: 
1. The exclusive privilege is granted, to him or his representatives, to navigate the coasts and 
ports of the Sates of North and South Peru, with vessels propelled by steam or any other 
mechanical power, for the term often years, with the exemptions and privileges allowed, or 
that may henceforward be granted to national merchant vessels. 
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2. The projector, in order to secure this privilege, shall be obliged to establish the packets within 
the term of two years, which shall commence and be computed on and from the first day of 
January, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven. 
3. The privilege shall take effect so soon as there shall have arrived, at any of our ports, at least 
two of the said vessels of the burden of three hundred tons, or more, each. 
4. If, within the term fixed by the second article, the projector prove to the Government the loss 
of one or more of said vessels, or their detention on account of sea risks, or any other 
fortuitous events, the necessary time for replacing them, not exceeding two years, shall be 
granted to him. 
5. A privilege is also given to establish the necessary hulks for the depositing of coal, utensils, 
provisions, etc., free of duty, for the use of said vessels. 
6. The vessels in which the coal is imported shall be free from tonnage dues, if they have not on 
board any other article of traffic or commerce. 
7. The vessels of the enterprise aforesaid shall freely enter the ports open to the coasting trade, 
to receive or leave cargo or passengers; they shall pay at the last port of their arrival the same 
tonnage dues as national vessels - the amount whereof shall not be calculated upon the entire 
tonnage ofthe vessel, but upon the tons of cargo that she may convey. 
8. The Government engages to have prompt despatch given to these vessels, in order that they 
may not suffer any delay in their voyages, taking care that the public revenues be not 
prejudiced thereby. 
Take note hereof in the public offices, communicate it to the Ministry of State, and publish it. 
(Signed) Sa-nk~ 
(Signed) 9l;..,<k:T~ 
I agree to the preceding articles, and in testimony of my conformity thereto, I sign this in Lima, 
September 13, 1836. 
Decree of the Supreme Government, Extending to the Ports of Bolivia the Privileges Granted by North and 
south Peru. 
The privileges granted to Mr. William Wheelwright by a decree of the 12th of September this year, for 
steam navigation in the Pacific, are hereby extended to the ports of the Republic of Bolivia. 
My secretary-general is intrusted with the execution of this decree, and with having it printed, published 
and circulated. 
Given in Lima, the 6th ofNovember, 1836. 
~Sa-nk~ 
By order of his Excellency Pio de Tristan. 
Sources: 
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Arthur C. Wardle, Steam Conquers the Pacific. A Record of Maritime Achievement 1840-
1940 (London: 1940), 185-187; British Library, Additional Manuscripts, "Copy of a Decree 
of the Chilian [sic] Government in Favor of the 'Pacific Steam-Navigation-Company,' 
projected by Mr. William Wheelwright," 25 August 1835; "Copy of the Licence of the 
Government of the North and South Peruvian States to Mr. W. Wheelwright ... to Navigate 
the Coasts and Ports Thereof, etc.," 12 September 1836. See also, William Wheelwright, 
Statement and Documents Relative to the Establishment of Steam Navigation in the Pacific, 
with Copies of the Decrees ... Granting Exclusive Privileges to the Undertaking (London, 
1838). 
Document 2: Conditions of Share Allotments, PSNC, 1838 
The capital of the company to be £250,000 divided into 5,000 shares of £50 each. 
1,000 shares to be reserved for South America. 
The remaining 4,000 shares to be in the distribution of the Directors, 
A Deposit of £5 per share to be paid on subscribing, at such time and place as the Directors 
shall announce, 
A further installment of £5 per share will be paid at the expiration of three months, from the 
date of allotment of the shares. 
The remaining capital to be paid up as, and when, required by the Directors, or in such 
manner, in all respects, as the charter shall provide. 
All calls made before the charter comes into operation to be announced in two London daily 
newspapers, fourteen days previously to the payment thereof; no such call to be for above £5 
per share, and an interval of at least three months to elapse between each call. 
The shares and all monies previously paid upon them to be forfeited to the Company, in 
default of payment of any call for the space of three months after the same shall be payable. 
The present Directors to have the power of filling up all vacancies which may occur in the 
Board of Direction previously to the Charter coming into operation, and to increase the 
number of Directors, and to increase the number of Directors as may be found necessary. 
All details, including all regulations for the government of the company, to be arranged by the 
Directors, under legal advice, and according to the regulations which may be made by Her 
Majesty's Government; the Subscribers binding themselves to accept the Shares subject to all 
such regulations and to the terms of this Charter. 
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Source: NML, MMM, MAL, Pacific Steam Navigation Company (B/PSNC),Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company Incorporated by Royal Charter, with Limited Responsibility, 5 November 1838, 4. 
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Document 3: PSNC, Balance Sheet and Profit-and-Loss Account to 1843 
Balance Sheet 
DR £/sld CR. £/s/d 
Cash in hand and at Bankers 2,001/02/08 Capital 90,390/00/00 
Bills Receivable 102/10/00 Loan 20,000/00/00 
Balance at debit of Financial 4,557/19/08 Insurance due in 1844 1,836/04/06 
Agency in the Pacific 
Cost & outfit of steamers Chile 60,931/16/05 Bills payable 971/16/03 
&Pent 
Cost & outfit of two Coal 6,738/10/08 Freights payable on coal 761/17/10 
Hulks & a schooner 
Coals (value of stock) 3,271/04/04 Sundry debts due by Company 426/19/08 
Talcahuano Mines, capital 2,194/03/08 
invested 
Store & workshops in Callao, 413/11101 
. capital invested 
Cost of spare machinery 6,061/00/07 
Cost of fixtures & furniture in 174/03/00 
London office 
Debts due the company 461/01/03 
Insurance on steamers, 3,148/14/00 
chargeable on receipts for year 
1843 
Sundry payment for wages, 995/02/04 
chargeable as above on year 
1843 
Preliminary expenses 9,640/09/09 
Profits and loss 13,695/08/10 
114,386/18/03 114,386/18/03 
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Profit and Loss 
DR. £/SID CR. £/SID 
Commission on shares sold in 160/02/01 Gain on sundry small [Illegible] 
the Pacific, and on freights accounts 
received 
Paid for damage to cargo on 142/16/00 Exchange account [Illegible] 
board the steamers 
Paid for damage done by 102/11/03 Gain on voyages of steamer 2,957 /[Illegible] 
schooner Lord A binger to two Peru to 31 December 1842 
other vessels 
Balance of account 15/13/08 Gain on voyages of steamer 3,553/[Illegible] 
irrecoverable Chile to 31 December 1842 
London charges from Nov. 2,398/03/10 Balance 13,695/[Illegible] 
1838 to 30 June 1843 
Interest on loans, renewed bills 4, 724/05/10 
and cash advanced ... to 30 June 
1843 
Value in shares allotted to Mr. 3,500/00/00 
Wheelwright 
General charges in the Pacific 1,248/13/08 
from October 1840-31 
December 1842 
Loss on policies opened for 947/19//01 
insurance on freight shipments 
per steamers 
Preliminary expenses, portion 2,410/02/05 
written off 
Salaries: namely: To Mr. 3,150/00/00 
Wheelwright from 5 November 
1839-31 December 1842 
To Mr. Nugent, from 15 April 600/00/00 
1842-31 December 1842 
To Captain G. Peacock from 441/13/04 
15 October 1840-31 December 
1842 
[Particulars not given] 4,191/13/04 
10,373/10/01 20,373/10/01 
Source: NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Administration, Directors' Report, 18 August 1843, 12-13. 
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Document 4: Pacific Steam Navigation Company, Supplementary Charter No.2 
VJ CTO RIA, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen, Defender 
of the Faith; To all whom these Presents shall come, greeting: 
WHEREAS, BY OUR Royal Letters Patent under the Great Seal, bearing date at Westminster the 
seventeenth day of February, in the Third year of our reign, me were graciously pleased to grant, ordain, and 
declare that the several persons therein named or described should be one body politic and corporate in deed and 
in name for the period of Twenty-one years, by the name of the PACIFIC STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY. 
And we did declare that the said corporation should be established for the purpose of providing vessels to be 
impelled by steam, or any other motive power, together with all engines, machinery, articles, matters, and things 
necessary for the same, and of employing the same, and sailing vessels, if need should be, upon such stations as 
might appear to be expedient along the shores of North and South America, in the Pacific Ocean; and likewise 
from or between those shores and the coasts of China and New Holland, both or either of them, inclusive of all 
intermediate islands; and also from or between the ports of New Granada, Central America, and Mexico, in the 
Atlantic Ocean, all or either of them, and those of the West Indies, in the event of there being a default, or 
cessation of, or intermission in, regular monthly British Government Mail Conveyances between those ports, 
or any of them; and with power to build, construct, manufacture, and make, or to purchase or contract for, hire, 
and provide, such vessels, steam-engines, apparatus, boats, articles, and materials, as might appear to them 
necessary for the purposes of the said Corporation, and to build, fit, contract for, hire, and provide such sailing 
vessels as might be necessary for carrying on the business of said Corporation. Provided Always, that it should 
not be lawful for the said Corporation to employ such vessels for the conveyance of passengers, specie, and other 
merchandise, except within the limits aforesaid. And we did thereby declare that the capital or joint -stock of the 
said Corporation should consist of the sum of Two hundred and fifty thousand pounds, to be subscribed in Five 
thousand shares of Fifty pounds each, with powers to extend and increase the capital of the said Corporation, 
so that the total amount of such new or increased capital should not exceed the sum of Seven hundred and fifty 
thousand pounds. And Whereas, by our further Letters Patent, under the Great Seal, bearing date the Fourth 
day of November in the Nineth year of our reign, We were graciously pleased to grant, declare, and ordain that 
certain alterations should be made in the constitution and mode of management of the affairs of the said 
Corporation. And Whereas, by our further Letters Patent, under the Great Seal, bearing date the Twenty-third 
day of December in the Twenty-third year of our reign, we were graciously pleased to grant and declare that the 
said Corporation should continue incorporated during the period of Twenty-one years, to commence from the 
Seventeenth day of February, One thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and should continue so incorporated 
for all the purposes in the said first recited Charter mentioned, or such of them as they should think fit to carry 
on, and in all respects as if they had been for such period incorporated by the said first recited Charter. And 
Whereas, by our further Letters patent, under the Great Seal, bearing date the Sixteenth day of June, in the 
twenty-eighth year of our reign, we were graciously pleased to grant, declare, and ordain that in addition to the 
purposes specified in the said previous Charters of the said Pacific Steam Navigation Company, it should be 
lawful for the said Company, during the continuance of their existing Charter, to establish lines of 
communication, by steam or otherwise, for the conveyance of mails, passengers, specie, and merchandise 
between the West Coast of South America and any ports and places within the River Plate, including the 
Falkland Islands, and any intermediate ports or places, and such other ports or places in North and South 
America and other Foreign parts as to the said Company should seem expedient, so as such lines of 
communication should be connected with and be in the nature of auxiliary branches to the several lines of 
communication which the said Company had already established, or were by their existing Charter authorized 
to establish; and that the said previous Charters should be read and construed to all intents and purposes as if 
the limits in the said first recited Charter mentioned had extended to and included all such additional ports and 
places aforesaid. And Whereas, a humble petition had been presented to us in council by the Directors of the 
said Company, whereby, after stating that in pursuance of the powers conferred upon them by their said first 
recited Charter, the Capital of the Company had been increased to the extent of Seven hundred and fifty 
thousand pounds, which, with the two hundred and fifty thousand pounds subscribed for, made up a total capital 
of One million pounds. That the Chilean Government had for some time been, and then were, desirous of having 
a mail service established between the West Coast and the United Kingdom, and were disposed to intrust the 
same throughout to one Company. That the said Company were most desirous of being in a position to meet 
517 
the views of the Chilean Government by undertaking the entire service, and otherwise to extend the 
accommodation to the public, but that for these purposes it would be necessary that the limits of the Company's 
existing Charters should be extended, so as to permit their steam-ships to run to and from the United Kingdom, 
calling at such Ports and places in South America, the Cape de Verde Islands, the Madeiras, and the Continent 
of Europe, as the said Company might deem expedient. And that they might be empowered to increase their 
capital to a total sum of Two million pounds. That such an extension would very greatly promote the interests 
of the said Company, and be of great advantage to this country, and to Europe generally, in a political and 
commercial point of view. That the operations of the said Company in the Pacific were then so extensive as to 
employ upwards of Twenty steam-ships, two or three of which must be sent to this country for overhaul and 
refit, and returned to their stations every year; and that, by the extension now sought for, these vessels could be 
employed in the conveyance of mails, passengers, and merchandise on the voyage to and from the United 
Kingdom. That the additional commercial and postal route thus proposed would render the public less dependent 
on the Isthmus of Panama, the means of transit over which were barely sufficient for the present traffic, besides 
being liable to be interrupted by local revolution, or other political commotion. That the Directors of the said 
Company have by their said Petition most humbly prayed that we would be graciously pleased to extend the 
limits of the Company's existing Charter so as to enable them to meet the views of the Chilean Government, and 
also to extend the accommodation of the public in other respects, by empowering them to establish lines of 
communication for the conveyance of mails, passengers, specie, and other merchandise, between the various 
ports and places to which their existing powers extend and the United Kingdom, and such intermediate Ports 
and places in South America, the Cape de Verde Islands, the Madeiras, and the Continent of Europe, as to the 
Directors of the Company shall seem expedient. And for the purposes aforesaid to increase the capital of the 
Company to Two million pounds instead of One million pounds, the amount of their existing capital, with such 
other powers and privileges as might be necessary to carry the above purposes into effect. And know ye that as 
well upon the prayer of the said Directors as also of our own especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere 
motion, we do by these presents, for ourselves, our heirs, and successors, grant, declare, and ordain that in 
addition to the purposes specified in the said Charters of the pacific Steam Navigation Company, it shall be 
lawful for the said Company during the continuance of their said existing Charter, to establish lines of 
communication for the conveyance of mails, passengers, specie, and other merchandise, between the various 
ports and places to which their existing powers extend, and the United Kingdom, and such intermediate ports 
and places in South America, Cape de Verde Islands, the Madeiras, and the Continent of Europe, as to the 
Directors of the said Company shall seem expedient; and for the purposes aforesaid to increase the capital of the 
Company to Two million pounds, instead of One million pounds, the amount of their existing capital, and that 
the said previous Charters shall be read and construed to all intents and purposes as extending to and including 
all such additional services, and power to increase the capital as aforesaid. And we do for ourselves, our heirs, 
and successors, grant and declare that this our Royal Charter, or the enrolment thereof, shall be in all things valid 
and effectual in the law, according to the true intent and meaning of the same, and shall be so recognised by all 
our Courts and Judges in Great Britain and Ireland, or elsewhere, and by the Governors, Consuls, and all other 
officers and persons, and bodies politic or corporate whom it may concern, and that the same may be taken, 
constructed, and adjudged in the most favourable and beneficial sense, and for the best advantage of the said 
Company, as well in our several Courts of Record in Great Britain and Ireland as elsewhere, notwithstanding 
any non-recital, mis-recital, uncertainty, or imperfection in this our Royal Charter. In witness whereof, we have 
caused these our Letters to be made patent. 
Witness ourself, at our Palace of Westminster, this Third day of December, 
in the Thirty-first year of our reign. 
By Her Majesty's Command, 
Source: NML, MMM, MAL, B/PSNC, Pacific Steam Navigation Company. Supplementary Charter No. 2, 
1868. 
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Graph A1: Proportions of Newly-Registered Tonnage Held by Various Occupational Groupings in 
Liverpool, 1830, 1850, 1870, 1889 
Notes; 
Source: 
1830 
1870 
fll Shipowners 
D Merchants 
• Others 
1850 
1889 
• Companies 
• Mariners 
• Marine Tradesmen 
In 1820 neither shipowners, companies (apart from simple partnerships), nor shipbrokers 
appeared in the registries as investors. The exact tonnage for merchants and mariners could 
not be determined as individual proportions of any sixty four shares in a vessel were not then 
noted. Tonnage measurements for 1850 are unspecified, while those for 1870 and 1889 are 
gross. 
BT 107/108, Liverpool Vessel Registries, various years. 
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